chance, and often when he has not, he has shown us what he might have done under happier auspices. Apart from the extreme beauty, ingenuity, and power of the wellknown purely orchestral pieces, there are many noble and delightful fragments for the voice. The controversy is still too hot about Wagner to hope for a dispassionate opinion; but the time will come when he will be judged by the same standard as every one else (a thing forbidden at present), and it will be seen that in view of the high aim with which he started his plays are dull and his verse poor; that after all he has suffered shipwreck on the same rock as his predecessors. But all honor to him for his great and influential attempt to restore the ideal !

Now we come to Otello," the "heir of all the ages." In the first place, it is not necessary to say much about the play. "Othello" needs no advocate. But we must insist upon the significance of going to Shakespeare for a subject. In truth he is for us the one fountain of what is greatest in drama. He is our Eschylus, Sophocles, and Aristophanes in one. Instead of trying to reconstruct the classical Greck drama, as the early Italians and Gluck did, or of inventing a classical German one, as Wagner did, following the same lines, but employing German legend instead of Greek, Verdi and Boïto have gone to the great poet who truly represents our later age. In the second place," Othello" has been most admirably and skilfully handled by the librettist. Boïto possesses quite unique qualifications for the task. He is a poet of great taste and cultivation and a most gifted musician, who yet has the modesty to take a second place and work for another's glory. It is to Boïto that a large share of the success of "Otello" is due. His work gave Verdi the stimulus and inspiration needed, and made the opera possible. Precisely for want of a Boito opera has so often failed in the past. This is markedly the case with the other Shakespearean plays that have been set to music. The drama has been largely spoiled, and in the French language at any rate there seems to be something inimical to Shakespeare. Boïto on the contrary has surmounted the dramatic and verbal difficulties with great skill. Such alterations as there are are in good taste and do not spoil the action, while the translation is noble and poetical. In the

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third place there is Verdi, the veteran composer. No man's work has been more belittled, or more popular. His operas are always called hackneyed; though why they should deserve that journalistic epi99 67 II thet any more than " Don Giovanni,' Barbiere,' Faust," or Carmen," it would be difficult to say. Verdi is not a Mozart or a Beethoven, but one thing is to be observed about him which stamps him as a true artist; throughout his long career he has steadily developed and progressed toward a higher goal. The setting of "Otello" to music is the highest task he has yet attempted. Two qualifications he undeniably possesses, a complete mastery of the resources of modern orchestration, and, what is rarer, a thorough knowl. edge of the human voice, that most difficult of instruments. He is one of the greatest writers for the voice that ever lived. Moreover he seems to have been inspired by his theme and to have risen with it. To enter into a detailed analysis of the opera is not the present purpose. It is enough to say that the music throughout gives just and appropriate effect to the verse. Exception may no doubt be taken here and there, but on the whole the meaning is expressed with extraordinary truthfulness and power. And yet there is not a single unmusical phrase throughout. It is the true musica parlante of Peri and Caccini, the rendering of the play of passion by the medium of song. It is the nearest realization of the ideal of musical drama that has yet been attained in our age, and fairly represents our modern equivalent of the Athenian declamatory tragedy. On our comparatively small stages it is not necessary for the actors to increase their stature by artificial means, as the Greeks did, and Tamagno at least needs no contrivance to strengthen his voice. But the art is the same in essence, so far as our knowledge enables us to judge. Pretty it is not,- how should it be? there are no serenades in Othelloand many people may not like it. That is no condemnation of it or of them. Many people do not care for tragedy, and many more like their music mild. But the grandeur of the effect is undeniable. This very effect, however, shows us the limitations of musical drama. "Otello" is, as opera should be, ordinary drama extended and magnified. But what is gained in size is lost in delicacy. The whole

thing is painted in broader lines and brighter colors. It is impossible for any artist on the operatic stage to act like Salvini; the conditions forbid him; his grand effects are grander, but he necessarily misses the subtle ones.

In conclusion, then, the phenomenal success of "Otello," both here and wherever it has been performed, is due to the unique character of the work. It is a drama of the highest kind, appropriately set to music. But because "Otello" is the highest point yet attained, it does not fol low that all operas are to be "Otellos." There is room for the lesser art as well as the greater. We can enjoy fun and ro

mance as well as tragedy. We may shudder at lago and be crushed by Otello; but we shall still be charmed by "Spirito Gentil," or "Salve Dimora :" we shall still smile at the Barber of Seville and Meister Beckmesser of Nüremberg; we shall still weep with Marguerite and Brünnhilde. As for Italian or any other opera being. dead, and the great merit of a certain sa gacious manager in reviving it, that is nonsense. The said manager, being a good man of business, perceived that what was dead was not the opera, but merely a bad article at a high price. That is dead and, let us hope, buried.-Macmillan's Magazine.

In some,

FOR eleven years Europe has not heard the clash of arms: nor, except in the Balkan Peninsula, for eighteen. Yet her soldiers are counted by millions, and her charge for military and naval establishments by hundreds of millions. These establishments, which are huge, require to be contemplated in various lights; but, whatever point of the compass we select for our inspection, the view is a dismal one. In the United Kingdon alone of the great States do the enormous burdens, which these establishments require, fail to constitute an apology for so-called protective laws, which fetter industry, diminish wealth, and aggravate distress. at least, of the six greater countries, the pressure upon the national finance in this time of peace is very heavy. In Germany, it is said to be so severely felt as to endanger the policy of peace. In Italy, it represents what might more properly accompany the extremities of an exhausting. war. The growth of the huge mass of national debts is rapid and continuous. The existence of enormous armies stimulates the martial spirit, and creates in each country a military class thoroughly centralized and of increasing power. In this state of facts a league of peace" is, indeed, a sweet-smelling savor, if it answer to its name. But that is the very question which it is needful to examine. assuredly the military condition of Europe as a whole is not the outward sign of a settled tranquillity, but is rather the announce

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For

ment of the strong and rather early likelihood of an agonizing war.

The European public may be said to know that the members of this league are Germany, Austria, and Italy; that its purposes are declared to be defensive; and that it expires, unless renewed, with the year 1890. Does this league altogether correspond with the character announced by its name is its strength adequate to its purpose is that purpose rational and just? and can the league itself be expected to endure?

The Holy Alliance, after the Treaty of Vienna, purported to be a league of peace. It was in friendship, though in an expiring friendship, with England. The power of France was then reduced, and her selfconfidence abashed. There was no possibility of a counter-combination able to look the Alliance in the face. It was not a league of peace, for no one wanted, or indeed was able, to break the peace. It was not a league of defence, for there was no assailant. It was a league of offence, constructed in order to put down liberty by force, and to secure immunity for Sovereigns who had given promises to their subjects that they did not mean to fulfil. Still there was nothing in the subsisting features of Europe which confuted its pretensions in regard to peace; for it fulfilled this essential condition, that it could hold the field, with its three at length victorious armies, against all comers.

There was another league of peace in

the year 1853, and with a different history. The Emperor Nicholas, lifted to a pinnacle of overweening self-confidence by his subjugation of Hungary, determined to anticipate the course of Nature, and break up the Turkish Empire by that powerful instrument of internal interference, which the Treaty of Kainardji was supposed to afford him. From whatever motives, the other four great Powers of Europe entered into a league of peace against him. This, too, was a combination of overwhelming force, against which it was impossible that Russia should make head. But, before the day of action came, the King of Prussia, relictâ non bene parmulâ, was frightened or cajoled into turning his back upon his allies; so that Austria did not venture to expose her ill-covered capital to the risks of a Russian invasion. Thus the combination, which had not unjustly claimed to represent the whole moral force, and in vast preponderance also the material force, of united Europe, dwindled in dimension. The difficult though successful war of the Crimea was a war between parties, and not the punishment awarded by a superior and competent authority to a rebellious Power. But England and France made manifest from the first their military superiority. In population they jointly equalled Russia, in determination they were not inferior, in wealth and resource they enormously surpassed her.

But, there being now six great Powers of Europe, of whom three only are in the "league of peace, "it does not at first sight appear that this league altogether answers to its name, if we are right in assuming that a body which advertises itself as intending to keep the peace ought to be able, as well as desirous, so to do. It does not appear clear, as it did in 1815 and in 1853, either that it has a commanding weight of moral authority, or that no counter-alliance can be formed against it with a possibility of success.

Still there might be an amount of available strength adequate to overcoming resistance, though not sufficient to prevent its being attempted. Is that quite certain in the present instance? The combined power of Germany, Austria, and Italy is doubtless very great. But from this combination France and Russia (to say nothing of England) are excluded. And this, not on grounds merely arbitrary, but for serious cause. Even apart from the state

of sentiment as between Russians and Germans, Austria and Russia have constituted themselves rivals in the Balkan Peninsula, and neither seems disposed to what some simple persons might take to be a probable method of escape from the difficulty-namely, leaving that Peninsula to the free use and disposal of its own inhabitants. France and Germany have between them the quarrel of Alsace-Lorraine, latent indeed, but, as it may be feared, profound. As between France and Italy, there are causes of difference which may be factitious or inadequate, but which nevertheless appear to have been sufficiently operative in producing a state of mind from which war may readily arise. But these reasons for the exclusion of two Powers from the league, if strong, seem to be hardly less strong for bringing about the union of those two Powers between themselves. Were that union to take effect, it does not seem that the match would be a very unequal one.

Granting that the German army is at this moment the first army in Europe, it seems not an unreasonable opinion that the Russian and the French, or the French and the Russian, armies are the second and the third, and that Austria and, in the fifth place, Italy, have to take rank behind them. Suppose we attempt roughly to measure relative strength by the threefold test of (1) numerical amount of army "with the colors" and navy, (2) population, and (3) revenue, we obtain, on resort to popular sources of information, something like the following results :

Germany with France and Austria and Italy. Russia. 1,652,000 1,578,000 Population (Europe only).... 113,000 000 125.000,000 Revenue... £279,000,000 £287,000,00

Army and Navy.

There is nothing in these figures demonstrative of gross disparity, or of an incapacity on either side to wage, if so minded, a deliberate and determined struggle. Especially does this seem clear, when it is borne in mind that the proportion of her population which Italy keeps under arms is enormous, so much so that to this total of forces kept on foot she contributes rather more than a moiety while the wealth of France is probably equal to that of any two among the other Powers. It is a remarkable fact that during the war of 1870, while German porcelain, discharged from private houses, was to be had at prices denoting what we term forced sale, France

did not send her endless works of art and articles of virtù across the Channel, but indeed continued to import at high prices precious stones from the East Indies. It seems then, thus far, that the league of peace is not so much an aggregation of overmastering forces able to command obedience to its will, as (at first sight) a skilful consolidation of the material and moral strength of three of the great Con tinental Powers against the other two, who might not impossibly be a match for them. There are further indications that the astute and masculine brain, which has formed and which directs this league of peace, is well aware that it is in truth not more nor less than a powerful league of preparation for the possibilities of a deadly struggle. We hear of no league between France and Russia; nor, according to the ably written paper of M. Flourens,* have these States been uniformly careful, since the war of 1870, to avoid incidents of at least diplomatic disturbance in their mutual relations. They seem content to allow these relations to be moulded by the course of events, and neither the one nor the other has gone out of its way to seek the formation of special alliances. But on the other side the case is far otherwise. Although the three Powers are manifestly beforehand with the two in their arrangements for the array of their gigantic armaments, yet they seem to feel that something more is wanted. In August of the present year the public journals have presented to us rumors that Spain was to join the league of peace. It may be questioned whether the fact would be one of cardinal or determining importance; but the inquiry may be spared, on the ground of the unlikelihood, not to say the absurdity, of the rumor. Spain has no interests as a principal; as a mercenary, even were she will ing to be bought, there is no one able to buy her.

Nor could her entrance, crowned by success, insure her admission to the charmed circle of the Great Powers. Much more importance attaches to the notion, which finds currency from time to time, that there is a secret understanding between England and the league of peace. It is said that the vast maritime power of this country is to be employed for the purpose of preventing France from forcing Italy, by the use of her navy on the Italian

*New Review, No. 3, Art. I.

coasts, to keep her army at home, instead of placing, as we are told she has bound herself to place, 300,000 men on the Alpine frontier of France at the opening of a war. It seems that in this manner, without moving so much as a corporal's guard, England might be worth 300,000 Italian soldiers to the Triple Alliance. Rumors, perhaps due to these apparent likelihoods, have attracted notice in Parliament. Questions have been put on more than one occasion in order to learn whether there was any treaty or any understanding between Great Britain and the Triple Alliance which was to secure our co-operation by sea in the eventuality of war. answers have been in the negative. The last, given by the representative of the Foreign Office in the House of Commons, and it is both recent and perfectly unequiv ocal. It is couched in the following terms, as reported in the Times of August 20, 1889. For the sake of clearness, we prefix the question put by Mr. Labouchere on the 19th ult.

The

"ENGLAND AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

tary for Foreign Affairs whether he had seen in the Times of that morning an extract from the National Zeitung, stating:-'It is believed in the best-informed circles that an understanding was arrived at at Osborne assuring an identity of policy between the Powers forming the Triple Alliance and England in European questions, and making provision for all the consequences of this policy.' He would also ask the right hon. gentleman whether there was anything justifying the best-informed circles' in entertaining this view.

"Mr. LABOUCHERE asked the Under-Secre

"SIR J. FERGUSSON.-The article in question is manifestly founded on pure conjecture. Its character is shown by the statement that the arrangements made with the Salisbury Government will be adhered to by their successors. (Laughter.) The reply that I gave to the hon. gentleman on the 19th ult. remains in forcenamely, that the action of her Majesty's Government in the event of war breaking out will be decided, like all other questions of policy, by the circumstances of that particular time and the interests of this country. Her Majesty's Government have entered into no engagements fettering their liberty in that respect."

The declaration was followed by an admission that on the late visit of the German Emperor to England, conversations on the future of Europe might or must have taken place. This addendum cannot be taken as qualifying the substance; to which we now refer only for a limited pur

pose. From the rumors which have been afloat we deem it to be evident that the Triple Alliance is aware, on the one hand, of its ability to make war and to contend for the mastery, with high hopes of attaining it; but, on the other, of its inability to command the continuance of peace, should Russia and France join hands together for the determination of European problems as yet unsolved. The league of peace is, then, a solemn announcement, first, of the danger in which Europe stands; secondly, of the amount of force which will be arrayed on one of the two sides, in the event of war, should that war break out before the end of 1891; thirdly, of the anxiety of its heads to obtain additional strength, which is only to be had in a degree really available by the adhesion of England.

The general question is of such vast importance that no apology can be required for an attempt to arrive at a true and full appreciation of the positions of the several States; above all to ascertain whether the causes of danger are superficial and conventional, or substantial and even profound. And, in order to clear this question, it will be well first to draw the lines which appear to mark out the position of England, not according to the sense of this or that individual or group or party, but according to the dictates of her duty, honor, and interest, to which a great European war can never be wholly foreign.

It will hardly be contended that the British Empire has any such interest in continental war as to warrant its engaging itself by anticipation to take a part in it simply as continental war. It offers no immediate or probable prospect of danger to our shores, or to the Queen's possessions. Should it entail injury to our commerce, that would not furnish us with a legitimate cause of war. Should it be likely to threaten the balance of power in Europe, we have to inquire a little what is the nature and extent of our concern with the balance of power. It is easy to understand that if any Continental State were now to acquire the amount and kind of predominance which Napoleon had attain ed before his expedition to Moscow, such a state of things might drag England into war. But such a state of things may be taken as impossibe. It was one thing to conquer or annex continental countries when many of the respective nations had little sense of interest in their institutions

or their independence, and when, consequently, war was an affair between government and government; and quite another to carry forward a similar enterprise when a spirit of nationality has been widely developed, and when, over a large part of Europe, the people are conscious that they themselves have largely to do with the making of the laws and institutions under which they live. Nor is it at all self-evident in whose interest or to whose detriment the balance of power would be injured by a proximate war, if at all. Those among us who speak most and loudest for maintaining the balance of power, commonly mean not its impartial maintenance, but its maintenance against France. it seems as likely that the change would be to the prejudice of France as of Germany. There is not in truth the remotest shadow of an argument which, as matters now stand, would be likely to induce the British nation to enter into any engagement beforehand, however guarded by conditions, to take part at the outset of the apprehended European war, lest the balance of power should suffer harm.

Yet

It

There is indeed another source of danger, which is perhaps less remote, and which makes a more legitimate appeal to British feeling than the possible tyranny of some one of the Great Powers over the rest. It is something more than possible to conceive a corrupt arrangement between two or more of them to accommodate their differences by the spoliation or absorption of smaller Powers. Without inquiring what might happen in the Balkan Peninsula, it is very difficult to forget the famous Benedetti memorandum, which was distinctly aimed at the national existence of Belgium. There were indeed disputes as to the origin of that memorandum. is, however, beyond dispute that it drew forth no repudiation, but slumbered quietly in its proper drawer until the moment arrived for using it as a telling weapon against Napoleon III. The best and purest part of the foreign policy of this country is that which has been directed to upholding the independence of the secondary Powers. Powers. It is among the virtues of England to cherish a ready indignation against the oppression of the weak; and a just cause for the intervention of England in the next great European struggle is perhaps as likely to proceed from this quarter as from any other. But this is a case to