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NAPOLEON'S

GREAT ADVENTURE."

BY ARTHUR E. P. B. WEIGALL.

THE extraordinary personality of Napoleon Bonaparte, and the bold manner in which he created and dominated the European situation during the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century, often lead us to forget that he, like most other commanders, made his blunders and suffered his defeats. The available forces of France were not always able to put into execution the grandiose and sometimes fantastic schemes of his fertile mind, and Napoleon's failing throughout his career was his inability to curb his ambitions. The splendid romantic dreams of conquest which were evolved in his brain led him to attempt more than his armies could accomplish, and on three or four occasions he embarked upon enterprises which ended in disaster. Yet so overjoyed is mankind at any display of confident optimism, so tolerant is the world towards any miscalculations in a scheme which is in any way heroic, that it is our custom to judge an enterprise not so much by its degree of success as by the boldness of its conception. The drama of Moscow is laid on so grand a scale that we are pleased to regard the retreat of the French army more as a triumph than as a catastrophe. The abandonment of the project for the invasion of England is for

gotten in the press of the crowding events of that period. The disasters which led to the Emperor's exile on Elba are wiped out in the memory of the stirring "hundred days." And, in like manner, Bonaparte's Egyptian campaign, which was a total failure, is dressed by the historian in the trappings of the projected Oriental conquests or in the tinsel of the Battle of the Pyramids; and the prime fact of the breakdown of the entire scheme is steadily ignored. There is something magnificent in the picture of Bonaparte pacing the broad avenues of the park of Passeriano in the glow of the sunset, demonstrating to his generals his schemes for the conquest of Egypt and of Asia, "frequently betraying by his exclamations the gigantic thoughts of his unlimited ambition," as Lacroix tells us. "Was it not, then, a noble project," asks that historian, "to reopen the roadway of the ancient world, to explore a country SO rich in great memories, to go to mark his place amongst the most illustrious conquerors, and to plant the tricoloured flag upon the ruins of Thebes?" Indeed, it was a fine, if a somewhat sensational, dream; and the mouth of the critic being stopped by the largeness of its conception, he is wont to refrain from the cold comment

that a very temporary and quite useless subjection of little Malta and unwarlike Egypt was all that came of Napoleon's romantic project. Here, as in the Peninsula and in Belgium, he collided with that so often under-estimated factor in international affairs-the persistence of England, which in some irresistible manner slowly sweeps all before it by virtue of a combination of pluck and optimism. His wild plans for making himself Sultan of the Orient, which developed out of the original scheme, were brought to a sudden termination by the Battle of the Nile, in which a small fleet of British ships destroyed his armada, and by the Defence of Acre, where a handful of British sailors turned back his whole invading army; and, when he had slipped back to France in disgust, a British expeditionary force caused that same army to capitulate ignominiously at Alexandria. In Egypt and Syria the great duel between England and the much-dreaded "Boney" opened; and the first bout, like the last, ended in an overwhelming victory for our arms. The events deserve a far greater prominence than they generally receive, not only because they reveal the amazing fighting power of England, but also because they show Bonaparte in a role which, at first romantic, can only be described in its later phases as that of a lunatic.

The ostensible reason for the invasion of Egypt was provided by a communication received from the French Consul in

Egypt, M. Magallon, who pointed out that French commerce was suffering greatly owing to the precarious situation of the French merchants resident in that country, who were always liable to unjust and tyrannical treatment at the hands of the Mamelukes. Bonaparte, therefore, caused it to be understood by those who were admitted into the secret, that he was about to restore order and security in Egypt by overthrowing the Mamelukes and by upholding the authority of the Sultan. This was, however, but one of several objects which he had in view. Egypt and Asia suggested all manner of possibilities to his creative brain. The East had always appealed to him, possibly owing to an Oriental strain in his blood. As early as August 1795 he had seriously thought of going to Turkey to reorganise the Sultan's artillery, but now this far greater opportunity had presented itself. He saw himself setting out from the abundant Nile to conquer Asia and to bring India under his domination. He regarded Egypt as the natural gateway to the East, through which his armies should stream out into the unlimited plains of Asia, and thence over the mountains to the sacred rivers of India. The Venetian Sanuto had spoken of the effect on India which must follow from the conquest of the Nile valley; and the Comte Daru had declared that the possession of Egypt was to be preferred to that of all the provinces between the Indus and the

Ganges, so essential was it to of camels and dromedaries in the conquest of the far coun- abundance." tries beyond. The English were already making themselves masters of India, while their trade with the East was very considerable; and thus the French were assured that the capture of Egypt might lead on to the destruction of British prestige in Asia.

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"There were," says Bonaparte in his Memoirs, "three objects in the expedition to Egypt. Firstly, to establish a French colony on the Nile which would prosper without slaves, and serve France instead of the Republic of St Domingo and of all the sugar islands. Secondly, to open a market for our manufactures in Africa, Arabia, and Syria; and to supply our commerce with all the productions of those vast countries. Thirdly, setting out from Egypt, as from a place of arms, to lead an army of 60,000 men to the Indies to excite the Mahrattas and oppressed people of these extensive regions to insurrection. 60,000 men, half European and half recruits from the burning climates of the equator and the tropics, carried by 10,000 horses and 50,000 camels, having with them provisions for sixty days, water for five days, and a train of artillery of 150 pieces, with double supplies of ammunition, would have reached the Indus in four months. Since the invention of shipping the ocean has ceased to be an obstacle, and the desert is no longer an impediment to an army possessed

This all sounds very well, but it is in actual fact sheer nonsense. It would have been quite impossible to collect 50,000 camels, even supposing that the Arabs would have attempted the task to the best of their ability, which is a highly improbable supposition. The watering of this vast caravan at the shallow wells in the desert, and the feeding of the camels, would have been impracticable; and the carrying of sixty days' rations and five days' water per man would have wanted the assistance of some very black magic.

Bonaparte further conceived the idea of cutting a canal between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, along the route of the later Suez Canal, and of opening this new passage to none but French shipping. The ancient road to India, travelled by Alexander the Great, and the maritime highway down the Red Sea, would thus be patrolled by the men and the ships of France; and he might hope to found an Oriental Empire of vast extent. For this purpose he had already sent his agents posting away over the hills to spread discontent amongst the peoples of India, in order that they might welcome the French army, when it should come, as their deliverer from oppression; for such preparatory methods had already been tried with conspicuous success in Switzerland, Venice, Italy, Ireland, and other countries. He had, moreover, entered into negotia

tions with the famous Tippoo provided his expedition with a Sahib, "the tiger of Mysore," fine collection of mathematical who was then struggling and scientific instruments, and against the English advance with a good library of books of in India. There can be no reference; while, for the purdoubt that at this time Bona- pose of issuing proclamations parte was honestly impelled by and general orders, he took his desire for the glory of with him printers and a printFrance and for the destruction ing-press stocked with both of her enemies; but as the Latin and Arabic type. scheme shaped itself in his mind patriotic sentiments gave way to personal ambitions, and he came to regard the projected march into Asia not so much as a French campaign as the fulfilment of his own destiny. The expedition for the destruction of British commerce was changed in his mind to an armed establishment of himself upon that far-distant throne for which he believed that Providence had ordained him.

On April 12, 1798, when all was in readiness, the army, the fleet, and the transports being collected at Toulon, Bonaparte received in Paris his orders from the Directoire, stating that "he will chase the English from all their Oriental possessions which he is able to reach, and notably he will destroy all their stations on the Red Sea. He will cut through the Isthmus of Suez, and he will take the necessary measures to assure the free and exclusive possession of the Red Sea to the French Republic." Shortly afterwards he set out for Toulon, and on May 10, just after his arrival, he issued a bombastic proclamation to the troops, telling them that though they had fought their way over mountains and plains, the sea yet remained to be conquered. "Soldiers!" wrote he, "Europe has its eyes on you," and much else he penned of a similar nature which, owing to the disparity between the emotional training of the French and English nations, it were better here to leave unrecorded.

As though consciously setting out to found an Empire, Bonaparte decided to take with the expedition a large staff of artists and savantspainters, poets, musicians, architects, engineers, mathematicians, astronomers, archæologists, historians, botanists, entomologists, zoologists, geologists, and others-who should study the countries visited, and thus demonstrate to the world that the Corsican was the pioneer of an advanced and noble civilisation. The work accomplished by these scientists still stands as a record of the utmost importance. It served as the foundation of the science of Egyptology, and to this day the archæologist is able to regard the monumental 'Description d'Egypte' as a standard work. Bonaparte the chief officers. The British

On May 19 the fleet set sail. Its destination was an absolute secret from all save

Government knew nothing, vessel, which informed him that

and the rumours that an Oriental campaign was pending were discredited as being fantastic and improbable. Bad weather, and this lack of information as to the direction in which the French proposed to move, combined to divert the attention of our English squadron; and though it was known that Nelson was cruising on these seas, the chances were small that the two fleets would meet, while in the event of such an occurrence the French men-o'-war, commanded by Admiral Brueys, were considered strong enough to hold their own and to defend the 300 transports in their charge. On June 10 the fleet arrived at Malta, which, after a brief struggle, capitulated to the invaders, the Knights of St John of Jerusalem who held it being in no mood to fight. On June 19, a month after setting sail from Toulon, the great armada put out from Malta, steering for Crete; but on reaching this island Bonaparte received news that Nelson was in pursuit, and therefore gave orders to the Admiral to proceed at once to Alexandria.

Nelson did not know whither Bonaparte was bound; for Spain and Ireland, Greece and Syria, were equally probable goals of his ambition. He therefore had to inquire of passing vessels as to whether they had seen the French fleet. On reaching Naples, on June 19, he was told that the enemy had gone to Malta; but while following them thither he bespoke a passing

the French had departed eastwards. Nelson, at once guessing the truth, wrote to his Government saying, "They are going on their scheme of possessing Alexandria and getting troops to India." Immediately he set sail in pursuit, and therewith began one of the finest sea-hunts in history. "I will fight them," wrote Nelson, "the moment I can reach their fleet, be it at anchor or under sail.” The keen excitement of the British sailors at having "Boney" as their quarry inspired them to the supremest efforts, and the vessels were kept at top speed day and night. Nelson had, however, lost some of his frigates which had been disabled in a storm off Gibraltar; and owing to his lack of these "scouts" he passed the French fleet as it was sheltering under Crete, and arrived before them at Alexandria.

The town was at that time a small seaport, with a total population of not more than 8000 souls. The European colony was neither large nor prosperous, and had suffered many indignities at the hands of the native authorities. The governor of the town was an Egyptian who regarded the nations of Europe as the natural servants of the Orient. Like his ancestors of Pharaonic days, he considered only the Egyptians to be "men" and foreigners to be some quaint species of animal; and when Nelson's ships arrived and a deputation was sent ashore to ask for news of the French,

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