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ON THE INCONSISTENCIES AND CRIMES OF COMMUNITIES.

DEFENDIT NUMERUS.-Horace.

HUMAN NATURE has been justly termed "a bundle of inconsistencies." This is sufficiently true of individuals, to justify the adage. The varying states of the human mind under the influence of mood and feeling, the fluctuations to which it is subject, in consequence of its connexion with a physical system which is in a great measure at the mercy of external and uncontrollable agency, no less than its dependence upon circumstances and events entirely without the sphere of its direction, sufficiently demonstrate the truth of this humiliating statement. But, perhaps, it is still more strikingly true of human nature, considered collectively, than it is of the majority of individuals. In their social capacity, men seem but little sensible of the weight of personal responsibility. "Defendit numerus." The guilt of any practice, or of any bad system of social regulation, is divided among a multitude; and as each individual professes but a limited influence upon the notions and conduct of the whole, so he acknowledges but a slender share of accountability for the conduct of the community to which he belongs. Hence opinions pass uncontradicted, and practices are pursued, among societies which claim a high character for conscientiousness, and even for Christian principle, which would be indignantly disavowed by the large majority of individuals.

The proof of these remarks may be read upon the very surface of national history; and certainly the records of our own country and of our own times furnish ample illustration of their truth. It has, for example, been ever received as one of the fundamental principles of our political constitution, that the third estate of the realm is to consist of a perfect representation of the people. It is this principle which completes the boasted harmony of our system of government; and it is only on this principle that our nation can be considered to possess that freedom which every Englishman claims as his birthright. Indeed, it has ever been held as of the nature of an axiom, and has been assumed as such in the House of Commons, in the days of its foulest corruption. Yet who, that compares the present constitution of that House, with what it was but five years ago, can fail to perceive that if it is now any thing like a representation of the people of England, it was then any thing else than this? And, who that compares even its present constitution with that which is assigned to it in theory, can doubt that many important changes must pass upon it still, before it fulfils its appointed functions, and completes the integrity of that system which it goes to constitute? Yet but a few years prior to the corrective measures which have been recently adopted, this intelligent, thinking, and moral nation viewed, with almost entire indifference, the wide deviation of this branch of their legislature from its proper character, and quietly tolerated all the abominations, political, moral, and religious, to which that deviation gave rise.

Let us imagine a political millennium. Let us suppose (and it is not a chimerical supposition,) a state of things in which our posterity shall legislate upon those inviolable principles of moral truth, by which, as a Christian nation, we now profess to be guided; in which they shall not only acknowledge, but feel, that what is morally wrong can never be politically right; that "justice is itself the standing policy of civil society," and that any departure from it, under any circumstances, is no policy at all. Should the records of our national iniquity be preserved until that time, (and they will probably be very ancient and disputable documents long before it arrives,) the historical students of that day will become acquainted with the following facts: that in the 18th century, the parliament of this country listened to the eloquence and the political wisdom of some of the most illustrious men that ever adorned it; that their deliberations were sanctified (as some thought) by the presence of the ministers of religion; that the equitable administration of the laws was secured by publicity, as well as by the vigilance of the legislature,

and of the people at large; that education was making a progress unexampled in the history of the world; that the spirit of liberty was at its height; and that the Christian religion was dominant at home, and spreading abroad. They will read, that at this very time, under the sanction of this Government, and with scarcely a dissentient voice among its subjects, the unoffending inhabitants of the distant and almost unknown coasts of Africa were visited by English vessels, stolen from their homes, conveyed to our West Indian colonies in such numbers, that a large proportion of them invariably perished on the passage by suffocation, neglect, or punishment; that they were there separated and sold, and, while all the attachments of nature and instinct were lacerated and festering, the memory of these ills was effaced by a series of inconceivable toils and torments, from which they were only relieved by a mortality unknown except under the immediate inflic tions of the Divine judgments. They will learn that a few individuals of singular philan thropy arose, who deeply felt, and inveighed against, the injustice and atrocity of this system, and devoted their lives to its extirpation; but that they were very generally regarded as enthusiasts, who were willing to sacrifice the commercial interests of their country to certain abstract principles of their own. That, after years of futile effort, the reins of government were placed in the hands of one, whose benevolence was as ample as his genius, and who bequeathed his name to immortality, linked with the ABOLITION OF

THE SLAVE TRADE.

But with what unmeasured indignation and contempt will they view the conduct of their ancestors subsequently to this great act of justice. That a Christian nation, after having thus slowly and reluctantly yielded to the imperative claims of humanity, after having committed themselves to the principle upon which the continuance of slavery must be condemned as the last of atrocities, should have still continued carefully to rear slaves, and only so far altered the laws affecting them, as to make them a contraband article of import; worst of all, that they should have visited with the most malignant persecution those who dared to speak to them of hope even beyond the grave, and to mitigate the horrors of bondage by announcing "a rest that remaineth ;"-surely, if such persons as have been supposed, should read and believe these accounts, they would blush to belong to the same species as ourselves. We may, however, imagine that they would read on, with some degree of curiosity, to discover what we proposed to ourselves in this monstrous inconsistency and atrocity; and at length they will satisfactorily trace it to a general preference of one kind of sugar to another, and a prevalent taste for rum and water, and cigars !!

But leaving hypothesis. It is not too much to assert,—that no man, of average good sense and good feeling, would tolerate improprieties analagous to these in his own household, or in any social system under his exclusive control; and that, not from their interference with his own comfort, but from their inconsistence with the universally received principles of equity. Yet society tolerates them; and finds its defence, as one would suppose, in the same excuses as might be framed by a riotous mob, in which the ringleaders would plead that they were impelled forward involuntarily by the multitude in their rear; while the multitude would plead their ignorance of the mischief which was done by the foremost.

But, perhaps, the strongest instance of inconsistency between the opinions of each individual, and the almost universal conduct of society, is to be found in the practice of duelling. There can be little doubt as to the origin of this absurd and barbarous custom. It is a relic of one of the most gross and stupid superstitions which ever disgraced human nature-that of litigation by combat. The principle in which this practice originated, namely, that God would decide for the right, in every instance of dispute, by the death of the injuring party, is sufficiently absurd; and is only to be accounted for by the utter ignorance and barbarism of those who adopted it. But this principle has long been abandoned. The practice is continued on very different grounds; but these, while they are more wicked, are equally irrational and indefensible. It is manifest that the practice of duelling is not now regarded as a mode of revenge, else it would be punished with death;

ON THE CRIMES OF COMMUNITIES.

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for it is "malice aforethought," which, in the eye of the law, constitutes murder. Again, as a means of reparation, it is utterly absurd; for the injured party generally subjects himself to a degree of danger equal to that incurred by the aggressor, and consequently runs an even chance of adding mutilation or death to the injury he has previously sustained. It is impossible, therefore, to attribute this motive to the challenger, except in those few cases in which the chances are known to be in his favour. The principle by which duellists are generally actuated appears to be this-that the commission of the affront supposes that the party against whom it is committed will be afraid to resent it, and therefore virtually charges him with cowardice; but cowardice, in warlike and chivalrous nations, is held as a crime which renders a man infamous, and ought to exclude him from society; and the stigmatized party feels himself, in conseNow, we imagine that, quence, bound to prove his courage by fighting the aggressor. whatever be the result of a duel, it will be difficult, morally, to clear the duellist of all the sin which attaches to suicide, to murder, or to both; the latter, certainly the most At all events, we frightful accumulation of guilt which any single action can involve. will hazard an opinion, that no man accepts a challenge, without a distinct conviction of "The state of the heinousness of his conduct; but he dares not endure the alternative. society," says he, " 'obliges me to this; else, I must prepare for the stigma and sneer of my associates; and that, I dare not and will not incur." In this, which we are persuaded is the true point of view, the conduct of the party alluded to assumes a character which, if the subject were not a solemn one, would be unspeakably ridiculous. His conscience and his instincts revolt from this mode of proving his courage; but he adopts it because he dares not incur the consequences of declining it—that is, (as he knows that every body will perceive,) because he is fearful of being thought afraid to do so!! The peculiar character of the logic by which the duellist arrives at his conclusion, will, perhaps, suggest to the reader a reason why the practice is so prevalent in the sister kingdom.

Yet

But it is not only the principle of duelling which is indefensible and absurd, the most monstrous inconsistencies are involved in the practice. Can any thing be imagined more preposterous than that the first General of the present day, covered with the glory of a hundred victories, at the summit of reputation both as a soldier and a commander, and occupying the most important station in the government of his country, should feel it necessary, in order to prove his courage, to exchange shots with a harmless and respectable country gentleman, who happened to be a little bilious and irritable? this farce we have seen enacted in our own day. We had hoped, indeed, that this occurrence would have been the means of exploding the custom, by demonstrating such an intolerable absurdity. But this appears to have been premature; it has but recently, in the House of Commons, received the virtual sanction of one of the most influential and respected members of the present government, whose excellent sense and proverbial goodness of heart were unable to stand against the fashion of his associates; who lost the opportunity of distinguishing himself by an open reprobation of this absurdity, and was content to rank among the fops and fools of his day.

Here, then, is a striking instance of inconsistency and guilt, peculiar to men in their collective capacity. A practice which would be repudiated by each individual composing society, is retained by each, because society enforces it! This is scarcely too And whence are we to expect the remedy? Upon strong a statement of the case. the infatuation which dictates this childish practice, all argument is lost and thrown away. Moreover, it has already been so unmercifully burlesqued and caricatured, that we can hope for but little effect from ridicule, unless some second Cervantes should arise, and level against it the laughter of the world.

This is, it must be confessed, a most humiliating, though, we believe, a just view of society need we go far for the inferences to which it leads, and the lessons it is adapted to impress? A very cursory examination of the inconsistencies which we have indicated, will convince us that they are mainly attributable to the want of independence and deci

sion of mind. They could never have originated, except from the universal surrender of the right of private judgment; and nothing more is necessary to explode them at once and for ever, than a general or even a partial assertion of that right. However true it is that "in the multitude of counsellors there is safety," it is equally true that "where no counsel is, the people fall;" that the large majority of society never think for themselves, and are helplessly dependent for the accuracy of their notions on those to whom they yield a servile acquiescence: surely, in bending to such a majority, we shall "follow the multitude to do evil." Apart from the ignominy of this "passive obedience,” involving the surrender of that freedom of mind which is the birthright and the glory of human nature, it is chargeable with a high degree of moral turpitude, as evincing an utter insensibility to the value of truth, and the consequent sacredness of opinion. The charge of eccentricity, therefore, (except on those points which "come home to every man's business and bosom," and on which, therefore, each individual thinks for himself) appears to be one of a very light, and often of a very enviable character. While the monstrous inconsistencies and vices which we have noticed, and which will probably suggest others to the mind of the thoughtful reader, receive the blind and tacit sanction of the community; eccentricity must wear the aspect of a duty, and that conformity to which it is opposed, however favourable it may be to the repose of society, is chargeable with all the results which follow from those fatal slumbers.

There is such a thing as the despotism of the many, far more to be feared than that of any individual. To the latter species of tyranny, Providence has appointed some mitigations, by limiting the term of life, and the sphere of personal influence. But though individual tyrants die off (through God's mercy) and "go to their own place," this more formidable tyrant, this "bellua multorum capitum," never dies, but continues from generation to generation, to rivet upon men the fetters of custom, the more fatally secure from being neither seen nor heard, nor even felt, except when they are attempted to be broken. It is evident that this power could never have arrived at the illegitimate height which it has attained, had not men lost sight of the fact, that though they might act in a collective capacity, they were responsible as individuals. It is then the duty of the wise and the good to assert, and act upon this principle, and to draw from it the motives which it supplies to decision of character. It is the want of this most ennobling distinction of the human mind, to which most of the inconsistencies and crimes of communities are attributable. It is the cultivation of it to which we must look for their only sure and permanent remedy. At the same time, while we connect these results with decision of character, it is necessary to distinguish between it, and that obstinacy which sometimes resembles it in its operation, but which is a vice as common as the virtue which it apes is rare. The essential difference between them is easily stated. Obstinacy is the invariable mark of an obtuse and insusceptible mind, and consists in immoveable adherence to opinions or purposes, irrespectively of the arguments and opinions of others; but to decision of character, nothing is more essential than extended induction and mature deliberation; at the same time, the capital distinction of the decided mind is, that while it entertains the opinions, arguments, or practice of others, they merely enter as elements into a calculation which is throughout conducted by itself alone. The essential difference between the genuine and counterfeit, between true decision of character and "that false and contemptible kind of decision which we term obstinacy," has been admirably illustrated by one of the greatest moralists of whom our literature can boast, in his incomparable Essay on Decision of Character; where he designates obstinacy "a temper which can assign no reasons but mere will for a constancy, which acts in the nature of dead weight, rather than of strength; resembling less the reaction of a powerful spring than the gravitation of a big stone."