rence to the Cape. The addition proposed was one regiment of cavalry, one battery of horse artillery, and two battalions of foot. But as the title of the Appendix ,,The Strategical Importance of the Cape" sufficiently shows, this increase of garrison was advocated on other grounds and not only, or indeed principally, on the necessities of the situation in the Colonies themselves. It is significant to notice that the Marquis of Lansdowne, who replied in a memorandum of 10th July 1896, quoted the language of the Commander-in-Chief, we should be strong there not only to resist attacks from without, but to put down at once any internal troubles fomented amongst the Boers by an enemy," and remarked „would it not be true to say that if we are to be strong enough to do all these things we shall have to strengthen the garrisons of the Cape and Natal by much more than two battalions of Infantry?" || In his reply to this memorandum, dated 30th October 1896, Lord Wolseley does not specifically refer to the Cape. But in his evidence he defended the adequacy of his proposals, saying,,it would have enabled us to have held some defensible position, and it would have enabled us to protect what we had, I think." 33. The minutes of November 1897 are concerned with the organisation of the Army as a whole, and the next minute, dated 20th April 1898, bearing on the subject of South Africa was quoted by Lord Wolseley in his answer to Q. 8745. It proposed to send out to Cape Colony „at least one regiment of cavalry, and three batteries of field artillery to make the force there complete in all arms." Also to collect transport ,,for the forces now in South Africa" and to despatch reserves of rifles and ammunition. It contained also the following passage: „Our troops in Ladysmith have no adequate supply of provisions. Two months' food for man and beast should be at once collected there for a regiment of cavalry, three batteries of field artillery, a mountain battery, 120 mounted infantry and a battalion of foot. This is absolutely essential to prevent any force at Lalysmith from being starved out before help could reach it from England." | The minutes of Lord Wolseley and Lord Lansdowne in January 1899, which come next in the series, deal with the Army generally. || 34. With the summer of 1899 a period is reached which calls for separate and particular attention. The first of Lord Wolseley's minutes at this time is dated 8th June, and his proposals were stated as follows:-|| "In the event of war with the Transvaal we should require, in addition to the force now in South Africa, one complete Army Corps, one Cavalry Division, and one battalion of mounted Infantry. For the line of communications we should require four battalions. | The pressing question for - the Government to consider at this moment is, to what extent shall we prepare for this contingency; first, secretly, and, secondly, without any concealment whatever as to the objects of our preparations? Much could be done at once without attracting any attention, provided no one in the War Office or outside the Cabinet be admitted to the secret. || We could supply all our troops now in South Africa with a double establishment of regimental transport. We could send out three companies of Army Service Corps one at a time. Taking advantage of the recent outbreak of fever in Natal, we might || 1. Accumulate in South Africa a large amount of medical transport and material. || 2. Nominally to superintend the hutting of the troops at Ladysmith and other stations, we might send out three Field Companies R. E. || 3. Commissariat supplies to a very large extent could be collected at Cape Town and Maritzburg. || 4. We could at once despatch to the great sources of mule supply officers to make arrangements for purchasing mules as soon as they received telegraphic orders to begin. || 5. We could increase our naval squadron on the Cape Station. This is, I think, a point of much importance. 6. We have been of late years urged very strongly to mobilise one of our three Army Corps and a Cavalry Division. Let us do this at once on Salisbury Plain, under the General whom it is intended should command in South Africa in the event of war. The expense would be an extremely small matter when compared with the cost of war, and it might probably wake up the Transvaal to the fact that England was at last serious, and, by doing so, prevent war altogether. This would not require any immediate calling out of the Army Reserve. came for war, the Reserves for that Army Corps and the Cavalry Division would alone be called out. They would join at Salisbury, taking the places of the superfluous young soldier who would be disposed of according to our Regulations on the subject. || It is very evident that this demonstration would be far more effective if the Reserves for the force to be collected at Salisbury were called out as soon as the troops were placed under orders to assemble there, and I need scarcely add, that the Army Corps, should it have to be used in the field, would then be far more effective as a military machine for war purposes. || The operations should begin in South Africa as soon as possible, so as to be over by next November. || It would create an excellent feeling if each of the Australian Colonies, Tasmania, and New Zealand, furnished contingents of mounted troops, and that Canada should furnish two battalions of foot." 35. It will be observed that no immediate reinforcements were sug gested beyond three companies of Army Service Corps and three com When the time panies of Royal Engineers but the collection of transport and stores was to be „secretly" arranged. On the other hand an open demonstration of mobilising an Army Corps and a Cavalry Division on Salisbury Plain was strongly advocated. This was never seriously entertained by the Government and is chiefly of interest as the first indication of the nature of the force which it was supposed would suffice in the event of war, and which was eventually despatched. || 36. It is evident that in this sense the proposal of the Commander-in-Chief was accepted, for the next of his minutes is one dated 7th July which encloses and comments on a memorandum by Sir R. Buller, who had been designated for the chief command of this Army Corps. The recommendations of the Commanderin-Chief in regard to the distribution of forces are stated as follows: I 6. As originally recommended by me in my minute of 8th June 1899, I would still urge, as the most pressing step to be taken, and the most effective demonstration open to us, the immediate mobilisation of one Army Corps and one Cavalry Division say 35 000 men at Salisbury or Aldershot, whichever might be cheapest and most convenient. || But whatever decision be adopted on this point, the Cabinet should now consider whether we should not at a very early date send one Infantry Division and one Cavalry Brigade say 10000 men to South Africa, to act the double purpose of being an open demonstration of a warlike policy, and also an efficacious method of strengthening our present military position there. That is, in fact, No. 1 of the recommendations in Sir R. Buller's minute of yesterday. || There can be no doubt as to the present necessity of strengthening our military position in South Africa, and, in my opinion, the early despatch there of the above-mentioned force would be the most practical and convenient form in which that object would be secured." 37. The suggestion of a reinforcement to the extent of 10000 men is here made for the first time, but ten days later it does not appear to have been considered urgent, to judge from a note which is so important that it may be quoted in extenso: Question for Sir Redvers Buller. „Are you quite satisfied that our present position in the Cape Colony and in Natal is quite safe? || In the event of an ultimatum being sent to Kruger, telling him that unless he concedes what Sir A. Milner has demanded, Her Majesty's Government will feel obliged to adopt measures other than diplomatic, do you see any necessity for sending to either, or to both above-mentioned Colonies, any augmentation of our present garrisons there? And, if so, what should such angmentation consist of? Wolseley." 17. 7. 99. ,,There was a meeting in Lord Lansdowne's room at the War Office on the 18th July 1899, at which Sir R. Buller was asked this question. He replied that he had complete confidence in Butler's ability and forethought, and that as long as clever men like Butler and Symons on the spot did not say there was danger, he saw no necessity for sending out any troops in advance of the Army Corps to strengthen our position against any possible attack by the Boers on our frontiers. I do not say these were his exact words, but they are the exact meaning and pith of what he said to Lansdowne and me. - (Signed) W." 38. On 2nd August the Government decided on the dispatch of a reinforcement of 2000 men to Natal for the purposes described in the following Minute of Lord Lansdowne: ,,2nd August 1899. The view of Her Majesty's Government is that we should, without making ourselves responsible for the ,,complete protection" of Natal in the sense of securing it from all possible risk of invasion, make some addition to the strength of the force now stationed in thate colony. | The object of such an addition would be to strengthen our own position, to reassure the colonists, and, above all, to strengthen our diplomacy during the new phase which is commencing. || The number of men which, from the latter point of view, seems to us sufficient, would be 2000, or thereabouts. We should be glad if the addition of this force to that already on the ground enabled us to advance near enough to Laing's Nek to make that place safe from a mere raid by a small body of men. I gather that to hold the Nek against an invasion in force would require a much larger number of troops, but such an invasion is not anticipated, and we are not asked to provide against it. | The Cabinet would like one battalion for Natal to be taken from the Cape Colony, where it could be spared for a time. It is also suggested that the Natal local forces might be used in conjunction with ours for a movement in the direction of Laing's Nek. Some of the troops required might perhaps be obtained by detaining in Natal troops on their way to or from India. L." 2nd August 1899." ,,P. S. I suggest that these proposals be considered as wholly distinct from the question of mobilising an Army Corps in South Africa." 39. This was acknowledged by Lord Wolseley in these terms: ,,Secretary of State, - I am very glad it is contemplated to add some 2000 or 3000 men to our force in Natal, for, although that augmentation will not, I think, render the Colony entirely free from external danger, it will make our position north of the Tugela River, and at Ladysmith particularly, much more secure than it is at present. At this distance. from Natal I should not like to lay down where this reinforcement is to be quartered, for that is a matter that must be decided on the spot by the Major-General Commanding in Natal. But I think it might be intimated to him that for political reasons it is desirable these extra troops should be pushed forward either to Ladysmith or, if he thinks fit, even north of that position. He might be told that, if he deems it right to Occupy Dundee, or even Newcastle, with a view to a more careful watching of Laing's Nek, he may do so. || It is very desirable he should arrange for the collection of information as to Boer doings, movements, and plans in the neighbourhood of Van Reenan's Pass, and the other passes over the Drakensberg, between Natal and the Orange Free State." 40. The last of this series of Minutes which it is necessary to quote in the present connection is Lord Wolseley's of 18th August, which he evidently intended for submission to the Cabinet as a careful and reasoned statement of his views at that date. It is therefore inserted here in full. The subsequent correspondence to which it gave rise will be found in the Appendix, but does not deal so much with the proposals for the force to be employed as with questions of its constitution and of general policy. 18th August 1899. ,,Lord Lansdowne, I do not see all the telegrams that pass between the Colonial Office and Sir A. Milner, but from those I have read, I gather he is anxious about the weakness of the military force we now have in South Africa. I have long shared this anxiety with him, and consider our present military position in Natal to be very unsatisfactory. Having served in South Africa in a civil as well as a military capacity, and had close dealings with many of those who are now in office and in opposition in its several provinces, I think I am in a position to express an opinion upon the present aspect of affairs there. I venture, therefore, to put in writing my views upon it, looking at it chiefly from a military point of view. || I gather from Sir A. Milner's recent telegrams that he is not satisfied with the number of troops quartered in the Cape Colony, and I am inclined to agree with him. One of the most serious events that could happen for our rule in South Africa would be any Dutch rising in any part of the Colony. In my opinion we should hold the Orange River Station and the De Aar Junction (about 70 miles south of it) by one battalion, distributed as the I |