SPECIAL SCRIPTURE TEXTS-LEV. XVIII. 18.

79

*

This then is our positive Scripture argument. The writer has been anxious to preserve it simple and unembarrassed, and has therefore purposely avoided many collateral topics, which only serve to perplex the reader. Some of these will be presented in an Appendix.* Such, we repeat, is our general argument, based on great Scripture principles, not on doubtful criticisms on a controverted text. It will be perceived we have as yet founded nothing on Lev. xviii. 18. It is not our argument, nor the ground of it, neither can it be held as an argument against us on any one principle that pervades the laws of incest in the Bible. At the best, it can only be pleaded by the Libertarians as an exception to the general principle pervading the law, nay, as an inference from an exception that is at the best strangely remote from its subject, and very, very doubtful if it be an exception at all, and giving a greater liberty in the way of marrying a sister-in-law or wife's sister than an aunt-in-law or a grandstep-daughter. What reason is there in this? But whether there be reason or no, is it the fact?

Section VII.-Special Scripture Texts Continued-Lev. xviii. 18.

Is Lev. xviii. 18 an exception to the general principle of Lev. xviii. 16? Libertarians allege that it is. What is this text then? It is in our version, "Neither shalt thou take a wife to her sister, to vex her, to uncover her nakedness, beside the other in her life-time." One remark must occur here to every one, viz., that if it be an exception to the principle of the 16th verse, which plainly forbids the marriage of a brother's wife, that is, forbids a man to marry his brother's widow, and by consequence a woman to marry her sister's husband or widower; and that on the general principle that what is forbidden to the woman is forbidden to the man, it is strange that the exception does not occur here after the 16th verse, which it would naturally do if it were an exception, but after other laws are laid down. It is stranger still that, in such a place, where God was revealing his law to rectify the disorders, correct the ignorance, and forbid the crimes, which, in the course of ages, had settled down as part of the curse on man for the violations of the original law and constitution of his God, and that in no one of these respects did the curse fall upon them with more degrading and destructive effect, than in the indulgence of those very lusts which brought down ruin on Sodom and Gomorrah and the cities of the plain, and on the Canaanites, who had fallen into such abominations that the land was sick of them and vomited them out; it is stranger still, we say, that at such a time of renewing think to certify to the good character of the offender, or to profess so much pain in visiting him with the punishment he had justly merited ?" These questions, if sincerely put, argue great ignorance both of men and things, and very innocent simplicity. The first of them might be answered by another-What point of morals has not been a matter of dispute, and that under every one of the ten commandments? How many doubts and difficulties have been started as to the degrees of theft and drunkenness that constitute sin, and make them a subject even of moral blame, not to say of church censure? The more prone human nature is to the sin, the greater the immoral sympathy for the sinner. We need not go to Popish Moral Theologies, or to the decision of priests in the confessional, for an answer to such questions. The proceedings of our church courts give ample evidence, that sympathisers and certifiers can be found in most woeful and perilous abundance; and their expressions of sympathy and pity, being so cordial and tender, that the guilty parties might be tempted to conclude they were martyrs rather than offenders against the laws of God, and a scandal to the Church of Christ. It is not God's Word that is doubtful; but man's corruption and self-interest that dim the moral and intellectual perceptions. * See Appendix C.

† Marshall uses the same kind of argument.

80

LEV. XVIII. 18 NOT AN EXCEPTION TO LEV. XVIII. 16.

his law, prefaced by the awful solemnities of Sinai, God should subvert two of his own laws: viz., the original law at the creation, of one woman to one man, and the law of Lev. xviii. 16, prohibiting to a man marriage with a brother's wife, and, by consequence, to a woman marriage with a sister's husband. At such a time, most certainly, one would rather expect to find the renewal of the original law at the creation, than a divine sanction of its violation; and that too for the purpose of merely enabling men to indulge a brutal lust in having as many wives as they pleased, and that at all hazards of purity, health, family peace, and of the indulgence of all the vile and malignant passions of humanity, provided only it were not done by marrying two actual sisters, the daughters of the same father and mother, of one or both of them, at one and the same time. This is moral demonstration against such an idea-that is, as Mr Binney would say, moral demonstration to us; and as there is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding, I believe it is moral demonstration to every understanding, not perverted by passion and prejudice, or by having a theory to maintain. We do not admit that the Libertarians have a monopoly either of all candour or of all common sense, though many of them write with a confidence and flippancy which strongly indicate that they themselves seem to think so. I believe it is perfectly possible, moreover, that they are not beyond the range either of passion or of prejudice.

It is perfectly plain to any one reading Lev. xviii. that the verses from the 6th to 17th inclusive are sui generis; that they relate to the subject matter of "nearness of kin," and determine its degrees. In every one of the verses the specific nature of the kinship is assigned, and in every one of the prohibitions, the uncovering of the nakedness is forbidden, and the specific reason is given, viz., that it is the nakedness of the relation specified, whether by affinity or consanguinity. The manner totally changes at verse 18. A new subject is plainly introduced. Nearness of kin is no longer assigned as the reason. If, on the theory of the Libertarians, this verse sanctions polygamy, and only forbids it in the case of two actual sisters, surely nearness of kin," the reason which they allege forms the ground of the peculiarity, would have been as good a reason here as in all the other cases. The kinship could not have been nearer. This is a plain proof that nearness of kin is no ground of the prohibition in this verse at all; and that this verse opens up another subject altogether.

66

It has no one of the circumstances or forms that make an exception. A zealous writer on the other side says, that this verse is connected with the preceding verses by the "conjunction ' "neither." It would have been as true to have said that it is disconnected by the disjunction "neither." The truth is, all the conjunction that is in it is the conjunction of prohibition, whatever be the matter of the prohibition. The original is, "and thou shalt not," fitly enough rendered "neither," and the same kind of phraseology," and thou shalt not," goes on to the end of the prohibitions in the chapter, and in cases which have no connection whatever with kindred. Every one of them begins with "and," followed by "not," indicating that all the prohibitions proceed from the authority of God, who introduces them with an assertion of his eternal authoritative right, verses 2, 5-" I am Jehovah your God. I am Jehovah, the God of all flesh," and closes the declaration of his judgments against them by the same authority, verse 30, "I Jehovah your God."

The subject of incestuous marriages being finished, God, who is the law

LEV. XVIII. 18 NOT AN EXCEPTION TO LEV. XVIII. 16.

81

vex

giver, adds other prohibitions by the same august authority, and by the same awful sanctions. One of these, as in our version, is Lev. xviii. 18, "Neither shalt thou take a wife to her sister to vex her, to uncover her nakedness, beside the other in her life-time." It will be observed here that the reason of the prohibition is entirely changed. The reason, the " ing," whatever that may mean, is new. It is not said she is her sister's sister, or it is her sister's nakedness. Nothing of the sort. The reason is new. Though we could admit that the divine Lawgiver could bring in an exception as an after-thought, removed from the general prohibition in the 16th verse, to which it is supposed by our opponents to refer, still there is not only no renewal of the reason 66 nearness of kin," but a new reason altogether the proof positive that it is also a new subject.

Contrary to this, the Libertarians assert that this verse is both a sanction of polygamy, in every case but that of two actual sisters, and a permission, in the way of exception to the prohibition, verse 16, of marrying a "brother's wife"-to marry her after the death of her sister; the latter depending on the phrase life-time. They state it much more strongly than we have now done. Mr Binney, in his pamphlet, "The Men of Glasgow and the Women of Scotland," p. 35, says of Lev. xviii. 18, "But whatever was the reason of the law, which it is no business of ours to determine" (he has discussed it, however, through three pages), "there is the law itself. There, as it appears to us, is, as a matter of fact, the plain, express, unequivocal enactment, in one breath permitting polygamy and forbidding the contemporaneous marriage of sisters," but, of course, he means sanctioning them in succession. This is the inference, without which the alleged "law" is of little value to his argument. These gentlemen are very stern in demanding not only express statute law, but in excluding all inference, implication, or parity of reasoning, in the application of Lev. xviii. 16, but very quietly avail themselves of the liberty they deny to others, and on the supposition that two wives, and these two sisters, are forbidden in one particular case, therefore they infer that they are sanctioned in all other cases. They even turn the inference into a "plain, express, unequivocal enactment." Why this freedom in their own case, while they refuse it to others, even in a much less questionable form? Though the freedom were allowed, it does not follow that the use they make of it is legitimate, and their conclusion certain.

It will be observed, then, that the task proposed to themselves by the Libertarians is, to prove that God sanctions polygamy by his law, and that the word "time" rules the general prohibition in the 16th verse; and sets it aside at the death of the first wife. Let us then look at this latter point first, and see if there be in the words of verse 18 that which will bear them out in this task, and subvert all the reasonings, both from general principles and specific texts, by which we have endeavoured to make good our Scripture argument. The opponents confidently assert that there is, and plead it as positive Scripture proof, which can neither be questioned nor gainsaid. This text is their alleged stronghold. But it is not, and never was, though men of high name, such as Lord Denman, have supposed and asserted it was, either the alleged stronghold or ground of the argument maintained by their opponents. Our argument is complete without it, and the question is, does this text overthrow it? Is there enough in this disputed text to overthrow all the reasoning on fixed, clear, indisputable principles on the other side-indis

F

82

LEV. XVIII. 18 A PROHIBITION OF POLYGAMY.

putable by all who receive the saying, "ALL Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness," that the "man of God" (not the Jew only, but the Gentile also), “ may be perfect, throughly furnished unto all good works?" If there be not-if this text be doubtful-then he that will violate the law and the principle of the law of Lev. xviii. 16, on a mere doubt, is guilty of sin. "He that doubteth is damned if he eat"-if he do the forbidden thing" for whatsoever is not of faith is sin."

66

We have read and studied Lev. xviii. 18 carefully with this view, and affirm that, irrespective of the marginal rendering in our version of the Bible, there is no evidence whatever that the phrase in the Hebrew, rendered "life-time" in our version, conveys the smallest hint that the thing here forbidden was lawful after the death of one of the parties. There is no evidence whatever to show that it means the life-time of the first wife, which it must mean to serve the purpose of the Libertarians. After reading, and re-reading, and reading again and again the Hebrew, all that I can discover, or that any other man can discover, of the literal meaning of the words, even though you admit that the word rendered wife is necessarily "wife," is this, "A wife (or woman) to her sister thou shalt not take, to rival, or vex, to uncover her nakedness upon her, in her life." There is no evidence whatever that the word rendered "life-time" signifies more than simply her "life;" and in this view the text simply means, "Thou shalt not take a wife (or woman) to her sister to make her miserable in her life." After coming to this conclusion, I found that Professor Mill of Cambridge, as quoted by Mr Sleigh, renders it thus-" And a woman unto her sister thou shalt not take: to annoyance, to uncover her nakedness upon her in life." His punctuation is arbitrary, but his rendering is literal. But, in truth, great injustice is done to our translators by the way in which they are dealt with. Any one looking into the common English Bible will see that they carefully give the word "her" after vex, and the word time after life, in italics. Their translation in the text actually is, "Neither shalt thou take a wife to her sister to vex, to uncover her nakedness, beside the other in her life." In truth, no proof that the idea of "time," implying that that which is forbidden ceased to be forbidden at the death of the first wife, is contained in the passage at all. But, moreover, this rendering of the verse is that of the Arabic version, the Latin of which in the Polyglott is as follows:- "Et mulierem cum sorore sua ne sumas, ut sit ipsius rivalis, ad detegendam turpitudinem ejus cum ipsi in vita illius." "And a woman with her sister take not, that she should be her rival, to uncover her shame with her in her life." Besides, any one looking into the Hebrew will perceive that the affix her has, to say the least, as much a reference to the woman that is taken second as to the woman that is taken first. What, then, do I mean by all this? Why, simply this, that it is a prohibition of polygamy in some form or other. Because the reason, rivalry—as the Septuagint has it, or vexing-or afflicting, refers to the second woman as well as to the first, and takes place whether it was an ordinary case of two women or of two actual sisters; while in the latter there would be the additional crime of incest. It is therefore a prohibition of polygamy on the ground of the rivalry, the misery, and distress, strifes, hatreds, and consequent sins and crimes thereby occasioned, and is only in accordance with the original appointment of God,-the evil connected with it being applicable to the one woman as well as to the other. It forbids polygamy, a state in

OPINIONS OF MICHAELIS AND MR BINNEY.

83

which, according to Michaelis, mutual hatred of the wives, and consequent misery of the whole family, are inevitable.

*

The opinion of Michaelis, who is a great authority with the Libertarians, is one of the strangest which we have seen on this subject. He affects to find the proof perfectly clear in the 18th verse in favour of marrying the sister of a deceased wife. He says, "I cannot comprehend how it should ever have been imagined that Moses also prohibited marriage with a deceased wife's sister-that very connection which we so often find a dying wife entreating her husband to form, because she can entertain the best hope of her children's welfare from it." Though the " dying wife's" hope were well founded, which there are strong principles in human nature to disprove, neither a "dying wife's" hope, nor Michaelis' comprehension, is the measure of God's law, and they are a very poor ground for questioning it, though both were facts, and facts of more importance than they are. His statement of the case in the following passage renders the whole argument, and that of others who adopt it, ridiculous. He says farther,"What Moses prohibited was merely simultaneous polygamy with two sisters; that sort of marriage in which Jacob lived when he married Rachel as well as her sister Leah. The reason of this prohibition it is not difficult to discover. Sisters, in whom nature has implanted a principle of the strongest affection, are not to be made enemies to each other by polygamy. That two wives of the same husband should love each other is inconceivable. The man, therefore, who wishes to live in polygamy, and make two wives hate each other from jealousy, should make use of strangers and not of sisters. The history of Jacob, who, contrary to his inclination, was brought into this predicament, furnishes a very animated representation of the reasons on which this law is founded. Enmities between sister-wives will, besides, always be more violent, and, from their having known each other too intimately all their lives, more unmannerly, than when they are strangers to each other, and cannot so freely venture to outrage decency in their mutual hatred."† Michaelis was of a different opinion from that of Mr Binney. Michaelis thought polygamy must make enemies of the women, and he could not conceive their loving each other to be possible, but that their mutual hatred was certain. But, as the polygamist must have his way, stranger women are good enough for his purpose. Mr Binney, however, thinks Jewish and Turkish women of a different nature altogether, and would be vexed and humbled beyond measure if their husbands had each only one woman to wife! I suspect the following incident speaks more

*It is a certain fact that the affection of an unmarried aunt, whether she be the sister of the father or of the mother, is more intense to their children than that of the married aunt, who has children of her own, and so would it prove if the aunt became both married aunt and stepmother. Children of her own would totally alter the case. Her affection would instantly be fixed on them, and there would be great danger of a very opposite feeling to those who would now be nephews and nieces and stepchildren all in one. The very mention of such confusion excites loathing. Yet the alleged "dying wish" of dying wives is made a leading question with the Royal Commissioners, and a point of moment in the alleged facts collected by the hired agents sent over England, and then assembled to give their ex parte evidence, as if the wishes, though they were expressed, of persons, whether men or women, when their minds and feelings are not always in the most fit state for giving a judgment on anything, were to be a ground of legislating on one of the most important questions that can engage the attention of human beings. Were the results not of a very grave character, such a mode of establishing a ground for legislation would provoke only a smile of contempt.

+Commentaries, vol. ii. pp. 113, 114.

Anything characterised by more disgusting levity than the two or three pages of Mr Binney's pamphlet, in which he handles this point, we have not read in the writings of any