AFFIRMATIVE.

A CONSIDERATION of the question in its various bearings seems to lead to the conclusion that such a court would be an advantage. At present the Royal prerogative of mercy in remitting, reducing, or varying the sentence in capital cases, is exercised by Her Majesty, under the advice of the Home Secretary, which is based upon representations made to him and upon the results of inquiries he may make. There are three classes of cases in which it may be rightly exercised. (1) In cases where it is found that the person convicted is innocent; (2) where the person convicted is guilty, but the sentence is considered unduly severe; and (3) where there is such an amount of reasonable doubt as to render the infliction of the extreme penalty of the law scarcely justifiable. In cases of the first class the prisoner is entitled to a remission of the sentence; in those of the second to a reduction; and in those of the third to a remission or reduction, as may be advisable. Testing our arguments by applying them to each of these classes of cases, we can readily obtain a practical view of the important question, whether, instead of the Home Secretary's discretion, we ought not, in the interests both of justice and mercy, to have a responsible Court of last appeal, with power to revise or remit sentences. Take first the case of an innocent man. He has been publicly tried, and on certain evidence publicly condemned. If his innocence be afterwards demonstrated, it is due to the man, to society, and to the law, that the demonstration should be equally as public as his condemnation was;

and it is also especially due to the man that after his innocence has been made clear he should receive, not a pardon, which implies that he is still guilty, but a complete remission of his sentence and a declaration of his innocence. In such a case as this a responsible public tribunal seems altogether preferable to the Home Secretary's discretion, exercised in the manner it now is. It would also be preferable in the second class of cases above mentioned. The public would then have the advantage of knowing the principles which guide decision, and of being able to judge both as to the impartiality of the inquiry as it regarded the prisoner on the one hand and the Crown on the other, and as to the soundness of the decision which in each case might be come to. The third class of cases consists of those in which doubt exists and re-consideration is desirable. The doubt

inay either exist at the time of the prisoner's trial, or arise after his conviction. If it exist at the time of trial, it receives consideration by both judge and jury, and the prisoner frequently has the benefit of it. A court of appeal is therefore not so strongly needed in these cases as in those where the doubt arises after the prisoner's condemnation. It is then important the whole case should be seriously re-considered and re-weighed, allowance being made for all doubts, and still more important that this shall be done by some thoroughly competent person or tribunal. In many instances not only would reconsideration be necessary, but also some degree of fresh inquiry or investigation. The advantage of a carefully and ably

constituted court seems, therefore, to be as apparent in cases where doubt has arisen as in those where the person convicted is supposed to be innocent, or where, being guilty, he has been too severely dealt with. The principal objec tion made against such a tribunal is that it would introduce an element of uncertainty into the results of criminal trials. A contrary effect may, however, be anticipated, and it should be borne in mind that where the penalty is death there can scarcely be too much care taken to guard against mistakes or injustice.-G. T. H.

Trial by jury is one of our great constitutional institutions, and should be the fundamental principle on which the present question is to be based. 1. It is unconstitutional that an answer to an appeal should rest in the hands of any one person, when the sentence of death has been unanimously passed by a jury of twelve men. 2. Our law theoretically maintains that the responsibility of passing a sentence of death should not rest on the shoulders of any one person. 3. When the answer to an appeal was invested, nominally in the person of the sovereign, it was more constitutional, inasmuch as the circumstances of the case were fully dis cussed in the Cabinet. 4. Both Sir George Grey and Mr. Walpole, who severally held the office of Home Secretary, expressed their desire that they might be relieved from performing so very solemn and reponsible a duty; and it is also very evident that those sentiments are fully acquiesced in by Mr. Bruce. 5. The very unequal decisions of our Home Secretary alone demand a court of appeal.-GEORGIUS D. E.

The institution of such a court is highly desirable. The public would feel enlarged confidence in a properly constituted tribunal, with

which rested the duty of revising the sentence, instead of a minister whom any influences or representations may direct to a decision in a case, while there is no opportunity for challenging these; and often on the individual official a whole legion of other duties press, to the great danger of this important one being treated with deprecable haste. The present system has too often when at work found itself opposed to the decision of the national mind when there was no possibil ty of reasons being demanded. The fault-finding disposition of political party would be diminished by the change.-J. F. B.

We have not now to discuss the merits or demerits of capital punishments, but whether it is wise that the Home Secretary should hold the power without being responsible. 1st. We think that heaven has not blest any man with such wisdom as is needed for this very important task. 2nd. We find as a fact that before the Queen came to the throne it was customary for the members of the Administration to be summoned, the Sovereign to be present and the Lord Chief Justice, and then to consider the question. Well, when the youthful princess was crowned and swayed the sceptre it was thought unwise to carry on this principle on account of her youth; and no doubt many things would have to be discussed totally unfit for her ears. So we conclude it was never intended to rest with one man; and has been somewhat rudely thrust upon the Home Secretary. 3rd. It is too great a responsibility for any one man to have. Picture to yourself the power of life and death over a fellow-creature, however wicked and depraved he may have been; he consigns them (by not holding out the clemency of the Crown) to eternity, and we fear too often to future misery. 4th. The uncertainty of the law brings it into

contempt. How often have we been led to inquire what could have induced the Home Secretary to respite or reprieve such or such a criminal. And further, it is a secret trial; the prisoner has been tried, found guilty in an open court, condemned to death, and as soon as the sentence is pronounced all kinds of petitions, affidavits, &c., are sworn to and sent in. Well, this is strictly private, and hence the public are much dissatisfied because they know not why the sentence is not carried out. Another reason why something ought to be done is for the sake of the prisoner. I think ofttimes he, in hope of mercy from an earthly tribunal, thinks too much of that to be able to devote much time for making his peace with God, and up to the very last he holds hopes that he will be spared; and the all-absorbing thought is to save the temporary life, forgetting and neglecting altogether the future one. This would be greatly avoided by having more certainty in the remission of capital sentences.-A. S.

That there could be a negative to this question seems to my mind impossible. It is lamentable that the final issue of such life or death matter as remission of a capital sentence should be confined to the discretion of one individual. The judgment of one man's mind, be its reasoning powers ever so finely balanced, cannot be satisfactory to a large community; and that a state of things like this exists is one of the disgraceful absurdities of "enlightened England." It requires no argument to prove that a number of heads of equal calibre are better than one; and where one is liable to fail, causing discontent among the people, many are more certain of creating confidence and yielding satisfaction. -W. L.

NEGATIVE.

Nothing that would weaken or

lessen the sense of responsibility in the jury, the public confidence in the judge, the respect for the tribunals of the country by the people, should be adopted unless there is no avoiding such a scandal. The institution of such a court as is supposed here would very materially weaken the sense of responsibility in the jury and lessen the care they would take in coming to a decision; for they would in most cases find a verdict under the assumption that it would be reviewed. The judge in like manner, not being looked upon by the people as a final adjudicator, would gradually come to be thought only a secondary authority, and any capital sentence he might pass would be regarded as one to be traversed and brought under review. In this way the entire judgment of our courts would be brought into disrespect, and even the sentences passed in other cases would come to be acquiesced in grudgingly. Besides, the Supreme Court itself could not really be regarded as final, for the Sovereign has dispensing powers in the last and latest. Again, a rehearing of a case would grow to be a right, and great expense, delay, discomfort and passionate excitement would be occasioned. We require our present system improved, not destroyed, still less depraved; but we should have no such court.S. A. S.

"The last appeal" is not one of right but of grace. To establish a court would convert a privilege into a right, and make the prerogative of mercy impossible'; or if it did not would make it an absurdity. Impossible if the decisions of the court of last appeal were always carried out; and an absurdity if they were not.-F. M.

If a court of last appeal were instituted, would it be a court of justice or of mercy? If of justice, in what would it differ from the courts

now sitting? if of mercy, how could that be administered by law? We do not ask a re-trial because of miscarriage of justice in most cases, but because of some speciality in the extenuating circumstances of the crime committed. If we had a tribunal to re-try criminal cases, we should do more damage to the judgment of the country than we could do good to the criminals who would be brought before it. As things are there must be some plea capable of being decently used before the Home Secretary can be asked to interpose his personal forgiveness to the condemned one, and this acts as a restriction which could not be enforced if a court were established for the purpose of giving a second chance to those who had broken with violence into the house of life. Let us keep justice and mercy clearly apart.-W. G. J.

The general drift and tendency of legislation has been of late to constitute, as far as possible, the judg ments of our law courts final. It has been thought that this greatly economizes expense and produces greater thoughtfulness, and thoroughness in getting at the right point of view, seeing that the question requires to be decided correctly "once for all." The constitution of our courts is such now that the most painstaking care may be exercised in each case, and the laws of evidence are now so well-known and clearly laid down that there can be little occasion for mistake or substantial injustice. Our judges are now, too, trained and tried. We ought to proceed as we are doing, and endeavour to get each special court to perform all the work entrusted to it earnestly, carefully, and well. Every opportunity of rehearing allowed is a temptation to remissness in the transaction of the whole business of the courts below the one final court, beyond which

no appeal is permissible. To unhinge and loosen the whole machinery of criminal procedure for the sake of taking this retrograde step would be most unadvisable. Be

sides, even then, could we do without an appeal to mercy,-for law always tends to fall into dull, technical courses, and to decide upon these? Keep the appeal to the Royal clemency intact.-R. R.

Certainty mingled with judicious leniency should rule in all our criminal courts. Any such court of review being instituted would probably lead to its being used as a means of procuring a temporary respite, greatly to the detriment of our criminal procedure. Juries would more hastily and rashly decide on the guilt of those who had committed capital offences if there were a supreme court in which the sentence could be revised; and the sentence given would be looked upon as uncertain. It would be much better to revise our Criminal Code in regard to capital punishment, and allow the jury to bring in a verdict with extenuating circumstances of different classes, and so enable them to give effect to their doubts, reserving capital punishments only for those in which extenuating circumstances did not appear.-J. S. S.

A tribunal whose duty it was to review capital sentences, if private would be as unsatisfactory as the decision of the Home Secretary, which is practically given as the result of a court of review, and if public would be very disadvantageous, as showing on what grounds mercy was granted, and so misleading those who were not capable of holding in one view the whole of the threads of evidence which, unitedly, led to remission-false analogies would be sure to prevail. Thus the tribunal would be unmerciful in its granting of mercy.-W. S. C.