Even the claims of the individual conscience are not to be regarded when they are in opposition to the will of the sovereign. He says: "I observe the diseases of a commonwealth, that proceed from the poison of seditious doctrines, whereof one is, That every private man is judge of good and evil actions." And again, "Another doctrine repugnant to civil society, is, that whatsoever a man does against his conscience, is sin; and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of good and evil. 1 Therefore, though he that is subject to no civil law, sinneth in all he does against his conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a commonwealth; because the law is the public conscience by which he hath already undertaken to be guided." Of course the sovereign's power does not extend to the feelings, opinions, and beliefs of men, for these he cannot reach. It only extends to the manifestation of these in external conduct. The sovereign's will is the measure of all things to the individual, so far as his external conduct is concerned, within the limits indicated by the covenant. This absoluteness of the sovereign pertains not only to things civil, but also to things religious. There is no church exercising authority independent of the State. The State indeed is the church. The "civil sovereign is the supreme pastor, to whose charge the whole flock of his subjects is committed." All other pastors get their authority from him. In a commonwealth, as supreme pastor, the sovereign has authority to preach, to baptize, to consecrate temples and pastors to the service of God. He has supreme power in matters of policy and religion and can make what laws he deems fit for the government of his subjects. He has the right to determine what doctrines are to be taught and who is to teach them. If in things 1 Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XXIX. religious the sovereign hands over the government of his subjects to a pope, or a supreme pastor, or an "assembly of pastors," these then exercise their charge not jure divino, but jure civili, — not in God's right, but in the right of the sovereign. Whereas, the sovereign himself performs his office as supreme pastor jure divino. The sovereign, then, is supreme in things religious with reference to the government. of his subjects.1 But here again appears the question of the individual conscience. We have seen that in things civil external actions in defiance of the sovereign's will cannot be tolerated on the ground of the claims of the individual conscience. Is this so also in matters of religion? Hobbes's position on this difficult question is admirably stated by Professor Robertson as follows: "It is impossible that the state by any machinery of instruction or of penalties should control the thoughts and feelings of the subject. On the subject's side, with freedom of thought left ever untouched, the claim of anything that can be called conscience to override the sovereign's commands must be at once rejected. This is plain so far as temporal affairs are concerned; for the laws of nature enjoin civil obedience as the elementary condition of human welfare. In case of religion, if natural religion is meant, it is not otherwise, because the law of nature is but another name for the law of God; if revealed religion, everything depends upon a true understanding of its import. Now what, according to Scripture, is really necessary for salvation? Only the confession that Jesus is the Christ, with whatever is involved therein, but excluding all the vain dogmas invented by church doctors under the influence of pagan philosophy. The sovereign power which utters any command trenching on the religious sphere is either Christian or it is not. If Christian, it will not go against the fundamental tenet. Whatever it enjoins is, therefore, either indifferent, or is likely 1 Leviathan, Pt. III., chap. XLII.; also De Corp. Pol., Pt. II., chap. VI. to have as much Scriptural warrant as can be adduced for the opinions of private men or for the injunctions of any pretended universal church; not to say that some determination of controversial points in religion is necessary. In either case, the subject may safely follow its command, more especially as no mental assent — only outward conformity is extorted; and would do wrong not to follow it, because otherwise civil anarchy must result. If, on the other hand, the sovereign power is not professedly Christian, the subject cannot indeed be expected, in a case where something is required involving damnation, to obey man rather than God. Let him then be ready, if need be, to lay down his life, expecting the reward in heaven of his martyrdom; but in any case let him not resist a power which, whether Christian or not, is divinely appointed, since it has its origin in reason uttering the law of nature, which is the law of God." But although the sovereign is in no way subject to the people of a commonwealth, nor in any manner subject to the civil laws, he is, however, subject to the law of nature; and is accountable to God, who is author of the law of nature, for his conduct.2 The duty to which he is obliged by the law of nature is to secure the end for which sovereignty was established: "the procuration of the safety of the people." "By safety here, is not meant a bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which every man by lawful industry, without danger, or hurt to the commonwealth, shall acquire to himself."3 This is to be done mainly "by a general providence contained in public instruction, both of doctrine and example; and in the making and executing of good laws, to which individual persons may apply their own cases."4 It is contrary to the duty of 1 Hobbes, Edinburgh, 1886, pp. 154-55. 2 Leviathan, Pt. II., chaps. XXIX. and XXX. 4 Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XXX. the sovereign to transfer or to relinquish his rights, because this would mean the dissolution of the commonwealth and a return to a state of nature, which is a state of war, which is the greatest evil possible to life. The sovereign must maintain his rights in their entirety. Again, it is contrary to his duty to allow the people to be in ignorance or wrongly informed in regard to the grounds of his rights, because through ignorance and wrong information men are seduced and influenced to resistance when the commonwealth calls for their use and exercise. The sovereign, then, is under obligation only to the law of nature - - accountable only to God who is the author of this law.1 The measure of his obligation is determined by the end for which sovereignty is established. But with this absoluteness of the sovereign goes a certain "liberty" of the subject. Because, “whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it; it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself. And therefore there be some rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to aim thereby, at any good to himself. The same may be said of wounds, and chains, and imprisonment. Not, then, having renounced all rights by his submission to the sovereign, a certain amount of "liberty" is his while subject to the sovereign. That is to say, there are some things "which, though commanded by the sover 1 The right of nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that break his laws, is to be derived, not from his creating them, as if he required obedience as of gratitude for his benefits; but from his irresistible power. - Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XXXI. 2 Leviathan, Pt. I., chap. XIV. eign, he may, nevertheless, without injustice refuse to do." A man is at liberty to disobey the command of the sovereign, though justly condemned, "to kill, wound, or maim himself"; or, when he is commanded, "not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live." He is not under obligation, when guilty of crime, to confess it when interrogated by the sovereign, unless assured of pardon. Neither is he under obligation to yield obedience to the sovereign's command, to “execute any dangerous or dishonorable office," if disobedience does not frustrate the end for which sovereign power was established. And, finally, when the sovereign power is no longer able to protect the subject, then the subject's obligation to the sovereign ceases. In short, man's chief end is self-preservation. For the better realization of this end he forsakes a state of nature and becomes a member of the commonwealth according to the manner already described. When the State, whether justly or unjustly, seeks to destroy or injure him, then man has the right to resist the State. He has entered into no covenant which obliges him to submit to death or injury of the character described above; but, rather, into a covenant whereby security of life and person may better be attained than in a state of nature. In his "act of submission" he has not surrendered all rights, but only a right to all things. He has given up only those rights which, if retained, would make against "the peace of mankind" which the laws of nature dictate to be essential for the security of his person; but has retained the right to defend himself against death, wounds, imprisonment, etc., even in defiance of the command of the sovereign. And if sovereignty fails in its power to protect the subject to procure his safety then the subject is no longer under obligation to the sovereign, for no man can relinquish the 1 Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XXI. |