understood, as they probably will be some centuries hence. The institution is still recent. It has been put in practice till very lately, in only two or three countries, and from this small number of instances, and comparatively short trial, it would be unsafe to draw, with perfect confidence, any general conclusions. It is highly probable, however, that property exercises its natural influence in this, as in other governments; and that this influence is not much affected by the particular forms under which the representative system presents itself. If the right of suffrage is restricted, it naturally falls into the hands of the proprietors, as the prominent members of the community. If extended, it is still exercised by persons under their influence, and of course in their interest. Hence, the true secret, and only effectual way of giving a popular character to a political system, is not to extend the right of suffrage, but to distribute the property as equally as possible through the community.

In France, as we have seen, this object had already been effected to a great extent. Almost the whole mass of property had been newly divided and distributed; and the proprietors, generally speaking, might be said to hold of the revolution, as they were all said, under the feudal system, to hold of the king. Their interest was, of course, identified with the order of things produced by the revolution; their opinions were in

accordance with its principles; and these opinions would have probably been manifested by almost any system of suffrage that could have been introduced. They pervaded the mass of the people, from the highest to the lowest ranks, and the whole nation might be said, in this sense, to be completely revolutionary. Hence, had the king, upon his return, placed himself frankly and honestly at the head of this new order of interests, opinions, and feelings, there must have been a perfect harmony between the representatives of the nation and the government, which would have existed alike under any system of elections; so that the laws upon this subject would have been of slight importance, and would probably have engaged but little attention.

Circumstances prevented the government from adopting this course of policy. They appeared, on the contrary, to look with suspicion on every thing connected with the interests and opinions of the revolution; and evidently gave their confidence to the adherents of the ancient system, although some formal concessions, and many fair promises were made to the friends of the new. It was natural to suppose that the popular interest, alarmed at this state of things, would express itself at the elections with redoubled energy; and hence, as it was found necessary to gratify the nation with the form of a representative government, the difficult problem presented itself, to in

vent a system of popular representation, in which the people should not be represented. The solution of this problem has occupied almost the whole time and attention of the government, since the restoration; and to do them justice, they appear to have succeeded, at least for the moment, better than could have been reasonably expected.

The opinion seems to have been early adopted, that the great proprietors would be less favorable to the popular cause, than the smaller; and, accordingly, the charter itself, which was published in 1814, at the time of the first restoration, restricted the right of voting in the election of deputies, to persons paying three hundred franks annual taxes; leaving most of the other details to be determined by law. Meanwhile, until this law should be passed, the legislative body, as it existed under Bonaparte, was preserved. No law, however, was passed upon the subject, before his return from Elba, when the house of deputies was dissolved, and a new one chosen; which was again dissolved at the king's second restoration; and, there being still no new law to regulate the elections, recourse was had to the old imperial system for this purpose. Under this system, the deputies were in substance nominated by the government; and the result was the house of 1815, denominated by the king, introuvable, (undiscoverable,) probably in derision; as he made great haste to get rid of it, by dissolving it the year after. This

house held but one session, during which a law was proposed by the ministry on the subject of elections, which was regarded by the house as too .democratic, and amended by the introduction of some aristocratic features. In this state, it was sent to the house of peers, and there rejected as too aristocratic; the French government presenting, at that time, the rather singular spectacle of a democratic house of peers, an aristocratic house of commons, and a neutral ministry. On the 5th of September, 1816, the house was dissolved by a royal ordinance, and no law having yet been passed, in consequence of the disagreement just mentioned, recurrence was had again to the old imperial system; the ductility of which was then displayed in full perfection; for although, from the growing influence of M. de Cases, the ministry had assumed a popular character since the last elections, the same forms which then discovered the undiscoverable chamber, now brought to light another, containing a large majority of voices, tuned precisely to the ministerial pitch. At this time the government exhibited a stronger appearance than at any other since the revolution, of an honest intention to embrace the true national policy. There was a perfect harmony among the three branches of the legislative power; and at the first session of the new house of deputies, a law was proposed on the subject of elections, conferring the right of suffrage,

agreeably to the charter, upon rather less than a hundred thousand of the richest proprietors, in a nation of nearly thirty million inhabitants. This law, aristocratic, one would think, if any thing could be so, was violently opposed by a party in parliament, as being of democratic tendency, a circumstance which, with a thousand others, evidently proved, that this party was not properly aristocratic, but anti-national. The law, however, passed by handsome majorities, and went into operation at the re-election of the fifth part of the house of deputies, whose term of service expired at the close of the next year.

The operation of this law was such as had been anticipated by its friends and its enemies. It was neither aristocratic nor democratic in any obnoxious sense of either term. The deputies returned by it were universally men of distinguished talents and high character, and, in most instances, of rank and property; but the great majority of them were acknowledged friends of the popular and national interest, in contradistinction to that of the emigrants. The effect of the law, in favouring the popular cause, was no doubt assisted in some degree by the influence of the ministry, which was then exercised in the same direction. But that its tendency was essentially the same as it appeared to be, is evident from two circumstances. First, the elections under it were, in several cases, more popular than was agreeable to the ministry, and