part of those possessed of them, such a co-partnership in the legislature as may enable them to interpose effectually for their preservation. But, when such a co-partnership no longer exists when the decisions of the House of Lords are, "vox et preterea nihil”— when the Commons are both ready and eager to vindicate their legislative omnipotence with an angry jealousy which reminds us of those eastern despots who can bear "no brother near the throne"-it then becomes those, who have hitherto constituted the privileged orders, to look out for some more secure defence than can be found either in the rusty armoury of their ancestors, or in the very precarious position which they are still permitted to occupy, upon the ruins of the constitution. All this, it will be said, is obvious. It is but it is not so obvious that men are always much more likely to be actuated in their public conduct by the remembrance of what has been, than the reality of what is. The freeman who has been subjugated, will, habitually, forget his chains. The slave who has been emancipated in body, will still be manacled in mind, and find it difficult to shape the course of his conduct, without an instinctive reference to his former degradation. So, also, it is with us. Contrary to what almost amounts to demonstrative evidence, we are fain to act with reference to exploded notions of the British constitution. The practice of our ancestors, and the theory of our jurists and philosophers, maintain their influence over our minds, in despite of Lord John Russell and the reform bill.

But this must no longer be. Old associations must be broken. We must consider ourselves not as we have been, but as we are. It cannot be denied, that a large subtraction has been made from the power of the aristocracy; and, unless they endeavour to compensate, by the increase of their personal, the loss which they have sustained in their political influence, nothing remains but that the waves of popular fury shall break in upon them, and their places in the legislature shall know them no more.

We are not unconscious that there have been occasions on which our aristocratic parliament have proved themselves both corrupt and selfish. We have never thought of the repeal

We

of the income tax, without feeling that the men by whom it was sanctioned disgraced themselves as much as they injured the country. What an outcry was raised against Lord Londonderry for censuring, as he boldly did, their ignorant impatience of taxation! go farther than he did. We call the feeling which led to the abandonment of that tax which bore us triumphantly through the war, and which, if continued up to the present day, would have liquidated more than two thirds of the national debt, criminal-basely criminal;-a kind of abuse of legislative power almost calculated to justify as well as provoke a summary visitation of popular vengeance.

When the income tax was repealed, it was bringing nearly fifteen millions annually into the treasury. It would, of course, have increased with the property of the country; and our estimate is not over, but, we are convinced, considerably under the mark, when we say that, if extended, as it ought to have been, to the empire at large, it would, in a very few years, have amounted to from twenty to twenty-five millions annually.

If we suppose twenty millions employed annually as a sinking fund for the space of five and twenty years, the first twenty, at the ordinary interest of four per cent, would have doubled, and become forty. Let us then consider what the whole would amount to at the end of the period

The first twenty would have become £40,000,000 The last,

20,000,000

Seven hundred and fifty millions! A sum which would almost annihilate our national debt, and relieve the country from a dead weight of forty millions annually; the sum which we are at present obliged to pay for the interest of it, without the remotest prospect of seeing it discharged!

In the above calculation, we have made no allowance for compound interest. But as the commissioners for liquidating the debt would, no doubt, avail themselves. of that, the result would be much more favorable than we have supposed. A single pound, per

annum at compound interest at four per cent. would amount in twenty-five years to 41. 645908, or about 41. and somewhat more than six-tenths of a pound. Therefore, twenty millions multiplied by 41 6-10ths, will give a sum of more than 833 millions, a sum which, we believe, exceeds the whole of the national debt. Well might Lord Londonderry complain of "an ignorant impatience of taxation!”

We do not forget that the iniquitous abandonment of this tax was not a Tory, but a Whig measure. The opposition took advantage of the selfish prejudices of the land owners, and compelled the then government, much against their will, to have it repealed. But, it must be confessed, it was altogether an aristocratic movement, by which the gentry sought to relieve themselves at the expense of the work ing classes. And if the working classes at present took it into their heads to employ the political power with which they have become invested, for the purpose of having it re-imposed, we confess such a measure would appear to us very like a kind of retributive justice.

Something, undoubtedly, must be done, or the country will be undone. A dead weight of forty millions, pressing upon a people whose food is made dear by corn-laws, while their trade is constantly diminishing by foreign competition, cannot be borne much longer. And, unless prompt and energetic measures are taken, which may afford some prospect of ultimate relief from this heavy burden, we see not, we confess, how bankruptcy and ruin are to be averted.

We know well that the income tax was most unequal. In fact, any equal tax upon all income must necessarily, in its effects, be unequal. A professional man derives one thousand per annum from his practice. A landed proprietor derives one thousand per annum from his freehold estate. The one is a life, the other is a perpetual interest; and while they are both taxed only the same amount, one is at least twice as heavily taxed as the other. The tax should be measured, not by the amount of the income, but by the value of the property. And, holding this principle in view, a graduated income and property tax would be one of the most equitable that could be imposed.

We also hold the principle, that the legislature, in imposing taxes, should make a difference between the very affluent and the moderately affluent portions of the community, and rather lean upon the luxuries of the one, than upon the necessaries of the other. When the question is, whether one man must lay down his horse, or two or three others abridge the portion of wholesome food which might be required by their families, it requires but common humanity to say how it should be decided.

Neither should it be forgotten that the value of all landed property rose considerably during the war. Indeed, production of every kind experienced an extraordinary, if not a preternatural impulse-so that our prosperity more than kept pace with our taxation. This is strikingly illustrated by the following fact, which we extract from the Encyclopedia Britannica, under the article England. The same property, consisting of one hundred acres, paid a rent in 1790 of 88/. 6s. 34d; in 1803, 1217.2s.74d.; and in 1813, 1617. 12s. 7 d. being an increase, at the respetieve periods, more than sufficient to double any increase which could have taken place either in direct or indirect taxation. Now, compare this with the increase of the national debt during nearly the same period. In 1793, the unredeemed debt amounted in round numbers to two hundred and twentyseven millions; in 1813, to five hundred and seventy-five millions. Thus, the increase of rent very nearly kept pace with the increase of debt; the one having almost, and the other very little more than doubled. All property has, we know, since declined; but it would not be unfair to say, that those accumulations which accrued to individuals in consequence of the war, should be more peculiarly liable to taxation, for the purpose of liquidating the debt occasioned by the war, than other income or property which was comparatively unaffected by it.

The war was undertaken and carried on for the defence of property; and it is not unjust that the expense attending it should fall, in a considerable degree, upon the property which was defended.

The propriety of rescinding the law which renders it necessary for members of parliament to vacate their scats upon

acceptance of office, will, no doubt, be speedily brought under the consideration of the House of Commons. The reform ministry early foresaw the inconvenience of popular elections, and had resolved to obviate it by a provision which would have, in a certain degree, relieved them from subjection to the caprice of the mob; but in the hurry and bustle attendant upon the great measure, this important matter was overlooked, and they have since experienced, to their cost, the galling and ignominious bondage to popular tyranny which they have taken in exchange for the regulated liberty of the old constitution. An effort will, therefore, undoubtedly be made to emancipate the king's government from this degrading servitude, which threatens in no long time to put the royal prerogative into complete abeyance, and to convert those who ought to be servants appointed by the king, into keepers appointed by the people.

The government have already felt that the national interest must suffer, unless some remedy be found for this great evil. A man's moral or intellectual fitness for some great post is, as things stand at present, but a small portion of his qualification to fill it. He must, in addition, possess popularity to outstrip all competitors who may contend with him for the "most sweet" voices of the rabble, and wealth to stand the tug of a contested election. And the public business can never be efficiently carried on when the question is, not who ought to be appointed to places of high trust, but who can consent to take them.

We doubt not that the present House of Commons will agree in the propriety of adopting some proposition to the effect that we have supposed. In the first place, they are all individually interested in being relieved, upon the acceptance of office, from the expense and the turmoil of a contested election and, as little can it be doubted that the national welfare demands that the public should not be altogether dependent upon the services of those alone who may at all times be able to command the suffrages of a multitudinous constituency. The law in question was passed at a time when the royal prerogative was not a mere name, and when the House of Lords was permitted to exercise more than a sem

VOL. III.

blance of independence. It was passed at a time when the House of Commons might, not unnaturally, feel some jealousy of those who were appointed by a powerful monarch to the exercise of some high trust, and who might be suspected of a leaning in favour of an unconstitutional exercise of that authority from which they derived their emoluments and their grandeur. It was passed at a time when members of the lower house might naturally aspire, by a course of faithful service, to a seat in the House of Lords, and in whom, therefore, the acceptance of office naturally implied an elevation above the ordinary range of popular sympathies, which in some measure amounted to a presumptive incompetency to represent the feelings or the wishes of the people. But all this is now changed. Of whom have the reformed House of Commons to be afraid? Not surely of a reed shaken by the wind. Of whom have they to be jealous? Not surely of what was formerly considered the co-ordinate branch of the legislature, but all the substantial power of which has already passed away. So far from members of the House of Commons now aspiring to be members of the House of Lords, we are persuaded the time is not far distant when members of the House of Lords will wish, in vain, for seats in the House of Commons. The other house has, in fact, as things stand at present, become omnipotent; and it would be the silliest affectation to pretend to feel either jealousy or alarm at the ghosts of its former rivals. The ground is, therefore, taken from under the old enactment. The House of Commons may now boldly say, "Who's afraid ?" It needs not those checks which were formerly deemed necessary to prevent the apprehended encroachments of regal or aristocratic influence and it will not, we may be well assured, be disposed to convert what was intended to be a protection against the evil designs of others, into a species of penal enactment against itself.

We may, therefore, presume that it will not require a great deal of plausibility to persuade the honourable members of the lower house, that their acceptance of office does not imply any forfeiture of the confidence of those by whom they have been elected. Indeed, every one must admit that the

C

old provision should be abrogated, unless there be those who would seriously maintain that the government should be placed in the hands of those only who represent the feelings and the wishes of the very lowest of the people. None such, we take it for granted, can as yet be found in sufficient numbers to make any serious opposition to such a measure, if it should, in good earnest, be proposed; and the ministers have only to adopt it, and evince their determination to carry it through, in order to command the suffrage of every individual who is disposed to leave his most gracious majesty the semblance of authority or independence.

But there is an alternative, (and one that we should be disposed to prefer, although, it may be, not a great many of the honourable members would agree with us,) namely, to give the ministers of the king, whoever they may be, whether members of parliament or not, seats in the House of Commons, with a power of proposing and discussing all such matters as may come before the legislature, but without the power of voting, unless they should be bonâ fide representatives of the people. We see not, we confess, why the king should be, as he is at present, limited in his choice of those who are to assist him by their counsel. The changes which have taken place have deprived him of any direct or indirect influence in the election of members to serve in the House of Commons; and it would be rather strange to maintain that an assembly constituted as that house now is, should be the only body from amongst whom he is to be permitted to select his constitutional advisers.

We are aware that his majesty would find it more convenient to be represented in the House of Commons by those who can vote as well as speak, than by other individuals who could only have a voice without a vote in their deliberations; and we are therefore of opinion, that the power for which we contend would not be very frequently exercised. Our measure would include all that is desirable in the other, and at the same time make provision for possible cases, in which the wisdom or the eloquence of individuals, who might not possess the means of access to the House of Commons, should be made available for the

service of the country. If such cases should not occur, the privilege would remain a dead letter; and if they did, the proper exercise of it must surely be considered a national advantage.

It was admitted, even by the strongest opponents of the borough system, that it possessed this advantage, namely, that of sending into the House of Commons a number of talented men, whose untried abilities would never have recommended them to numerous democratic constituencies. The names of Chatham, and Pitt, and Burke, and Fox, and Windham, and Sheridan, and a host of others, are too familiar to our readers to be enlarged on by us; and those who bore them would, in all probability, have remained to the present day utterly unknown as public men, had they not obtained an access to the legislature by that avenue which has now been closed for ever. Would it not, therefore, be desirable that the king should be invested with a power of exercising, in a certain limited extent, this privilege which has been taken from the nobles, and presenting occasionally to his parliament, in the persons of his ministers, individuals who might be found, upon proof, capable of rendering him and their country good service? It appears to us a very obvious mode of mitigating the evil which has been caused by the sweeping abolition of the boroughs, and the adoption of which could not possibly be attended with any danger.

The most plausible objection to our proposal is, we imagine, an apprehended want of sympathy between parliament, and a ministry composed of those who might not be "bonâ fide" members. But it is not to be presumed that his majesty would not exercise a sound discretion in the choice of his advisers, and therefore no such want of sympathy need be feared. If he be indiscreet in his ministerial appointments, that indiscretion may be manifested in the selection of obnoxious individuals, who are, as well as those who are not members of the House of Commons. And if he be prudent, he will take good care not to shock the prejudices of that assembly by any appointment which he has not good reason to believe will be found, in its results, acceptable to the country.

The functions of the House of Commons may be said to be two-fold, le

gislative and demonstrative. It assists in the enactment of laws, and it also discusses and declares the grounds upon which they are enacted. Now an individual may be fully competent to assist in the one office, who yet may not be called upon to exercise the others; and that a minister should possess a privilege of debating, without a power of deciding on any matter which might come before the legislature, does not imply a mutilation of character, but a separation of duties. Under the borough system, the same individuals were called upon to do both; and no one has ever yet attempted successfully to shew that that system, however theoretically objectionable, was really injurious. But that for which we contend, namely, that simple and initiatory and discussional powers should be conferred upon individuals invested with ministerial responsibility, would not be even theoretically objectionable, while it would realize many of the solid advantages which the most violent opponents of the nomination boroughs never denied to belong to them.

It will, we know, be said by some practical men, that an education in the House of Commons is absolutely indispensable for a British minister; that no man can command the attention of the house but one who has had the training of an expert debater; and that, however well informed, and however highly gifted any individual may be, if he has not been long familiarised to the stormy discussions of a popular assembly, it would be idle to expect that he should exercise any important influence over its deliberations. In all this there is much truth ;--and we are disposed, on that account, to think that members of parliament would, generally speaking, constitute the ministers of the crown. Our dissent goes only thus far, that the House of Commons is not the only school for the formation of an able speaker. It is a very good school, we grant. It is the very school in which it is most desirable that a statesman should receive his political education. But in a country like this, there are great facilities for developing and disciplining the discussional powers; and of these highly gifted individuals would, no doubt, largely avail themselves, if they thought that by so doing any opportunity would

be afforded them of benefiting the country. We believe that many individuals who were and are eminent in the House of Commons, had very little to learn in the art of speaking when they entered that assembly. Pitt's first speech and first reply had, we believe, all the point, finish, and dexterity which characterised his most successful efforts at any subsequent period; and his rapid elevation to the office of prime minister could not be ascribed to any habits which he had acquired in an assembly of which he was almost the very youngest member. Our proposal, it must be remembered, does not require of his majesty to choose as his ministers those who are not parliament men. It merely enlarges the sphere of his choice, and permits him to select as his advisers those whom he may have good reason to believe to be fit men, although they may not be members of parliament. If his ministers, whoever they may be, are incapable of bearing their part in the wordy contest, they cannot maintain their ground; and if they be able to maintain their ground, it can be of very little consequence whether their competency was acquired within or without the walls of St. Stephen's.

It may be said, that the presence of individuals in the House of Commons, who would be only known as the representative of majesty, might have a tendency to overawe that assembly This would be an objection directly the opposite of the last, and, as we think, even more untenable. It assumes, that such ministers would have too little power the other, that they would have too much. But the time when such an apprehension could be reasonably entertained, has gone by for ever. In the present state of our legislature, the king of the English much less resembles Gulliver in Lilliput than Gulliver in Brobdignag. His power is much more permissive than absolute, and both he and every one else knows that if he pushed it beyond its proper limits, it would not be for one moment endured. We repeat it, therefore, that the time when such an apprehension could be reasonably entertained, has gone by for ever. Can the same be said of the contrary apprehension? If no sane individual can now maintain that the House of Commons has reason to fear the power of the