pelles or Parrhasius should go without compensation to the owner of a worthless tablet, if the painter had possession fairly, he says, as translated by Dr. Cooper. "But if he, or any other, shall have taken away the tablet feloniously, it is evident the owner may prosecute by action of theft.'

The case of Nesbitt vs. St. Paul Lumber Co., 21 Minn. R. 491, is directly in point here. The Supreme Court of Minnesota says: "The defendent claims that because they (the logs) were enhanced in value by the labor of the original wrong-doer in cutting them, and the expense of transporting them to Anoka, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the enhanced value; that is, that he is not entitled to recover the full value at the time and place of conversion." That was a case, like this, where the defendant was the innocent purchaser of the logs from the willful wrong-doer, and where, as in this case, the transportation of them to a market was the largest item in their value at the time of conversion by defendant; but the court overruled the proposition, and affirmed a judgment for the value at Anoka, the place of sale.

To establish any other principle in such a case as this would be very disastrous to the interest of the public in the immense forest lands of the government. It has long been a matter of complaint that the depredations upon these lands are rapidly destroying the finest forests in the world. Unlike the individual owner, who, by fencing and vigilant attention, can protect his valuable trees, the government has no adequate defense against this great evil. Its liberality in allowing trees to be cut on its land for mining, agricultural, and other specified uses, has been used to screen the lawless depredator who destroys and sells for profit.

To hold that when the government finds its own property in hands but one remove from these willful trespassers, and asserts its right to such property by the slow processes of the law, the holder can set up a claim for the value which has been added to the property by the guilty party in the act of cutting down the trees and removing the timber, is to give encouragement and reward to the wrong-doer, by providing a safe market for what he has stolen, and compensation for the labor he has been compelled to do to make his theft effectual and profitable.

We concur with the circuit judge in this case, and the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. AFFIRMED.

AMERICA C. AND JOHN R. BEDFORD VS.
BURTON.

2.

3. In such case, also, in a State where, by con-
tract, interest above the ordinary legal rate
may be stipulated for, such interest may be
recovered under the vendor's lien, if agreed
to be given in the notes for purchase-money.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Middle District of Tennessee.
Bradley J.-This case arises on a bill
in equity filed by G. W. Burton, the
appellee, alleging that in February, 1872,
he sold and conveyed to America Bed-
ford, one of the appellants, wife of John
R. Bedford, the other appellant, in fee, for
her separate use, free from the control of
her husband, a certain tract of land in
Tennessee for the consideration of $7,500,
one-third of which was paid down, and the
balance secured by the promissory notes
of Mrs. Bedford, drawing interest at the
rate of ten per cent. per annum. The deed
of conveyance specified these notes, and
reserved a lien on the land for the pay-
ment thereof. The notes were paid in
part, but not in full, and the bill was filed
for the foreclosure and sale of the land to
raise the balance due. The defendants,
Bedford and wife, filed a demurrer, whch
was overruled, and thereupon they filed
an answer and cross-bill, admitting the
facts stated in the bill, and that they took
and still had possession under the pur-
chase; and the cross-bill alleged that the
defendants had made permanent improve
ments on the land to the value of $500;
and claimed that the sale was void be-
cause of the coverture of the grantee, and
prayed that it might be declared void, and
that Burton should be decreed to refund
the amount paid on the purchase, together
with the value of the improvements, with
interest, after deducting the value of the
rents whilst the property was occupied by
the defendants. Burton demurred to the
cross-bill, and on final hearing the court
sustained this demurrer and made a de-
cree for the foreclosure and sale of the
property as prayed in the original bill, but
declared that the complainant was not en-
titled to a personal judgment against
America Bedford. From this decree the
defendants have appealed.

provements, and made payments on the by purchase, and that a security given
notes.]
thereon by her for the purchase-money
In such case the grantee is not entitled, by will be enforced. It was so held by this
reason of her coverture, to have the sale set
aside and the purchase-money already paid court in the case of Chilton vs. Braiden's
refunded, though consenting to account for Administratrix, 2 Black 458, where a lien
rents and profits, nor will she, or her hus- for the unpaid purchase-money of land
band, be allowed for permanent improve- sold to a married woman was enforced by
ments erected by them.
a decree for the sale of the land. Mr. Jus-
tice Grier, delivering the opinion of the
court, said: "When one person has got
the estate of another, he ought not, in con-
science, to be allowed to keep it without
paying the consideration. It is on this
principle that courts of equity proceed as
between vendor and vendee.
The pur-
chase-money is treated as a lien on the
land sold where the vendor has taken no
separate security." In a well-considered
case decided by the chancellor of New
Jersey (Armstrong vs. Ross, 5 C. E. Green,
109) where property was sold and con-
veyed to a married woman, and she and
her husband executed a mortgage for the
purchase-money, but the execution by the
wife was void because she was not pri-
vately examined, it was nevertheless held
that the vendor had a lien for the pur-
chase-money, and also that the mortgage,
being given for the benefit of her separate
estate, although void as a mortgage, might
be decreed a lien on such separate estate.
In the case of Willingham vs. Leake, 7
Baxter 453, it was held by the Supreme
Court of Tennessee that where land was
sold and a title bond given to a married wo-
man, who gave her notes for a part of the
purchase-money, the vendor's lien could be
enforced, although the notes might be
void as against the vendee personally. In
the subsequent case of Jackson vs. Rut-
ledge, 3 B. J. Lea 626, decided as late as
December Term, 1879, the same court held
that if a married woman buy land, partly
for cash and partly on time, and accept a
deed of conveyance to her separate use, a
lien being retained for the unpaid instal-
ments, she cannot have the money which
she has paid refunded merely because of
her coverture, and the lien reserved for
the payment of the purchase-money may
be enforced in equity.
nearly parallel to the present. A deed
was executed to the married woman for
her sole and separate use, retaining a lien
on the land for the payment of the notes
given for the purchase-money, and the
grantee and her husband went into pos-
session. A cross-bill was filed, as in the
present case, seeking to set aside the con-
tract as void, and for a return of the money
paid and the value of permanent improve-
ments. A decree for the sale of the land
to satisfy the unpaid purchase-money was
made by the chancellor, but no personal
decree against the parties. This decree
was affirmed by the Supreme Court in an
elaborate judgment, in which the authori-
ties on the subject are fully reviewed. The
court concludes the examination by say-
ing: "If the conveyance be to the sole
and separate use of the married woman,
there seems to be no difficulty in treating
a debt contracted in the purchase as bind-

The decree is sought to be reversed on
two grounds: first, because the sale to
America Bedford was void by reason of
her coverture, and ought to be declared
void and the money paid by her decreed
to be refunded; secondly, because the de-
cree gives ten per cent. interest on the
notes, a rate of interest which is not al-
lowed by the law unless there is a special
contract therefor, the legal rate being only
six per cent.; and a feme-covert is incapa-
ble of making such special contract.

1. Where a married woman, with the consent
of her husband, buys land and gives her
promissory notes for part of the purchase-
money, and a lien is reserved in the deed of
conveyance for the payment of the notes,
such lien may be enforced against the land,
though the notes be void as against the
The authorities are numerous and con-
woman personally. [The husband and wife clusive to the effect that a feme-covert
went into possession, made permanent im- may, with her husband's consent, take land

This case was

We see no error in the decree, and it is therefore affirmed.

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT.
IN BANC.

WRIGHT

[Filed March 23, 1883.]

ing on the property, although not person- upon her personally. Nevertheless, as it is
ally obligatory on the feme, because where a rate that may be lawfully stipulated for,
she takes possession under the conveyance if it is stipulated for, and is made part of
the debt is contracted for the benefit of the consideration for which a lien is re-
her separate estate." Again : "Her inca- tained on the land, it is as much secured
pacity to execute valid notes, if we treat by the lien as the principal is.
the purchase notes as void on that ground
and because not expressly made obliga-
tory on her separate estate, would not af-
fect the vendor's right to subject the land
to the satisfaction of the unpaid purchase-
money by virtue of the vendor's equity
and of the lien reserved. By the delivery
and acceptance of the deed of conveyance,
the contract was executed and the title
vested in her. She takes the title subject
to the charge created by the terms of the
deed. (Trezevant vs. Bettis, 1 Leg. Rep.
48; Lee vs. Newman, 1 Memph. L. J. 139;
Eskridge vs. Eskridge, 51 Miss. 522.) Un-
der such circumstances the married woman
is not entitled to have the cash payment
refunded. In making the payment, as we
have seen, she exercised a right which the
law concedes. * * * All she can claim
is exemption from personal liability."

These cases, decided by the highest court of Tennessee, where the land lies and where the transaction took place, are of stringent authority, and they accord with our own views of the law.

It should be added that, by the statute law of Tennessee, "married women over the age of twenty-one years, owning the fee or other legal or equitable interest or estate in real estate, shall have the same powers of disposition, by will, deed, or otherwise, as are possessed by femes-sole or unmarried women." (Code of Tennessee, Sec. 2486.) This provision would seem to be sufficient to confer upon a married woman purchasing land to her own use power to execute a mortgage upon the land to secure the purchasemoney, binding at least upon the land, if not creating any personal obligation against her.

But the present case is a stronger one than that of a mortgage. The deed by which she holds the property is qualified by expressly retaining a lien for the payment of the purchase-money. The lien goes with the estate, and affects it in a manner similar to a condition. It is, indeed, in the nature of a condition impressed upon the estate itself. It makes the deed say in effect: "I convey to you the land, but only upon the condition that you pay the notes given for purchasemoney; if they are not paid, I am to hold it as security."

VS.

ROSEBERRY.

}

No. 7,444.

land in controversy. If he had, it would be equivalent to a patent, and an action of ejectment might be maintained upon it against any one in possession under a subsequently acquired title. As it is, the defendants are in possession, claiming title under United States patents, which purport to convey the entire premises. And the question is, can the plaintiff maintain this action upon the title which he has acquired from the State, without showing that the land has been certified over to the State as swamp and overflowed? Counsel for appellant insist that although said land has never been certified The defendants are in possession of the over to the State according to the redemanded premises, and hold United quirement of said act of Congress, the States patents for the same. But it is title to said land, nevertheless, became claimed on behalf of the plaintiff that be- vested in the State. If that be so, the fore defendants acquired any right or title clause which requires the Commissioner to said land the title to it had passed out to certify over to the State as swamp and of the United States and become vested overflowed all the lands represented as in the State of California. The grounds such, upon such approved plats, within one of this claim as stated by one of the ap-year from the passage of said act, or pellant's counsel are as follows: "That on within one year from the return and apJuly 1, 1862, he (plaintiff) acquired the proval of such township plats, is supertitle of the State to the land in contro- fluous. The act of September 28, 1850, versy; that the State had, prior to July contains a clause somewhat similar to 23, 1866, selected this land as swamp land, and had disposed of the same to purchasers in good faith under her laws; that due notice had been given to the United States Land Department of this selection; that within the time required by the act of Congress of March 12, 1860, and before 1866, the State had segregated these lands as swamp; and that, under due and regular proceedings had under the fourth section of the act of 1866, this segregation was approved by the United States Land Department, and the tracts here claimed designated swamp on the United States plat of the township."

The clause of the fourth section of the act of 1866 to which reference is made reads as follows:

"That in all cases where township surveys have been made or shall hereafter be made under authority of the United States, and the plats thereof approved, it shall be the duty of the Commissioner of the General Land Office to certify over to the State of California as swamp and overflowed all the lands represented as such, upon such approved plats, within one year from the passage of this act, or within one year from the return and approval of such township plats.

this, and the construction which was given to it by the Supreme Court of the United States in French vs. Fyan (93 U. S., 169), seems to us to militate against the position which appellant's counsel seek to maintain in this case. That act made it the duty of the Secretary of the Interior, as soon as practicable after its passage, to make out an accurate list and plats of the land described in said act, and to transmit the same to the Governor of the State, and at his request to cause a patent to issue to it, and that thereupon the fee simple to said lands should vest in the State. In French vs. Fyan, supra, the Court held that the issuance of a patent to the State concluded the question of the character of the land, and that parol evidence to prove that it was not swamp and overflowed was, in an action at law, inadmissible. That the law devolved upon the Secretary "the duty, and conferred on him the power, of determining what lands were of the description granted by that act, and made his office the tribunal whose decision on that subject was controlling."

In Johnson us. Towsley (13 Wall., 72), the same Court said, "that when the law has confided to a special tribunal the authority to hear and determine certain matters arising in the course of its duties, the decision of that tribunal, within the scope of its authority, is conclusive upon all others."

"The Commissioner shall direct the United States Surveyor-General for the State of California to examine the segreThis peculiar character of the lien seems gation maps and surveys of the swamp to be a good answer to the second ground and overflowed lands made by said State; Section 4 of the act of July 23, 1866, for reversal-the reservation of interest and where he shall find them to conform makes it the duty of the Commissioner in at the rate of ten per cent. per annum on to the system of surveys adopted by the certain specified cases to certify lands the notes. Ten per cent. is not an unlaw- United States, he shall construct and ap- over to the State. And it seems to be left ful rate of interest in Tennessee. It may prove township plats accordingly, and to him to decide in each case whether or be reserved if the parties so agree. If forward to the General Land Office for not it is a proper one for the exercise of they make no agreement, the law gives six. approval." that power. The most that can be claimed The agreement to pay ten per cent. in this It is not claimed that "the Commis- on behalf of appellant is that the Comcase may not be binding on the wife per- sioner of the General Land Office has missioner has not performed his duty in sonally, but it is not binding on the same ever certified over to the State of Califor- this case. The law makes it the duty of ground that the principal is not binding nia as swamp and overflowed," any of the the Commissioner to certify over such

lands within a specified period, but does not provide that in the event of his failing to, the titles to such lands shall vest in the State. And we are unable to find anything in said Section 4 which impresses us as indicating that such was the intention of Congress.

But it is claimed on behalf of appellant that said Section 4 must be read in connection with Section 1 of the same act, which confirms to the State, lands selected by her in part satisfaction of any grant, and under her laws disposed of to purchasers in good faith.

may be adduced by the respective parties,
and thereupon to render judgment upon
the whole case. The respective appellants
in said actions severally to recover costs
on the appeal.”

The Court did find "that at the time of
the commencement of this suit the plain-
tiff was the owner, and entitled to the
possession of the south half of the north-
east quarter of section thirty-six, in suit,
which was unlawfully withheld from him
by defendant Roseberry; and of the east
half of the northeast quarter of section
twenty-five (containing eighty acres),
which was withheld by defendant Sim-
mons; and of the northwest quarter of
the southeast quarter of section twenty-
four, which was withheld from him by
defendant Powell; and that plaintiff is
damaged by defendant Roseberry in the
sum of $150, by defendant Simmons in the
sum of $150, and by defendant Powell in
the sum of $75."

In Sutton vs. Fassett (51 Cal., 12), the Court said: "The first section of that act does not relate to lands which had been segregated by the State as swamp and overflowed lands. The only section which purports to grant to the State-or in other words to confirm such segregation—is the fourth section." And that appears to us to be a reasonable construction of the language of said first section. It only ap- In addition to the lands described in plies to selections made of any portion of this finding, the plaintiff in his complaint the public domain "in part satisfaction of alleged that he was the owner of the lands any grant made to said State by any act described in the remittitur. On the last of Congress." This would seem to have trial the Court set aside its former findreference to grants of specific quantities, ings, and found that the plaintiff was not and not to a grant of an indefinite quan- and never had been the owner, or entitled tity. There would be no propriety in say- to the possession of all or any part of ing that the State accepted any number of the lands described in the complaint, and acres of swamp land in part satisfaction entered judgment in favor of the defendof the grant of all the swamp land in the ants. In doing so, appellant's counsel State. But in the cases of grants for insist that the Court did not follow the school and improvement purposes where directions of this Court, which were in the quantities are limited and defined, effect that the Court below should find, in deductions could be made, and it is addition to what it had already found, expressly provided in said first section, whether the plaintiff was the owner or "That the State of California shall not entitled to the possession of the lands receive under this act a greater quantity described in said remittitur. This might of land for school or improvement pur- be so, if this Court had not reversed the poses than she is entitled to by law." judgment of the Court below, and directed it to render a judgment upon the whole case. We think that the order and directions of this Court, taken as a whole, amount to a reversal of the former judgment, and an order for a new trial.

We therefore conclude that the title to the demanded premises has never vested in the State, and that the State could not convey a title to the appellant upon which he could maintain an action of ejectment against persons in possession of said premises under patents from the United States.

On the former appeal a remittitur issued out of this court, containing the following order and directions:

"It appearing that the Court below has failed to find upon material issues made by the pleadings, to wit: Whether or not the plaintiff is the owner or entitled to the possession of the north half of the northeast quarter of section thirty-six, the southeast quarter of section twenty-five, and the east half of the southeast quarter of section twenty-four of the lands in suit : "Whereupon it is now considered, or dered, adjudged and decreed by the Court here that the judgment of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, in and for the county of Yolo, in the aboveentitled cause, be and the same is hereby reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to the Court below to find upon the foregoing issues, from the evidence already taken and such further evidence as

COLORADO.

Boulder County.

Cornelia C. Munsen et al., Revenue Lode.
Chaffee County.

Mary J. Riggins et al., Maramac Lode.
Clear Creek County.

J. Robt. Fisher et al., Jewel Lode.
Geo. W. Hall, Treasury Vault Lode.
Rebecca Haywood, Pythagoras Lode.
L. E. Park et al., Standard Lode.
Frank Strausser, Dunbarton Lode.
Custer County.

Game Ridge Cons. Mg. Co., Ditto and Green
Silver Lodes.

Richard Irwin, Melrose Lode.

Jennie H. Sours, Silver Rouble Lode.
Dolores County.

J. M. Acker et al., Pigeon Lode.

Jos. Meredith et al., Grand Duke Lode. Santa Clara Mg. Co., Santa Clara Lode. Wabash and Democrat Cons. Mg. Co., Wabash Lode.

Wm. P. Dewey et al., Small Hope Lode.
Frank Morrison et al., Gildersleeve Lode.
Geo. H. Thacher, Jr., Illinois Lode.

J. B. Weston et al., Old Mariner Lode.
Ouray County.

John W. Bailey et al., Aztec Lode.
Ouray Union Mg. Co., Monitor and Standard
Lodes.

Theron Stevens et al., Great Western Lode.
Windham S. Mg. and Smelting Co., Olympia
Lode.
Pitkin County.

Jas. Lyons et al., Iowa Chief Lode.
Saguache County.
Roscoe G. Jordan et. al., Pelican Lode.
Plattsburgh Mining and Milling Co., Governor
Seymour Lode and M. S.

San Juan County.

D. J. J. McLaughlin, Black Cat Lode.
Richmond Mg. Co. of Nevada, Rearguard

Lode and M. S.

Nye County.

Geo. E. Crowell, Lodi South Lode.

MINNESOTA.
DULUTH.

Nos. 818, 820, 1023, 1095, 1096, 1097, 1098.
TAYLOR'S FALLS.

Ferd. S. Van Zandt, Cadiz, Potosi, Silver 1879 inclusive, 1881, 1883, 1886 to 1890 inclusive, 1893 to Crown and Silver Palace Lodes.

White Pine County.
Martin White Mg. Co., Juno and Merrill
Lodes.

UTAH.

Beaver County.

Utah Southern S. Mg. Co., Antwerp Lode.

Nos. 1117, 1827. 1833, 1839, 1847, 1861, 1868, 1869, 1871 to 1899 inclusive, 1901 to 1904 inclusive, 1908, 1910 to 1914 inclusive, 1917, 1918, 1919, 1920, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1926 and 1928.

WORTHINGTON.

Nos. 727. 2981, 3122, 3126, 3268, 3319, 3337, 3345, 3399, 3489, 3924, 4010, 6179, 6182, 6193, 6195, 6200, 6204, 6205, 6206, 6208, 6209, 6210, 6212, 6213, 6214, 6215, 6216, 6218 to 6223 inclusive, 6225, 6232, 6252, 6255, 6256, 6263, 6276, 6281, 6284, 6285, 6289, 6300, 6307 and 6320, 6429, 6430, 6431, 6434, 6435, 6436, 6438, 6439, 6441 to 6447 inclusive, 6449 to 6455 inclusive, 6457, 6458, 6461, 6462, 6463, 6465 to 6475 inclusive, 6477, 6478, 6479, 6481 and 6482, 6327, 6330, 6332, 6340, 6342 to 6346 inclusive, 6348, Samuel Holderman et al., Crown Point and 6350 to 6357 inclusive, 6359 to 6367 inclusive, 6369, 6370 to Clyde Lodes. 6377 inclusive, 6379 to 6385 inclusive, 6387, 6389, 6390, 6392, 6393, 6394, 6395, 6397 to 6401 inclusive, 6403 to 6407 inclusive, 6409, 6410, 6411, 6413, 6414 to 6421 inclusive, 6423, 6424, 6426, 6427,

Piute County.

Summit County.

John J. Daly, Daly and Silver Cliff Lodes.
Tooele County.

Fred. Auerbach, Hecla Lode.

HOMESTEAD PATENTS ISSUED. COPP'S LANDOWNER for this month reports the following final numbers of Homestead Patents issued and sent to the below-named land-offices:

ALABAMA.

MISSOURI.
SPRINGFIELD.

GRAND FORKS.

Nos. 148, 420, 444, 450, 476, 483, 510, 513, 523, 562, 615, 653, 711, 750, 771, 781, 801, 821, 824, 839, 846, 847, 905, 936, 940, 986, 1053, 1061, 1081, 1144, 1168, 1206, 1232, 1234, 1253, 1257, 1259, 1311, 1317, 1340, 1375, 1404, 1437, 1463. 1465, 1483, 1499, 1501, 1514, 1556, 1592, 1597, 1621, 1659, 1670, 1734, 1737, 1738, 1740,

1746, 1757, 1765, 1771, 1773, 1782, 1784, 1791, 1794, 1797, 1798. 1800, 1801, 1803, 1805, 1806, 1809, 1826, 1828, 1844, 1847, 1853, 1869, 1874, 1875, 1876, 1877, 1882, 1884, 1885, 1892, 1894, 1900, 1915, 1925, 1938, 2028, 2029, 2034, 2042, 2064, 2079, 2084, 20-8, 2089, 2090, 2098, 2100, 2101, 2105, 2110, 2112, 2118, 2119, 2125,

2129, 2132, 2144, 2150, 2151, 2157, 2162, 2164, 2172, 2175, 2178, 2180, 2182, 2186, 2187, 2192, 2225, 2233, 2237, 2240, 2241, 2243, 2259, 2269, 2272, 2276, 2282, 2301, 2304, 2305, 2312 to 2315 in2344, 2349, 2350, 2352, 3268, 3374, 3105, 3437, 3552, 3557, 3717, clusive, 2319, 2323, 2325, 2329, 2333, 2336, 2337, 2342, 2343, 3905, 3907, 3916, 3923, 3925, 3927, 3928, 3931, 3932, 3942, 3945, 3947, 3956 to 3959 inclusive, 3961, 3962, 3963, 3976, 3979, 3984, 3987 to 3990 inclusive, 3998, 4004, 4012. 4014 to 4017 inclu sive, 4022, 4034, 4039, 4042, 4045, 4047, 4049, 4050, 4055. 4060 to 4064 inclusive, 4066, 4068, 4071, 4076, 4077, 4078, 4080, 4081, 4082, 4086, 4087, 4091, 4093, 4094, 4097, 4102, 4103, 4105, 4110, 4111, 4112, 4116, 4117, 4118, 4122, 4123, 4138 to 4141 inclusive, 4143, 4145, 4146, 4151, 4152, 4154, 4156, 4160, 4162, 4164, 4165, 4166, 4173, 4174, 4175 to 4179 inclusive. 4184 to 4187 inclusive, 4200, 4201, 4202, 4204, 4205, 4207, 4209, 4213, 4215, 4220, 4222, 4225, 4228, 4231, 4235, 4236, 4239, 4241, 4242, 4245, 4247,

Nos. 4016, 4398, 4446 to 4452 inclusive, 4454, 4455, 4457 to 4248, 4249, 4252, 4253, 4254, 4258, 4262, 4271, 4272, 4273, 4277, 4467 inclusive.

ΜΟΝΤΑΝΑ.
MILES CITY.

Nos. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24.
NEBRASKA.
BLOOMINGTON.

Nos. 3356, 3360, 3538, 3569, 3575, 3594, 3598, 3667, 3679, 3681, 3685, 3686, 3691, 3694, 3696, 3705, 3707, 3712, 3714, 3719, 3730, 3740, 3746, 3751, 3756, 3759, 3761, 3763, 3768, 3770, 3772, 3773, 3774, 3776, 3777, 3779, 3780, 3781, 3782, 3784 and 3785, 3787 to Nos. 257, 343, 493, 505, 611, 628, 658, 678, 945, 956, 973, 1051, 3797 inclusive, 3800, 3801, 3803, 3804, 3806, 3807, 3810 and 1087, 1413, 1454 and 1459. 3812.

HUNTSVILLE.

No. 914 in favor of Silas P. Dodds.

MONTGOMERY.

Nos. 1204, 1354, 1356, 2431, 2571, 2574, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2600, 2610, 2611, 2615, 2617, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2626, 2630, 2632, 2636, 2639 to 2642 inclusive, 2659, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2670 to 2673 inclusive, 2676 to 2681 inclusive, 2683, 2685, 2689, 2694, 2698, 2704, 2706, 2707, 2708, 2710, 2712, 2713, 2714, 2716, 2719 to 2725 inclusive, 2729, 2730, 2732 to 2735 inclusive, 2737, 2740 to 2743 inclusive, 2749, 2751 to 2755 inclusive, 2757 to 2762 inclusive, 2764, 2765, 2770 to 2774 inclusive, 2776, 2778, 2779, 2781, 2786, 2787, 2788, 2791, 2795, 2800 to 2805 inclusive, 2807, 2808, 2809, 2811 to 2832 inclusive.

LINCOLN.

Nos. 1604, 6085, 8906, 10545 to 10550 inclusive, 10552, 10556, 10558, 10564 to 10571 inclusive. 10576, 10577, 10578, 10579, 10581, 10585 to 10589 inclusive, 10591 to 10595 inclusive., 10599, 10601, 10603, 10605, 10607, 10608, 10609, 10610, 10612, 10613, 10615, 10616, 10617, 10619 to 10623 inclusive, 10625, 10626, 10627, 10630 to 10633 inclusive, 10635 and 10637.

NELIGH.

4278, 4279, 4288, 4293, 4295, 4298, 4300, 4301, 4304, 4306, 4308, 4311, 4312, 4316, 4319, 4320, 4325, 4326, 4329, 4336, 4344, 4348, 4350, 4352, 4354, 4356, 4359, 4361, 4363, 4368, 4375, 4379, 4385, 4386, 4395, 4406, 4411, 4421, 4430, 4437, 4444, 4450, 4451, 4458, 4461, 4462, 4471, 4485, 4486, 4487, 4488, 4497, 4499, 4503, 4507, 4510, 4511, 4513, 4514, 4515, 4518, 4526, 4537, 4542, 4543, 4545, 4546, 4548, 4549, 4550, 4551, 4552, 4553, 4556, 4560, 4561, 4562, 4565, 4566, 4567.

HURON. Watertown Series, Nos. 2374, 2414, 2416, 2431, 2432, 2454, 2488, 2490, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2521, 2563, 2577, 2585, 2587.

WATERTOWN.

Nos. 2389, 2391, 2421, 2438, 2445, 2461, 2510, 2512, 2534, 2536, 2537, 2586, 2593, 2597, 2606, 2610.

KANSAS.
INDEPENDENCE.

Nos. 8048, 8071, 8077, 8111, 8167, 8242, 8246, 8252, 8263, 8319, 8348, 8400, 8403, 8448, 8464, 8465, 8467, 8476, 8484, 8485, 8491, 8494, 8499, 8504, 8506, 8507, 8512, 8521, 8528, 8534, 8536, 8642, 8543, 8545, 8549, 8557, 8562, 8578, 8587, 8589, 8591, 8592, 8610, 8613, 8622, 8627, 8633, 8635. Osage Trust Lands.

WICHITA.

Nos. 4305, 4309, 4312, 4215, 4320, 4322, 4328, 4329, 4340, 4353,
4356, 4357, 4359, 4360, 4361, 4366, 4369, 4371, 4372, 4373, 4375,995, 998, 1006 to 1011 inclusive. 1013 to 1017 inclusive,
Nos. 838, 925 to 930 inclusive, 932 to 940 inclusive. 984,
4378, 4383, 4385, 4386, 4388, 4389, 4390, 4391, 4393 and 4394.
West Point and Norfolk Series, Nos. 706, 1633, 2737,
1019, 1020, 1021, 1030, 2034, 1179, 1198, 1201, 1202, 1206, 1234,
1236.
2933, 3298, 4028, 4039, 4157, 4185, 4187, 4192, 4221, 4251, 4254,
4255, 4260, 4269, 4284 and 4291.

Nos. 8178, 8285, 8300, 8363, 8365, 8366, 8368, 8369, 8373, 8374, 8379, 8380, 8382, 8383, 8385, 8386, 8394, 8395, 8403, 8405, 8410, Nos. 798, 1397, 1585, 1636, 1732, 2121, 2156, 2175, 2176, 2178, 8568, 8570 to 8575 inclusive, 8577, 8578, 8579, 8581, 8582, 8583, 8411, 8440, 8441, 8442, 8450, 8457, 8517, 8527, 8565, 8566, 8567, 2180, 2181, 2184, 2186 to 2191 iuclusive, 2193 to 2197 inclu-8585, 8588, 8591, 8605, 8606, 8608, 8612, 8613, 8616, 8621, 8627, sive, 2199, 2201, 2203 to 2210 inclusive, 2214, 2215, 2219, 2220, 8631, 8632. 22-22, 2223, 2225, 2226, 2228, 2230, 2231 and 2232.

KANSAS.
KIRWIN,

Nos. 377. 3259, 3326, 3745, 4370, 4444, 4578, 4622, 4630, 4633, 4643, 4644, 4664, 4679, 4691, 4713, 4722, 4963, 4970, 4984, 4991, 5015, 5085, 5103, 5113, 5123, 5124, 5139, 5166, 5169, 5173, 5177, 5180, 5181, 5190, 5193 to 5207 inclusive, 5209, 5212 to 5216 inclusive, 5218, 5219, 5222, 5223, 5224, 5225, 5227, 5229 to 5233 inclusive, 5235 to 5239 inclusive, 5241, 5243 to 5247 inclusive, 5253, 5254, 5255, 5257, 5260, 5261, 5262, 5265, 5267, 5268, 5270, 5272, 5274, 5275, 5276, 5277, 5282, 5283, 5286, 5287, 5288, 5290, 5291, 5293, 5294, 5295, 5206, 5298, 5300, 5301, 5303, 5307, 5309, 5310, 5311, 5312, 5314 to 5217 inclusive, 5319 to 5323 inclusive, 5325, 5326, 5327, 5529, 5330, 5331, 5333 to 5338 inclusive, 5341, 5342 and 5344.

TOPEKA.

Nos. 2684, 2687, 2696, 2697, 2702, 2704, 2709, 2710, 2712, 2713, 2714 and 2715.

WA KEENEY.

Nos. 742, 751, 817, 819, 820, 825, 830, 833 to 837 inclusive, 842, 843, 846, 853, 857, 859, 864, 866, 873, 874, 876, 877, 878, 881, 882, 884, 885, 886, 887, 889, 890, 891, 893, 894, 896, 899, 901, 902, 903, 904.

WICHITA.

Nos. 3863, 3918, 3935, 3938, 3940, 3944, 3949, 3965, 4039, 4044, 4053, 4059, 4060, 4062, 4063, 4064, 4066 to 4077 inclusive.

2043, 2044, 2045, 2052, 2061, 2063, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2074, 2080, 2084, 2085, 2088, 2092, 2096, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2107, 2110, 2111. 2114, 2117, 2118, 2120, 2121, 2123, 2125, 2128, 2130, 2131.

ST. CLOUD.

No. 8825, in favor of Belle Rosser.

TRACY.

Winona, New Ulm and Tracy Series, Nos. 1731, 7533, 7540, 7545, 7692, 7706, 7806, 7807, 7808, 7810, 7812, 7816, 7821, 7822, 7828, 7839, 7842, 7843, 7846.

WORTHINGTON.

Nos. 8287, 8296, 8510, 8529, 8553, 8559, 8560, 8562, 8563, 8566, 8570, 8573, 8575, 8684, 8590, 8593, 8605.

ΜΟΝΤΑΝΑ.
BOZEMAN.

Nos. 49, 74, 82, 83, 85, 86, 92, 93, 100.

NEBRASKA.
NIOBRARA.

Dakota City Series, Nos. 1877 and 1878, in favor of Caroline C. Thayer for S. W. 1⁄44 Sec. 1, Town. 29, Range 3 E, and Sec. 7, Town. 26, Range 3 E.

OREGON.

LE GRAND.

WASHINGTON TERRITORY.

COLFAX.

Nos. 10, 200, 286, 508, 607, 625, 644, 649, 655, 845, 866, 868,

895, 899, 900, 903, 904, 910, 912, 922, 925, 930, 932, 936.

WALLA WALLA.

Nos. 1119, 1329, 1470, 1586, 1599, 1600, 1603, 1634, 1679, 1728 1814, 1968, 1971, 1972, 1975, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1987, 1988, 1991. 1992, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2005. WISCONSIN. BAYFIELD.

3305, to 3507 to 3312 inclusive. 3315, 3324, 3325. 2526, Nos. 2862, 2889, 3065, 3067, 3223, 3227, 3228, 3294, 3303, 3304, 3338 to 3342 inclusive, 3344 to 3348 inclusive, 3352 to 3338 inclusive, 3360 to 3364 inclusive. 3366, 3368 to 3371 inclusive, 3374 to 3382 inclusive, 3385, 3387, 3388, 3390 to 3393 inclusive, 3395 to 3398 inclusivé, 3400 to 3408 inclusive.

WAUSAU.

Nos. 15614. 15663, 16066, 16077, 16239, 26240, 16241, 16242, 16330 to 16333 inclusive, 16335, 16336, 16337, 16339, 16362, 16408, 16411, 16440, 16442, 16444 to 16451 inclusive, 16453, 16454 to 16475 inclusive, 16479 to 16489 inclusive, 16491 to 16497 inclusive, 16501 to 16511 inclusive, 16513 to 16533 inclusive, 16535, 16536 16588, 16539, 16540.

COPP'S LAND OWNER.

THIS paper furnishes more valuable law informa- counties in middle Georgia, are likely to
tion for less money, and is read by more land attor be considerably encumbered by law suits
neys and real estate dealers, by more homestead, about their lands, a Col. Cox having old
pre-emption, and other land claimants, and by more
which he pro-
mine owners, engineers, and superintendents, than deeds to over 300,000 acres,
any other publication in the United States.
poses to sue for.

73 Kansas with marvelous results. For- THE new law firm of Sickels & Randall merly it was thought that the dry plains acted as attorneys for the successful party stretching towards the Arkansas river in the pre-emption case of Plummer vs. 74 were useless for agricultural purposes. Jackman, the decision wherein is published elsewhere in this issue.

New Orleans, Baton Rouge & Vicksburg R. R. Co. 75 The light and fickle rainfall, the dry air,

THE citizens of Richmond, Franklin, double quality of being useful as well as IV iv Washington, Dooley, Cooke and other ornamental.