he had fallen; and left himself, of course, no excuse for a repetition of them. Yet since his second return, the course of policy adopted has been, with some occasional vacillation, substantially the same as it was after the first; and, at the present moment, is more decidedly anti-national than ever.

What, it may be enquired, are, in point of fact, the measures that make up this anti-national system? In this respect what has not been done, is perhaps of more importance than what has been done. At no period since the Restoration has the government possessed the confidence of the people. To acquire this was the first and most important object. Possessing the public confidence, they might have arranged the detail of their measures without fear of an opposition; but having failed in this, they can obtain no credit for their proceedings, supposing them even the wisest and most salutary that could be imagined.

It

It is urged, however, by the ministry and the royalists, that the party expressing dissatisfaction with the policy of the government is not to be considered as expressing the national sentiment. is represented as consisting of a few ambitious, unprincipled demagogues, and a few honest, but visionary theorists, the dupes and instruments of the former. These two descriptions of persons, by their loquacity in public assemblies, and the zeal with which they promulgate their opinions through the medium of the press, by activity of

speech and fertility of pen, give themselves the appearance of representing a large and imposing section of the public; as two or three individuals in a fort, by frequently shifting their position and keeping up a rapid fire from several points, have been known to give the enemy the idea that the place was defended by a strong garrison. But imprison a few of these disturbers of the public peace, and deprive the rest of their means of operation by abolishing deliberative assemblies, and silencing the press; and, according to their hypothesis, you may put an end at once to party divisions, and establish a general uniformity of opinion through the whole society. Without entering here into an examination of the personal composition of the liberal party, upon which I shall touch slightly hereafter, it may be observed, in general, that it is utterly repugnant to the theory here stated, its leaders being among the most intelligent, wealthy, and respectable persons in the nation. Indeed, if there is any correctness in the view I have taken in the preceding chapter of the general composition of parties in Europe, the very imagination of such a system by the royalists is a sufficient proof how insensible they are to the present state of society, and consequently how incapable of directing the government. But independently of any general reasoning or preconceived opinion, the experiment of the election law of 1817, which I have already described, must have

satisfied every person, not completely blinded by prejudice, that the great mass of property throughout the country was in the liberal interest, carrying with it, of necessity, the mass of population and intellect.

It is urged again, however, that this popular party is unreasonable; that it is essentially hostile to the Bourbon dynasty, and to a monarchical form of government; that it aims at the establishment of a republic or a military despotism, and that of course it can never be trusted with power. This argument either proceeds upon the same misconception in regard to the composition and strength of the liberal party with the last; or it proves rather more than perhaps would suit the purpose of those who employ it. If it be true that the mass of population and property is resolutely hostile to the present form of government and the dynasty of the Bourbons, the proper conclusion perhaps would be, that it is their policy to abdicate at once. For a single family to make head against such a nation as France, I take to be wholly impracticable; and the attempt could only produce greater evils than abdication itself. But before adopting a system, which leads necessarily to such a conclusion as this, it might perhaps be expedient to make trial of the liberal party, to trust them for once, and learn by experiment their real intentions. This has not yet been done. It seems on the contrary to have been admitted as an

axiom, that if this party obtained an ascendant in the ministry, or a majority in parliament, inevitable ruin would follow at once. For myself I see no reason to suppose that there is any such hostility in the liberal party to the present government, or the Bourbon dynasty. There may be individuals among them attached to republican forms, although the experiment they made of that system had but little tendency to create such an attachment. Considered as a great party, supported by the population and property of the country, their object is not forms or families, but essential liberty. This they have already obtained in substance, by the revolution in the state of property, and in form by the charter. Their only important object at present is to secure what they have acquired, and to maintain the existing state of things. Nothing, of course, can be more contrary to the idea of revolution; and if the Bourbons ever exhibit a sincere intention to assist in these objects, they must, of necessity, obtain the undisguised attachment and support of the liberal party, because the interest of that party would then be identified with theirs; and there is little danger of mistake in predicting that their attachments and opinions will be determined by their interest.

I observe, with some surprise, in the same article of the Edinburgh Review to which I have already alluded, a disposition to countenance the imputation upon the liberal party of an ungovern

able and seditious spirit. The reviewers seem to forget that this party is essentially the same with the whig party in England, which they habitually support. Are they prepared to admit the correctness of the similar charges made against their friends by the British ultras, with just as much foundation? As a proof that the liberal party are anxious for a republic or a despotism rather than substantial civil liberty, they quote a passage from a speech of one of the most distinguished orators of that party, General Foy, in which he remarks, that the French, if they cannot have liberty and glory, prefer a brilliant military despotism to a feudal aristocracy. Is it fair to consider this as a preference of despotism over liberty? I confess that if I were compelled to decide between these two evils, I should be disposed to make the same choice. Of all the kinds of government that have ever been practised, the feudal aristocracy of the middle ages seems to have been the most intolerable, uniting as it did all the horrors of complete anarchy with all the oppression of the most ruthless despotism. Then they say that the French can form no idea of any other aristocracy but a feudal one. How does this appear? It seems, on the contrary, to be the reviewers who can form no idea of any other. It is they who assert that the feudal law of primogeniture is absolutely necessary to form an aristocracy. The French deny this necessity, both in theory and practice; and are quite