gether incompatible with their cha racter.

But,

Secondly, Our author asserts that the Jews were wholly unacquainted with types, previously to their intercourse with the Greeks; that types, being of heathen original, could not have been first instituted under the sanction of divine authority; and that the doctrine of accommodation must follow from these facts, let the consequences be what they will. There are two things on which this assertion is grounded: Plato's recommending to the teachers of the Athenian youth the adoption of the allegorical sense, in the exposition of Homer; and the intercourse between the Greeks and Jews, after the conquests of Alexander.

It appears, however, from the testimony of credible authors, that the allegorical sense was in use among the Greeks, long before the age of Plato, and could not therefore have been indebted to him for its origin, as our author would insinuate. It happens, likewise, that the Greeks were far more indebted to the Jews, than the Jews to the Greeks, if the question is to be determined by historical evidence. It is asserted by Plutarch, and the author of the life of Pythagoras, that the allegorical sense had its origin in the Egyptian hieroglyphics. Whatever may have been its origin, it is certain, from the testimony of the last mentioned author, that Pythagoras was acquainted with it. This philosopher, it is well known, lived in the age of Tarquinius Superbus, several centuries before the time of Plato. Pythagoras is said, by the author of his life, to have resided, for some time, upon Mount Carmel, and to have conversed with the sages of Phoenicia, Chaldea and Syria. Porphyry gives nearly the same account, upon the authority of Diogenes, and adds explicitly, that Pythagoras derived part of his knowledge from the Hebrews. Theodoret asserts, in a similar manner, that the doctrine of Pythagoras

* Jamblichus.

*

was derived from the Egyptians and the Hebrews. It may likewise be safely inferred, from several passages of Philo, that the Essenes in his time, had been, for many ages, acquainted with the allegorical sense. In fact, historical testimony is decidedly against the supposition, either that it originated among the Greeks, or if it did originate among thein, that Plato first invented it; but as far as any thing can be determined from history on this subject, the presumption is, that the Jews were acquainted with it, long before any other nation whatever. But we have other testimony on this point, which is decisive. It appears from the authority of the Old Testament writers, not only that the Jews were accustomed, in those ages, to typical emblems, but that typical emblems were actually employed by the holy prophets, under the sanction of divine command. I need only refer, in confirmation of these facts, to those numerous external signs and actions, by which the prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel, expressively represented the severe judgments about to be inflicted upon the Jews and neighbouring nations. These examples, while they furnish a satisfactory refutation to the present objection, likewise show the temerity of the assertion, that the sacred writers of the Old Testament do not, in any one instance, give us the least intimation of the existence of types. The conclusion that the inspired writers intended to deceive,-by speaking one thing and meaning another, -was partly grounded upon this assertion, and, of course, that conclusion must be greatly weakened by proving this assertion false. lest it should be objected, that the inspired writers gave such intimations only in a few instances, while, in general, they furnished no clue, by which to determine whether their writings contained a hidden sense or not, it will be necessary,

But

Thirdly, To examine a little more critically that objection which imputes to these writers insincerity and

intentional deception. This objection supposes, either that the Jews were unacquainted with the existence of a hidden sense, or, if they were acquainted with its existence, knew not when, and in what circumstances, it was used in their writings; or it supposes, that the authors of these writings knew, when they penned them, that they conveyed a hidden sense, and knew, at the same time, that all others were ignorant of this hidden sense except themselves. If the author of the objection can establish the truth of all these suppositions, he will, perhaps, have gained his point; otherwise, his argument, drawn from this objection, is of no force whatever. The first of these suppositions is already proved to be groundless. It is a well established fact, that the Jews did know there was a hidden sense, and of course they expected to find such a sense in the sacred writings. But, if they expected to find it in these writings, how could there be any deception in its being there? When a person is deceived, there is something imposed upon him which is foreign from his expectations; but here no such thing can be predicated or pretended.

The second supposition is, that the Jews, even although they knew there was a typical sense, yet had no rules by which to determine when and where to look for it; and, consequently, were liable to deception-sometimes adopting it, in a passage in which it was not contained, and, at other times, rejecting it, in those passages in which it really existed. How this supposition can be proved true, it is impossible to conjecture. Because we are unacquainted with any rules by which they

could determine whether or not there was a hidden sense contained in a passage, does it follow that they had no rules? Certainly not.

The only remaining supposition is, that the sacred writers knew that their compositions contained a hidden sense, and knew too, that those to whom they wrote were wholly unacquainted with the means by which to determine it, and yet these writers refused to furnish those means. It has already been proved, that the sacred writers did, in some instances, furnish a clue for ascertaining the hidden sense; and, in those instances in which they have furnished no such clue, it behoves the objector to prove that the writers themselves were acquainted with the hidden sense of their writings. If they were not acquainted with it, of course they could not intend to practise deception. We have, perhaps, some reason to believe, that the sacred writers, in many instances, were entirely unacquainted with the typical import of what they themselves describe, and that they were merely the amanuenses of the Holy Spirit. But, whatever may be the true theory on this subject, it is sufficient for us to know there is both a literal and a typical sense in their writings; that the former conveys important truths to the understanding, and that no proof can be brought, upon any supposition, which is sufficient to fasten the charge of intentional deception, upon those authors whose divinely inspired writings contain the latter. The remaining objections of Baur will naturally come into notice under the third head, where the extension of types is to be considered. (To be continued.)

THE IMPORTANCE OF PIETY IN AN INTERPRETER OF SCRIPTURE.

(Continued from p. 70.)

III. A third canon of interpretation, upon which unrenewed men cannot act in relation to the Bible, is-that we must come to the work of exposition, without prejudice of feeling against the author, or his doctrines.

This rule does not require that in order to a fair exhibition of an author's meaning, we should approve of him or his doctrines, but that our feelings should be in such a state, as to allow us cheerfully to acquiesce in the fact, that the author examined has actually taught such or such doctrines, whatever be their character. If it be requisite, in order to the fair exposition of any writer, that we be thus free from prejudice, it is doubly important, when we approach a volume which we recognise as divine; whose doctrines relate to our personal character, duty and destiny; which claims to propound articles for our faith, and to possess an authority from which there is no appeal. It is clear that if this book of high prerogative, should actually contain doctrines repugnant to the strongest feelings of our nature, we should be little likely to sustain the character of fair expounders of its meaning.

The argument then for the necessity of piety, under this head, is summarily this-that the feelings of men have great influence over their perceptions and reasonings-that the feelings of unrenewed men being hostile to the truths of the Bible must pervert their views of its meaning and consequently that piety, which removes this enmity to the truth, is essential to an interpreter of scripture.

That men are influenced by their feelings in all their perceptions and reasonings, on every subject in which their feelings are deeply concerned,

is a fact strongly supported by experience. The extent of this influence is indeed much greater than we should at first consider possible. The truth is, that the understanding is much less independent in its operations, and much less under the influence of truth, than is commonly supposed. How it is that a particular state of a man's feelings should prevent his perceiving a subject as it is perceived by others--or prevent his feeling the force of arguments convincing to every mind but his own, it is not our present business to explain. The fact cannot be questioned. Without experience we are indeed ready to suppose that what we clearly perceive, we can so clearly state, that others, willing or unwilling, must yield their assent. But when we come to make the attempt, we find that after all our efforts at precision of statement and clearness of argument, we often fail to gain admission into the mind preoccupied by prejudice, even for the simplest principles, or the plainest deductions. Every case of enthusiasm is an instance of the domineering influence of the imagination and feelings over the understanding. Conclusions, directly opposed to the clearest principles of reason, are embraced with a strength of conviction which demonstration could hardly produce; and no force of reasoning will convince the enthusiast of his error, though every argument he can advance in its defence is as flimsy as the air.

The occurrences of common life, also, afford innumerable instances of the same kind. We daily find how difficult it is to convince men of the truth or justice of any principles which oppose their opinions or their interest. It is however upon subjects connected with religion, that the frequency and extent of this influence is most lamentably exhibited. There is hardly any form of absurdity which to some minds has not appeared in

the form of truth-nor an axiom in religion or morals, which has not been denied by those whose doctrines it has opposed.

The great diversity of opinion on matters of religion, therefore, is a standing proof of the power of prejudice over the mind. With the same Bible, and the same facilities of ascertaining its meaning, such diversity and contrariety could not exist, if the mind were free from the influence of prejudice. God has not left the evidence of his truth so obscure as to fail of convincing the mind when it is unbiassed by hostility of feeling.

The only other illustration of this point I would adduce is-the strange expositions we constantly see given of the sacred scriptures. There is scarcely an unnatural perversion which has not been adopted, to avoid the necessity of admitting obnoxious doctrines. Were there no other evidence of the truth of this assertion, than the various expositions given of the few first verses of St. John's gospel, it would be sufficient. The author of "The Calm Inquiry," in commenting on the expression, the Word was God, speaks thus: "The Word was God-or a God-i. e. an inferior God, derived from the supreme, and delegated by him: or God was wisdom-or the word; i. e. the teacher was a prophet, endued with miraculous powers or, if the conjecture of Crellius be admitted, Otov for Otos, the Word was God's, the teacher sent from God." But it would be endless to cite examples-The plain obvious import of the doctrinal parts of the Bible is resisted by a great body of commentators; and the melancholy spectacle is exhibited of men feebly struggling against the strong current of holy writ, and vainly endeavouring to prevent its bearing their doctrines and their hopes together to destruction. But I am dwelling too long on a point which cannot be questioned-It has passed into a proverb, that a man convinced against his inclination is not to be considered as having al

tered his opinion; that is, that the understanding is more governed by human feelings than it is by truth.

All, therefore, that is requisite for our present argument is, to ascertain whether the feelings of unrenewed men are hostile to the truth of Godwhether the doctrines of the gospel are not opposed to the pride of human reason, and the strongest feelings of the human heart-and whether true piety does not, in a great degree, correct and change this state of mind so unfavourable to the reception of inspired truth. If these points be ascertained—and our address is to those who are supposed to have ascertained them-then it must follow that no individual, destitute of vital piety, can be an impartial expounder of the word of God.

Since piety, moreover, consists in sentiments and feelings in accordance with the doctrines of the Bible, being the product of the same Spirit by which those doctrines were revealed, there thence arises that peculiar congeniality of feeling, between the pious mind and the sacred writers, which is the best possible guide to their meaning. The importance of this congeniality is acknowledged upon other subjects. No one expects the man who is sunk in vice to enter into the refinements of the moralist, nor the clown into the pleasures of the scholar. Yet the profligate is not incapable of moral feeling, nor the clown of the principles of taste. But the case is even much stronger here, for it has never entered into the heart of the unrenewed man to conceive of the peculiar views and feelings which arise from piety.-It is not to be expected, therefore, that he should enter into feelings of which he has never formed a conception, nor adopt sentiments which, without such feelings, will ever appear either true or desirable.

Another important influence of piety, in producing a state of feeling adapted to a just perception of revealed truth, is-that it leads to humility. This, as it refers to a willingness to yield our previous opi

nions, has already been noticed. But a no less important result is, that it produces a sense of our dependance upon the teaching of God, for all correct knowledge of divine thingsa conviction that it is He who must preserve us from prejudice, guard us from error, and illumine our minds with the light of truth. That there is such assistance to be obtained in studying the sacred scriptures, can be proved from the declarations of the word of God, as well as the experience of his people. The doctrines which were "a stumbling block to the Jews, and foolishness to the Greek," were "the wisdom and power of God," to those who were called. "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and bring to naught the understanding of the prudent-Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and revealed them unto babes." These, and similar passages, as well as those which speak of the inability of the natural man to understand the things of the Spirit-of the blinding power of Satan over the minds of the men of this world-and of the teaching of the Holy Spirit; all go to prove that the people of God have an assistance in the study of the word, not enjoyed by others. That this is the fact is abundantly confirmed by the frequent instances which occur, of unlettered men whose views of the doctrines of the gospel are both enlarged and correct, while the learned, if unenlightened from above, are so little acquainted with its genuine import.

Now if there be this divine assistance, and if it be the most effectual and the safest guide to a knowledge of the truth, then they who feel they need it, and most humbly seek the blessing, will be most likely to experience its power; while men, proud in the consciousness of strength, confident in their own sagacity-in the efficacy of their rules and the learning of their commentators, will be left to wander in the darkness of error. To gain admission to the temple of divine truth, we must seek it humbly-To thunder at her gates,

with confidence of entering, will but provoke the Lord to leave us to our folly. In a word, and agreeably to the repeated declarations of scripture, to know God's doctrine we must "do his will."

If then it be admitted that our feelings regulate, to a considerable degree, our opinions-that the feelings of unrenewed men are hostile to the doctrines of the Bible-that piety not only removes this hostility, but produces a congeniality of feeling between the reader and the sacred writer; and if, above all, it leads him humbly to depend upon that divine Spirit whose office it is to lead us into the truth-must it not be allowed that piety is, of all qualifications, the most important to an interpreter of sacred scripture.

Finally-The appeal, at last, must be made to experience. It is vain to attempt to prove by argument the necessity of piety, if our conclusion is contradicted by facts. And here, perhaps, it may be thought, our cause must fail-That if piety did secure correct views of the doctrines of the Bible, there could not be such diversity of opinion among men confessedly pious; nor such manifest perversions of scripture, as are sometimes to be found in their writings. To this objection we reply-that we are far from maintaining that piety is the only requisite for an interpreter of the Bible. It has already been stated, that the requisites for a good interpreter of scripture are both numerous and unusual; an individual, therefore, may fail in his exposition from a variety of causes. He may be led into error by his ignorance of the original languages; by ignorance of ancient facts; and by ignorance of the rules of grammar, or of the just principles of interpretation. He may also be blinded, in a degree, by remaining prejudice; or be deficient in solidity of judgment. As we do not assert that piety will supply all these deficiencies, we may, while we maintain the necessity of piety, consistently admit the numerous aberra