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MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

BOOK V.

DUTIES TOWARDS GO D.

С НА Р. I.

IN

DIVISION OF THESE DUTIES.

N one fenfe, every duty is a duty towards God, fince it is his will which makes it a duty but there are fome duties of which God is the object, as well as the author; and these are peculiarly, and in a more appropriated fenfe called duties towards God.

That filent piety, which confifts in a habit of tracing out the Creator's wifdom and goodness in the objects around us, or in the hiftory of his dif penfations; of referring the bleffings we enjoy to his bounty, and of reforting in our diftreffes to his

I

fuccour,

fuccour, may poffibly be more acceptable to the Deity, than any visible expreffions of devotion whatever. Yet thefe latter, which, although they may be excelled, are not fuperfeded by the former, compofe the only part of the fubject which admits of direction or difquifition from a moralist.

Our duty towards God, fo far as it is external, is divided into worship and reverence. God is the immediate object of both: and the difference between them is, that the one confifts in action, the other in forbearance. When we go to church on the Lord's day, led thither by a sense of duty towards God, we perform an act of worship: when, from the fame motive, we reft in a journey upon that day, we discharge a duty of reverence.

Divine worship is made up of adoration, thankf giving, and prayer. But, as what we have to offer concerning the two former may be obferved of prayer, we shall make that the title of the following chapters, and the direct fubject of our confideration.

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СНА Р. II.

THE

OF THE DUTY AND OF THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER, SO FAR AS THE SAME APPEAR FROM LIGHT OF NATURE.

WHEN one man defires to obtain any thing

of another, he betakes himself to intreaty: and this may be observed of mankind in all ages and countries of the world. Now what is univerfal, may be called natural; and it seems probable, that God, as our fupreme governor, fhould expect that towards himself, which, by natural impulfe, or by the irresistible order of our conftitution, he has prompted us to pay to every other being on whom we depend.

The fame may be faid of thanksgiving.

Again, prayer is neceffary to keep up in the minds of mankind a fenfe of God's agency in the univerfe, and of their own dependency upon him.

But after all, the duty of prayer depends upon its efficacy for I confefs myself unable to conceive, how any man can pray, or be obliged to pray, who expects nothing from his prayers; but who is perfuaded at the time he utters his request, that it cannot poffibly produce the smalleft impreffion upon the Being to whom it is addreffed, or advantage to himself. Now the efficacy of prayer imports, that we obtain fomething in confequence of praying, which we fhould not have received without prayer; against all expectation of which, the following objection has been often and seriously alleged. "If it be moft agreeable to perfect wifdom "and juftice, that we fhould receive what we de

" fire,

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"fire, God, as perfectly wife and juft, will "give it to us without afking; if it be not agree"able to these attributes of his nature, our intrea"ties cannot move him to give it us; and it were "impious to expect they fhould." In fewer words, thus; "If what we request be fit for us, we shall "have it without praying; if it be not fit for us, we cannot obtain it by praying." This objection admits but of one anfwer, namely, that it may be agreeable to perfect wisdom, to grant that to our prayers, which it would not have been agreeable to the same wisdom to have given us without praying for. But what virtue, you will afk, is there in prayer, which fhould make a favour confiftent with wisdom, which would not have been fo without it? To this queftion, which contains the whole difficulty attending the fubject, the following poffibilities are offered in reply.

1. A favour granted to prayer may be more apt, on that very account, to produce good effects upon the perfon obliged. It may hold in the divine bounty, what experience has raised into a proverb in the collation of human benefits, that what is obtained without asking, is ofttimes received without gratitude.

2. It may be confiftent with the wisdom of the Deity to withhold his favours till they be asked for, as an expedient to encourage devotion in his rational creation, in order thereby to keep up and circulate a knowledge and fenfe of their dependency upon bim.

3. Prayer has a natural tendency to amend the petitioner himself, and thus to bring him within the rules, which the wisdom of the Deity has prescribed to the difpenfation of his favours.

If thefe, or any other affignable fuppofitions, ferve to remove the apparent repugnancy between the fuccefs of prayer and the character of the Deity, it is enough for the question with the petitioner is not

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from

from which, out of many motives, God may grant his petition, or in what particular manner he is moved by the fupplications of his creatures; but whether it be confiftent with his nature to be moved at all, and whether there be any conceivable motives, which may difpofe the divine will to grant the petitioner what he wants, in confequence of his praying for it. It is fufficient for the petitioner that he gain his end. It is not neceffary to devotion, perhaps not very confiftent with it, that the circuit of causes, by which his prayers prevail, fhould be known to the petitioner, much less that they fhould be present to his imagination at the time. All that is neceffary is, that there be no impoffibility apprehended in the

matter.

Thus much must be conceded to the objection; that prayer cannot reasonably be offered to God with all the fame views, with which we oftentimes address our intreaties to men (views which are not commonly or easily separated from it), viz. to inform them of our wants or defires; to tease them out by importunity; to work upon their indolence or compaffion, in order to perfuade them to do what they ought to have done before, or ought not to do at all.

But fuppofe there exifted a prince, who was known by his fubjects to act, of his own accord, always and invariably for the beft; the fituation of a petitioner, who folicited a favour or pardon from fuch a prince, would fufficiently resemble ours: and the queftion with him, as with us, would be, whether, the character of the prince being confidered, there remained any chance that he fhould obtain from him by prayer, what he fhould not have received without it. I do not conceive, that the character of fuch a prince would neceffarily exclude the effect of his fubjects' prayers; for when that prince reflected, that the earneftuels and humility of the fupplication had generated in the fuppliant a frame of mind, upon which the pardon or favour asked, would

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