THE CHRISTIAN SETTING UP A PHILOSOPHY OF HIS OWN. 31

tainly," said I. "Are the same souls," he asked, "in all Justin. animals, or is there one soul of a man and one of a horse or an

ass ?"

› have not the

,, know God.

"The same in all," I answered. "Will, then, horses Those who or asses see, or have they ever seen, God ?" No," "said I, have and "nor will the great majority of men; only he who lives capacity to righteously, purifying himself by the exercise of all virtues.' "The mind, then, does not see God in consequence of its relationship to Him, nor because it is mind, but because it is temperate and just ?" Yea," said I, "and because it has the capacity of knowing God." Why, then," said the old man, "do not the animals see God, seeing they have done nothing evil ?" "Their body is the hindrance," was the answer.

memory.

The next point discussed between them is the nature of Punishment punishment, and how the soul can be better for punishment in and another world or condition, if it does not remember what it has been and has done. Thence the old man goes on to proclaim the prophets, who were filled with a true and holy spirit, and not the philosophers, as the true guides to wisdom.

The rest of the dialogue is addressed to Trypho's Jewish feelings, and is an argument from the prophets to show that his position is no longer a tenable one.

position.

18. Justin called himself a philosopher, and wore the philo- Justin's sophical cloak to the end of his days. Apparently he held no recognised ecclesiastical office; nevertheless, the simple Ignatius evidently approached more nearly, at certain points, to such a thinker as Plutarch, than he did. The man who knew nothing of what Greek sages had been saying, proclaimed, as part of his baptismal faith, of his Scriptural lore, a conviction which stood in wonderful affinity to some of the thoughts which had been awakened in them; the other, who was conversant with all the terms and methods of the old philosophy, felt a kind of repugnance to it, partly from a conviction of its inadequacy to satisfy his wants, partly from a desire to make the Gospel an antagonist philosophy. The position he took up is a most natural and intelligible one, but it prevented him from doing full justice to those whom he had abandoned,-perhaps from doing full justice to the cause which he had embraced.

19. Justin's first apology was addressed to Antoninus Marcus Pius, though it was intended also for his colleague in the Aurelius. empire. His death* is usually, and on good grounds, assigned to the reign of Marcus Aurelius. This Emperor opens a new

*It is commonly ascribed to the intrigues of Crescens, one of the favourite court philosophers. There is no reason to doubt the tradition ; the Sophists who basked in the Emperor's patronage seem to have been as despicable as he was noble. That they should have availed themselves of his dislike to the Christians to put down one who adopted their own character, is most natural.

Marcus
Aurelius.

to Plutarch and Epic

tetus.

page in our history. Like Plutarch, the Greek and Roman characters were in him remarkably blended; but, unlike Plutarch, the foundation of his mind was Roman: he was a student, that he might more effectually carry on the business of an His relation Emperor. He was therefore not, like Plutarch, first of all a follower of Plato, but, like Seneca and Epictetus, a Stoic. Seneca we mention, however, much more for the sake of their contrast than their resemblance: they were both busy about a practical object, but Marcus Aurelius did not make his object the acquisition of personal ease and quietness. He far more resembled Epictetus in the character of his Stoicism: to him he confessed great obligations. But their ends were different, as their positions were different: the slave inquired after the secret of moral freedom; the Cæsar inquired after the secret of Self-government.

Glad to profit by help from

all quarters.

His benefactors.

lib. i.

20. It would not be easy to find any man in any period of the world's history who pursued this end more strenuously. A Stoic was, in the judgment of Marcus, simply a man who sought carefully and deliberately for the means of ruling himself; he thought it, therefore, not a dereliction of his sect, but a fulfilment of its primary function, if he asked help from every other quarter, as well as from the teachers of the Porch. He opens his first book with an enumeration-a little too formal and elaborate, perhaps, but exhibiting evident and sincere gratitude -of his different benefactors. His mother stands almost first Meditations, among them; to her he owes his reverence for that which is divine, a disposition to communicate, a restraint not only upon his actions, but upon his thoughts. He thanks Rusticus for keeping him from the love of sophistry, of rhetoric, of poetry, of all display, whether in speech or in appearance. He thanks Alexander, the Platonist, for teaching him not often, or without necessity, to say to any one, or to write in a letter, that he is busy. From his brother Severus he learned love of justice, love of truth, love of kinsfolk; he learned through him to be acquainted with Cato, Dion, and Brutus, and to conceive of a just polity ordered according to maxims of equality and freedom, and of a kingdom that honours above all things the liberty of the governed. These examples we take at random. The other obligations which he confesses are even more directly for lessons of self-government. The gods he thanks for all kinds of benefits, but especially for good ancestors, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, good members of his household, good kinsmen, good friends. To them, also, he owes it that he had a passion for philosophy, that he did not fall into the hands of any sophist, that he did not waste his time among writers of books, or in unravelling syllogisms, or in studying meteorology.

The gods.

distractions.

chap. 5.

19. These indications will, perhaps, suffice to show that the His Roman root of the Emperor's mind was to be found in the old Roman sympathies. discipline of affections and relationships; but that he grafted upon this an amount of self-consciousness and reflection which belong much more to the country whose language he used, than to that of which he was a citizen and ruler. " Every hour think strongly with thyself," he says, "that thou art, as a Roman and as a male, to do that which is before thee with accurate, severe, and unfeigned gravity, with kindliness, and freedom, and justice. And take care to give thyself rest from all surrounding fantasies that may interfere with thy immediate work. And this you will secure if you work each action as if it were Care to the last of your life, avoiding all precipitation and every influ- avoid ence that would withdraw you from the word that has hold of you (ảnõ rov aipovvros Móyov): avoiding also hypocrisy, selflove, discontent with the things that are appointed for you. You see how few the things are, by laying hold of which, a man may live a tranquil and god-conformed life; nor will the gods ask anything more from the man who is careful of these things." Book 2, Nothing is more miserable," he says in another place, "than the man who is always moving round and round, and surveying all things that lie about him, and prying into the things below the earth and speculating upon that which passes in the souls of his neighbours, and not perceiving that it suffices to dwell with the dæmon within himself, and to serve him manfully. But the service of him is the keeping oneself free from passion Service of and temerity, and from discontent with the things that come to us from the gods and from men. For the things that come from the gods are venerable; those from men are dear because of our relationship to them. Some things there are, no doubt, which are sad, in consequence of our ignorance of what is good and what is evil: this blindness is not less than the one which deprives us of the power of distinguishing white and black." Discipline "You must accustom yourself," he says, only to set such thoughts. images before yourself, that if any one should suddenly ask you, Book 2, what you are now thinking about, you should be able to answer him immediately, with all confidence, this or that; so that it may be clear at once that all is simple and gracious, and becoming a creature that has fellowship with other creatures, and is indifferent to mere pleasures of sense, and generally to all images of mere enjoyment; and has not rivalry, or envy, or suspicion, or ought else in the mind at which would blush if you were discovered in it." "Let the god that is in Book 3, thee," he says, shortly after, "be the guardian of a creature chap. 4. that hath the qualities of a male and an elder, and of a political being, and of a Roman, and of a ruler, one that hath set himself

D

tr

you

the dæmon

within.

of the

chap. 13.

The body, soul, and

reason.

Book 3, chap. 5.

What distinguishes the good

man.

Book 3, chap. 16.

Impres

to govern

them.

Book 5, chap. 16.

in order, one who is awaiting the summons out of life, ready to be set free; one that needeth not an oath, nor any human witness."

20. The following passage contains something more of formal philosophy, yet combined, as always with practice and selfexamination. Body, soul, reason,-to the body belong sensations, to the soul impulses, to the mind or reason determinations (cóyuara). To receive impressions from outward (δόγματα). appearances belongs even to cattle; nervous impulses may belong to wild beasts, to Phalaris, to Nero; to have the reason as a guide in reference to the phenomena that present themselves, may belong to those who do not believe in the gods, and to those who desert their country, and to those who do acts which require that they should shut their doors. If, then, all else is common to these we have enumerated, that which remains as the special gift of the good man is the being content with and welcoming the things that befal him, and those things that have been spun by the destinies for him; the not mixing or disturbing the dæmon that is established in the heart with a crowd of phantasies, but the keeping him propitious, reverently submitting to him, speaking nothing that is contrary to the truth, doing nothing that is beyond the right. And though all disbelieve that such a man is living a simple, and reverend, and brave life, he is not angry with any of them, nor does he turn out of the way that is leading him to the goal of his life, to which he must come pure, silent, ready for dis missal, cheerfully fitted for that which is appointed him."

Hear

21. Marcus Aurelius had a very strong feeling, like Epicsions; how tetus, that the management of the impressions which objects make upon us was the chief part of mental discipline. how he applies this to his own position, which was so different from that of Epictetus:-" According to the impressions which thou art continually receiving, will be the temper of thy mind; for the soul gets its dye from these impressions. Dye it then with the continual repetition of such impressions as these: that wheresoever it is appointed you to live, there it is possible to live well; that it is your appointed lot to live in a palace, then it is possible to live well in a palace. And again, that each thing is carried on towards that for the sake of which it has been prepared and ordained. That in that point to which it is Social life; bearing, you will find the end or purpose of it; that wherever its dignity. is the end and purpose of it, there is the good of it; that the good of the reasonable creature is society. That we were born for society, has been shown long ago. For is it not evident that the worse things exist for the sake of the better, the better for the sake of each other? But creatures that have

life are better than creatures without life, and creatures that have reason are better than those that have merely life."

Pantheism;

22. This idea of man as a social or political being enters very deeply into the mind and philosophy of Marcus Aurelius. "We are portions of the great whole" is a thought which Tendency to continually recurs to him. At times it gives a coldness to his how speculations; the man seems in danger of being lost in the resisted. universe. But quite as often it is urged as an argument, apparently an effective one to the writer's mind, against selfishness and self-exaltation. Unquestionably he was more inclined than Epictetus was to follow the old Stoics in identifying God with the world-the world signifying not the earth or the visible frame-work of things, but the order and constitution to which we belong. There was much, however, in his Roman education, his devout temper, his personal affections, and his watchfulness over himself, to counteract this tendency. He has no idea of the universe as self-governed. The phrase "directing reason," is one which occurs continually in connection with his idea of the whole; and to this "directing reason" he assigns. gracious and human qualities. "The being of the universe," The personhe says, in the beginning of his 6th Book, "is easy to be en- divinity he ality of the treated, and flexible. The reason that directs it hath in itself worshipped. no motive to ill-doing. Malice is not in it, nor is anything done by it maliciously, nor is anything injured by it. All things come to pass and are accomplished in obedience to it." The first clause of this sentence niay seem somewhat unintelligible, The Emperor designs, we apprehend, to oppose the universal substance to that which is the cause of all untractableness, the feelings and passions of the individual. He would lead the man out of these by bringing him to feel that he is not a separate existence, but part of a scheme from which he cannot tear himself without destroying himself. "All particular things," The alternahe says just after, "fulfil their end according to the nature of the whole; not in conformity with some other nature, either inclosing it from without, or comprehended within, or existing Conseapart from it and only accidentally attached to it. Either there quence of is in this universe only a mixture of elements, a strange entanglement, to terminate in dispersion and dissolution, or there is unity, order, providence. Supposing the first to be the right view, why do I desire to meddle with such a ferment and confusion of accidents? What else have I to trouble myself about than the how and when I am to become earth? And in that case why do I fret myself? The dissolution will come to me whatever I do. But if the other is the case, I bow down with reverence, I set myself in order, I put confidence in the Book 6, Director of all things.' One extract more may set this point cc. 9, 10.

tive.

either.