condemnation of Dreyfus was secured on a sound basis of fact and under due process of law, and that the sentence is to stand; or, without going into the question of fact, the Court may hold that there were irregularities in the proceedings, and, as a remedy, order a retrial of the case before another court martial; or the Court may declare Dreyfus innocent and order him set free. In view of the gravity of the situation and the great importance attached to their decision, the Court may decide upon a rehearing of the testimony, or of certain parts of it, for the purpose of forming their own opinion in regard to the witnesses. If they do this, an opportunity will be afforded to bring forward any additional proofs of the guilt of Dreyfus. The general feeling seems to be that the Court must decide either to set Dreyfus free or to order his retrial; and the anti-Semites are hoping that the latter decision may be reached, because in that case the organization of the new court martial will be in the hands of the General Staff, and there is very little doubt of the character of a court martial made up in this way. In all probability it would, so far as it dared, repeat the history of the first trial. Two Revolutions A petty attempt at revolution in Nicaragua, led by General Reyes, has come to an end, for the present at least for revolutions in Spanish-American countries have a fashion of reappearing after every one had supposed them dead and buried. General Reyes's little revolution died from paucity of support, and never had life enough in it to frighten the authorities greatly; as usual, its cause was chiefly personal ambition and a disposition to be "ag'in' the Government as a principle. The revolution in Venezuela has been a little more serious, and may yet give trouble. General Guerra, the head of the revolutionists, sympathizes with the party led by Crespo in his lifetime; and Crespo's State, Guarico, is the scene of the contest. Guerra has two or three thousand men in arms, and is carrying on a guerrilla warfare. The Government is strong enough to cope with the insurgents easily if it can only put its finger on them; but their mode of warfare, like that of the Cubans, makes it hard to An amus corner them and force a battle. ing illustration of the difficulty the Government finds in filling its ranks with volunteers is found in the story that a recruiting officer sent two hundred men to his superior accompanied by the following letter: "I send you two hundred volunteers; please send back the handcuffs.” There is little doubt, however, that the sentiment of the business men and orderly people of Venezuela sustains the Government, and has no desire for a revival of the constant fighting and disorder of the Crespo régime. It is said that Venezuela has had forty-four revolutions in the eightynine years of its existence. The SpanishAmerican love of overthrowing authority is almost ludicrously in contrast with its lack of constructive power. The Facts The situation in the Philippines is painful and confusing: painful because it compels the use of force by a Government which represents in a pre-eminent degree the methods of order, law, and peace; confusing because the situation is not yet perfectly mastered by knowledge, and because a good many people on this side of the ocean are bent upon adding to the confusion. That a free Government, based on the consent of those whom it rules, should be fighting, on their own ground, the people of a remote island, seems, on the face, to be a contradiction in terms; and that such a Government should be putting to death men who are apparently contending for their own freedom seems, on the face, not only an anomaly, but a crime. It is necessary, therefore, to keep the few basic facts in the situation clearly in view. It will take us a good while to familiarize ourselves with the new conditions and to reconcile ourselves to our new duties. It is well to remember, therefore: First, that Manila fell into our hands, not by choice, but by the fortunes of war. Admiral Dewey did not set out to expand the sovereignty of the United States nor add to its territory; he set out to destroy the fleet of an enemy in the harbor of Manila. That enemy was, after a fashion, governing the group of islands; so far as they had any government, the Spaniards conducted it. We destroyed the Spanish We power. If we had sailed away and left the islands, we should have left chaos behind us. We should have pulled down the sole authority in a community and then shrugged our shoulders and left the community to take care of itself. The sovereignty in the Philippines will be transferred from Spain to the United States by the Treaty of Paris, which now needs only the formality of ratification by Spain, but the responsibility for maintaining order and civilization in the Fhilippines was passed over to us the moment Dewey destroyed the Spanish force. inherited all the moral obligations of the Spaniard on the spot. To have left Manila would have been the easiest and least expensive course, but it would also have been the cowardly and therefore the impossible course. The argument that we have complicated our future and added to our expenses ought to have no more weight with us than the same argument would have with an honest and courageous man when some difficult task is thrust into his hands-a task which he cannot refuse without being meanly selfish or cowardly, It is well to keep this fundamental fact in view and not to allow it to be blurred by sophistry on the one hand or appeals to prudence on the other hand, It is the controlling fact in the situation, Second: the United States has no intention of reducing the Filipinos to the condition of a subject race. It has had no opportunity of ascertaining what their city of New York. It is painful to resist him, for the country hates the use of force of any sort; but it is just as essential and inevitable under the circumstances as would be the use of force in putting down a riot in an American city. As to Aguinaldo himself, there is great difference of opinion. There are those who believe him to be honest and patriotic in his motives; there are others who declare that he is a mercenary and unscrupulous insurrectionist, bent, not upon freeing his countrymen, but upon getting the most for himself out of troubled conditions. To surrender the islands to him under present conditions would be to transfer our responsibility without any assurance that we were placing it where it could be properly carried. To put the island in his hands to-day would probably be to open it to disorder, bloodshed, and plunder, What this country is trying to do is not to put down Filipino patriots and make a subject people; it is trying to establish those conditions which will make it possible to find out what the Filipinos want, what they need, and what can be safely at this moment given to them, Aguinaldo is sacrificing the interest of his country either for a personal end or through ignorance; he is postponing the freedom about which he talks, and which, if he were in supreme authority, would probably be denied all Filipinos except those who work with him. needs are or what their will is; it simply The Organization of the proposes to establish order, to set the processes of law in motion, and to create the proper conditions before determining what the Filipinos want or what they ought to have. As has been before pointed out in these columns, every grievance of which the Filipinos in their revolt against Spain complained was removed the instant the United States flag was hoisted; every reform upon which the Filipinos insisted went that instant into operation. The moment American rule began in Manila the political and religious conditions in the islands were advanced, not only beyond the demands, but beyond the conception, of the men who were striving against the tyranny of Spain. Aguinaldo is therefore in the field, not as a patriot, but as a disturber of the peace; as much so as if he were the leader of a riot in the Army The question of army reorganization is one of immediate importance, and there is no little danger that it will receive scant attention from those who alone have the power to compel its right solution-the people of the United States. If the question were submitted to the people, Are you satisfied with the management of your army in the last war? the answer, No! would come back with an emphasis which would possibly startle even the apathetic and self-satisfied men who think or profess to think that all was well done. But if the second question were put, How shall the intolerable evils of the last campaign be prevented in the future? there would be but a feeble response, or rather a number of feeble responses. Lieutenant Parker, in his paper published on another page, is absolutely right in saying that this question can be answered only by experts, and that to a commission of experts it should be referred. But it will not be so referred unless there is a public demand, in the interest of the soldiers and of the country, sufficiently strong to counterbalance the demand for places in the army and for promotion by personal and political favor. America's experience in the Spanish-American war demonstrated-if demonstration were neededthat the appointment of young men, without experience in either military or civil life, to superintend supplies and transporta tion is fatal to efficiency in the Commissary and Quartermaster's Departments. America's experience in the Civil War demonstrated that the appointment of civilians, without education in military science or experience in military life, to command in the army is fatal to efficiency in the field. It ought not to have required experience to teach either lesson; it should have been enough to read any military history of the Napoleonic campaigns, in which military merit won an easy victory over political favoritism, so long as the two were matched against each other. The question whether merit or favoritism should dominate in our army is one on which the country does not need to wait for expert opinion. It should express its decision on this question in terms such that the stupidest demagogue-American equivalent of courtier-could not fail to hear and understand. There are two other questions on which the people do not need to wait for expert judgment: the relation of volunteers to the regular army; and due subordination within the army. The function of volunteers is settled by the Constitution in that clause which defines the power of Congress over the militia, as follows: To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions. This is the function, and the whole function, of our militia. It cannot be called upon to man our fortifications, or guard permanently our Western borders from Indian raids; still less to do service in foreign lands or in possible colonies. If we Its function is distinctly defined. have fortifications to be kept in order, or a border to be permanently guarded, or an invasion of another territory to be conducted, or colonies to be " pacified," we must depend on a Federal army, not on militia. And, on the other hand, we need no Federal army to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, or repel invasions. As to the latter, we must depend on our navy to defend us from invasions, of which, indeed, we stand in no danger, except in case of possible war with either Canada or Mexico; and that danger is so remote that our militia is ample protection. That there may arise cases in which the militia is not sufficient to execute the laws of the Union and suppress insurrections, the Civil War demonstrated. But history abundantly confirms the proposition that it is safer to provide a special force for such a special exigency, should one arise, than to put into the President's hand a considerable force which he is free to use in repressing whatever he is pleased to regard as lawlessness or insurrection in any State. These two considerations should determine the size of the regular army. It should be large enough to man our fortifications, guard our border where it needs guarding, and do whatever foreign duty our new foreign policy may involve; and it should be no larger. It should not be made large for the purpose of either repelling invasion or suppressing lawlessness and insurrection. For this we should depend on the militia. An The second principle is equally clear: due subordination within the army. army is not and cannot be a democracy. It must be under a single head. If any credence is to be attached to newspaper reports, this is not now the case in the American army. It is true that constitutionally the President is Commander-inChief, and all officers are subordinate to him. But, subject to this limitation, it is apparent that there has been no due subordination in the Federal army. The Commissary-General, Quartermaster-General, and Surgeon-General have apparently been independent officers, and their departments independent departments. The General Commanding has had no authority, certainly no undisputed authority. No one .knows, even the President's Commission was unable to find out, who was responsible for the totally inadequate conveniences for landing our troops at Santiago, for the confusion worse confounded of the embarkation at Tampa, for the lack of medical stores and medical attendance, for the unpardonable inefficiency of the provision for the transportation of the troops after the war was over, for the equipment of soldiers in tropical and semi-tropical climates with clothing and food fitted for service in Alaska. The Departments which Lieutenant Parker describes- -assuming that the division which he suggests is the best, a question to be determined by experts-should all be subject to the General commanding in the field, who could then be held responsible for the equipment and efficiency of the army as well as for the campaign which it is to conduct. And a custom with all the force of law, if not law itself, should determine the relation between that officer and the Secretary of War. It appears to us that the Secretary, who is generally a civilian, should confine himself to the service which a civilian may be presumed in the East after he had made it a condition of his acceptance of his office that he should not be interfered with. These principles, then, we hold to be self-evident: that America should depend on its militia for special exigencies, and should adjust the size of its standing army to the permanent military needs of the Nation, at home and abroad; that every department in that army and all its staff should be subordinated to the commanding General in the field; and that the duty of the War Department should be to co-operate with the commanding General in the military operations which ought to be intrusted to his autocratic authority. These principles recognized, it should be left to experts to determine by what methods they can best be carried into execution. In this editorial we have spoken of the army simply as a campaigning force in time of war. Its constructive work in time of peace, a work in which the commanding General in the field need not necessarily have any important share, we reserve for possible consideration at some future time.. Fight competent to render—the drawing of con- The Amsterdam Avenue tracts, the securing of supplies, and the proper, adequate, and prompt response to the requisitions made upon him by the commanding General in the field. It is certain that if the Secretary of War is to plan the campaign he must be an educated military officer; for war is a science, not to be comprehended instantly by .intuition. It is certain that the attempt to direct military operations by a war office. remote from the battle-field has rarely if ever succeeded-whether attempted by the Directory in Paris, by the War Office of George III. in London, or by Halleck and Stanton in Washington. The advance on Richmond ordered by Lincoln for political reasons, against the advice of military men, ended in the disastrous rout at Bull Run; the constant interferences with McClellan's plans made it impossible for the country to hold him responsible for their failure; and the first decisive successes of the war, we may almost say the only decisive successes on land, were won by General Grant in the West after he had cut the wires over which interfering orders came to him from Washington, and New York City has not in years been so stirred by an anti-corporation campaign as by the present one against laying another set of tracks on Amsterdam Avenue outside the set already there, and thus practically turning that attractive street into a dangerous car-yard. This fight was begun a year ago, when some of the residents on Amsterdam Avenue succeeded in getting through both houses of the Legislature a bill to prevent the additional tracks, only to have the bill recalled when Mr. Edward Lauterbach, counsel for the Third Avenue Railway Company, notified the authorities that he so desired. company went on getting permits from property-owners on Amsterdam Avenue until it claimed the consent of the requisite majority, and the fight against it seemed lost. The At this stage, however, Dr. John P. Peters, of St. Michael's Episcopal Church, threw himself into the fight heart and soul, and carried his church with him. Money was raised by the church—or, at least, by the pastor with the church's approval to fight the corporation, and the quickening spirit infused by Dr. Peters and a few conscientious anti-monopolists gave new life to the agitation. By means of the money raised a suit was begun to enjoin the laying of the tracks, on such grounds as that many of the consents had not been properly obtained, and last week this suit resulted in an injunction against placing the tracks in front of the property of St. Michael's Church and the other property-owner joining in the petition. Meanwhile the work of awakening the public was carried on with unprecedented vigor. Daily newspapers took up the fight, and when, last week, a delegation was called for to go to Albany in support of a bill against the four tracks, seven hundred citizens responded to the call. It is doubtful if Albany ever saw such a delegation. In the Assembly the desired bill -one forbidding tracks within twenty feet of the curb on either side, and thus requiring the two companies to interlace their tracks or use the same tracks-was passed unanimously; but in the Senate the Railroad Committee reported it with an amendment opening the way to prolonged lawsuits to sustain the "vested rights" of the Third Avenue Company in tracks already laid. Inasmuch as the original bill made provision for compensating the company for the losses occasioned, the earnest friends of the bill fought the amendment, while the supporters of the street-car corporation insisted upon it. At present the latter seem to have a majority in the Senate, but the fight is not ended, and Governor Roosevelt expresses the belief that the unamended bill will reach him. If it does, the credit of the remarkable victory will belong to Dr. John P. Peters. Last Sunday, in response to circulars sent out by himself and the Reverend Father Galligan, of a Roman Catholic Church in his vicinity, urging that "the combating of evil is as much a part of religion as the encouragement of goodness," a good many ministers preached against the proposed confiscation of the public way. Dr. Peters's own sermon, read for him because of his exhaustion due to the fight, proclaimed in the spirit of the old prophets the curse of God upon wealth obtained through the injury of society. A Lenten Thought That the value of the Christian year is being more and more understood is evidenced by the increasing number of churches which, in one form or another, observe its successive commemorative or festival days. In the course of the twelvemonth it brings before the mind the great facts and experiences in the life of Christ, and therefore the great facts of human life and its critical experiences; for there is a fundamental relation between the things which came to Christ and the qualities which are in human character. The Lenten season brings home with special force the connection between the death of Christ and the sinfulness of men. The one was the direct result of the other; and it has been well said that the true character and significance of sin can be realized only in the light which comes from Calvary. That forty days should be set apart to the commemoration of the temptation of Christ is in itself significant of the great place which the experience of temptation, with its possibilities of moral disaster and wreck, fills in the life of men. In times of social disorder men are constantly reminded of the elemental passions and of the danger of their outbreak. During the French Revolution it was not necessary to tell intelligent Frenchmen that there were elements of violence and lawlessness inherent in the French life of the time; the presence of these elements was witnessed by a series of awful occurrences. In times of peace and social order, however, men are likely to forget that the great passions exist in society as strongly as ever, and that what prevents their destructive activity is not their extirpation, but the larger control to which they are subjected. It is only when some horrible crime startles an orderly community that the possibility of criminal violence occurs to most men. Many a man has gone on in full tide of an active and honorable life, until he has almost forgotten that there are such things as serious temptations, and has begun to feel himself almost secure from their attack. Suddenly, in an unexpected moment and from an unexpected quarter, he finds himself assailed with a force which astounds and perhaps terrifies him. However highly organized society may |