only a student of the great problems of existence. I have read with attention Broussais, Cabinis, and others of that school, and have partially, but as present less attentively, read works on physio-psychology on the other sid Dr. B. Do they give no evidence on the question?

L When a question is put to me on a matter of fact capable of verific tion, and when the total of my knowledge is derived from other men whose accuracy I have not tested, I decline to put forward their statements a evidence until after I have examined them, and I admit my own ignorano and at once say I am not prepared to answer.

Dr. B. Are you yourself ignorant on that, the vital point of the whole. L If by the word "that" you mean am I ignorant of the precise lesion, or of the special mode of destruction of man's organisation, by the withdrawal of air-I am: except that I have already told you that it would vary with his age, temperament, health, and the particular circumstances of the case.

Dr. B. Then as you are unable to give an answer on the vital point of your own system, I shall come to the nature of man. Is man a responsible being?

L. I do not know to whom you wish to imply that he is responsible, and at present do not answer your question.

Dr. B. To whom is man responsible?

I. I do not know that he is responsible to any one.

Dr. B. Then if a man commit adultery is he responsible to no one? I. If by responsibility you mean does the commission of an immorality tend to misery, yes: if you mean more than that, no.

Dr. B. Is he not responsible to the husband?

I. One must have the whole of the circumstances to say yes or no. Suppose a husband were unkind to his wife, that he turned her into the street for the basest of purposes, would your question apply to such a husband?

Dr. B. Is he responsible to a good and kind husband?

I. If by responsible you mean, should a good husband take measures to prevent the commission of adultery, yes: if more, what do you mean?

Dr. B. After the act of adultery is he responsible to a good and kind husband?

I. As you have given no further explanation of what you mean by responsibility, I have no further answer to give.

Dr. B. I mean responsibility in its common, popular sense.

I. You and I disagree as to the common, popular sense of words; give me your definition of the word responsibility.

Dr. B. Do you refuse to answer the question?

I. If you refuse to define the word responsibility, yes.

Dr. B. What do you suppose will all sane persons judge of your refusal? I. That you did not find it convenient to define the word you used, and that I was not foolish enough to answer a question until we both agreed upon its meaning.

Dr. B. Has the husband a right to inflict any punishment on the adulterer?

I. I do not understand what you mean by a right, but if a man were to rob me of that which I prize more than all the world besides, then if I came upon him in hot blood, in the excitement of passion, I should probably kill him, because my passions might be stronger than my reason. If I came on him when my passion had cooled, I cannot so certainly speak as to the result. Others might be of stronger organisation, others again of weaker frame, and their conduct would necessarily vary.

Dr. B. Has society a right to punish the adulterer?

I. Society is bound to do that which will prevent the commission of

immoral deeds. Punishment should only be preventive of future crime, not vengeance for that which has passed.

Dr. B. Has society a right to punish evil doers?

I. If the punishment tends to prevent the recurrence of immoral deeds, yes; if purely retributive vengeance, no; thus I object to the punishment of death as a mere revenge, but if the punishment be reformation, yes; thus I assent to the reformatories established for the better education and conversion of criminals into useful citizens.

Dr. B. If society have a right to inflict any sort of punishment, is a man so far responsible to society?

I. If by responsibility to society you mean that every citizen should contribute to the well-being of society, and aid in the prevention of crime, yes; but if more, no.

Dr. B. Then if any sort of responsibility exist, is not one man responsible to other men?

I. If by responsibility you mean as already defined, yes; further than that, no.

Dr. B. In an important sense is not one man responsible to another?

I. Define what you mean by an important sense, and then I will answer. Dr. B. Then in your own sense of the word responsibility, is not man responsible to his fellow men?

I. My own sense shuts out responsibility; therefore, no.

Dr. B. If a man be known to be an adulterer, is he morally responsible to others?

I. If by morally responsible you mean should men and women take such a course as should prevent the repetition of his adulteries, yes; if

more, no.

Dr. B. Then might he be admitted to society, but only well watched? I. I should not admit an adulterer to the society of my wife or my daughter. Dr. B. Why not; if you watched him well?

I. My reason is that I would not give him a chance of producing immorality and misery in my family. I should also discountenance his immorality. Dr. B. Then is not there a right of severe punishment in society-viz., the exclusion of the immoral from the moral?

I. I am not certain of your use of the term right in society. If you mean has society the right to prevent immorality, to reform the immoral, and to train them for better, to remove them from vicious conditions, and to substitute better conditions? then, yes; it more, no.

Dr. B. Is exclusion from society a severe punishment? Yes or no,

I. From some society, yes; from other society, no.

Dr. B. Is exclusion from moral society a severe punishment?

I. To a man who desires to be in moral society, yes.

Dr. B. Then has not moral society the duty of inflicting severe punishment?

I. If by that you mean has not moral society the duty of excluding men who desire to be moral, no.

Dr. B. Has not moral society the duty of inflicting severe punishment by excluding the immoral?

I. It is the duty of the State to take every means to change the desire for immorality into a desire for morality, and this if necessary by exclusion. Dr. B. Would not that be a severe punishment?

I. No; it would be a great good.

Dr. B. Is not the agency employed a punishment?

I. It depends on the nature of the agency: if punitive, yes; if not, no. Dr. B. Is exclusion from moral society no punishment?

I. It is a punishment in so far as it is attended with disadvantage to the man excluded.

Dr. B. What does Atheism teach about marriage?

I. It teaches that if a man take a woman he is bound to do everything that a man can for their mutual happiness, also the woman for the man. It teaches that the man and the woman should be thoughtful before marriage to see that they have a mutually suitable organisation; that they shou endeavour to thoroughly understand and appreciate each other; that the man and woman have equal rights and duties, that, on the whole, the man is not inferior to the woman, that the woman is not inferior to the man, but in the speciality of each there is much that the other cannot do.

Dr. B. If their organisation be unsuitable, may they separate at will? I. If they both be of opinion that their continued union would tend to misery, it would be better for them to separate than to live in strife and unhappiness; and that is a principle now fully recognised in the tendency of our present legislation.

Dr. B. May a man marry more wives than one?

I. Not at a time.

Dr. B. May you marry more wives than one during the lifetime of the other wife?

I. I should not do so.

Dr. B. Is not that shuffling and evading the question?

I. No; and you know it is not.

[The Chairman here rose, and first rebuking Dr. Baylee for the personal nature of the question, also rebuked "Iconoclast" for saying that Dr. Baylee knew.]

I. Mr. Chairman, I repeat my answer, I spoke earnestly on the question, for I have a dear wife whom I love, and little ones whom I strive for. I detest polygamy, and my sincerity of manner should have affirmed that detestation. Dr. B.

What law is broken by polygamy?

I. As far as my limited experience is concerned, I find that polygamy tends to demoralise and weaken the states in which it is allowed.

Dr. B. If a man be responsible to society, may he not be to a superior power?

I. I have not admitted that man is responsible, and as you avoided giving a definition of the word I cannot answer the question.

Dr. B. Why do you believe that like could not produce unlike?

I. I do not believe on that subject at all. I affirmed that things which had nothing in common with each other could not be conceived in relation to each other, could not be the cause of, or affect one another.

Dr. B. Is thought like a nerve?

I. Not being aware that thought is an entity, or even a mode of entity, I cannot compare them.

Dr. B. What did you say last evening was the fundamental axiom against a belief in Theism?

I. I quoted more than one axiom, but the one to which I presume you specially allude is that-things which have nothing in common with each other, cannot be conceived by means of one another, or in relation to each other.

Dr. B. Has thought or thinking any relation to the cerebral system? I. The axiom referred to things. I am not aware that thought is a thing.

Dr. B. Is thought a result of organisation?

I. Thought is a result never found without organisation.

Dr. B. Has it no relation to organisation?

I. If by relation you mean do we often find thought in connection with organisation, yes: if more, tell me what you mean?

Dr. B. Can intelligence result from non-intelligence?

I. I know of a quality or compound of qualities which I call intelligence, but have no knowledge of a quality called non-intelligence, and therefore

cannot answer.

Dr. B. Is a cabbage stalk non-intelligent?

I. If you mean has a cabbage the power of thinking, I have no evidence of such a capability.

Dr. B. Do you think there may be evidence that a cabbage stalk can think?

I. I never thought about it.

Dr. B. Would it be absurd to expect to find a thinking cabbage stalk? I. I should think it absurd.

Dr. B. Has a cabbage an organisation?

I. Do you mean an imperfect cabbage stalk, or a perfect cabbage?

Dr. B. Has a perfect cabbage an organisation?

I. It has such organisation as I always find in the vegetable cabbage. Dr. B. Then thinking is not a quality of organisation?

I. Of some organisation, yes: I never found it in connection with vegetable organisation.

Dr. B. What is life?

I. I do not know; it is a subject which I am investigating. Some of the phenomena of life have been solved by others, some I hope in time to solve myself, and if successful, may be able to tell you then what life is. Dr. B. What becomes of you when you die?

I. As I have never died, I cannot answer the question.

Dr. B. As my hour is now so nearly up, instead of asking you any further questions, and as you are trying so hard to find what is life, let me close by telling you and this meeting where to find life:

"He that hath the Son hath life, and he that hath not the Son of God hath not life."-1 John, v., v. 12.

I. And I answer to your last remark that you will best solve the great problem of life by studying the conditions of existence, and imparting them to others; the secret of true happiness and wisdom consisting in making others happy and wise

APPENDIX.

Permission on both sides to publish. Meeting at 18, Dale Street, Liverpool, June 30th, 1860.

MEMORANDUM.

Present: The Rev. W. Binns, the Rev. Joseph Baylee, D.D., and Charles Bradlaugh, agree as follows:

1. The Rev. Joseph Baylee, D.D., will, as early as possible, according to the condition, forward to Mr. Bradlaugh a copy of the questions and answers in the late debate.

2. Mr. Bradlaugh shall, as early as possible, say within eight days from such receipt, inform Dr. Baylee of any disagreement in such questions and answers.

3. That if either party publish the debate, or if both parties shall do so, then they shall, where they disagree, give both versions of the questions and answers; but, as it is quite possible that during the excitement of debate mistakes may have occurred on either side, no dishonesty shall be imputed on either side.

WILLIAM BINNS, Chairman.
CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
JOSEPH BAYLEE.

[JULY 30TH.-Dr. Baylee never did forward to me any copy of the questions and answers before printing them as agreed. He forwarded to me the printer's proof of the first two hours only; and I never saw the complete printed edition until it was issued for public sale. There are many slight and some material differences between his report and mine; some few I notice in the Appendix, but critical readers had better buy both reports.]

To the answer to the question-" Was I in existence before I was born?" Dr. Baylee has since appended the following note:

66 Birth is not a creation, but a pro-creation. In the sense of giving existence, the Bible teaches us of but one act of creating:-'In the beginning God created the Heaven and the Earth'" (Gen. i., 1).

To the next question he also adds the following:

"This and the preceding question involve the whole doctrine of original sin. If our parents did not create us, we must have existed in our parents before we were born. Levi was yet in the loins of his father when Melchizedek met him' (Heb. vii., 10). Levi therefore did what Abraham did:•Levi paid tithes in Abraham '(Heb. vii, 9). Should any one ask-Have we any consciousness of having been thus in our parents?-the simple answer is an appeal to human ignorance, and also to analogy. What absurd reasoning it would be to deny the first year of our conscious existence and actions in this life, because not one of us has the smallest present consciousness of that period of our unknown existence."

[It is hardly necessary to comment on the terrible absurdity of the position laid down by the Rev. Dr. Baylee, which in fact amounts to the assertion that if Adam and Eve were the first parents of the human race.