`manner, as his translator has judiciously observed: he warms our fancy, and exalts our mind; he forms our taste; and teaches us to distinguish what is either fine, or faulty, in the most famous ancient writers. B. Is Longinus fuch a wonderful author? did he not live in the days of Zenobia, and the emperor Aurelian? A. Yes; you cannot but know their history. B. Did not those days fall vaftly short of the politenefs of former ages? and can you imagine that an author who flourished in the declenfion of learning and eloquence had a better taste than Ifocrates? I cannot believe it. A. I was furprized myself, to find it fo: but you need only read him, to be convinced of it. tho' he lived in a very corrupted age, he formed his judgment upon the ancient models; and has avoided almost all the reigning faults of his own time; I fay almost all, for, I must own, he studyed rather what is admirable, than what is useful; and did not confider eloquence as fubfervient to morality; nor apply it to direct the conduct of life. and in this he does not seem to have had fuch folid views as the antient Greeks, and especially An ardent judge, who, zealous in his trust, Mr. Pope's effay on criticism, p.45. fome of their philofophers. but we ought to forgive him a failing, for which Ifocrates was far more remarkable, tho' he lived in a more refined age. and this defect ought the rather to be over-looked in a particular difcourfe, where Longinus does not treat of what is proper to inftruct men, but of what is apt to move and feize their paffions. I chufe to recommend this author, Sir, because he will help to explain my meaning to you. you will fee what a glorious † character he gives of Demofthenes, from whom he quotes feveral paffages that are most fublime: he will likewise fhew you those faults of Ifocrates that I mentioned. if you be unwilling to take the trouble of becoming acquainted with thefe authors, by reading their works; you may get a very just notion of them by confulting Longinus. let us now † ----ὁ δὲ ἔνθεν λαβὼν τὸν τὸ μεγαλοφυεςάτε και ἐπ ̓ ἄκρον ἀρετᾶς συντελελεσμένας ὑψηγορίας τόγον, ἔμψυχα πάθη, περιεσίαν, ἀγχίνοιαν, τάχος, ἔνθεν δ', ὃ κύριον, τὴν ἅπασιν ἀπρόσιον δεινότητα καὶ δύναμιν· ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα, ἐς ἑαυτὸν ἔσπασε. διὰ το το οἷς ἔχει καλοῖς ἅπαν τας ἀεὶ νικᾷ, καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐκ ἔχει, ώσπερεί καταβροντᾷ καὶ καταφέγγει τις ἀπ' αἰῶνος ῥήτορας· καὶ θάττον ἄν τις κεραυνοῖς φερομένοις ἀντανοῖξαι τὰ ὄμματα δύναιτο, ἢ ἀντοφ αν 21 φημὶ, ὡς θεόπεμπλά τινα | θαλμῆσαι τοῖς ἐπαλλή ώς δωρήματα (ὲ γὰρ εἰπεῖν λοις ἐκείνε πάθεσιν. Lonθεμιτὸν ἀνθρώπινα) αθρόα | ginus, §. 34. leave Ifocrates; and talk of Demofthenes, and Cicero. B. You are for leaving Ifocrates, because he is not for your purpose. A. Let us go on then with Ifocrates, fince you are not yet convinced: and let us judge of his rhetoric by the rules of eloquence itfelf; and by the fentiments of Plato, the most † eloquent writer among the antients. will you be determined by him? B. I will be determined by him, if he be in the right: but I never refign my judgment implicitly to any author. A. Remember this rule: it is all that I ask of you. and if you do not let some fashionable prejudices biass your judgment, reason will foon convince you of the truth. I would therefore have you believe neither Ifocrates, nor Plato: but judge of them both, by clear principles. now I fuppofe you will grant that the chief end of eloquence is to perfuade men to embrace truth and virtue. + Sed ego neque illis affentiebar, neque harum difputationum inventori, & principi longe omnium in dicendo graviffimo, et Eloquentissimo Platoni, cujus tum Athenis cum Carneade diligentius legi Gorgiam quo in libro, hoc maxime admirabar Platonem, quod mihi in oratoribus irridendis, ipfe effe Orator Summus videbatur. Cic. de Orat. lib. 1. §. 11. Quid denique Demosthenes? ----non illud jusjurandum per caefos in Marathone ac Sala mine propugnatores reipublicae, fatis manifefto docet praeceptorem ejus Platonem fuiffe? quem ipsum num Asianum appellabimus plerumque instinctis divino fpiritu vatibus comparandum? Quint. lib. xii.cap. 10. fee Longinus §. xiii. B. I am not of your mind: this is what I have already deny'd. A. I will endeavour to prove it then. eloquence, if I mistake not, may be confidered in three refpects: as the art of enforcing truth on people's minds, and of making them better: as an art indifferent in itself; which wicked men may use as well as good; and which may be applyed to recommend injustice and error, as well as probity, and truth: and, as an art which felfish men may use to ingratiate themselves with others'; to raise their reputation, and make their fortune. which of thefe ends do you admit of? B. I allow of them all. what do you infer from this conceffion? A. The inference will afterwards appear. have patience a little; and be fatisfyed, if I fay nothing but what is evidently true, till by gradual advances I lead you to the right conclufion. of the three ends of eloquence, I now mentioned, you will undoubtedly prefer the first. B. Yes it is the best. A. What think you of the fecond? B. I see what you drive at: you are going into a fallacy. the fecond fort is faulty, because of the ill use the orator makes of his eloquence, to enforce error and vice. but still the rhetoric of a wicked man may be good in itself, tho' the use he makes of it be pernicious. now we are talking of the nature and rules of eloquence; not of the ufes it fhould be applyed to. let us keep to the true ftate of the question. A. If you will do me the favour to hear me a little, you will find that I have the point in dispute always in view. you seem then to condemn the second fort of eloquence or, to fpeak without ambiguity, you condemn the † abuse of rhetoric. B. Right, you now fpeak correctly, fo far then we are agreed. A. What say you of the third end of eloquence; I mean the orator's endeavouring to please others, by talking; that he may raise his reputation, or his fortune? B. You know my opinion already. I reckon fuch an ufe of eloquence very fair and allowable; feeing it excites a laudable emulation, and helps to improve men's talents. A. What kind of talents would you have chiefly + When I confider the means of happy living (says an eloquent writer) and the causes of their corruption, I can hardly forbear recanting what I said before; and concluding, that eloquence ought to be banished out of all civil societies, as a thing fatal to peace and good manners. to this opinion I should wholly incline, if I did not find, B that it is a weapon which may be as easily procured by bad men, as by good: and that if these only should caft it away, and those retain it; the naked innocence of virtue would be upon all occafions exposed to the armed malice of the wicked. Bishop Sprat's hift. of the royal fociety, p. 111. |