An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Zväzok 2
J. Johnson, W. J. and J. Richardson, W. Otridge and Son, F. C. and J. Rivington, D. Ogilvy and Son, Leigh and Sotheby, T. Payne, [and 11 others], and J. Mawman, 1805 - 510 strán (strany)
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able abstract actions agree agreement or disagreement allow answer appear apply arguments assent authority believe body called cause certain certainty clear common conceive concerning connexion consequence consider consists demonstration depend determined discourse discover distinct doubt equal essence eternal evidence examine existence experience faculties faith farther figure follow give gold grounds hath ideas ignorance immaterial inquiry knowledge known language learned least ledge less light material matter maxims means men's mind modes moral motion names nature necessary never objects observe opinions particular perceive perception perfect perhaps principles probability produce proofs propositions prove qualities question rational reason received relations revelation rules sciences Secondly sense serve side signification sort soul sounds speak species spirit stand substances supposed taken things thought tion true truth understanding wherein whole words
Strana 102 - Who also hath made us able ministers of the new testament ; not of the letter, but of the spirit: for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.
Strana 102 - As thou knowest not what is the way of the spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child: even so thou knowest not the works of God who maketh all.
Strana 273 - Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father of light, and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties: revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives, that they come from God.
Strana 337 - I have mentioned mathematics as a way to settle in the mind a habit of reasoning closely and in train ; not that I think it necessary that all men should be deep mathematicians, but that, having got the way of reasoning which that study necessarily brings the mind to, they might be able to transfer it to other parts of knowledge, as they shall have occasion.
Strana 201 - ... deserves the name of knowledge. If we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think nobody can, in earnest, be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels.
Strana 163 - ... neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon ; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist ; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together.
Strana 436 - Heat is a very brisk agitation of the insensible parts of the object, which produces in us that sensation, from whence we denominate the object hot ; so what in our sensation is heat, in the object is nothing b,ut motion.
Strana 69 - For if we reflect on our own ways of thinking, we shall find that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: and this, I think, we may call intuitive knowledge.
Strana 214 - For the ideas that ethics are conversant about being all real essences, and such as I imagine have a discoverable connexion and agreement one with another ; so far as we can find their habitudes and relations, so far we shall be possessed of certain, real, and general truths : and I doubt not, but, if a right method were taken, a great part of morality might be made out with that clearness, that could leave, to a considering man, no more reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the truth of...