source of mutual attraction for the systems, and the eclectic scheme of Alexandria was the result of this amalgamation. Thus as time progressed, philosophy went on modifying itself, assuming every variety of form, combining, dissolving, falling off into numberless minute divisions. But the Romans,-rude conquerors! were rolling on the tide of victory and empire towards the East. They swept over the classic cities of Greece and Asia Minor, and made a conquest of these entire countries from sea to sea. So Grecian liberty fell, but Grecian philosophy survived. Roman power domineered over the empire of Philip and Alexander, but Grecian refinement and wisdom penetrated the ranks of the conquerors, and carried back the standard of victory to the very capital of Augustus. Thus it was that philosophy1 was very widely spread in the early days of Christianity, through Grecian, through Roman society, through the west of Asia and the north of Africa. Musonius, the Cynic, taught in Babylon; Favorinus, the Platonist, in Arles of Gaul; Athenodorus, the Stoic, in Tarsus of Cilicia. All the sects of ancient wisdom were reproduced in the schools of Greece, or by the wandering philosophers who traversed every part of the Roman empire, the Pythagorean, the Epicurean, the Peripatetic. Athens arose again as a leader in the intellectual movement, and professors of the principal philosophies were established there by Adrian and Antoninus. Philosophy was, in truth, everywhere; but how far were the tenets of its professors opposed to the doctrines of Christianity!

The conclusions of philosophy, if fairly deduced, cannot be opposed to the revealed word of God. To philosophize, in the proper acceptation of the word, is to argue rationally, and reason, like revelation, is a gift from the Source of Truth. Moreover, if we take a cursory view of philosophy in its three great branches,-Logic, Metaphysics, and Ethics, we must perceive, that so far from coming into collision with revelation, it is capable of demonstrating

1

1742.

Enfield, "History of Philosophy," ii. p. 31, et seq. Dublin,

many truths from rational principles which have come to us by the Sacred Scriptures. Thus in metaphysical science, the existence of the Necessary Being is shown from the existence of beings contingent-the existence of a Creator from the disposition of this well-ordered world. The metaphysician tells us that the soul, which is a simple substance and has no parts, cannot perish in the only way we are acquainted with, namely, by the dissolution of parts so he leaves us to infer that the soul is immortal. In like manner, from the providence of God, as regards the good and bad in this world, we argue logically the existence of a plan of rewards and punishments in the next life, on a basis established by metaphysics; namely, that God is by nature infinitely perfect, and by consequence infinitely just. Then in ethical science, philosophy brings to light many truths, identical with the "dicta of the inspired writers: for example, temperance, chastity, justice, charity, and other moral virtues, are, in their primary principles, discovered by reason, and recognized as obligatory, and the violation of them is known to be a crime. Sound and legitimate philosophy being but another means of coming to the knowledge of many truths, which God has given to man through His prophets and apostles, it is evident that the Grecian systems, if they had been faithful to their duty, would have prepared the minds of the learned ones of the empire for the reception of the Apostolic preaching. Unfortunately, however, there were countless errors in them; errors in theory, errors in practice, errors in principle, errors in detail, vital errors, which grew over the whole field, and absorbed all the sap and nutriment that was there, and corrupted by their pestiferous contact the few sound maxims that had been. planted there by reason, guided from on high.

To form an idea, however imperfect, of the philosophic errors of Greece, it would be necessary to pass before us the materials of innumerable systems. Such an undertaking would be endless. We must, therefore, limit ourselves here to a few illustrations of this subject; and for them we are indebted to the "Biographical History of

1

:

2

Philosophy," by G. H. Lewes, a work in which the tenets of the leading schools are closely and critically investigated. "The Pythagoreans," says the writer referred to, quoting the authority of Aristotle, "did not separate numbers from things. They held number to be the principle and material of things, no less than their essence and power." (Arist. Met. 1, 5.) "The soul is a monad (a number one) which is self-moved." (Arist. de Animá, 1, 2.) Of course the soul, inasmuch as it was a number, was One, i.e., perfect. But all perfection, in as far as it is moved, must pass into imperfection, whence it strives to regain its state of perfection. Imperfection he (Pythagoras) called a departure from unity: two, therefore, was accursed. The soul in man is in a state of comparative imperfection it has three elements, Reason (voũç); Intelligence (ppǹv), and Desire (Ovuòs); the two last, man has in common with brutes; the first is his distinguishing characteristic." These principles appear to be a harmless description of nonsense; but behold the sad results and conclusions to which they lead! "The one soul may have two aspects intelligence and desire, as in brutes; or it may have three aspects, as in man. But each of these aspects may predominate, and the man will then become eminently rational, or able, or sensual; he will be a philospher, a man of the world, or a beast." 3 "This soul, which can look before and after, can shrink and shrivel itself into an incapacity of contemplating aught but the present moment. Of what depths of degeneracy is it capable! What a beast it may become! And if something lower than itself, why not something higher? And, if something higher and lower, may there not be a law accurately determining its elevation and descent? Each soul has its peculiar evil tastes, bringing it to the likeness of something beneath itself; why may it not be under the necessity of abiding in the condition of that thing to which it had adapted and

1"A Biographical History of Philosophy," by G. H. Lewes. Series I. Ancient Philosophy, vol. i. p. 65. London: Charles Knight, 1845.

2 Id.

reduced itself?" The soul, then, according to the Pythagorean doctrine, may be perpetually changing its dwelling from the form of man to the form of a beast, and from the form of one beast to another; and this not by accident, but in virtue of a fixed and unchangeable natural predetermination. What is this but the doctrine of the transmigration of souls-so eminently anti-Christian and so directly opposed to the words of revelation, "It is appointed unto man to die once, and after death the judg

ment."

Plato's theory of the soul and ideas is not less repugnant to revelation. According to him:1-Ideas are not the images of things, but things are the images of ideas. Ideas are the "substantial forms," the "intelligible essences" of things. Whence these ideas, of which things are representations? Plato answers-from the previous state of the soul. The soul is and ever was immortal. It looked into the region of real existences in the course of certain revolutions to which it was subjected in times past. It saw there "existence itself colourless, figureless, intangible." It retains the ideas of what it then saw. Thus it is, that sensible objects participate in ideas and receive their name from them; "for it is in consequence of their participation in ideas anteriorly existing in the soul, that all objects of the same genus receive the same name as the idea they represent." The doctrine of an increated soul, which is the foundation of these Platonic dreams, is subversive of the first principles of revelation; and it is a plain denial of the truth of the 27th verse of the 1st chapter of the book of Genesis: "And God created man to his own image: to the image of God he created him: male and female he created them."

But here is another philosopher, the gentle, the amiable Socrates surely he will be a safer guide than those we have hitherto cited? What of his teaching? No doubt he demonstrated the existence of a beneficent Providence in words of earnest truth and beauty almost inspired; but

1 Biog. Hist. Phil. vol. ii. art. "Plato," c. iv., v.

C

listen to him speaking on an ethical subject. "Vice,” he says, "of every kind is ignorance, and involuntary because ignorant. If a man is cowardly, it is because he does not rightly appreciate the importance of life and death. He thinks death an evil, and flees it. If he were wise, he would know that death is a good thing, or, at the worst, an indifferent one, and, therefore, would not shun it. If a man is intemperate, it is because he is unable to estimate the relative value of present pleasure and future pain. Ignorance misleads him. It is the nature of man to seek good and shun evil; he would never seek evil, knowing it to be such; if he seeks it, he mistakes it for good; if he is intemperate, it is because he is unwise." The obvious consequence of such positions as these is the eminently unchristian and fatally immoral doctrine, that there are no sins of passion; that the wise man, while acting with a knowledge of all the bearings of his act, cannot transgress against the moral law; and it would follow from them that the Apostle was wrong when he said, "I find another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and leading me captive to the law of sin, that is in my members."

1

The Sceptics who, on the one hand, denied that a true knowledge of things can be had through the senses, and on the other, refused to admit that reason is the "criterion" of truth, subverted the principles on which the Christian revelation is authoritatively declared to be demonstrated-" Faith from hearing, hearing from the word of God."

3

The Epicureans, who defined happiness to consist in pleasure, and who affirmed that philosophy is that power by which reason conducts men to happiness, were in obvious collision with that divine teaching which enjoined its disciples "to mortify their members upon the earth," and "to crucify the flesh with its vices and concupiscences.'

When we say that philosophy occupied the minds of the

1 Biog. Hist. Phil. vol. i. 223. 2 Id. vol. ii. art. "Sceptics," 131. 3 Id. art. "Epicureans," 139.