at all," that is, neither directly by God, nor indirectly by any thing related to him. This interpretation is greatly confirmed, by a paffage in the twenty-third chapter of the fame gofpel, where a fimilar diftinction, made by the Scribes and Pharifees, is replied to in the fame manner.

3. Our Saviour himself being" adjured by the "living God," to declare whether he was the Chrift, the fon of God, or not, condefcended to anfwer the high priest, without making any objection to the oath, (for fuch it was) upon which he examined him. "God is my witness," fays St. Paul to the Romans, "that without ceafing, I make "mention of you in my prayers:" And to the Corinthians ftill more strongly, "I call God for a re"cord upon my foul, that to fpare you, I came not as "yet to Corinth." Both thefe expreffions contain the nature of oaths. The epiftle to the Hebrews fpeaks of the custom of fwearing judicially, without any mark of cenfure or difapprobation : "Men verily "fwear by the greater, and an oath, for confirma❝tion, is to them an end of all ftrife."

Upon the ftrength of these reasons, we explain our Saviour's words to relate, not to judicial oaths, but to the practice of vain, wanton, and unauthorized fwearing, in common difcourfe. St. James's words, chap. v. 12, are not fo ftrong as our Saviour's, and therefore admit the fame explanation with more ease.

IV. Oaths are nugatory, that is, carry with them no proper force or obligation, unless we believe, that God will punish false swearing with more feverity than a fimple lie, or breach of promise; for which belief there are the following reafons:

1. Perjury is a fin of greater deliberation. The Juror has the thoughts of God and of religion upon his mind at the time; at leaft, there are very few who can fhake them off entirely. He offends, therefore, if he do offend, with a high hand, in the

face,

face, that is, in defiance of the fanctions of religi on. His offence implies a difbelief or contempt of God's knowledge, power and juftice, which cannot be faid of a lie, where there is nothing to carry the mind to any reflection upon the Deity, or the divine attributes at all.

2. Perjury violates a fuperior confidence. Mankind must truft to one another; and they have nothing better to truft to than one another's oath. Hence legal adjudications, which govern and affect every right and intereft on this fide the grave, of neceffity proceed and depend upon oaths. Perjury, therefore, in its general confequence, ftrikes at the fecurity of reputation, property and even of life itself. A lie cannot do the fame mischief, because the fame credit is not given to it,*

3. God directed the Ifraelites to swear by his name; and was pleased, " in order to fhow the "immutability of his own council," ‡ to confirm his covenant with that people by an oath: neither of which it is probable he would have done, had he not intended to reprefent oaths, as having fome meaning and effect, beyond the obligation of a bare promise; which effect must be owing to the severe punishment, with which he will vindicate the authority of oaths.

V. Promiffory oaths are not binding, where the promise itself would not be fo: for the feveral cafes of which, fee the Chapter of Promises.

VI. As oaths are defigned for the fecurity of the impofer, it is manifeft they must be interpreted, and performed in the fenfe in which the impofer intends them; otherwife, they afford no fecurity to him. And this is the meaning and reason of the

* Except, indeed, where a Quaker's or Moravian's affirmation is accepted in the place of an oath; in which cafe, a lie partakes, fo far as this reafon extends, of the nature and guilt of perjury.

+ Deut. vi. 13. x. 20.

Heb. vi. 17.

rule,

rule, "jurare in animum imponentis;" which rule the reader is defired to carry along with him, whilft we proceed to confider certain particular oaths, which are, either of greater importance, or more likely to fall in our way than others.

T

OATH IN EVIDENCE.'

HE witnefs (wears, to fpeak the truth, the "whole truth, and nothing but the truth, "touching the matter in question."

Upon which it may be obferved, that the defigned concealment of any truth, which relates to the matter in agitation, is as much a violation of the oath, as to teftify a pofitive falfehood; and this, whether the witnefs be interrogated to that particular point or not. For when the perfon to be examined is fworn upon a voir dire, that is, in order to inquire, whether he ought to be admitted to give evidence in the caufe at all, the form runs thus: "You fhall true answer make to all fuch queftions "as fhall be asked you;" but, when he comes to be fworn in chief, he fwears, "to fpeak the whole

truth," without reftraining it, as before, to the queftions that fhall be afked: which difference fhews, that the law intends, in this latter case, to require of the witnefs, that he give a complete and unreferved account of what he knows of the fubject of the trial, whether the queftions propofed to him reach the extent of his knowledge or not. So that if it be inquired of the witness afterwards, why he did not inform the court fo and fo, it is not a

fufficient,

fufficient, though a very common answer to say, "because it was neyer asked me."

I know but one exception to this rule; which is, when a full difcovery of the truth tends to accufe the witness himself of fome legal crime. The law of England constrains no man to become his own accuser; confequently, impofes the oath of teftimony with this tacit refervation. But the exception mult be confined to legal crimes. A point of honour, of delicacy, or of reputation, may make a witnefs backward to disclose fome circumftance with which he is acquainted; but will in no wife juftify his concealment of the truth, unless it could be fhewn, that the law which impofes the oath, intended to allow this indulgence to fuch motives. The exception is alfo withdrawn by compact between the magiftrare and the witness, when an accomplice is admitted to give evidence against the partners of his crime.

Tenderness to the prifoner, although a fpecious apology for concealment, is no juft excufe; for if this plea be thought fufficient, it takes the adminif tration of penal juftice out of the hands of judges and juries, and makes it depend upon the temper of profecutors and witneffes.

Questions may be afked which are irrelative to the cause, which affect the witnefs himfelf, or some third person; in which, and in all cafes, where the witnefs doubts of the pertinency and propriety of the question, he ought to refer his doubts to the court. The anfwer of the court, in relaxation of the oath, is authority enough to the witness: for the law which impofes the oath may remit what it will of the obligation; and it belongs to the court to declare what the mind of the law is. Nevertheless, it cannot be faid univerfally, that the anfwer of the court is conclufive upon the confcience of the witnefs: for his obligation depends upon what he apprehended, at the time of taking the oath, to be the design of the law in impofing it;

and

and no after requifition or explanation by the court, can carry the obligation beyond that

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I B

DO fincerely promise, and fwear, that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to his Majefty King GEORGE." Formerly the oath of allegiance ran thus: "I do promife to be true and "faithful to the King and his heirs, and truth and faith to bear, of life, and limb, and terrene ho

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nour; and not to know or hear of any ill or "damage intended him, without defending him "therefrom;" and was altered at the Revolution to the present form. So that the present oath is a relaxation of the old one. And as the oath was intended to ascertain, not fo much the extent of the fubject's obedience, as the perfon to whom it was due, the legislature feems to have wrapped up its meaning upon the former point, in a word purpofely made choice of for its general and indeterminate fignification,

It will be moft convenient to confider, firft, what the oath excludes, as inconfiftent with it; fecondly, what it permits.

1. The oath excludes all intention to fupport the claim or pretenfions of any other perfon or perfons, to the crown and government, than the reigning fovereign. A Jacobite, who is perfuaded of the Pretender's right to the crown, and who moreover defigns to join with the adherents of that caufe, to affert this right, whenever a proper opportunity, with a reasonable profpect of fuccefs, prefents it

felf,