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ARMED MERCHANTMEN

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for leadership of the moral sense of the American people, and it lost the power which a knowledge of that leadership and a sympathetic response from the moral sense of the world would have given to our diplo

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ARMED MERCHANTMEN

WHAT SHALL WE DO ABOUT THEM?

BY ELLERY C. STOWELL

Germany has issued a new warning to the world-that she will sink passenger liners and other merchant vessels after March 1 if they carry guns for defending themselves. The American State Department had already issued to the Governments of the Allies a suggestion that they disarm these merchant vessels, so that they could not defend themselves against German submarines, and intimated that it was about ready to decide to shut out from American harbors all merchant vessels that were not disarmed. The Outlook commented upon this American memorandum in the issue for February 9 before it was published, but when its substance was known abroad as well as here. The American memorandum and, in substance, the German threat have both now been published. An account of them appears elsewhere in this issue. These tvo documents aroused great opposition among the Allies, and the American position or the subject was regarded as scarcely friendly. The situation betokened trouble for the United States. Is Germany within her rights in making this threat? Would the United States be acting lawfully in attempting to require that merchant vessels be disarmed in accordance with the German demand? These are questions of international law. We have therefore asked Mr. Stowell, who is Assistant Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University and a recognized authority, to answer some questions which this situation raises, and we here print our questions and his answers.-THE EDITORS.

I likely to sit us informed m

S the question of armed merchant vessels

It is sure to involve us in difficulties,
and it may possibly lead to war.

With whom might it bring us into war?
If we carry out Secretary Lansing's sug-
gestion (as contained in his note of January
18), so that merchant vessels have to be dis-
armed to enter our ports, such British merchant
vessels will be in greater danger of being
sunk. By disarming merchantmen we strike
at Great Britain's rights, and she will have
to take action to defend them. On the other
hand, if we do not carry out Secretary Lan-
sing's suggestion, Germany's apparent yield-
ing on the Lusitania controversy will almost
certainly prove to be a will-o'-the-wisp, and
the controversy will become still more acute,
if that be possible.

Have we a right to keep armed merchantmen out of our ports?

In

Merchantmen have a right to come and go in our ports. That they are armed does not change the fact that they are merchantmen; therefore we have no right to close our ports to them or to put any limit upon their armament for defensive purposes. theory, this Government can close its ports any time it considers it has a National interest so to do, but it cannot discriminate against any one nation or attempt to exclude certain ships for reasons that do not concern our own vital interests or international law.

If France, one of the Allies, has a law which prevents the arming of merchantmen, why should we not be free to adopt it and act on it?

France may have such a law which she

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applies to her own ships at her pleasure. To-morrow she may modify this law and claim the right to arm her merchantmen. We have no control or concern with the particular system that France applies in this regard, and it does not affect the general principle. France has a perfect right to arm her merchantmen, but she simply does not take advantage of it. It would be a similar kind of logic to call submarines illegal because Servia did not use them.

Have we a right to warn Americans not to travel on armed vessels?

Our Government might warn them of the dangers of such travel, unnecessary as that seems; but the Government has no right to restrict their traveling on such vessels where they have a right to go.

Is it the patriotic duty of Americans to keep off belligerent vessels and travel exclusively in American or neutral vessels?

It has never been considered a part of American patriotism to forego the exercise of the rights of an American citizen, especially when the interests of the individual are important enough to lead him to risk his life for them. In these circumstances it is his country's duty to protect him and not to ask him to forego his rights so as to relieve it of its legitimate responsibilities to him. If the neutral Governments had been careful at the beginning of the war to insist upon the observance of neutral rights, this question would never have been asked.

If Great Britain during the Russo-Japanese War warned her subjects not to travel on belligerent vessels, why should it not be honorable for the American Government to issue a similar warning to American citizens?

Great Britain had in the seas where naval operations were conducted the finest fleet of merchant vessels of any nation, and the warning which she issued to her citizens put them to no inconvenience, but was perhaps a disguised way of increasing the patronage of British liners. Great Britain's action was mostly political. She never would have recognized that she must issue such a warning, and the effect upon either belligerent was of trifling importance. It has no bearing on the submarine issue. British subjects traveling in Russian or Japanese vessels were likely to be captured and otherwise inconvenienced. Her warning brought to their attention the inevitable consequences of a

state of war, and did not in any way diminish the protection which she intended to accord them.

If Americans, after we have warned them to keep off armed merchantmen, should be sunk by a torpedo without warning, would this Government be justified in refusing to take any action?

Have merchantmen customarily had the right to carry arms!

Merchantmen have a right, founded upon custom of long standing, to arm for selfdefense.

Is not the right of merchantmen to arm intended to protect them against the attack of pirates?

That was one of the incidents of the right to arm for defense, and if our vessels should go without arms we might see a sudden sporadic development of piracy, so valuable have modern merchantmen become. But the principal object of the defense was against privateers, to which the modern converted cruiser or other form of commercedestroyer bears some likeness.

Is there any justness in the plea that merchantmen should be unarmed because submarines are weak?

It would be a curious doctrine which should ask one country to weaken its methods of protection against another, so that its enemy might more easily attack it. If the submarine is practically powerless against an armed merchantman, it had better not attempt to hold up a quarry stronger than itself. This is but the universal law of every creature hunting its prey. Of course the United States might step in and add its might to the puny strength of the submarine. That really would amount to intervention. It might take the form of a note, but it would be backed by America's potential strength.

Would American intervention in this question on the side of the submarines be in accordance with our traditional policy to defend the rights of humanity, our own general interests, and the security of sea-borne commerce?

America's action would be hurtful from all these points of view. It would break down a recognized rule of international law, and thus shake the foundations of the system upon which the rights of all humanity and our own Nationai security rest. It would

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ARMED MERCHANTMEN

further inconvenience the international commerce of the United States with all other countries, since it would help to place thousands of tons of shipping at the mercy of German submarines.

Has the United States a right to modify a rule of international law while the war is going on?

Neither in peace nor in war can a single nation by its own action change an accepted international rule. We could not, therefore, expect during the war to change the rule of the seas that merchantmen have a right to arm. If, however, it were very dangerous to our security to admit such armed merchantmen to our harbors, we might decide to shut them out. If our only munition works were located at our ports and a shot from a merchantman would explode them, we might

refuse the admission of such merchantman

for the sake of protecting our own munition plants. That is an instance of vital interest which would give a good cause for the exclusion, just as we might, for the safety of the locks, decide to prohibit ships carrying great quantities of high explosives from going through the Panama Canal. Unless, however, we have some such good reason as that, the exclusion of armed merchantmen from our ports might well be regarded as an unfriendly act, and an unfriendly act in time of wa. is a good ground for war. But even if we should go to war to prevent armed merchantmen from coming into our harbors, that would not deprive merchantmen of the right to sail armed on the high seas.

What effect will Secretary Lansing's proposal to disarm merchantmen have on the Lusitania case?

It leaves the Lusitania case the way it was on May 7, 1915-the day she was sunk. It may, indeed, possibly be interpreted as a justification for Germany's whole submarine conduct.

Why does Germany think she has the right to torpedo armed vessels without warning?

Germany has practically admitted that her procedure was illegal under international law, but has justified her conduct on the ground of retaliation for Great Britain's interference with neutral commerce bound to Germany. England in her attempt to beleaguer Germany has brought the German civilian population to want, and Germany retaliates by sinking passenger vessels contain

423

ing non-combatants, women, and children, and drops bombs from her Zeppelins upon the English population. This policy of one country's getting even for the misdeeds of another is called reprisal.

Is there anything in this reprisal idea?

I can only answer that our whole legal system of punishment has been a slow development from the primitive forms of retaliation. The Bible makes constant reference to the law of the talion-an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.

What kind of reprisals should America approve of and be willing to practice herself in case of war?

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Reprisals smell of barbarism. "Getting soon gets belligerents into a state of complete savagery. A civilized country should

even

exercise the utmost care in the matter of

reprisals. It should never employ any reprisals which will injure innocent parties,

such as neutral citizens. Non-combatants

should not be made the object of reprisals except in retaliation for the unjustifiable killing of non-combatants, and even in this case there is the strongest reason to believe that the most effective form of reprisal is to bite one's lip and to utilize the surging indignation in one's heart to spur the nation on to more effective military operations against the enemy. We all remember, as children, how relieved we were when we had spluttered and kicked the door. The strong, quiet man holds his temper in check and is feared by all. The British nation, in the case of Miss Cavell, did not shoot some poor German nurse detained in England, but they flashed over the cables of the world the sad tale of this heroic woman, they built hospitals in her name, and displayed her pictures as a stimulus to recruiting. Such reprisals are the most effective form of retaliation. As the law of war is ever in accord with effective warfare, the barbarous eye for an eye, a life for a life, form of reprisal will soon be discarded by the more advanced civilizations.

If England should agree to the proposal to disarm her vessels, would it make travel any safer for Americans on British liners?

Quite the contrary, I believe. In the first place, the submarines could not be sure whether the vessel they were approaching was one of those which had disarmed or not. Probably, therefore, the submarine would prefer to torpedo and put the best face pos

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sible upon the necessities of the particular case. I would prefer to take my chances on an armed liner with good-sized guns and trained gunners than to be put out at short notice far from land in a small boat.

Suppose the vessels were disarmed and one of them was sunk by a submarine, what could we say if Germany claimed she was armed?

It would be hard for our State Department to do anything more than insist upon as thorrugh an investigation as possible. Several months after the war was over we might find that American lives had been lost in violation of international law. Germany would hardly fear the probability of war at such a time, and, in any event, she could easily make adequate redress and admit the illegality of her action, since the need to use her submarines would then have passed, and she would have garnered the fruit of illegality.

Is the stand that Secretary Lansing has taken helpful in protecting private property at sea?

Quite the contrary. It would open up the widest possibilities for cheaply constructed and widely cruising submarines to drive private property from the seas.

How is this going to affect the Kansas farmer?

The Kansas farmer of middle age has an interest in the coming twenty years and in the future of his children. The Kansas farmer will find that his products will be consumed in increasing measure in all parts

of the world. Should another war unhappily

occur, he will be among the first to feel the consequences of any interference with the freedom of commerce upon the seas. Even now, as the war progresses, he will find that the lack of shipping to carry his products will restrict his market to America and curtail the prices which he might receive for his farm products.

What interest has the Southern cottongrower in this question?

The same general interest as the Kansas farmer. Although England's interference with neutral trade has been a sore grievance and an unwarrantable interference with the rights of the Southern cotton-grower in many cases, he must never forget that the enormous consumption of cotton for high explosives has opened up to him a great market in the Allies' territory. The extension of illegal submarine operations against commerce might seriously interfere with his mar

ket. If Germany were successful in destroying all of the Allies' merchantmen, what guarantee would the cotton-grower have that she would not further extend her action to permit her to destroy all neutral vessels carrying cotton as contraband? We have already seen how easy it is to sink an unarmed neutral merchantman in the case of the Frye. After Germany had carried on successful submarine operations against neutral and belligerent Powers, it might be impossible for the South to find any means of transporting its cotton to markets abroad. Let us take appropriate action to open up the markets to which we have a right in Germany, but not proceed on a path which will destroy our only remaining market with the Allies.

Could Great Britain establish a boycott of American goods in retaliation for our insistence upon the disarmament of her merchantmen?

She would be perfectly justified in such a course, but it is questionable whether such a boycott might not cause her more inconvenience than profit. The American people may rest assured that Great Britain will find some effective way of maintaining her rights to protect her merchantmen against an illegal method of warfare.

Has the submarine now any rights that anybody is bound to respect, and, if so, what are they?

The submarine engaged in operations.

against war-ships, transports, scout vessels,

or any other military force, has all the rights that appertain to belligerents. It is only when the submarine attempts to disregard the recognized procedure concerning the visit and search of merchantmen that it is guilty of transgression. If persisted in, such transgression must justify merchant vessels in sinking any submarine at sight. Instead of asking that merchantmen disarm so that the submarine may easily conform to the recognized rules of visit and search before sinking them, a more fitting course for our Government to take would be to devise some still more effective method to prevent such attacks. I would go further: If the submarines persist in their illegal sinking of merchantmen without previous visit and search, the American Government should join in clearing the seas of these enemies to civilization. What greater enemy can there be to mankind than he who violates international law and humanity?

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A NATIONAL REORGANIZATION FOR

T

DEFENSE

A PROPOSAL BEFORE THE CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES

HE present equipment of our Government to handle National defense can be simply shown by the four circles and the four arrows in the first of the diagrams published on the next page. As this diagram indicates, the will of Congress is executed by the President acting through the Departments of War and of the Navy. At the head of the permanent personnel of the army there is a General Staff, the function of which is the formulation of plans of defense and the solution of our military problems. The navy has no such legally constituted General Staff. We have, then, a legislative body acting through an Executive whose tenure of office has never been more than eight years; who controls two professional departments (one inadequately organized) by means of two civilian secretaries whose tenure of office is more uncertain than that of the President himself. The professional officers of the army and navy can reach Congress only through committee hearings and through the reports made by their civilian chiefs. Two things are at once obvious from a study of this system of organization.

Its framework is of necessity subject to frequent political dislocations.

It makes no provision for the co-ordination of our civil industries with our two great military departments.

If we redraw our first diagram to remedy these faults, we must add two dotted circles and three arrows. One circle will represent a Council of National Defense, a body largely free from the shock of political conflict, and a smaller circle for a yet-to-be-created General Staff of Industries.

It will be seen by a glance at the accompanying diagram that a Council of National Defense (composed of legislators, executive officers, military experts, and leaders in civil life) would be in a position both to formulate an intelligent programme of preparedness and to make its recommendations directly felt in the halls of Congress. It would constitute a clearing-house of military, industrial, and legislative information; its members would be directly represented in every department of the Government dealing with the

problem of National defense. These departments in their turn would find in the Council a common field for the co-ordination of their efforts and the expression of their needs.

The widespread demand for this Council of National Defense has been very clearly stated in the recent report made by a Committee on National Defense to the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States recently assembled in convention at Washington. This report covers fully the principles of reorganization which we have here outlined. It was illustrated by

a diagram substantially the same as that which we have published as Figure II. Indeed, we owe the idea of these diagrams to a member of the Committee which prepared the diagram for the Chamber of Commerce. This report represented the unanimous opinion of the Committee responsible for it, and was adopted without a dissenting vote by the convention of the Chamber of Commerce assembled at Washington. It will now be prepared as a referendum to be submitted for the vote of the various affiliated Chambers of Commerce throughout the country. The action taken by these bodies will, it is expected, be made public some time in the early part of May.

This excellent report demands, as the first requirement for a sound reorganization of a military resource, a Council of National Defense. It advocates legislation creating for the navy a General Staff along the lines of that already possessed by the army; it advocates the creation of a staff of industrial mobilization which shall be given the power to work out and submit to Congress plans for the use of the National economic strength in time of war. According to the recommendations of this Committee, the functions of the staff of Industrial Mobilization would be to gather data as to the character and quantity of munitions and supplies required; the tools of industry available to produce them; and the means of making these tools of industry effective through legislation, organization, and training.

Concerning purely military and naval pre

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