The Principles of ArtRavenio Books, 21. 9. 2016 I do not think of aesthetic theory as an attempt to investigate and expound eternal verities concerning the nature of an eternal object called Art, but as an attempt to reach, by thinking, the solution of certain problems arising out of the situation in which artists find themselves here and now. Everything written in this book has been written in the belief that it has a practical bearing, direct or indirect, upon the condition of art in England in 1937, and in the hope that artists primarily, and secondarily persons whose interest in art is lively and sympathetic, will find it of some use to them. Hardly any space is devoted to criticizing other people’s aesthetic doctrines; not because I have not studied them, nor because I have dismissed them as not worth considering, but because I have something of my own to say, and think the best service I can do to a reader is to say it as clearly as I can. Of the three parts into which it is divided, Book I is chiefly concerned to say things which any one tolerably acquainted with artistic work knows already; the purpose of this being to clear up our minds as to the distinction between art proper, which is what aesthetic is about, and certain other things which are different from it but are often called by the same name. Many false aesthetic theories are fairly accurate accounts of these other things, and much bad artistic practice comes from confusing them with art proper. These errors in theory and practice should disappear when the distinctions in question are properly apprehended. In this way a preliminary account of art is reached; but a second difficulty is now encountered. This preliminary account, according to the schools of philosophy now most fashionable in our own country, cannot be true; for it traverses certain doctrines taught in those schools and therefore, according to them, is not so much false as nonsensical. Book II is therefore devoted to a philosophical exposition of the terms used in this preliminary account of art, and an attempt to show that the conceptions they express are justified in spite of the current prejudice against them; are indeed logically implied even in the philosophies that repudiate them. The preliminary account of art has by now been converted into a philosophy of art. But a third question remains. Is this so-called philosophy of art a mere intellectual exercise, or has it practical consequences bearing on the way in which we ought to approach the practice of art (whether as artists or as audience) and hence, because a philosophy of art is a theory as to the place of art in life as a whole, the practice of life? As I have already indicated, the alternative I accept is the second one. In Book III, therefore, I have tried to point out some of these practical consequences by suggesting what kinds of obligation the acceptance of this aesthetic theory would impose upon artists and audiences, and in what kinds of way they could be met. This book is organized as follows: I. Introduction Book I. Art and Not Art II. Art and Craft III. Art and Representation IV. Art as Magic V. Art as Amusement VI. Art Proper: (1) As Expression VII. Art Proper: (2) As Imagination Book II. The Theory of Imagination VIII. Thinking and Feeling IX. Sensation and Imagination X. Imagination and Consciousness XI. Language Book III. The Theory of Art XII. Art as Language XIII. Art and Truth XIV. The Artist and the Community XV. Conclusion |
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... logical flaws in a theory and therefore dismiss it as false; but it can never acclaim or propound any theory as true. It is wholly unconstructive; tamquam virgo Deo consecrata, nihil parit. Yet the fugitive and cloistered virtue of ...
... logic, magic or astrology. That is still its meaning in the time of Shakespeare: 'lie there, my art', says Prospero, putting off his magic gown. But the Renaissance, first in Italy and then elsewhere, reestablished the old meaning; and ...
... logical fallacy that underlies one, or some, of the various things called romanticism. It may very well be true that the only works of art which can be made altogether without a plan are trifling ones, and that the greatest and most ...
... logical strictness unnecessary, for its purpose will be to demonstrate that art proper is not and cannot be representative. But the idea of representation has played too important a part in the history of aesthetic to permit this ...
... logical thinking, for Locke and his contemporaries knew practically nothing about them. But it was very far from excusable in nineteenthcentury anthropologists, who knew that the peoples they called savage, even apart from the ...
Obsah
Art as Amusement | |
1 As Expression | |
2 As Imagination | |
The Theory of Imagination VIII Thinking and Feeling | |
Sensation and Imagination | |
Imagination and Consciousness | |
Language | |
The Theory of Art XII Art as Language | |
Art and Truth | |
The Artist and the Community | |
Conclusion | |