wouldest not have done to thyself. These laws of nature, which are the dictates of reason with reference to peace, are always obligatory upon man in foro interno, but not always obligatory in foro externo. That is, they always "bind to a desire they should take place," but not always "to the putting them in act.” This is so because "he that should be modest, and tractable, and perform all he promises, in such time, and place, where no man else should do so, should but make himself a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all laws of nature, which tend to nature's preservation. And again, he that having sufficient security, that others shall observe the same laws towards him, observes them not himself, seeketh not peace, but war; and consequently the destruction of his nature by violence." " Furthermore, the laws which bind in foro interno may be violated not only by acting contrary to them, but also when the act is in conformity to them but the purpose back of the act is in opposition to them. In such a case as this we have a breach of the law because the obligation is in foro interno. Again, these laws of nature are eternal and unchangeable; "for injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawful. For it can never. be that war shall preserve life, and peace destroy it." 4

3

The three laws of nature.which have been explained above are absolutely essential if man is to emerge from a state of nature, which is a state of war, into a state of peace, in which security of person and the means of enjoying life are to be attained. It is on these three laws that the commonwealth, which exists for the attainment of these ends, is founded. The genesis and development of the commonwealth Hobbes describes as follows: The reason why men lay down their liberty and assume the restraints of a commonwealth is "the foresight of their own preserva1 Leviathan, chap. XV. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.

tion, and a more contented life thereby." The commonwealth is necessary for the realization of these ends, because they are not to be realized merely by entering into covenants, but by performing them. However, it is not in accordance with our natural passions to perform such covenants. We, therefore, need some common power, possessed both of authority and means to cause men, through their fear of punishment, to keep their covenants. Such a common power may be established in the following manner: A large number of individuals may assemble together and "confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, . . . to bear their person; and every one to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills every one to his will, and their judgments to his judgment." That is, every man must completely surrender his natural right to all things to one common power, so that the commands, decisions, and acts of this power must be regarded by every man as his own. This Hobbes calls real unity; and a multitude thus united he calls a commonwealth. It is the great Leviathan. Or, speaking reverently, it is "that mortal god to which we owe under the immortal God, our peace and defence." In such a representative man (Hobbes here drops the words "or assembly of men "3) consists the

1 Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XVII.

2 Ibid. ; also De Corp. Pol., Pt. I., chap. VI.; also Philosophical Rudiments, chap. V.

3 Of the various forms of government Hobbes undoubtedly had a decided preference for a monarchy. Sir Henry Maine says: "When with a keenness of intuition and lucidity of statement which have never been rivaled, he has made out a case for the universal theoretical existence of sovereignty, it becomes clear that he has, to say the least, a strong preference for monarchies over aristocracies and democracies, or (to use the phraseology of the school which he founded) for individual over corporate sovereignty. Those of his intellectual followers who would have repudiated his politics have often asserted that he has been

essence of the commonwealth, which may be defined as "one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence."1 Such a common power is the sovereign. Those who have thus surrendered their rights are the subjects; and the kind of commonwealth thus defined is a political commonwealth, or a commonwealth by institution,2 as distinguished from a commonwealth by acquisition, which is based not on mutual covenant, but on natural force.

The "rights" of the sovereign as sovereign are derived from the "institution of the commonwealth." Among misunderstood, and, no doubt, some superficial readers have supposed that he was pointing at despotism when he was really referring to the essentially unqualified power of the Sovereign, whatever the form of the sovereignty. But I do not think it can in candour be denied that his strong dislike of the Long Parliament and of the English Common Law, as the great instrument of resistance to the Stuart kings, has occasionally coloured the language which he uses in examining the nature of Sovereignty, Law, and Anarchy." — Early History of Institutions, Lec. XII. However, notwithstanding his decided preference for a monarchical form of government, Hobbes says, after pointing out the nature of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, that "of the three sorts, which is the best, is not to be disputed, where any one of them is already established; but the present ought always to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best; because it is against both the law of nature, and the divine positive law, to do anything tending to the subversion thereof.". Leviathan, Pt. III., chap. XLII.

1 Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XVII. How widely removed is this conception of the origin of the State from that of Aristotle.

philosopher regarded man as constitutionally political.

The Greek

He says:

*Ανθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ξῶον.” Grotius also says that the "appetite for society" is a "property peculiar to man."

2 Mr. Ritchie (Natural Rights, p. 11) calls attention to the fact that "while Hobbes does not seem to ascribe any historical character to the social contract, which is at the basis of all political society, and while Rousseau expressly disclaims the attempt to offer an historical explanation (Contrat Social, I., c. I.) of how governments came into existence, Locke seeks to give historical proofs of the origin of political society by means of contract, referring to the cases of Rome and Venice (Treatise of Civil Government, II., § 102), and speaks of the state of nature as a golden age in the past."

these rights the following may be mentioned: In the first place, he has a right to the loyalty of his subjects, to the extent that no change of authority should be effected without his consent. His subjects may not establish a new covenant among themselves to render obedience to another; because, were one man to dissent from such action, then all others participating in such disobedience would break their covenant with this man, which would be injustice. It would also be injustice to the sovereign, for his sovereignty was given to him by every man implicated in the covenant by which the commonwealth was formed, and, therefore, to depose the sovereign is to take from him "that which is his own." Again, if any one attempting to depose the sovereign were to be killed or punished for such an attempt by the sovereign, this would be merely self-punishment, for previously he has made himself author of the sovereign's action. And since self-punishment is unjust, to depose the sovereign would be unjust from this point of view. In the second place, the sovereign cannot be guilty of a breach of covenant with his subjects, because he has made no covenant with them. The covenant simply exists between his subjects. Hence, "none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection." In the next place, the sovereign's acts are to be regarded as just, for everything he does was authorized by his subjects when the commonwealth was formed; hence, his actions are really the actions of his subjects. Again, the sovereign may not be put to death or punished in any manner by his subjects. For this would be punishing another for our own actions, inasmuch as the actions of the sovereign are the actions of the subject, by virtue of the covenant by which sovereignty was established. The sovereign has also the right to judge of "the means of peace and defence of his subjects, "and also of the

1 Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XVIII.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

3

2

hindrances and disturbances of the same," and to do whatsoever he may deem to be necessary for the preservation of peace and security, or "the recovery of the same when lost. Furthermore, it belongs to sovereignty to judge "of what opinions and doctrines are averse and what conducive to peace"; to determine the rules of propriety, "or meum and tuum, and of good, evil, lawful and unlawful in the actions of subjects." These rules of propriety "are the civil laws." The right of judicature belongs also to sovereignty; i.e., sovereignty has the right to hear and to decide "all controversies which may arise concerning law, either civil or natural, or concerning fact." The sovereign power possesses the right to make war and peace with foreign nations, and is generalissimo of the army of the commonwealth. The sovereign power has the right to choose "all counsellors, ministers, magistrates, and officers" of the commonwealth, "both in peace and war. In the sovereign is vested the power to reward and punish the subject; and also to "give titles of honor; and to appoint what order of place and dignity each man shall hold; and what signs of respect in public or private meetings they shall give to one another." of the foregoing rights belong to the sovereign power. They are of the very essence of sovereignty. They are "incommunicable and inseparable."7 Thus we see that with reference to his subjects the sovereign is supreme. His will, in a sense, is the measure of all things to his subjects. "As, for example; of what is to be called right, what good, what virtue, what much, what little, what meum and tuum, what a pound, what a quart, &c." 8

1 Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XVIII.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

All

2 Ibid. 7 Ibid. On the subject of the "rights of the sovereign," consult also De Corp. Pol., Pt. II., chap. I.; also Philosophical Rudiments, chap. VI. 8 De Corp. Pol., Pt. II., chap. X.; see also Leviathan, Pt. II., chap XVIII.