Obrázky na stránke
PDF
ePub

ON RIGHT,

AS A QUALITY OF ACTIONS.

SECTION L

RIGHT may be distinguished into absolute and relative; the former referring to the nature of actions considered in themselves; the latter to actions, considered relatively to the principles and motives of the agent.

Those actions are absolutely right, which, under all the circumstances of the case, a perfectly wellinformed moral agent is morally obliged to perform. When an agent, determined to do his duty, is at a loss how he ought to act in a given instance, the object of his inquiry is the absolute right of actions.

Those actions are relatively right, which proceed from a conscientious principle of duty in the agent.

Hence the same action may be absolutely right and relatively wrong, and vice versa. Thus, if I relieve distress from a principle of humanity, the

action is both absolutely and relatively right; if that I may bind the man to my interest for some criminal purpose, the act is absolutely right and relatively wrong. The conduct of St. Paul, when he persecuted the Christians from a false notion of duty, was relatively right, and absolutely wrong.

SECTION II.

ABSOLUTE RIGHT.

I. In what does absolute right consist, or what is that in actions, which we approve?

1. Is it their tendency to promote the good of the agent?

2. Is it their general utility, or tendency to promote the greatest good of the whole?

3. Is it their conformity to the will of God? 4. Or, is it somewhat of which our idea is simple, and cannot be defined, a fitness, a propriety?

II. How do we become acquainted with this quality, or by what part of our constitution are we informed of it?

1. Is it by sympathy, according to A. Smith? 2. Is it by a moral sense, according to Hutchinson ?

3. Is it by the understanding, according to Price?

First, then, in what does absolute right consist? If absolute right be a tendency, according to the two first systems, it is evident, that it is by reason, guided by experience and observation, that we judge of the tendency of means to an end. The question then arises, how are we informed of the value of the end, that is, the ultimate end?

If the end be our own happiness, we learn its value from self-love. If the end be the general happiness, we learn its value either from the experience, that it gives us an agreeable feeling, or from perceiving somewhat excellent in the thing itself. That is, our idea of it is simple, and is either a feeling, or a perception of the understanding. If, according to the third system, right be a conformity to the will of God; conformity to a rule is judged of by the understanding. But the idea of right, though it may arise from this conformity, is distinct from it, and must depend either on the sanctions of the rule, and is to be referred to the first system; or, as in the second, be a simple idea; either a feeling, or a perception of the understanding.

Thus it will appear, that the knowledge of right must be founded either on an ultimate reference to

the happiness of the agent; or, if not, it is a feeling produced in us by certain actions; or it is a direct perception of the understanding of some excellence in actions, not to be defined.

The question will then arise, is the idea of right a mere feeling, resulting from an arbitrary constitution of our nature, whereby certain actions affect us in a particular way; or is it a perception of the understanding, discerning a quality really in actions, and which must be the same to every intelligent being, contemplating them under exactly the same circumstances, and perceiving precisely the same relations?

SECTION III.

ON THE THEORY OF SELF-LOVE, OR PRUDENCE.

Is right the tendency of actions to the highest good of the agent?

Some, considering virtue as distinct from this tendency, have yet resolved moral obligation into prudence; but there is no foundation practically for this distinction.

The argument for the theory under consideration is principally a priori, founded on the presump

« PredošláPokračovať »