RATIONAL PRINCIPLES. REGARD TO OUR OWN HAPPINESS ON THE WHOLE, MAN resembles the brutes in the possession of the appetites, and most of the desires and affections, already described. These do not necessarily tend to the good of the individual on the whole; but often to its destruction. He differs from them in SELf-love, which is not seen in the inferior animals or infants. Self-love is a rational principle. Its office is to provide for our good on the whole, by the regulation, balancing, and use of the primary appetites, desires, and affections. It is distinct from these, and subsequent to them in its operation. Those desires, which terminate in some good for ourselves, may be, and often are, inconsistent with rational self-love. It requires, on the contrary, the strongest exercise of the benevolent affections. Benevolence and self-love are equally important, the former to the individual, and the latter to society. For it is essential to society, that each individual should take a reasonable care of himself; and we accordingly approve such rational regard to one's self, and condemn the want of it. Selfishness is wholly distinct from, and opposed to, rational self-love; as tending to degrade us and destroy our happiness. It consists in an exclusive regard to that class of desires, which terminate in some good for ourselves. wrong. SENSE OF DUTY. WE perceive certain actions to be right; others, This perception is accompanied with a belief of obligation. This belief is a principle of action. Acting therefore from a regard to the rectitude of actions is acting from a sense of duty. This principle differs entirely from those already considered. It may be viewed as natural; since that may be called natural, which is developed, when its proper objects are presented. Almost every right action has its appropriate sentiment, which leads to its performance. These are subsidiary to a sense of duty; and the office of a sense of duty is to supply the defects of these, and to regulate or check their operation. It becomes then an important question; When are we to be actuated by these sentiments, and when by a sense of duty? In relation to the appetites; the sense of duty is the principle by which they are to be regulated; not a motive to their gratification. In regard to those actions, which may be performed from various motives, the sense of duty leads us to give a decided preference to the benevolent affections over those desires which terminate in our own good. Thus an act of beneficence done from the mere desire of esteem is but little approved. We are willing that there should be a general regard to the good opinion of others, but it must be a sort of condiment, rather than a substantial motive. In regard to the benevolent affections; the approved office of a sense of duty is rather to control, and if the case require, to restrain them, than to prompt to the actions which they naturally produce. Thus we should not approve so highly a parent or friend, who needed a sense of duty to lead him to perform kind offices. We should, on the contrary, prefer that a sense of duty should be called in to check the excess of fondness and partiality. On the other hand, in regard to those actions which cause pain to others, such as the infliction الله of punishment, they become objects of moral approbation solely in proportion as they proceed from a sense of duty. * * * * * PIETY. ALL the principles we have mentioned, may be considered as laws of God, as they are parts of the constitution he has given us, and obviously tend to the best ends. Piety is a sentiment implying certain feelings, as well as perceptions of the understanding. There have been two erroneous extremes respecting its nature. Some have considered it as a mere feeling; and others have explained it as a mere intellectual exercise. Piety, philosophically considered, is distinct from the preceding principles, even from a sense of duty. The sense of duty existed in the minds of Heathens without reference to the will of God. At the present day, however, with the light which Christians enjoy, piety enters into, sanctifies, and elevates all the principles of right action. It is founded in the natural sentiments of the heart. Our venerate. idea of the moral character of God is nothing but the perfection and union of all which we love and Benevolence, veracity, and justice are qualities agreeable to us from their very nature, as their opposites are odious; and power and wisdom, united with goodness, form the proper and peculiar object of the sentiment of veneration. Piety, therefore, is natural to man. SENSIBILITY to beauty is in some degree common to all; but it is infinitely varied, according as it has been cultivated by habit and education. To the man whose taste has been formed on just principles, and who has been led to perceive and relish what is truly beautiful, a new world is opened. He looks abroad over nature, and contemplates the productions of art, with sentiments, to which those, who are destitute of this faculty, are strangers. He perceives in the works of God, and in the contrivances of man, all the utility for which they were destined and adapted, in common with others; but besides this, his heart is filled with sentiments of the beautiful or the grand, accord |