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go beyond words, words, words, that we dare not declare war against France, any more than the minister of foreign relations dare mention - our commercial pretensions to the irritable emperour. This impression of Napoleon's is made more evident by his publick expression concerning us; the allies of France and the United States sacrifice, with a resolution equally generous, their private conveniences, in repelling from all points the English commerce. Thus we the opinion of the emperour, coupled with France, in resisting nation. the British What our negociations with the French ministry to authorise such a conviction must have been, it is more easy to imagine than decide. From such an opinion as we entertain of Mr. Madison's sincerity, we cannot believe the following sentence, that in the fulfillment of his duty as President, among other motives which will actuate him, he intends to cherish peace and friendly intercourse with all nations, having correspondent dispositions; to maintain sincere neutrality towards the belligerent nations ; to prefer in all cases, amicable discussion and reasonable accommodation of differences, to a decision of them by an appeal to arms; to exclude foreign intrigues and foreign partialities, so degrading to all countries, and so baneful to free ones.'

We should have thought Mr. Madison had better have omitted any mention of Mr. Jefferson, than thus to satirise him; after saying he has the good fortune to have the path in which he is to tread, lighted by examples of services the most illustrious, he proceeds to observe : Of those of my immediate predecessor it might least become me here to speak; I may, however, be pardoned for not suppressing the sympathy with which my heart is full, in the rich reward he enjoys in the benedictions of a beloved country, gratefully bestowed for exalted talsents, zealously devoted through a long career, to the advancement of its -highest interests and happiness.'

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The benedictions of a beloved country' is an expression evidently ironical. A fifteen months embargo, his negociations abroad, hypocrisy at home, and the universal distress in which he has left the United States produce the strongest probability that the benedictions' of which Mr. Madison speaks, more resemble hatred and execration.

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bywały veron lpotio disg of SPANISH AFFAIRS. 12 rendcoil donori

pos vinat TO place too strong a reliance on the militia of a country is the general fault of visionary politicians. Courage, honour, personal strength, and patriotick motives may do very well for a little time; but they will soon give way to steadiness, concert, superiour discipline and tacticks. The experience of all

great generals, from Carthaginian Hannibal to Russian Suwarrow, proves the truth of this assertion. There is scarcely an instance where levies of militia, suddenly raised, have ever made any long stand against regular troops. It is real service and the practice of tactical knowledge, that will make soldiers, better than all the theory which can be invented. The Prussians, before the battle of Jena, were considered the best soldiers in Europe; the English had adopted their discipline and tacticks; and, to be sure, as far as mere proficiency in the manual exercise, external appearance and accurate manœuvres went, they were excellent troops. But the new tacticks of the French were too much for them; and they had been out of practice for many years: the consequence was, they were cut to pieces by Napoleon. In our revolutionary war we were almost always beaten when we came to action in the open field; and it was the true policy of Washington to retire to heights and other strong defensive positions, where he intrenched himself, and would never give battle if he could avoid it, but upon terms decidedly advantageous to himself.

The policy, which the Spanish generals are pursuing, is evidently the best, which they could adopt. They carry on a kind of partizan warfare; they do not concentrate their whole army, and hazard the fate of the country upon the issue of a general engagement. The battles of Austerlitz and Jena speak a lesson to them, upon the subject, too striking to be disregarded. If they are attacked they defend themselves as well as they are able, but retire when the danger of entire defeat becomes apparent. Thus the French make a progress in the country; but the Spaniards, sometimes successful and sometimes worsted, are learning to become good soldiers, and their officers are every day gaining intelligence. Peter the great first brought the Russians to be good soldiers; he fought with Charles the 12th of Sweden, and though at first more than 60,000 of his troops ran from 10,000 Swedes, yet before the war was ended, the Russians had learned to beat their instructors in the famous battle of Pulowa. The Supreme Junta, in recommending this system of warfare to the Spanish Generals, have been of incal culable service to their country; we are not prepared to declare that the Spaniards will ultimately succeed in their glorious struggle, but we really can conceive of no better system of defence

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than that on which they now practice. The Spaniards have a most excellent officer in General Blake; his retreat through the mountains of Asturias will be considered a masterly one hereafter, by military men; and by the last accounts from Spain, it appears that he is enlarging his army in Leon, and is again preparing to attack the enemy. This intimation, however it may, seem to contradict his having resigned the command of the army on the 27th of November to the Marquis of Romano, may be reconciled on the supposition that he has begun to collect another; which supposition is not weak, if it be considered that Romano has joined the English at Salamanca or Benevento.

The accounts which General Castanos gives of the battle of Tudella differs in many essential particulars from the French bulletins. In our last number we gave as clear an account of that action, as could be obtained from the perverted sources from which we derived it. But Don Castanos, in a great measure contradicts it, he claims a victory, and though this cannot be granted him, it appears that so far from giving way on the first approach of the French, the Spaniards fought with much steadiness and actually repulsed them. On the left particularly the Spaniards were eminently successful, but pursuing their successes too far, they lost the day; for the French, as they state in the bulletin, penetrated through Tudella, and took the pursuing Spaniards in the rear. But let us hear the Spaniard himself.

On the 23d the advanced parties reported that three columus of the enemy were marching in the direction of Tudella; the generale was beaten, and while the troops of Arragon were passing the bridge, the enemy occupied the points of attack, which began at eight o'clock in morning; at ten o'clock the whole line was engaged. Our troops maintained their position with the utmost valour, and the enemy was repulsed on both sides. He renewed the attack, and rendered himself master of an olive grove on the left, whence he descended with a tremendous fire, but was so well received by our gallant troops. that after the most obstinate conflict he was compelled to retreat, while our troops were pursuing the defeated enemy on our left, when another division of the enemy penetrated through Tudella on the right, and took our pursuing troops in the rear. This decided the fate of the day, and nothing was left for our army but to retreat to Borja. While this was going forward

in Tudella, the 4th division, commanded by Gen. LAPINA NA, which was in Cascante, two hours march from the field of battle, and had received orders to attack the right flank of the enemy, found 3000 French infantry, and 1000 cavalry opposed to them, in the act of offering battle; LAPINA immediately engaged, defeated and pursued them to the heights of Tudella, whence he was attacked by the enemy's troops, who occupied the heights. LAPINA retreated to the position of Cascante, where he defeated the enemy, and at the fall of night began to fall back to Borja, according to the last order he received; on his retreat he was again attacked by the enemy, but new troops checked his progress, and the four divisions reached Borja, where they marched to Calahayad.

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The forces of the enemy in these actions of Tudella and Cascante amounted to from 36 to 40,000 infantry and from 6 to 7000 cavalry. Their loss has been very considerable, as has likewise ours, in missing and prisoners, but the number cannot be accurately stated till the Generals of the Divisions have made out and delivered their lists.'

After this, Castanos for want of means of subsistence in Calahayad, resolved to proceed to Seguenza, which is nearer Madrid, since which we have not heard from him; he will probably remain in some convenient position, to act against the enemy in the event of his attacking Sarragoza, which it is said, is threatened by the Duke of Cornegliano.

After the battle of Tudella, Bonaparte could not anticipate many obstacles to his proceeding for Madrid, and he accordingly crossed the Duero at Aranda, on the 29th of November, and established his head quarters at the village of Bougillas. The 13th bulletin gives an account of an affair in the narrow passage of Puerto, or the post of Somosierra, in which they claim a victory. The Spanish account of the same action, on the contrary, declares that Don Benito S. Juan, who commanded the post, effected the complete defence of this point.' However bravely the Spaniards fought on this occasion, it is pretty certain they were obliged to abandon the position, for the head quarters of the French were removed on the 1st of December, to St. Augustine, and on the 2d to St. Martin near Madrid.

Madrid capitulated on the 5th of December, with merely a show of resistance; but there appears to have existed much un

easiness among the lower classes of people, who were willing to have hazarded their lives in defence of the city and notwithstanding the cautious language of the bulletins, it will be necessary to keep an extraordinary body of troops to overawe the multitude. Should this be the case, it will much facilitate the operations of Castanos and Palafox on one side, and the junction of Sir John Moore and Sir David Baird with the Marquis of Romanc on the other. The movements of the English troops have been uncommonly cautious. In consequence of Castanos' defeat at Tudella, they had considerably receded; but that affair not proving so decisive as was apprehended, they turned about again. Sir John Moore had reached Salamanca in Leon, from Portugal, and the latest news we have of him, the 19th of December, is that he had nearly formed a junction with Sir David Baird, and the latter General was at Benevento. Another account asserts that Romano had actually joined the English, and that the combined army were going to march for Valladolid with a view of cutting off the communication between the army at Madrid and Astonga. On the same authority we hear of another action at Tudella, in which Castanos had defeated the French with great slaughter.

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· On the whole, we do not perceive that the affairs in Spain have grown by any means desperate, because Napoleon has captured Madrid: on the contrary there are many topicks of consolation and encouragement; the capacity of General Blake, the probable junction of the English armies with Romano, the favourable situation of Castanos and Palafox after the battle of Tudella, the ill success of the French in Catalonia, the determined resistance of the province of Asturias, and generally the unconquered spirit of the Spanish people.

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"AS the new nomenclature of the French Generals occasions some difficulty to the readers of the Bulletins, we insert the following key of the new titles, with which Napoleon has distinguished his peculiar favourites.

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