he calls an 'abstraction', taking for a while a partial and limited view. It was impossible for him with his far-ranging vision to uphold in one department the contradictory of a proposition which he asserted in another, to maintain for instance that what was false in philosophy might be true in theology. For the same reason he was disposed to be impatient of the splitting up of philosophy into parts, considering that confusion lurked in the separation of logic and ethics from psychology, and in the consequent duplication of names for the same thing. Three other characteristics I will mention which seem to me to give a special value to all that Prof. Grote has written. He had, in the first place, a singular evovía, a moral sensitiveness quick and delicate to a most unusual degree. Few could be even slightly acquainted with him without being struck with this nobility of nature: o de TOLOÛTOs, as Aristotle says, ἢ ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως. It was the union of this fine sense of rectitude with sobriety of judgment and large-mindedness, a union rare in itself and still more rarely found in conjunction with speculative and analytical capacity, which led to his being much consulted in cases where it was difficult to discern the right line of conduct. The second characteristic which I will notice is one which is closely connected with the first, I mean his freshness of view: οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος, as Aristotle goes on, ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσει. While most of us in the course of years get embedded in an accumulation of other . people's ideas and vainly strive to penetrate to the native sentiment beneath, his mind remained a clear mirror reflecting back the forms of nature in their. original purity. Whatever he says has at least the merit of being genuine thought at first hand, not a mere repetition of what others have said or the imagination of what might be the right thing to say. This again is a part of his simplicity of nature, the naturalness which endeared him so much to friends, and which shines through all his writings. There is much in the chapter on Happiness, especially where it speaks of the enjoyment of simple pleasures, which will recall him to the memory of those who knew him. The homely scenery of Cambridge and Ely, the sight of the common wayside flowers, were to him the sources of as keen delight as Italy or the Alps are to others. His pocket-books contain a curious medley of philosophical jottings mixed up with notes on the songs and habits of birds and memoranda as to the wild plants seen in his walks. The third characteristic I have to mention is almost implied in what has been said already as to his large-mindedness: I refer to the fairness and freedom from prejudice which have been generally recognized by the reviewers of his former treatises. Like his brother, the historian, he had an almost fanatical love of freedom of thought, even when it took a form with which he could not himself sympathize. His bias, if he had one, was always in favour of the unpopular side, i. e. of the side, whichever it might be, which seemed to be in danger of being unfairly treated. These then are the merits I should especially claim for the Author whose speculations it is not less my privilege than my duty to bring before the public; fairness, freshness of thought, moral sensitiveness, consistency and yet breadth of view: and these I think must make his writings of import-. ance even to those who may be most inclined to dissent from the conclusions at which he arrives. It only remains for me to return my thanks to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for the liberal grant which they have made towards defraying the expenses of the present volume. CONTENTS. Eudæmonics, dealing with man from the side of his sentient nature, has for its axiom the existence of pain as a thing undesirable to suffer; aretaics, dealing with man from the side of activity, has for its axiom the Moral philosophy as an art referring to an ideal. Meaning of the term ideal: in what sense Moral Philosophy is ideal; shown in regard to the terms virtue, duty, happiness &c. Dis- tinction between the method of the inductive sciences and that to be followed here. Inconsistency of Bentham. Explanation of the term 'want.' Man's sentient nature gives rise to the ideal happiness, his active Want or egence is the starting point of action; may, or may not, be accompanied by the sense of want. Satisfaction of egence. Egence The summum faciendum, or rightness, answers the question, What · they are viewed in relation to self or otherwise. Various other ideals. The interpretation of one ideal by another is not necessarily an advance in knowledge: where it is so, there is a danger of confounding fact with PAGE The ideals are imaginations founded upon our sense of want, which informs us of something absent which may be made present. Besides this basis of fact, their reality is shown by the manner in which they influence the conduct of all, and by their consistency with the results of On the analogy between the intellectual and moral ideals. Dualism of perception. The communication between subject and object may be exhibited, as passive, in a scale of sensation, or as active, in a scale of intelligence. The corresponding moral scale illustrated in the case of pain. Truth, the intellectual ideal, appears in two forms, as the cogitandum or the ovτws ov; subordinate to these are the sub-ideals, that which is commonly believed, that which may be acted on. The moral ideals and sub-ideals correspond to these and are closely connected with them. Faith is needed alike for the apprehension of the moral The utilitarian view, that the moral value of an action is tested sim- ply by the resultant happiness, is the negation of the first moral ideal. The idea of good belongs to our active as well as to our sentient nature. Readiness to forego our own happiness (generosity) is as essential an element of moral value as the wish to promote the general happiness (usefulness). This shown by a consideration of man's active nature, of his conflicting interests, of the superiority of one part of his nature to another. Man does not act up to his nature if he confines his action to self. The morality of consequences may be either selfish or public- spirited. The latter is quite consistent with intuitive morality, but errs |