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of our own to stand immediately in view. In further process of time, if we find our enjoyments arising chiefly from the conversation or intercourse of one logical theory or a few persons, we practise the like method of engaging them to serve us so frequently, until this end slips out of view, and satisfaction, as we have before remarked in cases of translation, adheres immediately to the thought of doing them kindness. Then it is that love becomes personal, and then arrives at its highest state of refinement, wherein it may be defined the pleasure of pleasing: for I cannot conceive a purer love than that which makes us feel a sensible delight in gratifying another, and in everything that happens conducive to his gratification, without thought of any other benefit redounding therefrom to ourselves, except that very delight. And this delight is of two sorts, which may be distinguished into Love and Fondness; the latter tends barely to gratify, the other to gratify without doing a disservice, and even to forbear a present compliance for the sake of a real advantage." "Thus the most resplendent love springs originally from our concern for ourselves, and our own desires, like a rose growing from a dunghill.”

8. Mill's account seems to approach nearer to Tucker's than in the case of grief; he adopts the machinery of cause and effect, very much the same as that of means and end. At page 158, Vol. ii. (or p. 204, Vol. ii. ed. 1869) he says: "An object contemplated as a future cause of a future pleasure is an object loved, whether the anticipation is certain or uncertain." And this shows the constant union of joy and love, for joy is "a pleasureable sensation anticipated with certainty." When therefore, in think

ing of the cause of a future pleasure, the pleasure is contemplated as certain, we feel love and joy together.

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9. But here again I must repeat the same ob- logical theory jection. The satisfaction which is translated from the end of personal advantage to the means, the gratification of another, must be a satisfaction of the same kind after translation as before. But if the satisfaction in "the pleasure of pleasing" is of a different kind from the satisfaction of procuring self-gratification, then the presence of one does not account for the presence of the other; but the satisfaction in "the pleasure of pleasing" must be referred to some other source, namely, to the new object which is now represented, as the proper and peculiar object or framework of the emotion, and to the kind or mode of operation of the nervous matter concerned in supporting this representation, as the physiological cause both of the emotion and of its connection with its proper framework. The enumeration and analysis of the steps in the representation of this new object, or cognitive framework, of the emotion is not a sufficient account of the change in the kind of satisfaction, without taking also into consideration the kind of object which has so arisen, as the object of the new kind of satisfaction.

10. One more instance from Tucker, an instance in which his analysis is partially successful, will serve, by showing the reasons of its success, to apply, as it were, the method of concomitant variations' to the

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question in hand. I mean his analysis of avarice. Avarice proper, he says, or the love of money for its own sake is a desire of the advantages which money procures translated from the ends to the

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means, that is, to the possession of money itself separately from, or even to the exclusion of, those advantages. This account of avarice is true of all logical theory those cases in which the advantages procured by

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money are visible and tangible possessions of the same kind, visible and tangible, as money itself; and for this reason, that the kind of satisfaction is the same; it is the satisfaction of possessing visible and tangible objects. But even here this general kind of satisfaction is differentiated into varieties by the sub-differences in kind of the objects possessed; and though the general kind of satisfaction is the same, and may be translated from end to means, the theory does not hold in its minutiæ; the particular satisfaction of possessing coin or notes is not precisely the same satisfaction as that of possessing pictures, or plate, or horses, or servants. And as matter of fact, we rarely or never find that a man who cares much for the possession of objects which are consumed in the enjoyment, such as cigars, wine, or luxuries of the table, becomes avaricious either of money or of objects the enjoyment of which is reaped by the mere contemplation of possessing them. Still more, a man who desires power, or honour, or flattery, though all these may be commanded by money to a great extent, is never found to translate the desire of them to money as the means of procuring them. Avarice appears, in its fundamental characteristic, the love of possessions, to be not restricted to money; but, whatever a man is fond of possessing, of that he becomes avaricious, if that particular fondness is indulged to excess. The proportion of truth, then, which lies in Tucker's analysis of avarice, depends upon the sameness in the kind of satisfaction which

is translated from the possession of the end to the possession of the means.

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11. The foregoing instances show clearly enough the method followed by the psychological theory. logical theory Distinguishing sensations from emotions as feelings of a different kind, this theory attempts to show that the one grows into the other by means of representation or association. It is an extension of the doctrine Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu to the emotions, or as they used to be called affections or passions; Nihil in affectu quod non prius in sensu; and this further transition is wrought through the intellectus, or is an intellectual process. The difference in kind between sensation and emotion is not denied but insisted on, and then it is attempted to show that the one becomes or changes into the other. This attempt is necessitated by the distinction between them being at first drawn empirically, sensation set down as one thing and emotion as another, instead of metaphysically by conceiving emotion as sensation and something more besides. Consequently the psychological theory has not only to point out in an emotion the disjecta membra of sensation, but also out of these, together with the mode of their recomposition, to construct the whole of the emotion. This however cannot be shown, because in those states of mind which are called emotions we can distinguish not only these disjecta membra and their recomposition in new shapes, but also, simultaneously existing, the emotional element which gives its name to the whole.

12. Hartley was, I believe, the first to connect systematically the psychological theory with the physiological cause of sensation and emotion. I bring no

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objection against the physiological, but only against the psychological, part of his speculations. Indeed I would carry the physiological part more completely logical theory into action, by calling on it to account for the nature of the emotions, as well as for that of the sensations and their association. Hartley begins that section

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of his Observations on Man which treats of the Affections in general by saying: "Here we may observeFirst, That our Passions or Affections can be no more than Aggregates of simple Ideas united by Association. For they are excited by Objects, and by the Incidents of Life. But these, if we except the impressed Sensations, can have no power of affecting us, but what they derive from Association; just as was observed above of Words and Sentences." Observe the reasoning: the affections can be nothing but what the sensations together with their association were, because it is by them that they are excited; the nature is made to depend upon the genesis, instead of being analysed independently. He proceeds: "Secondly, Since therefore the Passions are States of considerable Pleasure or Pain, they must be Aggregates of the Ideas, or Traces of the sensible Pleasures and Pains, which Ideas make up by their Number, and mutual Influence upon one another, for the Faintness and transitory Nature of each singly taken. This may be called a Proof a priori. The Proof a posteriori will be given, when I come to analyse the Six Classes of Intellectual Affections; viz. Imagination, Ambition, Self-Interest, Sympathy, Theopathy, and the Moral Sense."

13. But though the physiological conditions of consciousness are brought into play, and, as is evident, by an ardent supporter of the psychological