Lord Castlereagh was equally clear and positive :—

'In England government depended on opinion, and public opinion would not allow any sacrifices to be made for the restoration of the House of France. . . . The cause of the Bourbons was unpopular; scarcely a newspaper could be found to say a word in its favour.'

M. de Vitrolles combated the allies' views intelligently, and with laudable zeal. He dwelt on the insurrections of Holland and Belgium, and on the protest of the mute Corps Législatif, as evidences that Napoleon was falling; insisted that it was on the field of politics, not of battle, that he could be best assailed; and pledged himself that if the allies would make the cause of the old monarchy their own, and cordially declare for the Bourbon princes, they would detach France from a rule she hated, and, even on her own soil, would be hailed as deliverers. Metternich remarked incredulously :

'We have been passing through France,' were his words, 'we have been living in France these two months, and nothing like what you speak of has been discovered. We do not perceive in the people among whom we are thrown the sentiments you announce; there seems to be no need of repose, no recollection of the past; there is even no general expression of discontent against the Emperor.'

The reply of M. de Vitrolles was correct, as events were before long to prove; but it was not creditable to the national character, though it illustrates one of its most distinctive features:

'For twenty years we have only found safety in submission, absolute and unreserved, to a succession of tyrannies. We suffer and hate in silence, oppressed by that terrible arm which has also weighed you down. Not one bold voice will be raised as long as the popular idea of the power of Bonaparte remains unchanged.'

The arguments of M. de Vitrolles had little weight with statesmen cautious and slow to move, bound too, as yet, by their own proposals. They stirred, however, the fickle and excitable Czar: "I was interrupted by a sudden movement ' of the Emperor. "It is true," he exclaimed, contradicting 'himself completely; "that is what I have said myself a 'hundred times, but no one would mind me.'

Alexander, in fact, whether in the field or the closet, was weak, unstable, and without a steady purpose. As Stadion had remarked:

'The Emperor of Russia, upon the slightest reverse, gives orders to treat upon any terms; at the first sign of success he will listen to nothing.'

Even at this crisis so little was thought of the Bourbons by

the allies' leaders, that the Comte d'Artois, who had ventured to hover on the skirts of the invading armies, had not received even a sign of notice :

'I had spoken to Stadion about Monsieur the Comte d'Artois. I had tried to find out if any one had charge of his interests at Châtillon, and if he was corresponding with the prince. He smiled at my simplicity. The name of Monsieur had not even been spoken of. It was thought that he had stayed behind at Bâle . . . but no account was taken of him.'

...

It was, in fact, Napoleon's suspicious jealousy that had made the allies aware that the Comte was at hand :

"The Duc de Vicence," said M. de Stadion, "is the only person who has ever spoken to me about the Comte. This prince, said the ambassador of Bonaparte, can only be in France with the approbation of the allied sovereigns, and especially with that of Austria. . . . I replied that the prince had no supporters, was not authorised to be in France, and had no political relations with us."'

M. de Vitrolles' sketches of the historic figures with whom he was thus brought in contact are full of life, and deserve notice. This is his delineation of Metternich:

'At that time he was about forty-five years old. His figure was pleasing and distinguished, his bearing noble and graceful, his manners attractive, natural, and extremely engaging.'

He thus describes Alexander :

'The emperor was standing; there was no kind of furniture in the room. I would rather have found him seated. His stature was imposing, but his appearance was not, though it bore the stamp of power. The expression of his features was that of ready kindness.'

This is his sketch of Castlereagh's impressive figure, still remembered by a few of his countrymen :

'He entered the room, a noble, quiet figure, with the calm and polite manner of distinguished Englishmen. Completely unmoved he listened to me in silence, and with mute attention.'

Meanwhile events of supreme importance had been rapidly changing the allies' purpose, and were leading them, though even yet with reluctance, to break with Napoleon, and to seek the Bourbons. The military situation of the French Emperor, despite his splendid success in Champagne, was visibly becoming all but desperate; he was hemmed in by the immense hosts of his enemies, fully four times more numerous than his own; and Wellington, on the southern frontier, was advancing in triumph along the Garonne. Italy, too, had been lost by the defection of Murat; Eugene was isolated beyond

the Alps; and Augereau, desertion already in his heart, was scarcely defending the south-eastern provinces; while Suchet, lingering on the verge of Spain, was abandoning Soult and avoiding Wellington. The Empire, in a word, was quickly breaking up, and, though the capital was still submissive, it was seething with terror and wild discontent. Peace, too, was not to be found at Châtillon; Napoleon rejected the allies' terms, and endeavoured to treat with Austria alone; but he was only playing a game to secure a chance to strike hard once more for his Empire. This state of affairs gave increased strength to the arguments of those who, like Pozzo di Borgo, of proved weight in the allied counsels, had been always opposed to a peace with Napoleon; and M. de Vitrolles and his disclosures were, doubtless, not without real effect, though he has, perhaps, exaggerated his own importance. The Congress was dissolved on the 19th of March, though probably a few days of grace were still left to the dreaded Emperor; but the rupture permitted the allied ministers to consider seriously the Bourbon cause, and to deal more directly with M. de Vitrolles than had been possible under their recent engagements. They held a conference at Bar-sur-Seine with the stranger, who, as he truly said, was the 'representative of France' for the time:

'We seated ourselves round the chimney. M. de Hardenberg, who was very deaf, placed himself next me, on the left; Count Nesselrode was near him. Lord Castlereagh was on my right, between Prince Metternich and myself. . . . A look of the most engaging kindness was on every face; and I was at once invited to express my views.'

M. de Vitrolles' suggestions, as may be imagined, were characteristically distinct and compendious. Napoleon was to be pronounced dethroned; Louis XVIII. was to be placed in his stead; well-tried supporters of the House of Bourbon were to be asked to form a Royalist army, and the administration of the provinces held by the allies was to be transferred to the Comte d'Artois and his partisans in the name of the King. M. de Vitrolles, too, like a true Frenchman, was not satisfied that France should return to her limits of 1790 or 1792; even under a Bourbon she ought to possess the 'natural boundaries' won by the sword and the doctrines of the devouring Republic, and offered to Napoleon after Leipzig:

'I had told Stadion that it was impossible, without doing us great wrong, not to leave us all that had been offered to Napoleon, at that period, and even more. This was due to France and to the engagements made at Frankfort. In our hands this would cause no danger to the

peace of Europe. To give less would be to place the royal family in a difficult position.'

The ministers of the allies, we need not say, did not fall in with these extreme views. They considered, indeed, the return of the Bourbons as a contingency to be really thought of, but they declined as yet to declare for them; and, in the first instance at least, they preferred to rely on men of the Empire in disgrace or alienated by Napoleon's despotism :

""Would there be any objection," I was asked, "to the Abbé de Pradt, the author of the Antidote to the Congress of Rastadt'? No doubt you are acquainted with him?

6.66

Certainly," I replied, "for a long time, and almost intimately. If it were not a rather treacherous compliment, I would say of him what all the world says he is not deficient in wit."

"Well," said M. de Metternich, "men of that kind would offer us better guarantees than those who surround your princes."

"Good heavens!" I answered, "the Abbé de Pradt, and many others! Only help us to obtain existence and power, and you will see that more adherents than you care for would flock in."

"But," observed another, "the prejudices of the Bourbons would prevent them from availing themselves of the assistance of men of weight in public opinion, and capable of directing it, such as M. de Talleyrand... Fouché?"

"And why not M. de Talleyrand?" I said, a little embarrassed. "You ought to regard him as wholly devoted to that cause, at least in his heart."

"They began to laugh. "Ah, his heart, that is an excellent joke!" "Well, then, in his thoughts," I replied. Then they asked seriously, "Could one of your princes really like Fouché?"

""Fouché," I exclaimed: "well, that is a hard thing; but still, if he were necessary. . .

It was finally arranged that, in certain events, the allies would make overtures to the Bourbons, and M. de Vitrolles was permitted to convey this intelligence to the Comte d'Artois. He had certainly fulfilled his mission well; and, though events had powerfully told in his favour, he had a right to assert that he was the first Frenchman who had ventured to open the allies' minds to the essential weakness of Napoleon's power, and to the actual state of opinion in France; and his views had had real weight in their counsels. From the following passage we see that the purpose of the Coalition was still not quite settled:-'I had hoped, after 'what had been arranged the previous evening, that I might • have been able to set off at once, but, to my great annoyance, Prince Metternich detained me, alleging that I must

' await the result of the battle being then fought at Arcis'sur-Aube.'

These memoirs contain an instructive account of the movements before this remarkable battle, which, in its consequences, hastened the fall of Napoleon. The Emperor, intending to repeat against Schwartzenberg, whose forces were scattered between the Aube and the Seine, the manœuvres which, a few weeks before, had proved nearly fatal to Blücher on the Marne, was anticipated by a fortunate chance, and, surprised in turn, was compelled to fight in a situation which ought to have caused his ruin but for the terror his troops and his name still inspired. These details are curious, and illustrate clearly the weakness and the divided counsels which so often made the allies fail:

'Prince Schwartzenberg was in bed, ill with gout. Uncertain what to do, and believing that Bonaparte was occupied in checking the advance of Blücher, he allowed his army to spread, upon an extended front, on either bank of the Seine. He felt himself so completely secure that he gave no attention to the reports of his lieutenants on his right.... The Emperor Alexander, accompanied by Prince Wolkonski, having arrived to visit Prince Schwartzenberg, he met General Toll, quartermaster-general.

""What are you doing here?" he exclaimed. "Do you wish to lose all your army

?

"Thank Heaven your Majesty is here," replied General Toll. "We could not make the commander-in-chief understand the real state of affairs. Your Majesty will now set everything right."

"The Emperor Alexander immediately gave orders-these were conveyed by the staff with extreme rapidity-that the different corps of the army should concentrate between Troyes and Pougy, that is, between the Seine and the Aube.'

Napoleon was, in turn, too confident, and was accordingly placed in extreme danger :

'Bonaparte, surprised at not having found his antagonist's columns in full march on the roads to Paris, took it into his head that, alarmed at his approach, they were falling back in retreat. To pursue them was not enough for him; he could only gain the decisive victory, which had become a necessity of his situation, by turning the positions of the hostile masses. . . . He marched eastwards, with the intention of ascending the Aube, if necessary, as far as Bar, in order to threaten Chaumont and the communications of the allied army with the Rhine. He thus advanced as far as Arcis and occupied the town, his only purpose being to dislodge any hostile detachments which might be there. ... Despising in turn the information which reached him from all sides, and which conveyed the news that his enemy was not retreating, and that Schwartzenberg had concentrated his whole force at a short distance, Bonaparte still insisted that the allies were falling back, and