IRENEUS AND TERTULLIAN.

109

All punishments according to them were only means of refor mation ordained by God, in order to lead fallen beings to a sense of their estrangement, and at last to a re-union with God.

IRENEUS forms the transition to the realistic standpoint, which regards punishment as something developing itself from within, as something inseparably connected with sin. Hence he says, God does not punish immediately, in order to punish, but punishment is that which follows sin of itself; as God is the fountain of all happiness, and those who abide in communion with Him, receive all good from Him, so estrangement from Him is the source of punishment. If TERTULLIAN, NOVATIAN, and LACTANTIUS, in their more decided Realism, sometimes used expressions liable to be misunderstood, yet they maintained not the less, that God must be supposed to act at all times differently from man, since He does nothing from mere feeling or passion, but according to the dictates of divine wisdom. Tertullian, especially, who enters deeply into these discussions, defends the idea of divine justice against Marcion, by showing the necessary connexion of redeeming love and justice. Does not redemption from sin, he asks, presuppose the existence of guilt in God's sight? Marcion is illogical*, since he denies the justice of God, and yet maintains the fact of Redemption. Tertullian aims to prove that the idea of divine justice has a deeper ground; that Marcion supposes it does not spring from a reference to the punishment of evil, but rests on an original revelation of God, on Creation generally, where it is equivalent to the justitia architectonica, since God has fixed definite limits to every being; the goodness of God, he says, created the World, and his justice regulates it. To set aside the divine Anthropopathisms is preposterous; if Marcion would on this ground refuse to believe in God's wrath and punitive

Adv. Marc. i. 26. iv. 10.-Sed et peccata dimittere an ejus posset esse, qui negetur tenere, et an ejus sit absolvere, cujus non sit etiam damnare, et an congruat, eum ignoscere, in quem nihil sit admissum.

+ Ibid. ii. c. 12.—A primordio dumque creator tam bonus, quam et justus. Pariter utrumque processit, bonitas ejus operata est mundum, justitia modulata est. Justitiæ opus est, quod inter lucem et tenebras separatio pronuntiata est inter diem et noctem, inter cœlum et terram, etc. Omnia ut bonitas concipit, ita justitia distinxit, totum hoc judicato dispositum et ordinatum est.

justice, he must also deny the other attributes of God; but instead of drawing down God to human limitation, we must rise to Him. "Why dost thou imagine anything human in God, and not that everything is divine?" The limits which cleave to the development of the divine in Man must all be abstracted. The long-suffering and compassion of God must be understood otherwise than in the case of human beings. From such a standpoint, he vindicated "the speaking after the manner of men," occurring in Holy Writ. God, he says, could not come into close contact with man, unless he appropriated human affections, a condescension that softens the exceeding splendour of his majesty, which otherwise would be too much for human weakness. Perhaps in itself it is not worthy of God, but for man it is necessary, and, therefore, worthy of God, since nothing can be so worthy of God as what contributes to the salvation of Man. He pronounces it inconsequent to believe in Christ, and yet to be inclined to deny the condescension of God in the Old Testament, in which he saw a preparation for the condescension of God in Christ. Tertullian sometimes expresses himself, as if he thought that moral goodness had no internal necessity, but was only made such by an act of the divine will. "We must not obey it because it is good," he says; but we must obey, because God has commanded it."§ Yet he would not affirm that God has arbitrarily determined this or that to be good. He only designed to refute those who would limit the authority of the divine law by a reference to the creature. In another passage he guards against such a misapprehension, and asserts that in God everything must be natural, eternal, and grounded in his Essence.||

66

The Idea of the Divine Omnipotence. From the standpoint

* Adv. Marc. ii. 16.

+ Ibid. c. 27. cf.-Conversabatur Deus, ut homo divina agere doceretur; ex æquo agebat Deus cum homine, ut homo ex æquo agere cum Deo posset: Deus pusillus inventus est, ut homo maximus fieret.

Ibid. c. 16.

§ De Poenit. c. 4.-Audaciam existimo de bono divini præcepti disputare. Neque enim quia bonum est, idcirco auscultare debemus, sed quia Deus præcepit. Ad exhibitionem obsequii prior est majestas divinæ potestatis, prior est auctoritas imperantis quam utilitas ser

vientis.

Contra Marc. i. 22, 23.

IDEA OF THE DIVINE OMNIPOTENCE.

111

of Antiquity, where the consciousness was confined within the
limits of Nature, the divine presented itself as subject to a
higher Nature. Christianity introduced the idea of Omnipo-
tence as something new in opposition to the Pagan view; it
was of peculiar importance to Christians; simple believers ap-
pealed to it as the ground of their confidence. Certainly its
development presented difficulties, when not viewed i. con-
nexion with the essential nature of God. It was then per-
verted into the idea of infinite arbitrariness, or the limitations
of human consciousness were transferred to God.
Such a
transference was made by the elder Pliny, in order to remove
the reality of the idea.* Celsus reproached the Christians with
referring on all occasions to the divine omnipotence.
"God,"
he says, misunderstanding the idea, "can do nothing irrational,
unnatural, or wicked."+ Origen defending the idea against
such objections thoroughly discusses the question. He dis-
tinguishes Nature in the ideal sense, which is one with the
divine arrangement of the Universe, from Nature as it actually
appears. If Nature be understood in the former sense, we
may indeed say,
God cannot and will not do what is against
Nature. On the other hand, the laws of phenomenal Nature
cannot bind God. There may be a standpoint raised above
these laws, and hence, when anything happens according to the
divine will, we cannot consider this as against Nature. These
views are important in relation to his idea of miracles. A
miracle certainly does not correspond with the laws of common
phenomenal Nature, the φύσις κοινότερον νοουμένη, but founded
on the higher law of Nature, on the general principles of the
divine government. As far as this involves any precise state-
ment, Origen maintains that the divine omnipotence is not to
be considered as infinite. But he denies infinity in a different
sense. It was a doctrine of the ancient Philosophers, that no
consciousness can embrace an infinite series, which, applied
to God, was an indirect Anthropopathism. Thus some came
to the conclusion, since consciousness implies limitation, no
consciousness can be ascribed to the Supreme Being; so it was
in the idea of the Neoplatonic "Ov. Origen sincerely main-
tained the idea of a personal and self-conscious God; § but in-
Hist. Natur. ii. c. 5.
Orig. c. Cels. v. 14, 23.

Plutarch. de Defectu Oracul. c. 23, 24.
In Joann. t. xxxii. § 18.—ὅτε ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γινόμενος περιωπῇ,

voluntarily influenced by the Philosophy of his age, he adopted the supposition above-mentioned as a truth, at the same time actuated by a Christian interest for a Providence which extended over all things, he thought that the divine Omnipotence could only embrace a limited range of existence. This is important in relation to his doctrine of Creation, the preexistence of souls, and the development of the Universe. He assumed that God had created a definite number of spirits, and accordingly beheld in the development of the world only a change of Forms.* By this specimen we perceive what an influence the Platonic Philosophy exerted on the Alexandrians, though the religious interest of Theism acted as a counterpoise. 3. THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION.

On this doctrine particularly, Christianity effected a revolution in the prevailing views. Natural Religion, formed by the contemplation of Nature, and a comparison of it with human relations, was unable to rise to the idea of a creation as the free act of God; an absolute act of unconditioned freedom performed by God was a thought totally foreign to antiquity. The phenomenal world was supposed to spring of itself out of Chaos; many attributed the same origin to the gods. Even when no Autonomy was ascribed to the World, no pantheistic view adopted, no development of Nature from itself allowed, but a Supreme Spirit was regarded as the Framer of the Universe, this was not considered as an unconditioned, absolutely free act on the part of God, but conditioned by a pre-existent matter with this assumption was connected the assertion of a necessary principle of Evil and Defect in the World. As long as Evil was regarded as founded in Nature, and necessary, the Divine agency must be supposed to be conditioned. When ἐπὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γνώσει καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρίᾳ οὔσῃ μείζονι τῆς ἐν υἱῷ θεωρίας, ὡς ἐπὶ θεοῦ χρὴ νοεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα, δεῖ λέγειν, ὅτι εὐφραίνεται ἄρα τόν τινα εὐαρέστησιν.

*ПIɛpt dpx@v. ii. c. 9.-In illo ergo initio putandum est tantum numerum rationabilium creaturarum, vel intellectualium, vel quoquomodo appellandæ sunt quas mentes superius diximus, fecisse Deum, quantum sufficere posse prospexit. Certum est quippe quod præfuisse aliquo apud se numero eas fecit: non enim, ut quidam volunt, finem putandum est non habere creaturas; quia ubi finis non est, nec comprehensio ulla nec circumscriptio esse potest. Quod si fuerit, utique nec contineri vel dispensari a Deo quæ facta sunt, potuerunt. Naturaliter nempe, quicquid infinitum fuerit, et incomprehensibile erit.

THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION.

113

Plato represented God as the being who organized the λŋ, it may be disputed whether this was not given by him as a mere mythical conception. The formation of the λn takes place when the divine idea is realized in it. But Dualism is never wholly overcome. The power that withstands the Divine never allows it entirely to succeed. This form was too mythical for the later Neo-Platonism, and not sufficiently intelligible. It substituted absolute Monism for Dualism. changed the acting God of Plato into the Absolute; the transitive act into the unconditioned development of an immanent rational necessity, from the Absolute down to the last point of existence, where the λn had its place as the necessary limit of this process.

In Judaism, on the contrary, we find the distinctive mark of Theism the doctrine of a Creation the absolute free act of the Divine Omnipotence the highest elevation of the human mind to which no Philosophy of Heathenism could attain. Christianity found this doctrine already in existence, and only announced it afresh, and purified it from those corruptions which it had acquired among the Jews.

The idea of Creation out of nothing denoted in opposition to Pagan Antiquity, an absolutely free act of God, conditioned by no pre-existent matter. The Dogma is found in the Shepherd (Tony) of Hermas, "God who brought all things into being out of nothing."* But this Idea found its way only by degrees, and when an entirely new direction had been given to the religious spirit and thinking. The speculative and popular mind, thinkers and simple people, as Tertullian remarks, took offence at it;t especially that Oriental speculative tendency of the Gnosis rebelled against it. The religious doctrine of the ancient World was connected with a speculative Cosmogony. Christianity, by its doctrine of Creation, dissolved this connexion, and thus established the independence of religious doctrine. The re-introduction of such a Cosmogony would have altered the essential character of Christianity. It was a first principle of the Gnostics that from nothing, nothing is made, and thus no agreement with them was possible from the Christian standpoint. For they were not willing to admit the fact as a matter of faith, but required an explanation how the Finite could be educed from the Infinite. To make this intelligible, they imagined a development of the perfection * II, Mandat, i, + De Resurr. Carn. c. 11.