held a slave in Jamaica. The inquiry was not, whether he was so held in obedience to the British law regulating the institution of slavery in Jamaica. The only question was, whether a slave in Jamaica, or elsewhere, who had by any means found his way into Scotland, was or was not free by operation of law. Not a word is directed to that point. And the court of session must have regarded its introduction before them as an argument in the case. as idle and as useless as would have been a page from his Rasselas. The British government established negro slavery by law in all her colonies, but made no provision by which the slave, when once found on the shores of England, could be taken thence again into slavery.

The object, no doubt, was wholly to prevent their introduction there, in favour to her own labouring poor. The British monarchy retained the whole subject of slavery under its own control. The colonies had no voice in the matter. They had no political right to say that the slave, thus imposed on them, should, after he had found his way into any part of the British Isles, be reclaimed, and their right of property in him restored. Their political condition differed widely from the condition of these United States at the formation of this republic.

They, as colonial dependants, had no power to dictate protection. to their own rights, or to insist on a compromise of conflicting interests to be established by law.

Dr. Johnson's argument is exclusively directed against the political and moral propriety of the institution of slavery as a state or condition of man anywhere, instead of the true question at issue. The argument, taken as a whole, is, therefore, a sophism, of the order which dialecticians call "ignoratio elenchi;" a dodging of the question; a substitution of something for the question which is not; a practice common among the pert pleaders of the day-sometimes, doubtless, without their own perception of the fact. In regard to him who uses this sophism to effect the issue, the conclusion is inevitable,-he is either dishonest or he is ignorant of his subject. And when we come to examine this celebrated production as an argument against the moral propriety of the existence of the institution of slavery in the world, we shall find every pillar presented for its foundation a mere sophism, now quite distinctly, and again more feebly enunciated, as if with a more timid tongue, and left to inquiry, adorned by festoons of doubt and supposition.

We shall requote some portions, with a view to their more particular consideration. And, first, "Yet it may be doubted whether slavery can ever be supposed the natural condition of man." This clause, when put in the crucible, reads, "Yet slavery can never exist in conformity to the law of God." Whoever doubts this to be the sense, we ask him to suppose what the sense is! The author did not choose these few words to express the proposition, because the law of God could readily be produced in contradiction: "Whosoever committeth sin is the servant (doiros, doulos, SLAVE) of sin." Besides, then, he loses the benefit of the sophism,-the substitution of the condition of man in his fallen state, through the ambiguity of the word "natural," for the condition of the first man, fresh from the hand of the Creator. This sophism is one of great art and covertness; so much so, that it takes its character rather from its effect on the mind than from its language; and we therefore desire him who reads, to notice the whole chain of thought passing in the author's mind,-lest he forget how our present state is the subject of contemplation offered as data, when, on the word "natural," as if it were a potter's wheel, our original condition is turned to the front, a postulate, from which we are left to compare and conclude.

The doctrine of the Bible is, that slavery is the consequence of sin. If "natural" be taken to mean the quality of a state of perfect holiness and purity, then slavery cannot be the natural condition of man; no doubts are required in the case. But if "natural" is used to express the quality of our condition under sin, sinking us under the curse of the law, then the propriety of its use will not be "doubtful," when applied to slavery, because it is a consequent of the quality of the condition. "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them." The proposition, as thus explained, we think of no value in the argument; but, as left by the author, obscure, its real meaning and intent not obviously perceived nor easily detected, and he may have thought it logical and sound.

"It is impossible not to conceive that men, in their original state, were equal."

Here is another sophism, which the learned call petitio principii, introduced without the least disguise,-the assumption of a proposition without proof, which, upon examination, is not true. If the author mean, by "original state," the state of man in paradise, we have no method of examining facts, except by a comparison

of Adam with Eve, who was placed in subjection. And if we may be permitted to examine the state of holy beings more elevated than was man,"For thou hast made him a little lower than the angels," then, by analogy, we shall find it possible to conceive that men, in the original state, were not equal, since even the angels, who do the commands of God, are described as those "that excel in strength."

But if Dr. Johnson mean the state of man after the fall, then Cain was told by God himself, that, if he did well, he should have rule over Abel.

"And very difficult to imagine how one would be subjected to another, but by violent compulsion." The object of this singular remark is to enforce the proposition, That slavery is incompatible with the law of God, which is not true.

* * * him *

"And if the servant shall plainly say, 'I love my master I will not go out free:' then his master shall bring and he shall serve (be a slave to) him for ever." But if it shall be said the value of the passage quoted resides in the term "violent compulsion;" that "violent compulsion," sufficient to make a man a slave, is incompatible with the law of God, then it will have no weight in the argument, because the "violent compulsion" used may be in conformity to the law of God. “And I will cause thee to serve (be a slave) to thine enemies in the land which thou knowest not."

"An individual may indeed forfeit his liberty by crime; but he cannot forfeit the liberty of his children."

This, as a proposition, presents a sophism of the order non causa pro causa, in reverse. We all agree a man may forfeit his liberty by crime; but how are we to deduce from this fact that the liberty of the child cannot be affected by the same crime? The truth is, the crime that deprives a parent of liberty, may, or may not, deprive the child. The framework of this sophism is quite subtle; it implies the sophism, "a dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter," to have full effect on the mind. Because, in truth, the crime that deprives the parent of liberty does not invariably involve the liberty of the child, we are, therefore, asked to assent to the proposition that it never does. But, perhaps, an analysis of the proposition before us may be more plain to some, when we remark, what is true in all such compound sophisms, that the proposition containing it is divisible into two distinct propositions.

In this case, the first one is true, the second not. If, by crime, a man forfeits his life, he forfeits his liberty. If he is put to death previous to a condition of paternity, its prospect is cut off with him. Those beings who, otherwise, might have been his descendants, will never exist. Hence rude nations, from such analogy, in case of very high crimes, destroyed, with the parent, all his existing descendants. Ancient history is full of such examples. The principle is the same as the more modern attaint, and is founded, if in no higher law, in the common sense of mankind; for, when the statute establishing attaints is repealed, the public mind and the descendant both feel that the attaint essentially exists, even without law to enforce it. Who does not perceive that the descendants of certain traitors are effectually attainted at the present day, even among the most enlightened nations. He who denies that the crime of the parent can affect the liberty of the child, must also deny that the character of the parent can affect him; a fact that almost universally exists, and which every one knows.

"Let his children be continually vagabonds and beg;

*

let his posterity be cut off; * * let the iniquities of his fathers be remembered with the Lord."

This doctrine was recognised and practised by the church, even in England, in the more early ages. Let one instance suffice.. About the year 560, Mauricus, a Christian king of Wales, committed perjury and murdered Cynetus,-whereupon, Odouceus, Bishop of Llandaff, in full synod, pronounced excommunication, and cursed, for ever, him and all his offspring. See Milton's ΕΙΚΟΝΟΚΛΑΣΤΗΣ, cap. 28.

This principle actively exists in the physical world. The parent contracts some loathsome disease-the offspring are physically deteriorated thereby. He whose moral and physical degradation are such that slavery to him is a blessing, with few exceptions, will find his descendants fit only for that condition. The children of parents whose conduct in life fostered some mental peculiarity, are quite likely, with greater or less intensity, to exhibit traces of the same. "The parents have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge." The law is not repealed by the mantle of love, which, in mercy, the Saviour has spread over the world, any more than forgiveness blots out the fact of a crime. The hope of happiness hereafter alleviates present suffering, but, in no sense, annihilates a cause which has previously existed.

"A man may accept life from a conquering enemy on condition of perpetual servitude; but it is very doubtful whether he can entail that servitude on his descendants; for no man can stipulate, without commission, for another."

All that is presented as argument here, is founded upon the proposition, that no man can stipulate for his descendants, whether unborn or not.

If what we have before said be true, little need be said on the subject of this paragraph. For we have already seen that the conduct of the ancestor, to an indefinite extent, both physically influences and morally binds the condition of the offspring. It is comparatively but a few ages since, over the entire world, the parent had full power, by law, to put his children to death for crime, or to sell them into slavery for causes of which he was the judge. And it may be remarked, that such is the present law among, perhaps, all the tribes who furnish from their own race slaves for the rest of the world. It is not necessary here to show why a people, who find such laws necessary to their welfare, also find slavery a blessing to them.

Civilization has ameliorated these, to us, harsh features of parental authority; yet, to-day, the world can scarcely produce a case where the condition of the child has not been greatly affected by the stipulations, the conduct, the influences of the parent, wholly beyond its control. The relation of parent has ever been found a sufficient commission to bind these results to the condition of the offspring.

***

"But our fathers dealt proudly, and hardened their necks, and hearkened not to thy commandments, and refused to obey; * * and in their rebellion appointed a captain to return to their bondage."

"The condition which he (the captive) accepts, his son or grandson would have rejected."

This, at most, is supposititious, and, as an argument, we think, extremely weak; because it implies, either that the acceptance of the parent was not the result of necessity, and the wisest choice between evils, or that the rejection, by the son, was the fruit of extravagant pretension.

"He that is extravagant will quickly become poor, and poverty will enforce dependence and invite corruption." * * * "I have avoided that empyrical morality that cures one vice by the means of another." Johnson's Rambler.