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cavalry raid which resulted in the capture of a few sheep and camels -the proudest moment of the Baker campaign. I remember our last parade on the Trinkitat sands. Some hundreds of the men were tested in rifle-shooting. They just knew how to load, and pull the trigger. C'est ridicule,' exclaimed the General, addressing Abdul Rasac, his chief of the staff, and with that expression of hopelessness and disgust, Baker rode off to his tent. It was ridiculous ; '—and pathetic, when, amid the rain and the sunshine of the second daybreak after, Baker's battalions marched away to their doom. How, when at last the unwieldy, inchoate square halted and paused, within touch' of the Wells, its hour having come; how at first the garrulous, disorderly rabble seemed as unconscious of their mortal peril as if they were school children out for a holiday; how, when the idea of danger began to dawn upon them, they huddled and elbowed one another into their places, with half-frightened, half-curious gaze; how, when the Arab 'rush' came on with swift suddenness, as if by magic, the Egyptians broke into wild panic, and threw away their weapons, and vainly prayed for mercy; how the savage foe ran abreast with the stream of fugitives until the five miles between the Wells and the sea were thickly strewn with the Egyptian dead; and how, in a few hours more, in the large encampment, full of life and activity, that had covered the seashore, nought remained but silence and desolation, with here the carcase of a camel or a bale of grass, or there an empty tent, its canvas idly flapping in the breeze;—all this, and much more, are deserving of more detailed narrative, but they can only find their place here as incidents in a course of mismanagement which, by thrusting victory upon the insurgents, went to develop the reckless valour and the fierce fanaticism which, a little later on, threw the Arab spearmen upon the fire and steel of the British lines.

One of the first results of Osman's victory was the formation of something approaching a nomad union or confederacy, in which every tribe, from Suakin to remote Kassala, was represented. Another was the surrender of the Tokar garrison, whose artillerymen helped the insurgents to construct the El Teb entrenchments, rifle-pits, and redoubts which gave General Graham so much trouble during the battle of the 29th of February. Baker's Krupp and machine guns were mounted on these redoubts, and Baker's three thousand rifles and half-million cartridges were stored at Tokar and Tamai. In their own barbarous fashion the Arabs were evolving a military system. Besides strengthening El Teb, the rebels came down in large numbers and hovered about Suakin. What with women and children weeping for their slain relatives, with a sulky populace, bands of Arab woolly-heads' swaggering about the streets with an air of unwonted insolence, and a demoralised, half-mutinous Egyptian garrison,-life in Suakin, during the interval between Baker's return

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and Graham's arrival, was the reverse of agreeable. Everyone félt relieved when the Jumna' steamed into Suakin harbour with the 10th Hussars and the Fusiliers. Suakin, however, was not to be the base of General Graham's first operation. Without touching at Suakin, troopships passed straight on to Trinkitat, where, before the 25th of February, the Black Watch, Gordon Highlanders, 60th Rifles, mounted infantry, 19th Hussars, the Irish Fusiliers, the 10th Hussars, and the Royal Artillery, were assembled. The sands were white with tents and alive with movement; the harbour was covered with a fleet of sixteen ships. Never had the Arabs, watching us from the ridges of their sandhills, witnessed such a wonderful spectacle. But though they knew that it was the English who had come, they were not afraid. They were only impatient for more plunder. They were of the same mind with Osman Digna, who, in reply to proclamations and offers of pardon, had just been threatening to treat the English as he had treated Baker's Egyptians. Allah had delivered us English into Osman's hands, and Osman would drink the blood' of onehalf of us, and drive the other half into the sea. Osman, the Arabs implicitly believed, was invincible and infallible. But a few days before, an astonishing ceremony had taken place in Osman's camp. This was the blessing of the sticks. Every Arab carries a club, besides his spear, and Osman had endowed each club with miraculous power to kill so many men, or break so many horses' legs-five, ten, twelve, or twenty, any number-according to the reputed faith of each owner, or the extent of his liberality to the communal fund. Every Arab felt sure of victory. With the tenacity of a barbarian, he associated in his own mind the previous blunders and defeats of his foes with the predictions of the Madhi and the interposition of Heaven. He himself might be killed, but his soul would go straight to heaven. To such people the word 'heaven' was no empty sound. Their unseen world was as real as the Soudan, only with less heat, and less cold, and no work, and with more milk and honey, and softer grass, and prettier flowers. The dying Arab boy who at El Teb came to avenge his father's death, and whom Baker captured, begged hard to be allowed to spear an Egyptian heretic, in order that he might enter Paradise with a clean conscience, and with just confidence resume there his parent's acquaintance.

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El Teb, the scene of Baker's defeat and of Graham's first victory, lies eight miles south-west of Trinkitat, halfway between it and Tokar, and about seven miles from the seashore. Its works, facing west by north, comprised a long semicircular shallow entrenchment, protected by a redoubt on the northern or Trinkitat side, a second redoubt on the southern or Tokar side, and a third, poorly armed, on the seaward side. Within the shallow entrenchment, and extending in some places to near the centre of the huge enclosure, were scores of rifle-pits, some of them capable of holding twenty men, and

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all of them so cunningly scooped out of the sand that an enemy coming in front of them might step right to their brink before becoming aware of their existence. The centre of the enclosure was occupied by the wells, of which, if I may trust my memory, there were about twelve. All this was, of course, only discovered after the fight; but our scouting parties had, during the preceding two or three days, and on the march out, learned enough of the enemy's disposition to enable Graham to arrange his general plan of attack. The plan was to attack the entrenchments in the rear, which, as will be understood from the preceding description, was left open, or nearly so. At eight in the morning of the 29th, we marched out with a total force of about 3,000 infantry, 700 cavalry, and 14 guns, six of which were machine-guns. The mounted infantry, with two squadrons of the hussars, scouted far ahead on the left, in front, and on the right. The main body of the 10th and 19th Hussars, under the command of General Stewart, followed in the rear. The infantry were disposed in square formation as follows:-the 75th in front; the 65th on the left flank, with the marines inside as a reserve; the 89th on the right, with the 60th Rifles in reserve; the Black Watch (to their very great annoyance) formed the rear. Three machineguns of the Naval Brigade were posted in the left-hand corner, between the 75th and 65th; the other three were in the right-hand corner, between the 75th and 89th; the Royal Artillery were distributed in centre of the square and the two corners of the rear. With these data fixed in his mind, the reader can easily follow the various movements of the battle. Gradually receding from the sea our huge square glided in a diagonal direction across the plain. It passed along the front of the Arab entrenchments; in other words, with El Teb on its left flank. The line of Baker's rout lay between it and the Arab posi

Thus our infantry were spared an unpleasant infliction, but the Hussars, with whom I rode for some distance, passed over the hideous. scene of the carnage. One turned almost sick with an atmosphere polluted by the hundreds of rotting bodies, which lay everywhere in every attitude of painful contortion. About half-past ten o'clock the square reached a point half a mile due west of the Arab lines, and right opposite the redoubt, which I have already indicated as protecting the northern or Trinkitat side of the entrenchments. The Arabs instantly opened a brisk fire of musketry and Krupp artillery. Without replying to or taking any notice of the enemy, Graham moved off still in the westerly direction; in about an hour more, he reached a point right opposite the southern, or Tokar side, redoubt, 800 to 900 yards off. This was the point at which it was resolved to enter and sweep clean through the Arab lines. Then the infantry lay down, and the day's work began in earnest. The blue-jackets of the lefthalf battery and part of the camel-battery poured a well-directed fire at and around the redoubt. The enemy's gunners quickly found our

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range and plied the British square splendidly with two Krupp guns. Think of the absurdity of the situation! Those smart gunners who knocked over our blue-jackets and infantry, and at a critical moment in the fight threw even the Old Sixty-fifth' into temporary disorder, were the very men whom we were trying hard to relieve at Tokar! In less than half an hour the enemy's two guns were silenced. Then the square advanced upon the redoubt. From the foregoing details of formation, the reader will understand that the 65th now formed the front line of the square; that the 75th, lately the front, now became the right flank; and the Black Watch the left flank. In this turning movement the 65th for a time bore the brunt of the Arab assault. The 65th cheered and rushed, accompanied by the blue-jackets. As the action developed, the infantry formation grew rather irregular, so that the Black Watch and portion of the 75th were exposed, equally with the 65th, to the desperate onslaught of the Arabs, who, waiting until their opponents had approached the entrenchments, charged right through the smoke and upon the bristling line of steel. It was during this perilous interval that Captain Wilson of the Hecla' and Captain Littledale of the 65th distinguished themselves by their deeds of bravery. The redoubt was carried, and, in a moment, the two Krupps were wheeled round by the marine artillerymen, under Major Tucker, and directed upon the second, or northern, redoubt, much to the astonishment of its defenders. The Egyptian gunners who had worked the captured guns had all been killed by the English fire; it was afterwards said that their sergeant, who had survived, was killed by the Arabs. It was during the pause which followed the capture of this redoubt that our cavalry, apparently under the impression that the infantry had finished their work, executed their brilliant charge. But the Arabs were not in flight, and, while the Hussars were engaged elsewhere, the infantry were head and ears in their stiffest and hottest task. This task was the capture of the second redoubt, to effect which the infantry must force their way across the entrenchments, from the southern extremity, where they now were, to the northern. By this movement the Black Watch entered into the front, or attacking, line. But in reality the square formation was broken up, so that the whole infantry division became an irregularly semicircular line, with the 42nd and 65th in the central and more advanced part of it, and the 89th and 75th on the wings. During this operation the left-half battery of the Naval Brigade, moving by the rear of the 65th, took up a position on the left of that battalion—that is, in the corner between the 65th and 42nd; the right-half battery placed itself in the corner between the 42nd and the 89th. The Arabs defended themselves with extraordinary bravery. A party of them in a red brick building which lay about half distance between the two redoubts held their ground. until the seven pounders had burst three shells in it, and the Gatlings

—with their harsh, deadly organ-grind—had bored a hole in its walls; all this at the short range of about 120 yards. The brick building was choked with dead bodies, most of them fearfully mangled; a few yards off, round about a huge, rusty old boiler (a relic, perhaps, of Ismail Pasha's civilising zeal), 160 Arabs lay dead. Onwards, slowly but surely, swept the English line, the Arabs, springing out of their rabbit-warren-looking rifle-pits, savagely contesting every inch. At two o'clock the Highlanders stormed the second redoubt, the infantry swarmed over the Wells, the Arabs disappeared, and the hard-fought fight of El Teb was won.

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One great fault, some have said, and one only, spoiled the battle, regarded, not as a victory, but simply in a technical sense, and as a series of manoeuvres. Why, it has been asked, did the cavalry charge at that particular stage in the development of the action? As, when the artillery have produced the first effectual impression on the enemy, the infantry advance to their terrible task, so the cavalry strike in to complete the confusion and ruin caused by the second : but, according to the criticism which I have often heard, Stewart charged before the enemy were half-beaten, when there was still a risk of our own infantry being repulsed; and he charged a body of men who had never been in the action at all, who were fresh, and the reverse of demoralised. Some have said that Baker Pasha, who had left Suakin to join the intelligence department in Graham's force, 'recommended' General Stewart to charge, on the ground that the Arabs were retreating; but General Stewart was not the man to take recommendations, much less orders, from any except his commanding officer. It has also been said that General Graham, not anticipating the mad resistance he would have to encounter at the rifle-pits, empowered General Stewart to charge the enemy as soon as he thought proper.

It will as a matter of course be presumed that General Stewart was led to believe that the Arabs were giving way, and that the moment had come for dealing them a final and crushing blow. But whatever explanation might be suggested by those who are most competent to pronounce upon the matter, it might be plausibly argued that the cavalry charge even against a second, and reserve, force of Arabs (supposing this to have been the Arab disposition) was a timely and singularly lucky movement. It seems certain that the Arabs who actually fought in the redoubts, pits, and entrenchments, did not number more than 2,500, or 3,000. Where were the remaining three or four thousand? The habit of the Arabs is to put their best men in front, and to reserve, away in the rear, a second body, to be let loose on their foes as soon as these have been broken up. Now there was a large body of Arabs hovering about on the south-western side of the Wells, on the way to Tokar; and it is more than possible that these Arabs, should it strike them that the break-up of the square