receive that sense from the ministers of the crown, or to admit them to be a proper or a regular channel for conveying it.

That the ministers in the said speech declare, "His majesty has a just and confident reliance, that we (his faithful commons) are animated with the same sentiments of loyalty, and the same attachment to our excellent constitution, which he had the happiness to see so fully manifested in every part of the kingdom."

To represent, that his faithful commons have never failed in loyalty to his majesty. It is new to them to be reminded of it. It is unne

cessary and invidious to press upon them by any example. This recommendation of loyalty, after his majesty has sat for so many years, with the full support of all descriptions of his subjects, on the throne of this kingdom, at a time of profound peace, and without any pretence of the existence or apprehension of war or conspiracy, becomes in itself a source of no small jealousy to his faithful commons; as many circumstances lead us to apprehend that therein the ministers have reference to

some other measures and principles of loyalty, and to some other ideas of the constitution, than the laws require, or the practice of parliament will admit.

No regular communication of the proofs of loyalty and attachment to the constitution, alluded to in the speech from the throne, have been laid before this house, in order to enable us to judge of the nature, tendency, or occasion of them; or in what particular acts they were displayed; but if we are to suppose the manifestations of loyalty (which are held out to us as an example for imitation) consist in certain addresses delivered to his majesty, promising support to his majesty in the exercise of his prerogative, and thanking his majesty for removing certain of his ministers, on account of the votes they have given upon bills depending in parliament,-if this be the example of loyalty alluded to in the speech from the throne, then we must beg leave to express our serious concern for the impression which has been made on any of our fellowsubjects by misrepresentations, which have seduced them into a seeming approbation of proceedings subversive of their own freedom. We conceive, that the opinions delivered in these papers were not well considered; nor were the parties duly informed of the nature of the matters on which they were called to determine, nor of those proceedings of parliament which they were led to censure.

We shall act more advisedly.-The loyalty

we shall manifest will not be the same with theirs; but, we trust, it will be equally sin cere, and more cnlightened. It is no slight authority which shall persuade us (by receiving as proofs of loyalty the mistaken principles lightly taken up in these addresses) obliquely to criminate, with the heavy and ungrounded charge of disloyalty and disaffection, an uncorrupt, independent, and reforming parliament.* Above all, we shall take care that none of the rights and privileges, always claimed, and since the accession of his majesty's illustrious family constantly exercised by this house (and

In that parliament the house of commons by two several resolutions put an end to the ministry, which ensued, in order to secure their American war. Immediately on the change of own independence, and to prevent the accumu lation of new burthens on the people by the growth of a civil list debt, they passed the establishment bill. By that bill thirty-six offices tenable by members of parliament were sup. pressed; and an order of payment was framed, by which the growth of any fresh debt was ren dered impracticable. The debt on the civil list from the beginning of the present reign had amounted to one million three hundred thousand pounds and upwards. Another act was passed for regulating the office of the paymaster general, and the offices subordinate to it. A million of public money had sometimes been in the hands of the paymasters: this act prevented the pos sibility of any money whatsoever being accu mulated in that office in future. The offices of the exchequer, whose emoluments in time of war were excessive, and grew in exact proportion to the public burthens, were regulated; some of them suppressed, and the rest reduced to fixed salaries. To secure the freedom of election against the crown, a bill was passed to disqualify all officers concerned in the collection of the revenue in any of its branches from voting in elections; a most important act, not only with regard to its primary object, the freedom of election, but as materially forwarding the due collection of revenue. For the same end, (the preserving the freedom of election,) the house rescinded the famous judgment relative to the Middlesex election, and expunged it from the journals. On the principle of reformation of public economy, an act passed for rendering of their own house,' connected with a principle contractors with government incapable of a seat in parliament. The India Bill, (unfortunately lost in the house of lords,) pursued the same idea to its completion; and disabled all servants of the East India company from a seat in that house for a certain time, and until their conduct was examined into and cleared. The remedy of infinite corruptions and of infinite disorders and oppressions, as well as the security of the most important objects of public economy, perished with that bill and that parliament. That parliament also instituted a committee to inquire into the collection of the revenue in all its branches, which prosecuted its duty with great vigour; and suggested several materia, improvements.

which we hold and exercise in trust for the commons of Great Britain, and for their be nefit) shall be constructively surrendered, or even weakened and impaired under ambiguous phrases, and implications of censure on the late parliamentary proceedings. If these claims are not well founded, they ought to be honestly abandoned; if they are just, they ought to be steadily and resolutely maintained.

Of his majesty's own gracious disposition towards the true principles of our free constitution, his faithful commons never did, or could entertain a doubt: but we humbly beg leave to express to his majesty our uneasiness concerning other new and unusual expressions of his ministers, declaratory of a resolution "to support in their just balance, the rights and privileges of every branch of the legislature."

It were desirable that all hazardous theories concerning a balance of rights and privileges (a mode of expression wholly foreign to parliamentary usage) might have been forborne.

His majesty's faithful commons are well instructed in their own rights and privileges, which they are determined to maintain on the footing upon which they were handed down from their ancestors: they are not unacquainted with the rights and privileges of the house of peers; and they know and respect the lawful prerogatives of the crown: but they do not think it safe to admit any thing concerning the existence of a balance of those rights, privileges, and prerogatives; nor are they able to discern to what objects ministers would apply their fiction of balance; nor what they would consider as a just one. unauthorized doctrines have a tendency to stir improper discussions; and to lead to mischievous innovations in the constitution.*

These

If these speculations are let loose, the house of lords may quarrel with their share of the legislature, as being limited with regard to the origination of grants to the crown and the origi nation of money bills. The advisers of the crown may think proper to bring its negative into ordinary use; and even to dispute, whether a mere negative, compared with the deliberative power, exercised in the other houses, be such a share in the legislature, as to produce a due balance in favour of that branch; and thus justify the previous interference of the crown, in the manner lately used. The following will serve to shew how much foundation there is for great caution, concerning these novel speculations. Lord Shelburne, in his celebrated speech, April 8th, 1779, expresses himself as follows: Vide Parliamentary Register, vol. x.

"The noble and learned lord on the woolsack, in the debate which opened the business of this day, asserted that your lordships were incompetent to make any alteration in a money bill, or a bill of supply. I should be glad to see

That his faithful commons most humbly recommend, instead of the inconsiderate specu lations of unexperienced men, that on all occasions, resort should be had to the happy practice of parliament, and to those solid maxims of government which have prevailed since the accession of his majesty's illustrious family, as furnishing the only safe principles on which the crown and parliament can proceed

We think it the more necessary to be cautious on this head, as, in the last parliament, the present ministers had thought proper to countenance, if not to suggest, an attack upon the most clear and undoubted rights and privileges of this house.*

the matter fully and fairly discussed, and the subject brought forward and argued upon precedent, as well as all its collateral relations. I should be pleased to see the question fairly committed, were it for no other reason, but to hear the sleek smooth contractors from the other house, come to this bar and declare, that they, and they only, could frame a money bill; and they, and they only, could dispose of the property of the peers of Great Britain. Perhaps some arguments more plausible than those I heard this day from the woolsack, to shew that the commons have an uncontroulable, unqualified right, to bind your lordships' property, may be urged by them. At present, I beg leave to differ from the noble and learned lord; for until the claim, after a solemn discussion of the house, is openly and directly relinquished, I shall continue to be of opinion, that your lordships have a right to alter, amend, or reject a money bill."

The Duke of Richmond also, in his letter to the volunteers of Ireland, speaks of several of the powers exercised by the house of commons, in the light of usurpations; and his grace is of opinion, that when the people are restored to what he conceives to be their rights, in electing the house of commons, the other branches of the legislature ought to be restored to theirs. Vide Remembrancer, vol. xví.

By an act of parliament, the directors of the East India company are restrained from accep. tance of bills drawn from India, beyond a certain amount, without the consent of the commissioners of the treasury. The late house of commons finding bills to an immense amount, drawn upon that body by their servants abroad, and knowing their circumstances to be exceedingly doubtful, came to a resolution providently cau. tioning the lords of the treasury against the acceptance of these bills. until the house should otherwise direct. The court lords then took occasion to declare against the resolution as illegal, by the commons undertaking to direct in the execution of a trust created by act of par. liament. The house justly alarmed at this re solution, which went to the destruction of the whole of its superintending capacity, and particularly in matters relative to its own province of money, directed a committee to search the journals, and they found a regular series of precedents, commencing from the remotest of those records, and carried on to that day, by

Fearing, from these extraordinary admonitions, and from the new doctrines, which seem to have dictated several unusual expressions, that his majesty has been abused by false representations of the late proceedings in parliament, we think it our duty respectfully to inform his majesty, that no attempt whatever has been made against his lawful prerogatives, or against the rights and privileges of the peers, by the late house of commons, in any of their addresses, votes, or resolutions: neither do we know of any proceeding by bill, in which it was proposed to abridge the extent of his royal prerogative: but, if such provision had existed in any bill, we protest, and we declare, against all speeches, acts or addresses, from any persons whatsoever, which have a tendency to consider such bills, or the persons concerned in them, as just objects of: any kind of censure and punishment from the throne. Necessary reformations may hereafter require, as they have frequently done in former times, limitations and abridgements, and in some cases an entire extinction of some branch of prerogative. If bills should be improper in the form in which they appear in the house where they originate, they are liable, by the wisdom of this constitution, to be corrected, and even to be totally set aside, elsewhere. This is the known, the legal, and the safe remedy: but whatever, by the manifestation of the royal displeasure, tends to intimidate individual members from proposing, or this house from receiving, debating, and passing bills, tends to prevent even the beginning of every reformation in the state; and utterly destroys the deliberative capacity of parliament.-We therefore claim, demand, and insist upon it, as our undoubted right, that no persons shall be deemed proper objects of animadversion by the crown, in any mode whatever, for the votes which they give, or the propositions which they make, in parliament.

We humbly conceive, that besides its share of the legislative power, and its right of impeachment, that by the law and usage of parliament, this house has other powers and capacities, which it is bound to maintain. This house is assured, that our humble advice on the exercise of prerogative will be heard with the same attention with which it has ever been regarded; and that it will be followed

which it appeared, that the house interfered by an authoritative advice and admonition, upon every act of executive government without exception; and in many much stronger cases than that which the lords thought proper to quarrel with.

by the same effects which it has ever produced, during the happy and glorious reigns of his majesty's royal progenitors; not doubting but that, in all those points, we shali be considered as a counsel of wisdom and weight to advise, and not merely as an accuser of competence to criminate.* This house claims both capacities; and we trust we shall be left to our free discretion which of them we shall employ as best calculated for his majesty's, and the national service.-Whenever we shall see it expedient to offer our advice concerning his majesty's servants, who are those of the public, we confidently hope, that the personal favour of any minister, or any set of ministers, will not be more dear to his majesty, than the credit and character of a house of commons. It is an experiment full of peril to put t the representative wisdom and justice of his majesty's people in the wrong; it is a crooked and desperate design, leading to mischief, the extent of which no human wisdom can foresee, to attempt to form a prerogative party in the nation, to be resorted to as occasion shall require, in derogation from the authority of the commons of Great Britain in parliament assembled: it is a contrivance full of danger, for ministers to set up the representative and constituent bodies of the commons of this kingdom as two separate and distinct powers, formed to counterpoise each other, leaving the preference in the hands of secret advisers of the crown. In such a situation of things, these advisers, taking advantage of the differences which may accidentally arise, or may purposely be fomented between them, will have it in their choice to resort to the one or the other, as may best suit the purposes of their sinister ambition. By exciting an emulation and contest between the representative and the constituent bodies, as parties contending for credit and influence at the throne, sacrifices will be made by both; and the whole can end in nothing else than the destruction of the dearest rights and liberties of the nation. If there must be another mode of conveying the collective sense of the people to the throne than that by the house of commons, it ought to be fixed and defined, and its authority ought to be settled: it ought not to exist in so precarious and dependent a state as that ministers should have it in their power, at their own mere pleasure, to

"I observe at the same time, that there is no charge or complaint suggested against my present ministers."-The king's answer, 25th February 1784, to the address of the house of commons. Vide Resolutions of the House of Commons, printed for Debrett, p. 31.

honour and respect the names of those who composed that house of commons, distinguished for its independence. They could not confide in persons who have shewn a disposition to dark and dangerous intrigues. By these intrigues thoy have weakened, if not destroyed, the clear assurance which his majesty's people, and which all nations ought to have, of what are, and what are not, the real acts of his government.

If it should be seen that his ministers may continue in their offices, without any signification to them of his majesty's displeasure at any of their measures, whilst persons considerable for their rank, and known to have had access to his majesty's sacred person, can with impunity abuse that advantage, and employ his majesty's name to disavow and counteract the proceedings of his official servants, nothing but distrust, discord, debility, contempt of all authority, and general confusion, can prevail in his government.

This we lay before his majesty, with humility and concern, as the inevitable effect of a spirit of intrigue in his executive government; an evil which we have but too much reason to be persuaded exists and increases. During the course of the last session it broke out in a manner the most alarming. This evil was infinitely aggravated by the unauthorized, but not disavowed use which has been made of his majesty's name, for the purpose of the most unconstitutional, corrupt, and dishonourable influence on the minds of the members of parliament, that ever was practised in this kingdom. No attention, even to the exteriour decorum, in the practice of corruption, and intimidation employed on peers, was observed: several peers were obliged under menaces to retract their declarations, and to recall their proxies.

The commons have the deepest interest in the purity and integrity of the peerage. The peers dispose of all the property in the kingdom, in the last resort; and they dispose of it on their honour and not on their oaths, as all the members of every other tribunal in the kingdom must do; though in them the proceeding is not conclusive. We have, there fore, a right to demand that no application shall be made to peers of such a nature as may give room to call in question, much less to attaint, our sole security for all that we Dossess. This corrupt proceeding appeared to the house of coinmons, who are the natural guardians of the purity of parliament, and of the purity of every branch of judicature, a most reprehensible and dangerous practice, VOL. I.-24

tending to shake the very foundation of the authority of the house of peers; and they branded it as such by their resolution.

The house had not sufficient credence to enable them legally to punish this practice, but they had enough to caution them inst all confidence in the authors and abettors of it. They performed their duty in humbly advising his majesty against the employment of such ministers; but his majesty was advised to keep those ministers, and to dissolve that parliament. The house, aware of the impor tance, and urgency of its duty with regard to the British interests in India, which were and are in the utmost disorder, and in the utmost peril, most humbly requested his majesty not to dissolve the parliament during the course of their very critical proceedings on that subject. His majesty's gracious condescension to that request was conveyed in the royal faith, pledged to a house of parliament, and solemnly delivered from the throne. It was but a very few days after a committee had been, with the consent and concurrence of the chancellor of exchequer, appointed for an inquiry into certain accounts delivered to the house by the court of directors, and then actually engaged in that inquiry, that the ministers, regardless of the assurance given from the crown to a house of commons, did dissolve that parliament. We most humbly submit to his majes ty's consideration the consequences of this their breach of public faith.

Whilst the members of the house of commons, under that security, were engaged in his majesty's and the national business, endeavours were industriously used to calumniate those whom it was found impracticable to corrupt. The reputation of the members, and the reputation of the house itself, was undermined in every part of the kingdom.

In the speech from the throne relative to India, we are cautioned by the ministers, "not to lose sight of the effect any measure may have on the constitution of our country." We are apprehensive that a calumnious report spread abroad of an attack upon his majesty's prerogative by the late house of common, may have made an impression on his royal mind, and have given occasion to this unusual admonition to the present. This attack is charged to have been made in the late parliament, by a bill which passed the house of commons in the late session of that parliament, for the regula tion of the affairs, for the preservation of the commerce, and for the amendment of the government of this nation, in the East Indies. That his majesty and his people may have