Obrázky na stránke
PDF
ePub

this, which is said, the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated."

Another controversy, bitter and undignified in character, which extended through a number of years almost to the time of his death, was a mathematical controversy with John Wallis, Savilian Professor of Geometry at Oxford. In this contest Hobbes met more than his match, and was undoubtedly defeated. Wallis, in his Elenchus and other writings, revealed the inconsistencies and fallacies involved in the mathematical reasoning of Hobbes. About a dozen works were brought forth by Hobbes in connection with this long and rather useless controversy.

In 1668 a Latin edition of his collected works was published in Amsterdam. In this edition the Leviathan was considerably modified. In 1675 an English translation of the Iliad and Odyssey was published by him. Another work belonging to this closing period of his life was the Behemoth: the History of the Causes of the Civil Wars of England, and of the Counsels and Artifices by which they were carried on from the year 1640 to 1660. The authorized edition of this work was not published before 1679, shortly after his death. Some works also of a minor character belong to this period. These works, together with the controversial writings referred to above, are evidence sufficient that the last twenty-five years of Hobbes's life constitute a period of great literary activity, evincing a good deal of mental vigor.

The closing years of his life, 1675-79, were spent with the family of the Earl of Devonshire at Hardwick and Chadsworth. In October, 1679, he became ill, and on December 4 of the same year death closed the long and varied career of Thomas Hobbes.

1 Of Liberty and Necessity, p. 274.

II.

Exposition of the Ethics of Hobbes.

There can be very little reasonable doubt that Hobbes himself regarded his ethical philosophy as a constituent part of his philosophical system. His philosophical system is divided into three parts. In the first part, physical phenomena are treated under the head of "Body." In the second part, mental phenomena are treated under the head of "Man." In the third part, social or political phenomena are treated under the head of "The State." In this system social or political phenomena are regarded as dependent on the mental constitution of man; hence the State, composed as it is of human individuals, has its foundation in human nature. Mental phenomena in turn are dependent on physical phenomena, inasmuch as all mental processes arise from sensations, which are merely the mental aspect of motions in the human body, which motions are occasioned by external bodies pressing upon the organs of sense.1 These external bodies are explainable also in terms of motion. We have, then, "Body" as "the first term of a series leading up to Society or the State through Man. Man, since his nature contains the ground of civil institutions, stands out from among all other natural bodies. The State is not simply to be viewed in its existent form as body politic, but rather as it comes into being product of human wit for the satisfaction of human wants. Thus, between Nature and Society the bridge is Man; and hence the profounder disposition of the whole work of the philosopher as a progression from Body (which remains natural) through Man to Citizen.” 2 Although the last

the

1 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. I. This mental aspect of bodily action Hobbes calls "appearance" and "fancy." See also Human Nature, chap. II., and Elements of Philosophy, Pt. IV., chap. I.

2 Hobbes, Robertson, p. 45.

part of this comprehensive system was developed before and, to a certain extent, independently of the first part, which contains Hobbes's views on "First Philosophy and Physics," owing to conditions mentioned below, still, a study of the mental history of Hobbes, already briefly alluded to, and the following confession on the part of Hobbes himself are sufficient grounds for believing that he regarded his ethico-political philosophy as a part of a complete philosophical system such as has been described above. On this point Hobbes says: "I was studying Philosophy for my mind sake, and I had gathered together its first elements in all kinds; and having digested them into three sections by degrees, I thought to have written them, so as in the first I would have treated of body and its general properties; in the second, of man and his special faculties and affections; in the third, of civil government and the duties of subjects. Wherefore, the first section would have contained the first philosophy, and certain elements of physic; in it we would have considered the reasons of time, place, cause, power, relation, proportion, quantity, figure, and motion. In the second, we would have been conversant about imagination, memory, intellect, ratiocination, appetite, will, good and evil, honest and dishonest, and the like. . . Whilst I contrive, order, pensively and slowly compose these matters (for I do only reason, I dispute not); it so happens in the interim, that my country, some few years before the Civil Wars did rage, was boiling hot with questions concerning the rights of dominion, and the obedience due from subjects; the true forerunners of an approaching war; and was the cause which, all those other matters deferred, ripened and plucked from me this third part. Therefore, it happens that what was last in order, is yet come forth first in time." Of course, in a

1 Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society, Preface to the Reader; also De Cive, Praefatio ad Lectores.

study of the ethical theory of Hobbes, we are more especially concerned with the second and third parts of his philosophical system, which parts are very intimately related, and for a good understanding of which a knowledge of the first part is really not necessary. It is in the treatment of the origin and regulation of the State that his ethical theory is developed, and, as has just been stated, the State has its foundation in human nature. It is, therefore, very essential to a full understanding of his ethical theory to be acquainted with his view of human nature.

[ocr errors]

Hobbes's conception of human nature is thoroughly egoistic. In his psychological analysis he finds naught but self-regarding feelings impelling man's activity. Even those emotions of pity, reverence, love, etc., which seem to be altruistic in their nature, are ultimately explainable from an egoistic point of view, as the following definitions indicate: "Grief, for the calamity of another, is PITY; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a FELLow-feeling.' This is stated still more broadly elsewhere: "Pity is imagination or fiction of future calamity to ourselves, proceeding from the sense of another man's calamity. But when it lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same, the compassion is greater, because then there appeareth more probability that the same may happen to us: for, the evil that happeneth to an innocent man, may happen to every man." 2 The same self-interest is present in his definition of reverence: "Reverence is the conception we have concerning another, that he hath the power to do unto us both good and hurt, but not the will to do us hurt." Again, in his conception of love we see his thorough-going egoism: "There is yet another passion sometimes called love,

1 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. VI.
2 Human Nature, chap. IX.

3 Ibid., chap. VIII.

[ocr errors]

but more properly called good will or charity. There can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein consisteth charity. In which, first, is contained that natural affection of parents to their children . . . as also, that affection wherewith men seek to assist those that adhere unto them." 1 The affection which leads us to give help unto strangers is prompted by a desire to purchase their friendship, or, because of fear, to purchase peace. Thus, from the foregoing, it will be seen that, if we examine the feelings which impel men to activity, we shall find all of them to be self-regarding in their nature. The same egoistic view of human nature manifests itself in Hobbes's conception of will. Will is "the last appetite in deliberating"; "and of all voluntary acts the object is to every man his own good." This explanation of the object of all voluntary acts occurs in his account of why we give gifts. It is apparent, then, from his treatment of the "passions" and the will, that he regards man as thoroughly selfishprompted in all that he does by motives of private interest. Bearing his views of human nature in mind, we shall gain a much more intelligent conception of his ethical theory than we should were we to study this theory independently of its psychological basis; for it is really on this egoistic psychology that he constructs his theory. The "good" towards which man's selfish nature constantly inclines him is the good of self-preservation. This "good" men recog

3

2 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. VI.

[ocr errors]

1 Human Nature, chap. IX. 3 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XV. 4 He sometimes includes in his conception of this "good "the means of so preserving life as not to be weary of it." Again, he speaks sometimes as if he really considered self-preservation and pleasure, as the ultimate good for which men really strive. Leviathan, Pt. I., chaps. VI., XIII., and XV.; Human Nature, chap. VII.; De Corp. Pol., Pt. I., chap. IV. Professor Sidgwick says: There is, however, a noticeable though perhaps unconscious discrepancy between

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
« PredošláPokračovať »