sense acts

the contact

flesh and an

membrane

over the

The

Occurs simultaneously with contact between the flesh and True this an object. For if one were to take a thin membrane and concurstrain it close around the flesh, this membrane would, just rently with like the naked flesh, seem to take the impression of touch between into consciousness co-instantaneously with the occurrence object: but of contact between it and an object. Yet such a membrane so it would would not, of course, be the organ of touch; though if, were a fine instead of being thus placed artificially round the flesh, strained tightlywr it were connatural with it, the sensation of touch would pass through it even more quickly, and still more would skin, it seem to be itself sensitive. A decisive argument to medium of the contrary is this: immediate contact between the flesh touch and taste, howand an object causes sensations of touch; but no other ever, is internal, sense-organ has its specific sensations excited by immediate contact with its object. Hence we must conclude that flesh is a flesh is only to be looked on as a medium of the sense of body itself. touch, somewhat as the air would be of the other senses, if It is this fact (of the it were a natural growth around our bodies. On the latter medium supposition we should have been thought to perceive sound, bined with colour, and odour by one and the same organ; and seeing, the organ hearing, and smelling would be held to be in a manner one body) that and the same sense. 'As matters stand, however, owing to makes us the separateness from us (i.e. from our bodies) of the medium not only through which the movements stimulating each of these what the three senses pass, the difference of their several organs is but manifest1. But now as regards touching, this remains

1

for the

part of the

being com

in the

uncertain

organ is,

whether the sense

several.

4238 10. I take δι ̓ οὗ γίγνονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις as Simplicius did, and as is one or Bäumker (op. cit., p. 43) does, referring it to the medium-air, which is not according to the above hypothesis περιπεφυκὼς ἡμῖν, but διωρισμένος. It is hard to see how Wallace's translation (which follows Themistius and Trendelenburg's note) can be acquitted of tautology. 'Now, however, as matters stand, by reason of the difference in the organs by which the movements are effected, the organs of sense which we have mentioned are clearly seen to be different from one another (the italics are mine).' If the air were μiv TeρITE¶Uкós, then (according to Aristotle's notion here) the sensibility to colour, sound, and odour would be as widely diffused over the surface of the body as is the sensibility to tangibles. The connatural air, no matter where the kívŋois affected the periphery of the body, would transmit this xivnois to the sensorium, and the local separateness which marks and distinguishes the organs of seeing, hearing, and smelling would disappear.

this, such

necessary.

uncertain Hence those two senses of touch and temperature which, according to Aristotle's principle of determining sensory faculties according to their objects; ought to be separated, remain for ordinary consciousness combined in one single sense.hani-on asuntobenos orst 1 Notwith-812. There must, however, be such a medium of sense standing as flesh, notwithstanding its effect in defeating our attempts medium at analysis of the sense of touching. An animate body as flesh is: cannot be composed of air or water singly it must be In order to something solid. Accordingly it must be composed of a perceive the quali- mixture of earth and these two other elements, i.e. it should ties of body be such a thing as flesh and what is analogous to flesh? qua body, viz. solid tend to be. Hence by implicit necessity the body must fluid, hot-cold, be interposed as medium between the organ of touch and we require its object, and cohering naturally with the former, through a solid which body the varieties of sensation classed under touch. The all alike pass notwithstanding their severalty and plurality. possibility of several That touching does comprise several kinds of sensation is senses 4 proved by the sense of touch immediately connected with mediated the tongue. For in virtue of the tongue, which is one and through the same the same organ, one has the sensation of all the other medium is objects of touching and also that of taste. Now, if the case of the rest of the flesh (as well as that of the tongue) had also tongue. been endowed with a sense of taste, touching and tasting would have been regarded as one and the same sense 3 As it is, however, they are seen to be two, owing to the fact that their organs are not thus each capable of discharging the other's functions.

medium.

*being

seen in the

in water

:

Can things 13. One might ask: if every body possesses a third submerged dimension-depth: and if two bodies, between which there touch one is a third, cannot touch one another: and if, further, that which is moist and fluid has, by implication, body, as it

another?

Can things

1 423a 11. What remains uncertain? The answer is: both the things in question, viz. (1) what is the organ of touching (whether the flesh or something internal)? and (2) is the sense of touching really not one but a plurality? This uncertainty arises from the σápέ being a connatural' medium, and therefore obscuring differences between organs otherwise discernible.

taste is

necessarily either is or contains water; and if things which in air? All touch one another in water have not (as they cannot have) contact in supposed their tangent extremities dry, and, therefore, necessarily touch and have water between them, the water with which the said but close extremities are flooded;-if all this is true, it is impossible proximity. that in water any one thing should really touch any other. And so, too, in air; since the air is to things in air just as water is to the things in water; though, as regards the question whether one thing touches another, when both are immersed in the fluid air, we (owing to our living in air) are less likely to notice the difficulty of it, just as aquatic animals (owing to their living in water) would be as to the question whether one wet thing touches another 1.'

mediation

organ,

other

senses.

differences

that the

objects of

§14. This being so (i. e. even supposed contact being Inrequiring only close proximity), it is natural to ask: is the sense- between perception of all objects whatever effected similarly, or are object and some objects perceived by sense in a fundamentally different touch and way from others, just as, in fact, the senses of tasting and tastedo not stand apart touching are both held to operate, i. e. by immediate contact from the with their objects, while the other three senses are supposed to perceive their objects from a distance? Or is this dis- The only tinction false, and do we perceive the objects of touching, are (1) e.g. hard and soft, through media, just as we do the object of hearing, the object of seeing, and the object of smelling, only touch and that while we perceive the objects of these three senses at con long distances2, we perceive objects of touching only near the body: and (2) at hand? Owing to this nearness it may well be that the that the mediation in the second case escapes notice; the truth being the case of that we perceive all alike through a medium, only that in the touch and case of these things (the objects of touch and taste, owing to itself part their proximity) the mediation is not observed. Yet, as we of the body. said before, if we were to perceive all objects of touch through ing and a membrane, which separated us from the objects without our tasting we perceive knowing that it did so, we should be in the same condition, concurrelatively to it, in which we now are, in fact, relatively the affec

1 De An. ii. II. 423a 21-31.

2 423b.6.

It has been shown or suggested (§ 13) that supposed contact is only close proximity.

taste must

come near

medium in

taste is

In touch

rently with

tion of the medium.

BEARE

HA is ni to water and air when we touch objects in them. For to it is supposed that we touch the very objects themselves, bad with nothing between us and them. But the object of touching differs from the objects of seeing and thearing in tag this, that we perceive the latter in virtue of the external

The true organ of touching

is the heart.

Such is

real con

medium producing an effect upon us, while we do not perceive the tangible by such operation of the object through an external medium, but we perceive it concurrently, or coinstantaneously, with the flesh regarded as medium; just as when a soldier is struck by a javelin which pierces his shield. It is not that the shield is driven against and strikes the man, but that shield and man seem to be struck together 1. § 15. On the whole (i.e. except for this last point) it seems that, the flesh in general, in touching, or that and tasting of the tongue, in tasting, is what air or water is with reference to the function of seeing, hearing, or smelling: Aristotle's that is to say, it is related to the organ of touch (or taste) viction. proper as either of these media is to the organ in each Yet he em- case. Accordingly, just as there would be no sensation current ter- of whiteness if the white object were laid immediately minology, based on on the eye, so there would be no sensation of touch if the tangible object were placed immediately on the veritable organ of touch, and not on the flesh. Hence it follows that the latter organ is not the flesh 2. Thus only would the facts in the case of touch (and taste) be analogous to those of the other senses.' The whole matter may be summed up thus. Aristotle abandoned the theory of his predecessors, that touch and taste are unmediated senses, because (a) the apparent simultaneity of tactual perception with contact between σáp§ and the object, reMegarded as an argument for this, proves nothing; (b) all the

ploys the

a partial

truth.

1

other senses have media; and (c) even between σáp§ and the object absolute contact is impossible, since water or air always intervenes. The true organ of touching (and) Movital

1 423b 12 seqq. Aristotle had no conception of a 'nerve process' which takes time to reach the centres of consciousness.

* 4225 19, 6560 35 οὐκ ἔστι τὸ πρῶτον αἰσθητήριον ἡ σὰρξ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον ἀλλ ̓ ἐντός.

of tasting) is the heart, or the region of the heart1. Yet, in spite of all this, we often (cf. p. 198, n. 2) find apart Aristotle speaking in terms of the popular view which makes flesh the organ of touching and tasting. He speaks of the flesh as organ of touch, and of the tongue as organ of taste. The key to this seeming inconsistency is the relative truth contained in the popular view. The flesh is not, indeed, the true organ; yet it is not such a medium as air is, viz. something external to us. It is part of our organism, and a sort of auxiliary organ; standing to the true internal organ as rò diapavés (the external medium) would stand to ǹ kópη were it naturally united with this, so as to form part of the whole living organism*. Flesh is a peculiar medium, yet a medium all the same 5.

such are

discerned.

which

§ 16. It is by touching that the distinctive qualities By touching the (diapopal) of body as body are discernible, i. e. the qualities qualities which characterize the different elements respectively, hot which belong to cold, solid fluid, of which we have already treated in our body as work on the elements". Now the organ which perceives such these is that of touching, being that part wherein primarily The organ what we call the sense of touching resides. This is a part perceives of the body which is potentially such as the object which these must affects it is actually. For to perceive by sense is to be tially affected in a way in which the (agent or) object so acts what the objects are upon the organ (the patient) as to impart to the latter actually. actually the quality which the object itself actually has, but which the organ before had only potentially. This explains ¿oíwois,

1 6560 29 αἱ μὲν δύο φανερῶς ἠρτημέναι πρὸς τὴν καρδίαν εἰσί, ἥ τε τῶν ἁπτῶν καὶ ἡ τῶν χυμῶν : cf. 4398 1-2.

2 6472 19.

3 533a 26.

4 6530 24 seqq. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις προσλάβοι τῇ κόρῃ τὸ διαφανὲς πᾶν.

5 Cf. Bäumker, Arist. op. cit. pp. 55–6.

6

423b 26 seqq., 329b 7 seqq. The second class of tangibles is elsewhere referred to as the hard and soft (τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακόν) but remains the same. The vypóv is the soft or fluid or moist: the έnpóv is the dry, the solid, the hard: i. e. in a loose and popular mode of expression. Even now it is not unusual for even men of science to oppose water to solids, as if water were not 'solid' (cf. Locke, Essay, Book II, ch. iv, and p. 185, n. 2 supra); what they mean is that water is soft. But this opposition is traditional from remotest times.

be poten

Thus alone

can the