though very judicious in themselves, could not be serviceable in the plan we had adopted. The peace, which has contributed so much to the happiness of Europe in general, has taken something from the entertainment of the curious and idle part of it. We are now deprived of those mighty events, of those astonishing revolutions of fortune, of those matters of anxious hope and fear, which distinguished the late troubled and glorious period. We do not, however, despair, by the continuance of our former industry, and the continuance of the public indulgence to it, of furnishing, from the occasional political transactions of each succeeding year, both foreign and domestic, something, which may not prove altogether unworthy of the reader's attention; and which may supply the loss of the military materials. THE State of Europe in the beginning of this year. Ill state of the British alliance. 1 2] verance. ANNUAL REGISTER, 1762. not to be expected, that the confe- Although nothing seems more certain in a general view of the political system, than that the king of Prussia is not the natural and necessary ally of this nation; yet his fortune neither was, since the beginning of the war, nor is it now a matter of indifference to us. The late Mr. Shippen was of opinion, that the power of France was become an object of much less terror since the growth of the power of Russia. But he never imagined it possible, that all the great continental powers of Europe should ever be united with France; and that they should conspire to load her scale, instead of balancing it. He never could foresee, what has actually happened in this war, that this very power of Russia could co operate with France, and even with Sweden; and, what is full as extraordinary, that both these latter could co-operate with Austria to destroy in effect the system which had been established by the treaty of Westphalia; that system, which The total ruin of Saxony, with such circumstances of unpardonable cruelty by that prince himself, and the exhausted state of all the other Protestant members of the empire, have narrowed that interest more and more to the single object of Prussia. As this interest was first formed in the empire, so its condition there cannot fail of having the most sensible influence on all the potentates of the same communion. Even in this light, England had an interest that the king of Prussia should not be entirely crushed by the prevalence of a combination composed in so extraodinary a manner, that its success must necessarily produce a total revolution in the system of Europe, and draw on a series of consequences, which, though it is impossible to particularize, must have undoubtedly been of the most important and alarming nature. But there was an interest yet nearer to us, the fate of our own army in Germany, which could not survive the destruction of the king of Prussia for an hour. These circumstances rendered the prospect of the campaign in Germany very gloomy; as there was no sort of ground to suppose that this prince, upon whose fate so many important interests interests immediately depended, could hold out till the middle of summer. Besides, Denmark shewed no favourable dispositions towards us and Holland discovered evident marks of coldness, if not of absolute alienation. Such was the disposition of the powers in the north. The southern powers of Europe, whose total unconnection with the causes, and whose great remoteness from the seat of war might appear sufficient to ensure their tranquillity, began to enter into action with a spirit equal to that of any of the parties who had from the beginning acted as principals; new fuel was heaped upon the fire of contention, which had wasted so many nations, just as it seemed to be on the point of expiring. That alliance between the branches of the house of Bourbon, of which we have spoken last year, and which is so well known by the name of the Family Compact, is one of the most extraordinary transactions of this, or perhaps of any time. It has already produced some effects answerable to its design; it may produce others still more important; and on the whole must be considered as an event of the most extensive, lasting, and alarming influence. The treaty of Vienna in 1756, between France and Austria, has certainly contributed not a little to give that new turn to affairs, by which almost all the discourses that have hitherto been written on the interests of princes, are rendered erroneous, and of little use in future speculations. That treaty, however, though it seems entirely to have disjointed the ancient system of alliance by which France was formerly counterpoised, may, possibly, not be so much a lasting change, as a temporary and excentric deviation from the sphere in which the house of Austria had formerly moved, and into which it seems so suitable to her natural and permanent interest to return. The Bourbon Compact is of a different nature; and it seems to have at length produced that entire union between the French and Spanish monarchies, which was so much dreaded on the death of Charles II. and which it was the great purpose of the treaty of partition, and the war of the grand alliance, to prevent. We have seen it take place in our days, comparatively with very little notice: so much greater is our present strength; or so much greater was the apprehension in those days, than the danger of the actual event in the present. It was a bold push in France to attempt, and an uncommon success to procure, towards the close of an unfortunate and disgraceful war, an alliance of this kind. France could not have expected from the most fortunate issue of her affairs, an advantage so great as that which she derived from her uncommon distresses. It is some time since the jealousy of her power has began to abate. But in fact her security, and probably too her power, will be greatly increased by this very cir cumstance. Instead of forming such an object as alarmed mankind, and against which all Europe used to unite, she is herself become the center of an alliance, which extends from the northern to the southern extremity of Europe; and she was, in this war, actually united with Russia, Sweden, Austria, the empire, Spain, and Naples; to say [B] 2 nothing nothing of Denmark, with which she had also some connections. With other nations, however, her ties are comparatively slight; but the engagements of the Bourbon Compact form rather an act of incorporation than an alliance. It contains stipulations hitherto unheard of in any treaty. By the 23d and 24th articles, the subjects of the several branches of the house of Bourbon are admitted to a mutual naturalization, and to a participation of such privileges and immunities, as if they were natural born subjects of the countries of their respective sovereigns. The direct trade to America forms the only exception to this comprehensive community of interests. The tenor of this article is of infinite consequence to the general trading interests of Europe; all the states of which, by the 25th article of the same alliance, are excluded from any prospect of obtaining similar advantages. This forms a civil union in almost the strictest sense; the political union is even more perfect. By the 1st and 16th articles, the two monarchs of France and Spain agree to look upon every power as their enemy, which becomes an enemy of the other; that a war declared against either, shall be regarded as personal by the other: and that, when they happen to be both engaged in a war against the same enemy or enemies, they will wage it jointly with their whole forces; and that their military operations shall proceed by common consent, and with a perfect agreement. By the 26th article, they agree reciprocally to disclose to each other their alliances and negociations. By the 17th and 18th, they for as mally engage not to make, or even to listen, to any proposal of peace from their common enemies, but by mutual consent; being resolved, in time of peace as well as in time of war, each mutually to consider the interests of the allied crown its own; to compensate their seve ral losses and advantages, and to act as if the two monarchies formed only one and the same power. The king of the Sicilies, and the infant duke of Parma are comprehended in this treaty. Here is the model of the most perfect confederacy. There is but one restriction to the extent of this scheme; but this particular restriction is a key to the whole treaty; as it shews, in the most satisfactory manner, against what object it was principally directed. For by the 8th article it is provided, that Spain shall not be bound to succour France, when she is engaged in a war in consequence of her engagements by the treaty of Westphalia, or other alliances with the princes and states of Germany and the north, unless some maritime power take part in those wars, or France be attacked by land in her own coun try. This exception of the maritime powers indicates sufficiently that the tendency of this article is to affect England, and serves to point out clearly, though obliquely, to the other powers of Europe, that their connection with England is the great circumstance which is to provoke the enmity of Spain. It should seem that this treaty alone, when once its true nature came to be discovered, if no other cause existed, would have been sufficient to justify Great Britian in a declaration of war against a monarchy which had united itself in so intimate |