that they sit in virtue of their dioceses, and that any limitation to their numbers would leave certain dioceses unrepresented. But, though it is desirable that all interests should be represented in the Upper House, it is not the least necessary, in modern times, that every territorial or ecclesiastical district should return a special representative. No injustice would be done by reducing the number of sitting spiritual peers in due proportion to the reduction made in the number of lay peers having seats in the House. Either the spiritual peers should select a proper proportion of their number to represent them in Parliament, in which case they would have no right to vote for lay peers, or the whole body of the peerage, lay and spiritual together, should elect a certain number of lay and spiritual peers to form the Upper House of Parliament.

The political status of those peers who would be excluded from the Upper House must be considered. They should be eligible for election to the House of Commons. It would be manifestly most unjust to deprive any individual of the dearest right of a free man, that of taking part in the councils of his country. It would be an equal infringement of the right of the people collectively to interfere with and limit their freedom of choice in electing any man they thought fit to represent them in Parliament. The Crown would have the right to elevate any commoner to the peerage; the peerage would have the right to elect any peer to the House of Lords. The people would have the right to send to the House of Commons any man not already sitting in Parliament. Another advantage would ensue upon making peers eligible to the House of Commons. It would grant to individual peers an opportunity of vindicating their action in the Upper House by a direct appeal to their countrymen, and it would in those cases enable the people to express in a constitutional manner, instead of by agitation, their disapproval or approval of the conduct of individual peers in the House of Lords.

Peers would have the right of resigning their seats in the Upper or Lower House at any time; but, in order that no unfair advantage could be taken of this right for mere party purposes, it is advisable that peers resigning their seats in the House of Lords should not be eligible for the House of Commons until the expiration of their term in the Upper House, and that peers resigning their seats in the House of Commons should not be able to take their seats in the Upper House until after the next dissolution of Parliament.

Two other alterations are advisable. The quorum should be largely increased; and the authority of the House to decide on points of order, and to call upon a member rising in his place to speak, should be delegated to the Chancellor, the Chairman of Committees, or a deputy appointed for the purpose.

Such are the reforms which may be made, with benefit as it appears to me, to the Crown, the State, the Upper House of Parliament,

6

and the Peerage. The power of the Crown, the fountain of honour,' to reward merit would be increased. It could honour with a peeragemen versed in social questions, and eminent not only in politics, but in the field of art, literature, and science-men who have rendered good service to their country, not as administrators only, but as sea-men and soldiers; and it could do so without being deterred by the thought that, though famous in these various fields, they might not prove useful in Parliament, or by the fear of creating a numerous nobility.' The advantages to the Upper House are that it would be reduced in number to a body of convenient size; that as decisions on great political questions could no longer be arrived at by majorities. composed principally or altogether of members who ordinarily take. no part in the deliberations of the House, and who do not interest. themselves in social or political matters, the House would be relieved of a great evil and one that does much to undermine its authority as a body, and to weaken the legitimate influence of individual members of it; that, being composed of men of eminence, of proved ability in administration, and of great experience, of men who have devoted themselves to the service of the State, or who have distinguished themselves above their fellows in the legal and other professions, and of men possessed of business qualities and industry, and who evince a. desire to apply themselves to political and social questions, its debates, opinions, and decisions would carry more weight than they do at present; and lastly that the House, though oscillating slowly, would move more readily and with less friction in conformity with the mature and expressed will of the people. Without losing an atom of the respect accorded to position and to ancient lineage, the peerage as a class would be, strengthened by the admission into its ranks of men famous in the various professions, pursuits, and walks of life, and would run no risk of suffering in dignity on account of large additions to its numbers. The peerage would be freed from the injurious accusation of stultifying itself by reversing former decisions in obedience to agitation. The advantages to each individual peer would be that he could appeal to the body of the peerage in support of his opinions, or even to a constituency; that he could relieve himself from the responsibility attaching to legislative duties; and that he could by resignation avoid the painful dilemma of having either to produce a deadlock in the machinery of government or to vote contrary to his views. The introduction of colonial peers would, I believe, prove beneficial to the peerage, the Upper House, the colonies, the mother-country individually, and to the Empire as a whole.

The advantages to the State are included in those accruing to the various members of the body politic. The great benefit to be hoped for lies in the acquisition of a Second Chamber capable of performing with as little friction as possible the revising, modifying, controlling functions which such an institution is intended to fulfil.

An appreciation of the value of a strong and efficient Second Chamber does not involve distrust of the people, or dislike to democratic government. On the contrary, it may be the outcome of a true affection for such a form of government; for, without a Second Chamber, government by a democracy appears to be impossible.. Large bodies of men are usually warlike, always emotional, and subject to sudden gusts of passion or prejudice. I do not mean to say that individuals of any class are free from these weaknesses; but the danger resulting from them is reduced to the lowest degree in an assembly of moderate size, composed of individuals whose experience and training have taught them fully to appreciate that danger. It is impossible for the majority of men to devote their lives to the study of intercolonial and international questions. History proves that, in times of great difficulty and danger, the people are compelled either to delegate their authority in practice, if not in theory also, to some individual, or to more or less willingly suffer it to be usurped from them. Ruin can be averted, in such cases, by temporary despotism only. Owing to the fact that two-thirds of our food supply and most of the raw material of our manufactures are imported from abroad, and in consequence of the sensitiveness of our Empire and the complicated nature of our foreign relationships, our position is one of chronic, though not of acute danger. By trade we live. Our trade depends upon our power to protect it. Our power to protect it depends upon our strength, upon the advantages we possess over all other nations in our colonies and dependencies, and upon a firm and consistent foreign policy, based upon non-intervention, and devoted to safeguarding the proper interests of the Empire. If the affairs of the nation are to be administered satisfactorily by means of a Parliamentary and representative form of government, a smoothly-working and strong Second Chamber is essential. It is worse than folly to hamper our Upper House with any evils, disadvantages, causes of friction or complaint that can possibly be removed. I am very far from claiming to have devised the best possible means of improving the constitution of our existing Second Chamber. Neither do I wish it to be understood that I bind myself to the proposals here made. I have merely set forth and endeavoured to explain the suggestions that present themselves to me, and I shall be well satisfied if by so doing I succeed in drawing the attention of others to the question of reform in the Upper House. One class of politicians and one section of the press are never wearied of inveighing against the House of Lords; yet they formulate no programme of reform. However useful it may be, for party purposes, to inflame class prejudices and cause unnecessary friction in the working of our Constitution, there is no sense, from a national point of view, in railing against an institution without. suggesting its abolition or improvement. I believe most politicians will agree that the present state of things is not altogether satis

factory, yet they seem strangely reluctant to undertake any project of reform. Reform ought to be desired by all Conservatives and Constitutional Liberals. Radicals who are in favour of a one-Chamber system, coupled with the essential quality of minority representation, should approve of it. Those Radicals only are naturally opposed to it who, while advocating a single Chamber in theory, object to reducing theory to practice by the abolition of the House of Lords, through fear of the consequent accession of strength to the Conservative party in the House of Commons. Their objections are based on party, not on national considerations, and constitute one of the strongest arguments in favour of reform.

II.

ON ITS ABOLITION.

Ir is now nearly eleven years since the late leader of the Tory party forewarned his supporters that, the cycle of fiscal, social, and economic legislation having nearly run its course, they would do well to be prepared for the advent of a new era, in which those great questions should again be revived which political philosophy has never been weary of discussing since the days of Aristotle, and on which mankind at large are as far from unanimity as ever. The age of Reform would be followed by the age of Revolution.

We are now emerging from the fiscal period in which almost all the public men of this generation have been brought up. All the questions of trade and navigation, of the incidence of taxation and of public economy, are settled. But there are other questions not less important and of deeper and higher reach and range which must soon engage the attention of the country. The attributes of a Constitutional Monarchywhether the aristocratic principle should be recognised in our Constitution, and, if so, in what form? whether the Commons of England shall remain an estate of the realm, numerous, but privileged and qualified, or whether they should degenerate into an indiscriminate multitude? whether a National Church shall be maintained, and, if so, what shall be its rights and duties? the functions of corporations, the sacredness of endowments, the tenure of landed property, the free disposal and even the existence of any kind of property—all those institutions and all those principles. which have made this country free and famous, and conspicuous for its union of order with liberty, are now impugned, and in due time will become great and 'burning' questions.

Men not deficient in political sagacity or political confidence sawthe same cloud on the horizon fifty years ago; and there are plenty to assure us that as it passed away then so it will pass away now, and that the institutions of the country are too securely rooted in the soil to be uptorn by any tempest which is likely to sweep over Great Britain. It may be so: I trust that it is so. But it is possible to account for the non-fulfilment of such prophecies down to the present time without supposing them to be false, or assuming that the page of the future which they profess to unfold to us is the offspring of political nightmare. Causes have intervened to retard the progress of ideas hostile to the established system, and to divert the public interest into other channels: and similar causes no doubt may intervene VOL. XV.-No. 84.

Q