surrender of Christ to suffering by any special feature of His life, he appeals to a passage in the Book of Psalms (Rom. xv. 3; cf. note a). It is still more significant, however, that, in order to set up the sacrificing love of Christ as a pattern, he contrasts His pre-temporal state of existence with His earthly life (2 Cor. viii. 9, for which see § 79, c; cf. Phil. ii. 5 ff.). Whether Paul has considered how this sinlessness of Christ during His earthly life is compatible with his doctrine of the power of sin having, through Adam's transgression, obtained dominion in the whole human race, cannot be ascertained. If he has conceived of this influence of Adam upon his whole race as owing to sexual procreation (§ 67, d), then nothing is more obvious here than the exclusion of the male factor by a direct creative act of God in the case of the only sinless one. But since Paul says that Christ was born of a woman (Gal. iv. 4), without hinting as to anything uncommon in the occasion of His birth, since he even makes Him be born of the seed of David (Rom. i. 3),3 and since we must not assume without more ado that the tradition which is found in our later Gospels of a miraculous conception of Jesus had ever reached him, we do not know whither he has drawn this consequence which was certainly almost indispensable to his system.

3 That Paul herewith denies a supernatural conception of Jesus (Pfleiderer, p. 152 [E. Tr. i. 151]), is certainly to say too much; for even for the consciousness of the evangelists, who relate the miracle of the supernatural conception, the latter did not exclude the extraction of Christ from the fathers (cf. even R. Schmidt, p. 143). If now Paul had not simply adopted his statement regarding the descent of Jesus from the seed of David from tradition, which was altogether unacquainted, at least in wide circles, with the events that took place at His birth, and therefore thought of that descent in the common sense, but had also reflected upon its compatibility with a supernatural conception, it is, of course, self-evident that such a conception was possible only if Christ was born of a woman (Gal. iv. 4) who belonged to the seed of David, i.e. according to Rom. iv. 13, to the family which was descended, bodily, from David. And even allowing that we had no other indication that Mary was descended from David (which I, for my part, would be disposed to deny), that does not hinder Paul or the evangelists from having in this way reconciled to themselves the traditional descent of Jesus from the family of David with His (presupposed or traditional) supernatural conception. Whether Paul, however, has thought at all upon this question, can no more be determined than whether he has drawn that dogmatical consequence. In his view of Christ as the second Adam there is certainly not yet involved the assumption of a new creative act on the occasion of His conception, for it is not permissible to carry out this typical parallel beyond the tertium comparationis which is clearly stated by himself (cf. § 79, a).

(c) If we inquire as to the idea which Paul has formed to himself of the person of Christ during His earthly life, it appears from Rom. i. 3, ix. 5, that in Him as well as in all men, he regarded the σáp as only one side of His being. If Christ is descended κатà σáρka from the fathers, and, more particularly, from the seed of David, it follows that, with the σáp, His whole being was not yet exhausted. In both passages, however, the antithesis makes it absolutely impossible to think that the cápέ means only the body of Christ (Rom. vii. 4), or even only His corporeity as possessed of a soul.4 It is rather the whole natural human being of Christ that is meant (§ 68, b), as distinguished from a higher divine element, which was in Him (i. 4), or from the divine dignity which He now possesses (ix. 5). Now, in all men the σáp§ is the seat of sin, and under the dominion of ȧuapría; not, however, because the σáp§ is sinful in itself, but because, with the transgression of Adam, sin has come into the world, and has made the human cápğ sinful (§ 68, 6). Although, accordingly, the σάρξ of Christ is not a σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας, which it cannot be, if He did not know sin (2 Cor. v. 21), He is, nevertheless, man in the full sense (äveрwπоs: 1 Cor. xv. 21; Rom. v. 15; cf. Acts xvii. 31), only such as man was, before sin began to dwell and reign in him. This gives us the full explanation of the statement in Rom. viii. 3, that God sent His Son ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας. This cannot mean

The strange question, whether Paul has ascribed a human soul to Christ, is neither to be answered in the negative with Zeller (Theol. Jahrb. 1842, 1), nor, with R. Schmidt (p. 156), passed by as incapable of being decided. It is owing to a total misconception of the Pauline anthropology, according to which the oup in the living man cannot be thought of otherwise than as possessed of a soul (cf. § 67, d), and is therefore to be answered in the affirmative. A question can only arise as to the manner in which Paul has conceived to himself the origin of the soul of Christ, whether by natural propagation, or, as in the case of the first man, by a new creative act of God; but this question is plainly closely connected with the unanswerable question as to his view of the conception of Jesus (footnote 3).

"This appears, in particular, also from 2 Cor. v. 16, where the knowing Christ narà cápa certainly means more than the knowledge of His bodily nature, and denotes the estimating of Christ according to His whole manifestation upon earth as a man, for it stands parallel with the statement that the apostle will no longer know any one according to what he is in his natural-human character (xarà rápna), but only according to what he is in his new life which belongs to Christ (ver. 15).

that Jesus had the σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας, and therefore sin itself although in Him it did not become aрáßaois (cf. Holsten, p. 41), nor does the expression conceal an unsolved antinomy, which leads to Docetism (cf. Baur, p. 191; Pfleiderer, p. 155 [E. Tr. i. 154]). Christ really possessed the human σáp, as is immediately presupposed in the ev Tŷ σapki, which can only refer to His σάρξ; but because His σάρξ was not a σὰρξ ápaρrías, it was only similar to it, i.e. to the cápę as it is constituted in empirical humanity, without anything being thereby awanting to it, which belongs to the essence of the σápέ as such (cf. even Biedermann, p. 239). Still it possessed the whole ἀσθένεια of the human σάρξ (2 Cor. xiii. 4: ἐσταυρώθη ¿§ ảo leveías), in particular its susceptibility to death, so that death could obtain power over Him (Rom. vi. 9).

The recent treatises on this passage have only helped to establish the common conception of it. The very confident assertion of Overbeck (in loco, 1869, 2; cf. also Pfleiderer, p. 153 f. [E. Tr. i. 152 f.]), that usiwe can only denote the homogeneity of the flesh of Christ with sinful flesh, and that it is pure arbitrariness to make the moment of dissimilarity, which even according to him lies in the idea of poiwa, refer to the condition of the rap which is indicated by the genitive, Zeller (ibid. 1870, 8) has already sufficiently weakened in favour of the current view (cf. § 69, c, footnote 2). If we ask, why then Paul did not simply write i capxí, it is clear that that condition of the empirical cap could not but have been expressly mentioned in a connection where the very question considered was the reference of the sending of Jesus to the sin which reigns in it, inasmuch as it was only upon the domain which had up to this time been its own that this sin could be conquered (cf. Wendt, p. 190). As the misinterpretation of that expression, however, is only possible when we understand by the σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας η σάρξ which is sinful in its essence (and this no more agrees with the Pauline anthropology than with a correct explanation of the expression; cf. § 68, d, footnote 14), so it leads also to the denial of the sinlessness of Christ, which is absolutely indispensable in this very passage, according to which it is through the sending of Him that the conquest of sin was to be effected, and sufficiently guaranteed by 2 Cor. v. 21. The misinterpretation of this latter passage by Holsten, who makes it refer to the sinlessness of Christ in His premundane state of existence, R. Schmidt (p. 99) has completely refuted; and a want of knowledge of the sin which dwelt in His flesh, although it did not manifest itself in rapußúous, would not only have been no advantage of Christ, for it was found in the whole of humanity previous to the time of Moses (Rom. v. 13, 14), but would have been only a great lack of self-knowledge. Pfleiderer (in loc.) has reverted to Baur's assumption of an unsolved antinomy; but this antinomy they first make themselves by imposing upon the apostle an anthropology which is at least incompatible with his Christology, the assumption, viz., of a sinful constitution of the ráp. Such an assumption is, of course, superfluous, if, with Schenkel, we explain the μn gróvta áμapr. to mean that Christ "did no sin knowingly, and therefore remained sinless in the subjective sense" (p. 246) !

(d) When Paul describes the veûμa åɣiwoúvns as the other side of the being of Christ (Rom. i. 4), he thereby attaches himself to the original apostolic view, according to which Jesus was anointed with the Holy Spirit (§ 38, b, 48, b). The expression Tveûμa ayiov he probably avoids purposely, in order to distinguish the Spirit, which was originally in Christ, from that which is communicated through Him, and he describes this Spirit-not as one which is the source of holiness for its possessor (R. Schmidt, p. 107), but as one whose quality is ȧywoúvn (gen. qual.), because in this way there comes out more clearly than in the term ayios the property of His being, which qualified Christ for the exaltation which is here asserted of Him (§ 77, b). More essential is the distinction that this Spirit does not appear as one which Christ has first received (on the occasion of His baptism); but that Paul appears to regard it as a constitutive factor of His being. If, in the natural man, the higher side of human nature is the voûs, which is distinguished from the πνεûμа (§ 68, c), and which remains powerless in opposition to the might of sin, in Christ its place is from the first taken by the essentially divine element of the veûμa, which therefore hindered sin from being able to obtain the mastery of His σáp (note c).' Christ is not on this account, however, the pneumatic man from the very first (cf. Baur, p. 191); even in Him rather this higher divine element of His being and the natural human σáp still form a relative antithesis (Rom. i. 3, 4). This antithesis, however, can and must be done away with, and this is effected through the resurrection. That Jesus was raised up in virtue of the veûμа which dwelt in Him, Peter also teaches (§ 48, c); but Paul draws the further consequence of this doctrine. It is through the resurrection that the ἔσχατος Αδάμ has first become εἰς πVεÛμа Swoπоιoûv (1 Cor. xv. 45, for which see § 76, d); it

7

In 1 Cor. ii. 16 the vous Xpro is spoken of; but we have already seen (§ 68, c) that here the expression is simply conditioned by the preceding quotation (Isa. xl. 13: rís ïyvw voũv xupíov). In Him the suμa, which all men first receive through Him, is originally present. This significant christological view of the apostle is altogether ignored when, in consequence of a wrong conception of the Pauline anthropology, we see in this uz only the principle of life which belongs to all men, and which makes them beings in the image of God (cf. Beyschlag, p. 211, 231).

is through it that that relative antithesis between the caps and the πveûμa, which was still also in Him, has been done away with, and His whole being, including His corporeity, has become pneumatic (ver. 46). Now first, therefore, can He become also for other men the author of the resurrection (vv. 20-23), and of an exclusively pneumatic state of existence (ver. 44)-of course, however, not till after that second event also has taken place, for which that original pneumatic property of His being qualified Him, and which was realized in consequence of His resurrection, His elevation, viz., to the full dignity of divine sonship (cf. § 77, 6).

§ 79. The Heavenly Origin.

As the second Adam, who has by His resurrection secured the pneumatic or heavenly corporeity to the human race, Christ Himself must have been of heavenly origin. (b) The assumption of such an origin depends also upon an inference from the dignity of the exalted Christ to an original divine state of existence of the Son, from which He had come into the earthly life. (c) In consequence of a similar inference from the office of Christ as the Mediator of salvation in His historical life, Paul ascribes to Him in His prehistorical state of existence the mediation of God's creative activity, and of the manifestations of His grace to Israel. (d) In His exaltation, however, Christ has, according to Paul, received more than He possessed before His incarnation.

(a) Christ is the antitype of Adam (Rom. v. 14: ó μéλλwv 'Adáμ), because His influence extends to the whole human race in the same manner as that of Adam.1 As sin and death came into the world through the latter, so righteous

It is often wrongly represented that, for Paul, the name of the second Adam was the most expressive designation of the nature of Christ (compare, e.J., Beyschlag, p. 223, 225, and against him R. Schmidt, p. 92). It is only the significance of Christ and Christianity for the whole human race, a significance which comes out so strongly in the teaching of Paul, that this expression primarily characterizes (cf. § 58, c, d). In Rom. v. 14 the tertium comparationis of the comparison which is made there between type and antitype is expressly stated, and we must not go beyond it to further inferences regarding the origin (cf. § 78, b, footnote 3) or the nature of Christ. Cf. Pfleiderer, p. 142 [E. Tr. i. 141 f.].