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phenomena, self-love and benevolence as commonly understood, and is requisite to analyse and explain both one and the other; and the results of this, in reference to the theories of the two schools mentioned, will be clearly shown by the sequel. The perception of the distinction, then, between the Subject and its objects contains under it, as a further distinction or differentiation arising in one of its terms, the objects, the perception of several minds; and the relations in which the Subject stands to any of these minds, and to its own among them, are modes or specifications of the general relation in which it stands to its objects, as proper objects of the Subject.

§ 24. 1. The Subject has before it in reflection, according to what has been said, two objects, other minds and its own; and the representations of these in their different modes and in their relations to each other are the frameworks of the reflective emotions. The first question, then, which arises in proceeding to analyse these emotions is this, with which of the two objects to begin, with the emotions which arise in the representation of the Subject's own mind alone, or with those which arise in the representation of the relations between that and other minds. It might seem natural at first sight to begin with the former, on the ground that a knowledge of oneself was the necessary preliminary to that of other minds, or of the effect they produce in relation to oneself; and that this is the way proper and even, on its own principles, necessary to metaphysic, and yet that it is a way fruitless and bewildering, is the substance of an objection often urged against metaphysic. But the latter way is the true one, and at the same time the way proper to metaphysic, which follows in the

Воок І. CH. II. PART IV.

§ 23. Inferences from these phenomena.

$ 24. The method to

be followed.

BOOK I. CH. II. PART IV.

$ 24.

The method to

track of actual history, the history of the actual development both of individuals and of mankind at large. The justification of this method on metaphybe followed. sical principles can easily be given. Let us consider first what the actual course of development must have been. The Subject, let it be supposed, has now distinguished its two objects, other minds and its own, at the first dawning of reflection; but this distinction by no means includes a knowledge of what emotions arise in contemplating each of these objects respectively, it is but the first step towards such a knowledge. The emotions of the Subject's own mind, from his knowledge of which he infers the nature of the emotions of other minds, are still entirely subjective, a mass of feelings unanalysed and unclassified, arising confusedly on occasion of presentations and representations of all kinds. Other minds make part of these presentations and representations. The total mass of emotions, and the total mass of their frameworks, can only be arranged and analysed pari passu. The emotions of the Subject arising from, or felt towards, other minds must first be distinguished from this mass; in doing which the Subject learns by degrees to treat the subjective emotions of his own mind objectively, as if they belonged to another mind, or as if they were inferred from outward signs instead of being subjectively experienced. Not till both these processes have been gone through is the Subject capable of drawing a clear distinction between emotions felt towards other minds and emotions felt solely towards his own. It certainly is not a distinction with which the mind begins its career; but rather the discovery of the relations of the Subject's mind to other minds is the first step in the

process of completely analysing and classifying the emotions of the Subject. The first glimpse attained by mankind that there was still this further work before them, namely, to analyse the mind itself, after analysing the relation of the mind to its environment and to other minds therein, was expressed, at least in Grecian development, in the famous inscription at Delphi Γνῶθι σεαῦτον.

2. But if this is the course of the actual development of reflection, it is absurd to demand that metaphysic should deviate from it in order to begin with the conception of a Self or a Mind ready analysed and established, with distinctions ready drawn between the emotions which arise solely in contemplation of itself and those which arise in contemplation of other minds, since these are distinctions which are not obvious from the first but are discovered gradually by a long course of reflection. Such a method would be more consonant to an ontological psychology, the principle of which is to treat the Self or the Mind as a single determinate being, marked out from the first as different from its objects, instead of being an object discovered by much, but now longforgotten, thought and observation. But metaphysic is itself in its present shape but the continuation of, though it is also the investigation into, these very processes of self-analysis and self-classification. The whole history of metaphysic is continuous, its earliest and latest enquiries are parts of one unbroken chain, in which the distinctions drawn, the insights won, and the classifications established, serve as the basis, the instrument, the logic, of further discoveries, discoveries which only differ from the earlier ones in being performed with a greater degree of self-con

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sciousness. And thus we may expect, in analysing the emotions, to find a certain logical filiation between their frameworks. As a matter of fact, however, there is no doubt that some of the earliest reflective emotions, both in the case of individuals and of mankind at large, are emotions which arise in the intercourse between persons, between mind and mind; of which therefore those other persons are the representational frameworks in the mind of the Subject, though of course without his making the further observation that this framework is necessary to the emotions which he experiences. This apparently is an earlier stage in reflective development than that to which belong reflective emotions entirely self-regarding. It is therefore proper to begin by examining emotions felt towards other persons, or in other words, emotions which are relations between mind and mind.

§ 25. 1. The first group accordingly is that of the sympathetic emotions. The simple feeling of fondness for any object, when that object is a person, is benevolence or goodwill, Aristotle's Evora, which he calls ágy pinías; see the whole Chapter, Eth. Nic. ix. 5. This emotion passes over into love or friendship, pia, when the fondness which we feel is represented as reciprocated by the person towards whom we feel it. This new object, so constituted, is the framework of the emotion of love; and in all cases of love it will be found that there is this element, namely, the reciprocation of fondness. The emotional difference between goodwill and love is affection ; affection, Aristotle's pianos, is the common emotional element in all cases of love or friendship; and the test of this feeling, an invariable mark distinguishing

it from goodwill, is the feeling of longing, óos, in
the absence of the beloved person.
It is singular
that this feeling should be entertained towards inani-
mate objects, when they have become habitual to us
or associated with our history; but it is impossible
to mistake the sameness of the feeling, the ground-
feeling of affection, towards home and objects familiar
as home, and of the longing for them in absence;
but it must be observed that in all these cases there
is personification of the beloved objects in imagina-
tion, and they always form a groundwork of poetical
feeling in the person who experiences them. For
instance, the most beautiful expression of this feeling
for home is also one of the most beautiful passages
in poetry, I mean the lines of Catullus beginning
Pæne insularum, Sirmio. Another form of the same
feeling is that towards the soil and ground of our
native country, a feeling somewhat different from
patriotism though contained in it, a feeling expressed
by Wordsworth in the lines,

"O joy when the girdle of England appears;
What moment of life is so conscious of love,

Of love in the heart, made more happy by tears?"

Although these forms of affection are imaginative and the groundwork of poetry, they do not by themselves belong to the imaginative section of the reflective emotions; because the imagination is not in the reflection but in the object, or rather in the previous reflection constituting the object, not in subsequent reflection upon it. When the reflective emotions are themselves imagined, then only are they themselves poetry or poetical imagination. The representation constituting objects of reflective emotion

VOL. I.

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BOOK I. CH. II. PART IV.

$25. The sympathetic emotions.

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