tion: |,,The anti-English feelings of the Transvaal Boers rose to a very high state of tension. | Repudiation of the suzerainty of England was openly declared in the public Press. Treaties with Foreign Powers were concluded without compliance with the conditions of the Convention of 1884. The offensive and defensive alliance with the Orange Free State was revised. Emissaries were despatched to procure co-operation of the Boers of the British Colonies. Fortifications were commenced at Pretoria and Johannesburg, and extensive orders were placed for guns, rifles, and ammunition. Natal and Zululand were threatened with invasion. || The extreme bitterness of the Boer hostility has somewhat abated, but it is beyond all doubt that they are still more disposed and better prepared for a rupture with England than ever before, and in no way inclined to redress the grievances of the Uitlanders. . . . The Government has already spent 1500000 7. this year upon military preparations, and 850 000 t. has been further voted for the provision of artillery, rifles, ammunition, and fortifications. As the Transvaal is almost entirely surrounded by British territory, this large expenditure can have no other explanation than an anticipation of war, or an intention of aggression against this country and its supremacy in South Africa.“ 24. On the whole, however, Sir John Ardagh then took a hopeful view of the prospects of a peaceful solution. He says — || „The remarkable and unprecedented spectacle afforded by the Transvaal must, so long as present conditions last, inspire us with apprehension, and compel us to regard armed intervention as a possibility which may be forced upon us, however conciliatory our attitude may be. || But, though the burghers continue to indulge in exasperating language, unfriendly manifestations, and wild aspirations, it must be admitted that President Kruger has displayed extraordinary sagacity in conducting the affairs of the Republic. We cannot suppose that he is not fully alive to the dangers which menace the illogical and unstable system he represents, both internally and externally. He has been, so far, remarkably successful, and nothing can be more advantageous to him than the maintenance of the status quo. The smouldering discontent of the Uitlanders, and the arrogance of the burghers are equally dangerous to his Government, and he may, presumably, be relied upon to use his influence to assuage the one and check the other. The burghers are quite aware that Uitlanders are, for them, the goose which lays their golden eggs; and the Uitlanders are more concerned in making money than in obtaining the franchise. | For the immediate present there seems to be a reasonable prospect of tranquillity, in spite of warlike preparations, menacing language, and oppressive legislation. || The future is largely dependent upon the productiveness of the goldfields, the attraction they hold out to immigrants, and the nationality of those immigrants. The stream of British emigration to South Africa continues to flow with unabated vigour, and is mainly directed towards the goldfields. Every day increases the number of Englishmen in the Transvaal. Other nationalities contribute to the influx, but their aggregate appears to be considerably under the number of British subjects. It consequently seems to be only a question of time for the British element to arrive at such an overwhelming preponderance as to be irresistible. If, meanwhile, they will remain quiet and act prudently, their eventual supremacy is inevitable.“ 25. Six months later, however, information had been received which indicated that the state of matters was more critical, and on 15th April 1897 Sir John discussed the position regarding the Orange Free State, urging that from a military point of view nothing short of an actively benevolent attitude should be accepted from the Free State," and adding that the chances of peace have evidently diminished. || Procrastination and delay in settling this important question of policy at the critical moment will be most prejudicial to us. A period of about two months must elapse between the issue of orders in England for the despatch of an expedition and the arrival of the troops in the theatre of war. During that time the British force in South Africa must remain on the defensive, and the Transvaal Government will have an opportunity of undertaking offensive operations." ||,,Both the Colonists and the Boers are at this moment convinced that there is a risk of war. Some of them regard it as inevitable. Under these circumstances the forces now at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding are manifestly inadequate to protect our interests during the inevitable interval between the ultimatum and the arrival of an expedition from England. || Both in the Cape Colony and Natal more troops are needed in order to enable us to hold our own during this critical period, and to command respect even if the friction should not increase." 26. During the next 18 months the situation did not improve, and it was again reviewed in the Intelligence Department in a paper by Major Altham, dated 21st September 1898. For the present purpose we quote the first paragraph and the conclusions. ||,,Necessity for readiness. - The Colonial Office have during the last 18 months in official letters addressed to the War Office repeatedly drawn attention to the unsatisfactory condition of political affairs in South Africa, and to the necessity for the Imperial troops being ready for a sudden emergency. || In a letter addressed to the War Office on the 5th of May last Mr. Chamberlain pointed out that 'in spite of the anxiety of Her Majesty's Government to preserve peace there are a number of questions which may lead to a rupture with the South African Republic and that it may be taken as probable that the Government of the Republic would seize any favourable opportunity offered by reason of Her Majesty's Government being involved in difficulties elsewhere, to assume suddenly a hostile attitude.' The letter then alluded to the fact (previously pointed out in page 41 of Intelligence Division publication 'Notes on the Dutch Republics of South Africa') that firmness and readiness at the outset of the war will greatly diminish the number of disloyal Colonists, who might be tempted by racial sympathies to join their kinsmen over the border; and for this reason Mr. Chamberlain urged that it is most desirable that Her Majesty's forces should be ready at once to meet, and at least hold in check until the arrival of reinforcements, any movement in force made from the Transvaal. Failure to do this, or delay, would almost certainly entail humiliation and increased expense.' || The information received in the Intelligence Division since the date of the above letter tends to the belief that the situation is unchanged, and in all probability will remain unchanged in the immediate future. || The Transvaal has, during the last two years, made military preparations on a scale which can only be intended to meet the contingency of a contest with Great Britain. These preparations still continue, and the condition of affairs in South Africa has practically now become that of an armed neutrality, which may last for years or may culminate in war at very short notice. At the outbreak of such a war we shall at first be in a decided numerical inferiority; moreover we should have to face the problem of protecting a very long frontier and should be handicapped with a certain amount of disloyalty (passive, if not active) within our own borders; at least a month or six weeks must elapse before any appreciable reinforcements could arrive from England or India. The problem of defence would therefore be a difficult one, and its difficulty will be enhanced by the fact that any mistake or lack of firmness at the outset would seriously affect subsequent operations. (8) Conclusion. - From the facts above submitted the following conclusions appear to arise: (a) That the political and military situa- || tion in South Africa renders it necessary that the troops should be able to mobilise at a few hours' notice for the defence of the frontier. || (6) That there is reason to fear that, from lack of organisation and insufficient transport, there would at present be considerable delay in such mobilisation. (c) That to remedy these defects defence schemes should be drawn up locally for the Cape Colony and Natal, worked out in all details on the same lines as the schemes of defence for home and colonial ports; and that the General Officer Commanding should be instructed to report fully all requirements necessary to perfect these defence schemes. || (d) That the Colonial Office should be asked to inquire through the High Commissioner of South Africa whether any schemes of defence have been prepared for Southern Rhodesia, and for Mafeking in Bechuanaland. || (e) That the arrangements which would be made for the despatch of reinforcements from England and for the provision of supplies and transport be worked out fully by the War Office; and that the General Officer Commanding, South Africa, be informed what action under these arrangements would be required of him on the outbreak of the war. D.M.I. (B). 21 September 1898." E. A. Altham, D.A.A.G.“ It has already been shown that the questions referred to in the Colonial Office letter quoted above had been the subject of a prolonged correspondence with the South African Republic during these years. Military Preparations. 27. In proceeding to examine the steps which were taken in consequence, it is desirable in the first place to state the division of the responsibility. || 28. Under the provisions of the Order in Council of 1895, which was in force at the outbreak of the War, the Commander-in-Chief was responsible for the general distribution of the Army at home and abroad, and for the preparation and maintenance of schemes of offensive and defensive operations". Accordingly, under his direct orders there was, on the one side, mobilisation sub-division, which dealt with questions of mobilisation and of war establishments; and on the other side, the Intelligence Division, which was charged with the preparation of information relative to the military defence of the Empire, including the compilation of maps and the strategical consideration of all schemes of defence. 29. We shall consider hereafter how far the equipment of these offices was adequate for the performance of the duties entrusted to them; but a statement of the distribution of duties is necessary to explain the fact that in the papers of the Intelligence Division relating to South Africa there is no definite suggestion of the nature or amount of reinforcements which might be required in the event of hostilities. On the other hand there was correspondence between the Director of Military Intelligence and the General Officer Commanding at the Cape a post held during the period before the War, first by General Goodenough and afterwards by General Sir W. Butler, regarding Defence Schemes; and the nature of these schemes must be clearly understood. || 30. A system exists for the preparation in every Dependency of the Empire of schemes of defence by the General Officer Commanding there, but No. 168 of the King's Regulations lays it down that: - ,,His schemes of defence should deal only with the men and material actually available". These schemes, therefore, dealt only with the garrisons actually available in South Africa at the time when they were drawn up, and must not be regarded as any measure of war requirements. This appears from the evidence of Sir William Butler, Sir John Ardagh, Colonel Altham, and others. There was also prepared, not under the King's Regulations, but at the instance of the Colonial Office, a local scheme of defence for Natal. This scheme, prepared by Major-General Cox and a Colonial Defence Committee, was transmitted by the Governor of Natal to the Secretary of State for Colonies on the 29th November, 1898. It is printed in the volume of Appendices, page 359. Like the schemes under the King's Regulations it was based upon the actual forces available at the time, regular and colonial. Lord Roberts observed that it was a very ambitious scheme for the small force at disposal to carry out. As a matter of fact none of these schemes seem to have been even submitted to the Generals in command during the War, though this does not imply that they were not ably and carefully prepared by the officers holding commands in South Africa previously to the War. || 31. If then, it was not the function of the Intelligence Division of the War Office to formulate from the information it had collected an estimate of the force required to guard against the dangers which that information disclosed, and, if the generals on the spot were not required to do more than detail the positions which might best be occupied by the troops under their command without any consideration of other circumstances, it becomes necessary to look to some authority, higher than both, which was competent to bring their energies into line. Obviously, this is to be found only in the Commander-in-Chief, with whom, as already stated, rested the duty of preparing schemes of offensive and defensive operations. Field-Marshal Viscount Wolseley submitted to us a series of minutes to illustrate his evidence, which he divided under three heads, (1) recommendations connected with the competency of the Army to fulfil its duties, (2) recommendations in connection with the War in South Africa, (3) recommendations regarding the administration of the Army and the constitution of the War Office. || 32. Examining these documents with a view to the second [of these heads we find in Lord Wolseley's minute of 22nd February 1896, a refe |