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fuch constitutions as might best improve their strength and valour, the numbers they sent out when they were overburthened, provided well for themselves, but were of no use to the countries they left; and whilst those Goths, Vandals, Franks, and Normans, enjoyed the most opulent and delicious provinces of the world, their fathers languished obscurely in their frozen elimatės. For the like reasons, or through the same defect, the Switzers are obliged to serve other princes; and often to employ that valour in advancing the power of their neighbours, which might be used to increase their own. Genoa, Lucca, Geneva, and other finall commonwealths, having no wars, are not able to nourishi the men they breed; but sending many of their children to seek their fortunes abroaut, searce a third part of those that are born among them die in those cities; and if they did not take this course, they would have no better than the nations inhabiting near the river Niger, who sell their children as the increase of their flocks.

This does not less concern monarchies than commonwealths; nor the absolute less than the mixed: all of tem have been prosperous or miserable, glorious or contemptible, as they were better or worse armed, difcipa li red, or conducted. The Asiyrian valour was irrefiftible under Nebuchodonozor ; but was brought to nothing under his bafe and luxurious grandson Belshazzar: the PerTians, who under Cyrus conquered Asia, were like swine espoted to llaughter when their discipline failed, and they were commanded by his proud, cruel, and cowardly fuccefTors. The Macedonian army overthrown by Paulus


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Emilius was not less în number than that with which Alexander gained the empire of the eaft; and perhaps had not been inferior in valour, if it had been as well commanded. Many poor and almost unknown nations have been carried to such a height of glory by the bravery of their princes, that I might incline to think their governmen as fit as any other for diseipling a people to war, if their virtues continued in their families, or could be transmitted to their successors. The impossibility of this is a breach never to be repaired; and no account is to be made of the good that is always certain, and seldom enjoyed. This disease is not only in absolute monarchies, but in those also where any regard is had to succession of blood, though under the strictest limitations. The fruit of all the victories gained by Edward the First and Third, or Henry the Fifth of England, perished by the baseness of their successors: the glory of our arms was turned into shame; and we, by the loss of treasure, blood, and territory, suffered the punishment of their vices. The effects of these changes are not always equally violent; but they are frequent, and must fall out as often as occasion is represented. It was not possible for Lewis the Thirteenth of France to pursue the great designs of Henry the Fourth : Christina of Sweden could not supply the place of her brave father ; nor the present king in his infancy accomplith what the great Charles Gustavus had noble undertaken: and no remedy can be found for this mortal infirmity, unless the power be put into the hands of those

are able to execute it, and not left to the blindness of fortunc. When the regal power is committed to an an



nual or otherwise chosen magistracy, the virtues of excelIcnt men are of use, but all does not depend upon thcir persons : one man finishes what another had begun; and when many are by practice rendered able tò perform the same things, the loss of one is easily supplied by the election of another. When good priaciples are planted, they do not die with the person that introduced them; and good constitutions remain, though the authors of them perish. Rome did not fall back into slavery when Brutus was killed, who had led them to recover their liberty others like to him pursued the same ends; and notwithstanding the loss of so many great commanders consumed in their almoft continual wars, they never wanted such as were fit to execute whatever they could defign. A wellgoverned statc is as fruitful to all good purposes, as the seven-hicaded serpent is said to have been in evil; when one head is cut off, many rise up in the place of it. Good order tcing once eitablished, makes good men, and as long as it lasts, such as are fit for the greatest employmients will never be wanting. By this means the Romans could not be surprised: no king or captain ever invaded them, who did not find many excellent commanders to oppose him; whereas they themselves found it eafy to overthrow kingdoms, though they had been established by the bravelt princes, through the baseness of their fucceffors.

But if our author fay true, it is of no' advantage to a popular state to have excellent men; and therefore he imposes “ a necessity upon every people to chuse the worst “ men for being the worst, and moft like to themselves; « left that if virtuous and good men thould come into

“ power,

power, they should be excluded for being vicious and

wicked, &c. Wise men would seize upon the state, « and take it from the people.” For the understanding of these words, it is good to consider whether they are to be taken fimply, as usually applied to the devil, and some of his inftruments, or relatively, as to the thing in question : if fimply, it must be concluded, that Valerius, Brutus, Cincinnatus, Capitolinus, Mamercus, Paulus Emilius, Nafica, and others like to them, were not only the worst men of the city; but that they were so often advanced to the supreme magistracics because they were so; if in the other sense relating to magistracy, and the command of armies, the worst are the most ignorant, unfaithful, Nothful, or cowardly; and our author, to make good his propofition, must prove, that when the people of Rome, Carthage; Athens, and other states, had the power of chusing whom they pleased, they did chuse Camillus, Corvinus, Torquatus, Fabius, Rullus, Scipio, Amilcar, Hannibal, Asdrubal, Pelopidas, Epaminondas, Pericles, Aristides, Themistocles, Phocion, Alcibiades, and others like to them, for their ignorance, infidelity, floth, and cowardice ; and on account of those vices, molt like to those who chose them. But if these were the worst, I desire to know what wit or cloquence can deferibe or comprehend the excellency of the best; or of the discipline that brings whele nations to such perfection, that worse than there could not be found among them? And if they were not so, but such as all succeeding ages have justly admired for their wisdom, virtue, industry,




and valour, the impudence of so wicked and false an afsertion ought to be rejected with scorn and hatred.

But if all governments, whether monarchical or popular, absolute or limired, deserve praise or blame as they are well or ill conftituted for making war; and that the attainment of this end do intirely depend upon the qualifications of the commanders, and the strergth, courage, number, affection, and temper of the people out of which the armies are drawn ; those governments must neccffarily be the best which take the best care that those armies may be wcil commanded; and so provide for the good of the people, that they may daily increase in number, courage, and strength, and be fo satisfied with the prefent state of things, as to fear a change, and fight for the prefervation or advancement of the public interest as of their own. We have already found, that in hereditary monarchies no care at all is taken of the commander: he is not chosen, but comes by chance; and does not only frequently prove defective, but for the most part utterly uncapable of performing any part of his duty; whereas in popular governments excellent men are generally chosen; and there are so many of them, that if one or more perith, others are ready to supply their places. And this «lifcourse having (if I mistake not) in the whole series, Mewn, that the advantages of popular governments, in selation to the increase of courage, number, and strength in a people, out of which armies are to be formed, and bringing them to such a temper as prepares them bravely to perform their duty, are as much above those of moBarchies, as the prudence of choice furpasses the acci


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