DISSERTATION II.

ON THE

PROVINCES OF THE DRAMA.

IN the former Essay, I gave an idea, or slight sketch, of Universal Poetry. In this, I attempt to deduce the laws of one of its kinds, the Dramatic, under all its forms. And I engage in this task, the rather, because, though much has been said on the subject of the drama, writers seem not to have taken sufficient pains to distinguish, with exactness, its several species.

I deduce the laws of this poem, as I did those of poetry at large, from the consideration of its end: not the general end of poetry, which alone was proper to be considered in the former case, but the proximate end of

this kind. For from these ends, in subordi nation to that, which governs the genus, or which all poetry, as such, designs and prosecutes, are the peculiar rules and maxims of each species to be derived.

THE PURPOSE OF THE DRAMA is, universally, "to represent human life in the way of "action." But as such representation is made for separate and distinct ENDS, it is, further, distinguished into different species, which we know by the names of TRAGEDY, COMEDY, and FARCE.

By TRAGEDY, then, I mean that species of dramatic representation, whose end is "to excite the passions of PITY and TERROR, and perhaps some others, nearly allied to them."

By COMEDY that, which proposeth, for the ends of its representation, "the sensation of pleasure arising from a view of the truth of CHARACTERS, more especially their specific differences."

By FARCE I understand, that species of the drama, "whose sole aim and tendency is to excite LAUGHTER."

The idea of these three species being then proposed, let us now see, what conclusions be drawn from it. And chiefly in respect may of Tragedy and Comedy, which are most important. For as For as to what concerns the province of Farce, this will be easily understood, when the character of the other two is once settled.

CHAP.I

ON THE PROVINCES OF TRAGEDY AND

COMEDY.

FROM the idea of these two species, as given above, the following conclusions, about the natures of each, are immediately deducible.

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1. If the proper end of TRAGEDY be to affect, it follows, "that actions, not characters, are the chief object of its representations.” For that which affects us most in the view of human life is the observation of those signal circumstances of felicity or distress, which occur in the fortunes of men. But felicity and distress, as the great critic takes notice, depend on action; xard Tas pages, saleoves, ἢ τεναντίον.

Tevavríov. They are then the calamitous events, or fortunate Issues in human action, which stir up the stronger affections, and agitate the heart with Passion. The manners are not, indeed, to be neglected. But they become an inferior consideration in the views of the tragic poet, and are exhibited only for the sake of making the action more proper to interest us. Thus our joy, on the happy

catastrophe of the fable, depends, in a good degree, on the virtuous character of the agent; as on the other hand, we sympathize more strongly with him, on a distressful issue. The manners of the several persons in the drama must, also, be signified, that the action, which in many cases will be determined by them, may appear to be carried on with truth and probability. Hence every thing passing before us, as we are accustomed to see it in real life, we enter more warmly into their interests, as forgetting, that we are attentive to a fictitious scene. And, besides, from knowing the personal good, or ill, qualities of the agents, we learn to anticipate their future felicity or misery, which gives increase to the passion in either case. Our acquaintance with IAGO's close villainy makes us tremble for Othello and Desdemona beforehand: and HAMLET'S filial piety and intrepid daring occasion the audience secretly to exult in the expectation of some successful vengeance to be inflicted on the incestuous murderers.

2. For the same reason as tragedy takes for its object the actions of men, it, also, prefers, or rather confines itself to, such actions, as are most important. Which is only saying, that as it intends to interest, it, of course,