dence, it had been increased to 20 officers. That it was undermanned for the work of preparation for a great war will scarcely be denied. But a considerable measure of success must be admitted. The valuable series of memoranda extending over several years, which have already been noticed, will be found in Appendix B to the Report. From them was compiled the handbook entitled,,Military Notes," which was first issued as a secret publication in 1898 and was afterwards presented to Parliament. These papers contained information which in many respects was remarkably accurate. For instance, Colonel Altham, who was mainly responsible for its compilation, was able to say, with regard to the guns and ammunition in the possession of the Boers, in reply to a question. whether the information of the department was accurate: ,,I think it was extraordinarily accurate. You will see the practical result is that we a little overshot the mark; we estimated the number of guns at 107, and the actual number was 99, and that over-estimate was principally due to the fact that we heard that 16 of those six-inch guns what they called Long Toms afterwards had been ordered, and we were under the impression that they had arrived in South Africa, whereas only four had actually arrived before the war commenced. As regards ammunition, you observe that we estimated that there were 33 000 000 rounds in Pretoria magazine, and there were actually 33 050 000; we were within 50 000 of the exact number. That is at Pretoria, the central reserve. And as regards general supplies, we said that the supply was sufficient for a protracted campaign. -- 258. It is, however, in respect, of the provision of topographical information and maps that there has been most criticism, and reference may be made to the evidence received on these points. Colonel Althan defines the possibilities in regard to topographical information as follows: 521. Q. You regard it as almost impracticable to provide beforehand all the topographical information which an Army really requires for its advance? A. Yes, all the information. I think a good deal of the information has necessarily to be obtained by the staff of the Army itself on the spot; the more, of course, that can be obtained beforehand the better; but when you are dealing with a very large theatre of war like South Africa I should say it was really impracticable to obtain all that may be needed. Even supposing you had unlimited means and unlimited personnel to put together in a concise form every possible piece of topographical information that was required afterwards, it would run into such stacks of books that they never would be carried about by the Army. You must give a general impression of the country and such general information that enables the General on the spot to give his decisions in the earlier stages and make his preliminary dispositions. 522. Q. And you must have enough information to make that general information accurate? A. Yes; quite so." || Here, then, the means available to the department becomes an important question, and all he can say is: „I think we got together as much information as we possibly could, having regard to the means we had for obtaining information. Of course, if we had had larger means, more information would have been obtained, which would have been of considerable value to the Army during the operations. As it was, we were only able to examine and report on what appeared before the War to be important points, such as the bridges over the rivers, the main line of advance up from the Free State, and the main roads through the two Republics, and in the northern portions of the Colonies." 259. There can be no doubt that the means for obtaining information prior to the War were limited. Mr. L. S. Amery represented the current opinion when he said,,We did not spend nearly enough money, or send enough officers; the eight, or ten, or a dozen officers who went out did very good work, I know, but they were fewer than the men I employed myself as,Times' correspondents, and I should have been ashamed to send Times' correspondents anywhere, or even a commercial traveller, with the sums of money they were given." || It may be argued that this statement of the case scarcely makes sufficient allowance for all the difficulties of the situation. Rightly or wrongly, the Government had made it an essential part of the policy to avoid any measures which might lead to friction. It is admitted by many witnesses that it would have been impossible for British officers to have collected information openly, or, indeed, in any systematic fashion, without running the risk of hostile demonstrations, and this applied not only to the Transvaal and Free State, but even to our own Colonies. The distinction between the work of the Intelligence Department which must be done before the outbreak of the War and the work of the Intelligence Officer in the field becomes here very apparent. As Sir William Nicholson stated, these are quite distinct, and the manner in which the Field Intelligence Department must grow up was clearly explained by Colonel Altham. No doubt in both cases certain qualities must be specially developed in the good intelligence officer. He must have ready observation, accuracy and rapidity both in analysis and inference, and a power of clear and precise statement. Accordingly the officers trained in the Intelligence Department often accompany a force in the field, and most of those whose names are mentioned above ser ved in South Africa. But that does not alter the fact that the two services differ essentially. The Intelligence Department officer must be selected on general grounds; his work is to prepare for war during peace, and therefore both the work itself, and still more the expenditure upon it, is naturally subject to rules and regulations. Under these circumstances, if the means of obtaining information by the Intelligence Department prior to the War were deficient, the proper way to guard against the recurrence of this deficiency is to give to the superior authority larger discretion and resources for the collection of confidential information. On the other hand, for the Intelligence Department in the field, it is essential to get hold of local men. You cannot keep up an enormous establishment of local people in peace time; the men probably that you kept up would not be the men you wanted in the war.“ || Colonel Robertson well described the organisation of Lord Roberts' Intelligence:,,708. It was recruited from local men, with myself and five other staff officers. There was also an Intelligence officer told off to every column, no matter what the size of the column might be it might be a division or half a brigade. In the war establishments there was then no Intelligence officer detailed to any unit below a division, but under the new arrangement an Intelligence officer was given to every column or detachment, and the local people were employed as scouts and guides. The guides were largely used because the country was practically without roads. || 709. Q. What was the duty of the Intelligence officer with these columns? A. To provide scouts and guides, and to procure and give to his General information regarding the enemy. || 710.Q. Procuring information with regard to the route he was to take? A. Yes; the General would know the place to which he wished to go, and the Intelligence officer would be expected to tell him the best route to it, and what opposition he might meet with on the way. He would find out about the enemy the best way he could from spies, deserters, and the usual sources." - 260. There is no suggestion that after the outbreak of war there was any lack of money for the Intelligence work. Further, there was an ample staff of scouts, guides, and other subordinates, both European and native, as described by Colonel Murray in the case of the Natal Army. But, as the same officer pointed out, there was not always a sufficiency of trained officers, and the best method of training a sufficient number of officers for this particular branch of a staff officer's duty is not as yet very clearly laid down. || 261. It was as to the provision of maps that there has been most general complaint, and there is no dispute that where maps were supplied at all they were, with perhaps one exception, very incomplete and unreliable. The question is how far this defect was one which could have been foreseen and avoided. | It will be observed from the statement of the Intelligence Division that, prior to the War, the Department possessed no means of producing maps; the duty of the two officers who formed the permanent staff of the mapping section being therefore confined to the providing of maps which could be obtained from the different countries. But as difficulties increased in South Africa, the importance of better maps was recognised; an officer was sent out to Natal in 1896, and this officer, Colonel Grant, gave evidence to the following effect: Asked under what circumstances he made a map of Northern Natal in 1896, he replied: -,,It was in 1896, when there was a tension between the Boers and ourselves; it arose after the Jameson Raid, and at the time of the tension it was grasped at home that we had no efficient map at all of the north of Natal; it seemed very desirable that we should get the information as quickly as we could, and I was sent out in a great hurry to write Reports of and reconnoitre all the communications north of Ladysmith, including the positions of Laing's Nek and the Biggarsberg. I may say we never went to the Treasury for any money. I got assistance out in the Colony, two officers from the garrison. I went out in August, 1896, and was back again by December of the same year. It took three months' work on the ground, and it was very rapid sketching, because the tension was still existing, and I did not want it to be known that I was there and I think that the Ministers in Natal did not wish it to be known either, so that we did it as rapidly as we could and got home again. In these answers three important points are to be noticed (1) That great economy had to be exercised to avoid the necessity of an application to the Treasury; (2) That the state of feeling in the country rendered great caution and secrecy a necessity; (3) That the country north of Ladysmith was considered to be the probable theatre of war. With regard to the last-mentioned point it will be remembered that this view is entirely consistent with other indications of the opinion entertained by military authorities of the probable course of events on the outbreak of war. It is fair to add that Sir John Ardagh endeavoured to procure a map of the southern part of Natal, and obtained a promise of assistance from Sir H. Escombe, then Premier of that Colony. The death of Sir H. Escombe, and a change of Ministry, brought this negotiation to an end, but it illustrates the fact that the responsibility for mapping cannot rest solely with the War Office or with the Imperial Government. No one is more emphatic than Sir John Ardagh that the work to be directly undertaken by the Intelligence Division would be for the parts of the Empire other than the self-governing colonies. But, if so, it is necessary to take into account the feeling in the several colonies, and undoubtedly for some years before the War it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for any Colonial Government in South Africa to have brought forward proposals for the preparation of maps for military purposes. 262. The outcry therefore in regard to the absence of good maps was not altogether well-informed. The Intelligence Division statement alleges that the Department was in possession during the period 1896 1899 of all map material of all parts of South Africa affected by the War which was known to exist." Lord Roberts, while he admits that a survey of the theatre of war, before hostilities commenced, was practically impossible," would seem to imply that something more might have been made of existing material. At any rate, he states that Colonel Henderson, the head of his Intelligence in South Africa, was able, especially with the assistance of Jeppe's previously unpublished maps of the Transvaal, 1000 copies of which happened to fall into our hands as contraband of war, to furnish him, as he was moving along, sheet by sheet, with maps which were of great use to him. Lord Roberts further agreed in the opinion that as the probability of war was foreseen about the month of February 1899, there would have been ample time to prepare all these maps with a little foresight." || Before passing from the question of mapping it is desirable not to overlook the opinion of Sir John Ardagh, the most ardent supporter of extended action in this direction, that a topographical survey of the Empire is a longer and more costly and more tedious process than most people imagine." This remark occurs in reference to an estimate that it would cost 150 000l. a year to place the Department on a sound basis and to make a topographical survey of the Empire." It is not surprising, therefore, that he, and also Major Hills, considers 20 000 7. a year as a modest sum, not all that I think would be eventually granted, but something to build up a real and efficient Survey Department, suitable for Colonial and Imperial military surveying." „But," he adds, „,20 000 l. a year is such a very large sum in comparison with what is now spent on the Intelligence Department that I had a feeling that if we were to ask for it it would be scoffed at in the War Office before it ever got to the Treasury.“|| 263. The position of the Department with reference to the production of maps remains the same as it was before the War, and, according to Sir |