logical hopes, and allied with unrestrained pneumatic dogmatics, and also the strict lex of the new rule of faith, which seemed ancient, because the heretics were undoubtedly innovators. He sought to be a disciple of the prophets and an obedient son of his Episcopal teachers. While he spent his strength in the fruitless attempt to unite them,1 he left both forces as an inheritance to the Church of the West. If the history of that Church down to the sixteenth century exhibits a conflict between orthodox clerical and enthusiastic, between biblical and pneumatic elements, if monachism here was constantly in danger of running into apocalyptics and enthusiasm, and of forming an opposition to the Episcopal and world-Church, all that is foreshadowed in Tertullian.

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A further element, which here comes before us, is the juristic. We know that jurisprudence and legal thought held the chief place in mediæval philosophy, theology, and ethics.2 Postapostolic Greek Christians had, indeed, already put Christianity forward as the "law," and the Roman community may have cultivated this view with peculiar energy; but in and by itself this term is capable of so many meanings as to be almost neutral. Yet through the agency of Tertullian, by his earlier profession a lawyer, all Christian forms received a legal impress. He not only transferred the technical terms of the jurists into the ecclesiastical language of the West, but he also contemplated, from a legal standpoint, all relations of the individual and the Church to the Deity, and vice versâ, all duties and rights, the

1 See our expositions of this in Vol. II., p. 67 ff., 108 ff., 128 f., 311 f.

2 See v. Schulte, Gesch. der Quellen und Lit. d. kanonischen Rechts, Vol. I., pp. 92-103, Vol. II., p. 512 f. Also his Gedanken über Aufgabe und Reform d. jurist. Studiums, 1881: "The science of law was in practice the leading factor in Church | and State from the twelfth century." That it is so still may, to save many words, be confirmed by a testimony of Döllinger's. In a memorable speech on Phillips he says, (Akad. Vorträge, Vol. II., p. 185 f.): “Frequent intercourse with the two closelyallied converts, Iarcke and Phillips, showed me how an ultramontane and papistical conception of the Christian religion was especially suggested and favoured by legal culture and mode of thought, which was dominated, even in the case of German specialists like Phillips, not by ancient German, but Roman legal ideas."

3 On the designation of Holy Scripture as “lex" in the West, see Zahn, Gesch. | d. neutestamentlichen Kanous, I. 1, p. 95 f.

moral imperative as well as the actions of God and Christ, nay, their mutual relationship. He who was so passionate and fanciful seemed never to be thoroughly satisfied until he had found the scheme of a legal relationship which he could proclaim as an inviolable authority; he never felt secure until he had demonstrated inner compulsions to be external demands, exuberant promises to be stipulated rewards. But with this the scheme of personal rights was applied almost universally. God appears as the mighty partner who watches jealously over his rights. Through Tertullian this tendency passed into the Western Church, which, being Roman, was disposed to favour it; there it operated in the most prejudicial way. If we grant that by it much that was valuable was preserved, and juristic thought did contribute to the understanding of some, not indeed the most precious, Pauline conceptions, yet, on the whole, religious reflection was led into a false channel, the ideas of satisfaction and merit becoming of the highest importance, and the separation of Western from primitive and Eastern Christianity was promoted.1

Another element is closely connected with the legal, viz., the syllogistic and dialetical. Tertullian has been extolled as a speculative theologian; but this is wrong. Speculation was not his forte; we perceive this very plainly when we look at his relation to Irenaeus. Notice how much he has borrowed from this predecessor of his, and how carefully he has avoided, in doing so, his most profound speculations! Tertullian was a Sophist in the good and bad sense of the term. He was in his element in Aristotelian and Stoic dialectics; in his syllogisms he is a philosophising advocate. But in this also he was the pioneer of his Church, whose theologians have always reasoned more than they have philosophised. The manner in which he rings the changes on auctoritas and ratio, or combines them, and spins lines of thought out of them; the formal treatment of problems, meant to supply the place of one dealing with the matter, until it ultimately loses sight of aim and object, and falls a prey to the delusion that the certainty of the conclusion 1 Consider, e.g., a sentence like this of Cyprian De unit. 15: “Justitia opus est, ut promereri quis possit deum judicem."

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guarantees the certainty of the premises-this whole method only too well known from mediæval Scholasticism, had its originator in Tertullian.1 In the classical period of eastern

1 A series of legal schemes framed by Tertullian for his dogmatics and ethics have been given in Vol. II., 279 f., 294 f., Vol. IV. pp. 110, 121. In addition to his speculation on substantia, persona, and status, the categories offendere, satisfacere, promereri, acceptare, and rependere, etc., play the chief part in his system. Most closely connected with the legal contemplation of problems is the abstract reference to authority; for one does not obey a law because he finds it to be good and just, but because it is law. (Tertullian, indeed, knows very well, when defending himself against heathen insinuations, that the above dictum is not sufficient in the sphere of religion and morals, see e.g., Apolog. 4.) This attitude of Tertullian, led up to by his dialectical procedure and his alternations between auctoritas and ratio, produces in many passages the impression that we are listening to a mediæval Catholic. In regard to the alternation above described, the work De corona is especially characteristic ; but so is Adv. Marc. I., 23 f. He writes, De pænit. 4: "Nos pro nostris angustiis unum inculcamus, bonum atque optimum esse quod deus præcipit. Audaciam existimo de bono divini præcepti disputare. Neque enim quia bonum est, idcirco auscultare debemus, sed quia deus præcepit. Ad exhibitionem obsequii prior est majestas divinæ potestatis, prior est auctoritas imperantis quam utilitas servientis." (Compare Scorp. 2, 3; De fuga, 4; De cor. 2.) But the same theologian writes, De pæn. 1: "Res dei ratio, quia deus nihil non ratione providit, nihil non ratione tractari intellegique voluit." The work De pænit. is in general peculiarly fitted to initiate us into Tertullian's style of thought. I shall in the sequel pick out the most important points, and furnish parallels from his other writings. Be it noticed first that the work emphasises the three parts, vera poenitentia (deflere, metus dei), confessio and satisfactio, and then adds the venia on the part of the offensus deus.

In chap. II. we already meet with the expression “merita pænitentiæ." There we read: "ratio salutis certam formam tenet, ne bonis umquam factis cogitatisve quasi violenta aliqua manus injiciatur. Deus enim reprobationem bonorum ratam non habens, utpote suorum, quorum cum auctor et defensor sit necesse est, proinde et acceptator, si acceptator etiam remunerator . . . bonum factum deum habet debitorem, sicuti et malum, quia judex omnis remunerator est causa." (De orat. 7: "pænitentia demonstratur acceptabilis deo;” we have also “commendatior"). Chap. III.; "Admissus ad dominica præcepta ex ipsis statim eruditur, id peccato deputandum, a quo deus arceat.” (The distinction between præcepta and consilia dominica is familiar in Tertullian; see Ad. uxor. II. I; De coron. 4; Adv. Marc. II. 17. In Adv. Marc. I. 29, he says that we may not reject marriage altogether, because if we did there would be no meritorious sanctity. In Adv. Marc. I. 23, the distinction is drawn between "debita” and “indebita bonitas"). Chap. III.: "Voluntas factì origo est; "a disquisition follows on velle, concupiscere, perficere. Chap. V. : "Ita qui per delictorum pænitentiam instituerat dominus satisfacere, diabolo per aliæ pænitentiæ pænitentiam satisfaciet, eritque tanto magis perosus deo, quanto æmulo ejus acceptus.” (See De orat. II; "fratri satisfacere," 18; "disciplinæ satisfacere,” 23; satisfacimus deo domino nostro"; De jejun. 3; De pud. 9, 13; De pat. 10, 13, etc., etc.: "peccator patri satisfacit," namely, through his penances; see De' pud. 13: "hic jam carnis interitum in officium pænitentiæ interpretantur, quod videatur

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theology men did not stop at auctoritas and ratio; they sought to reach the inner convincing phases of authority, and understood by ratio the reason determined by the conception of the matter jejuniis et sordibus et incuria omni et dedita opera malæ tractationis carnem exterminando satis deo facere "). In ch. V. it is explained quite in the Catholic manner that timor is the fundamental form of the religious relation. Here, as in countless other passages, the "deus offensus moves Tertullian's soul (see De pat. 5: "hinc deus irasci exorsus, unde offendere homo inductus.") Fear dominates the whole of penitence. (De pænit. 6: "metus est instrumentum pænitentiæ." In general "offendere deum" and "satisfacere deo" are the proper technical terms; see De pæn. 7: "offendisti, sed reconciliari adhuc potes; habes cui satisfacias et quidem volentem." Ch. X. "intolerandum scilicet pudori, domino offenso satisfacere." Ch. XI.: "castigationem victus atque cultus offenso domino præstare." Along with satisfacere we have "deum iratum, indignatum mitigare, placare, reconciliare." Ch. VI: "omnes salutis in promerendo deo petitores sumus. Compare with this " promereri deum" Scorp. 6: "quomodo multæ mansiones apud patrem, si non pro varietate meritorum porro et si fidei propterea congruebat sublimitati et claritatis aliqua prolatio, tale quid esse opportuerat illud emolumenti, quod magno constaret labore, cruciatu, tormento, morte . . . eadem pretia quæ et merces. De orat. 2: "meritum fidei." 3: "nos angelorum, si meruimus, candidati " ; 4: "merita cujusque.” De pænit. 6: “catechumenus mereri cupit baptismum, timet adhuc delinquere, ne non mereretur accipere." De pat. 4: “artificium promerendi obsequium est, obsequii vero disciplina morigera subjectio est." De virg. vel., 13: "deus justus est ad remuneranda quæ soli sibi fiunt." De exhort. I: "nemo indulgentia dei utendo promeretur, sed voluntati obsequendo;" 2: "deus quæ vult præcipit et accepto facit et æternitatis mercede dispungit." De pud. 10: pænitentiam deo immolare. magis merebitur fructum pænitentiæ qui nondum ea usus est quam qui jam et abusus est." De jejun. 3: "ratio promerendi deum" [jejunium iratum deum homini reconciliat, ch. VII.]; 13: "ultro officium facere deo." How familiar and important in general is to Tertullian the thought of performing a service, a favour to God, or of furnishing him with a spectacle ! He indeed describes as a heathen idea (Apolog. 11) the sentence: "conlatio divinitatis meritorum remunerandorum fuit ratio”; but he himself comes very near it; thus he says (De exhortat. 10): "per continentiam negotiaberis magnam substantiam sanctitatis, parsimonia carnis spiritum acquires." He sternly reproves, Scorp. 15, the saying of the "Lax": Christus non vicem passionis sitit; he himself says (De pat. 16): "rependamus Christi patientiam, quam pro nobis ipse dependit." De pænit. 6: "Quam porro ineptum, quam pænitentiam non adimplere, ei veniam delictorum sustinere? Hoc est pretium non exhibere, ad mercem manum emittere. Hoc enim pretio dominus veniam addicere instituit; hac pænitentiæ compensatione redimendam proponit impunitatem," (see Scorp. 6: “nulli compensatio invidiosa est, in qua aut gratiæ aut injuriæ communis est ratio"). In Ch. VI. Tertullian uses “imputare," and this word is not rarely found along with "reputare"; in Ch. VII. we have "indulgentia" (indulgere), and these terms are met somewhat frequently; so also "restituere" (ch. VII. 12: "restitutio peccatoris "). De pat. 8: tantum relevat confessio delictorum, quantum dissimulatio exaggerat ; confessio omni satisfactionis consilium est." Further, ch. IX.: "Hujus igitur pænitentiæ secundæ et unius quanto in arte negotium est, tanto operosior probatio

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in question. In the West, auctoritas and ratio stood for a very long time side by side without their relations being fixed-see the medieval theologians from Cassian-and the speculation introduced by Augustine was ultimately once more eliminated, (that sounds quite mediæval), ut non sola conscientia præferatur, sed aliquo etiam actu administretur. Is actus, qui magis Græco vocabulo exprimitur et frequentatur, exomologesis est, qua delictum domino nostro confitemur, non quidem ut ignaro, sed quatenus satisfactio confessione disponitur, confessione pænitentia nascitur, pænitentia deus mitigatur. Concerning this exhomologesis, this tearful confession, he goes on: "commendat pænitentiam deo et temporali afflictatione æterna supplicia non dicam frustratur sed expungit.” (“Commendare” as used above is common, see e.g., De virg. vel. 14, and De pat. 13: "patientia corporis [penances] precationes commendat, deprecationes affirmat; hæc aures Christi aperit, clementiam elicit."). The conception is also distinctly expressed by Tertullian that in the ceremony of penance the Church completely represents Christ himself, see ch. X. : "in uno et altero ecclesia est, ecclesia vero Christus. Ergo cum te ad fratrum genua protendis, Christum contrectas, Christum exoras." De pudic. 10, shows how he really bases pardon solely on the "cessatio delicti"; "etsi venia est pænitentiæ fructus, hanc quoque consistere non licet sine cessatione delicti. Ita cessatio delicti radix est veniæ ut venia sit pænitentia fructus." Further ch. II. : "omne delictum aut venia dispungit aut poena, venia ex castigatione, poena ex damnatione"; but "satisfactio" is implied in the "castigatio." In De pudic. I the notorious lax edict of Calixtus is called "liberalitas " (venia) i.e., "indulgence." Let us further recall some formulas which are pertinent here. Thus we have the often-used figure of the "militia Christi," and the regimental oathsacramentum. So also the extremely characteristic alternation between "gratia" and "voluntas humana," most clearly given in De exhort. 2: non est bonæ et solidæ fidei sic omnia ad voluntatem dei referre et ita adulari unum quemque dicendo nihil fieri sine nutu ejus, ut non intellegamus, esse aliquid in nobis ipsis. . . . Non debemus quod nostro expositum est arbitrio in domini referre voluntatem"; Ad uxor. 1, 8: quædam enim sunt divinæ liberalitatis, quædam nostræ operationis." Then we

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have the remarkable attempt to distinguish two wills in God, one manifest and one hidden, and to identify these with præcepta and consilia, in order ultimately to establish the "hidden' or "higher" alone. De exhort. 2 f.: "cum solum sit in nobis velle, et in hoc probatur nostra erga deum mens, an ea velimus quæ cum voluntate ipsius faciunt, alte et impresse recogitandum esse dico dei voluntatem, quid etiam in occulto velit. Quæ enim in manifesto scimus omnes." Now follows an exposition on the two wills in God, the higher, hidden, and proper one, and the lower : "Deus ostendens quid magis velit, minorem voluntatem majore delevit. Quantoque notitiæ tuæ utrumque proposuit, tanto definiit, id te sectari debere quod declaravit se magis velle. Ergo si ideo declaravit, ut id secteris quod magis vult, sine dubio, nisi ita facis, contra voluntatem ejus sapis, sapiendo contra potiorem ejus voluntatem, magisque offendis quam promereris, quod vult quidem faciendo et quod mavult respuendo. Ex parte delinquis; ex parte, si non delinquis, non tamen promereris. Non porro et promereri nolle delinquere est? Secundum igitur matrimonium, si est ex illa dei voluntate quæ indulgentia vocatur, etc., etc." On the other hand, see the sharp distinction between sins of ignorance (“natural sins") and sins of "conscientia et voluntas, ubi et culpa sapit et gratia," De pud. 10.