proven, but in children neither neurasthenia nor hysteria can be definitely said to be the cause.

CHARLES RICKSHER.

A NOTE ON THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF. By E. B. Titchener. American Journal of Psychology. Vol. XXII, No. 4, October, 1911. Pp. 540-552.

1

A number of observers trained in systematic experimental introspection at Cornell University were asked to answer certain definite questions pertaining to the nature of self-consciousness. The first question relates to the continuity or intermittence of the experience of self. On this point Titchener's own testimony is to the effect that "the conscious self, while it can always be constructed by a voluntary effort, is of comparatively rare occurrence, and Wundt writes in a similar vein, as when he states that the expression "forgetfulness of self' . . . is misleading, in as far as it is prompted by the tendency to consider reference to the subject as the normal . . . state of affairs." On the other hand, Calkins writes, "I am always, inattentively or attentively, conscious of the private, personal object, myself, whatever the other object of my consciousness"; and referring to the "material" self James states, "We feel the whole entire mass of our body all the while, it gives us an increasing sense of personal existence."

The question was formulated around the quotation, "I am always, inattentively or attentively, conscious of myself, whatever the other objects of my consciousness," in two parts, as follows: "Is this statement true, as a matter of experience, (a) in everyday life, (b) in the introspective exercises of the laboratory?"

The replies obtained by Titchener from his students show differences of introspective ability, of attitude, of training, of point of view and, perhaps also, of interest in the subject. Nevertheless they point to certain definite results, although Titchener is unwilling to claim finality for them.

Eleven out of thirteen observers (seven men and five women) deny the persistence of self-consciousness throughout the waking life; of this number nine (six men and three women) deny its existence even during introspective experience, not alone in everyday life. Even the two observers who affirm the continuity of selfconsciousness qualify their answers so that Titchener feels himself justified to conclude that "self-consciousness is, in many cases, an intermittent and even a rare experience."

'Text-book of Psychology, 1910, 544 f.

The second question asks for a description of the self-consciousness. Current psychological works record three ways in which the self may appear in consciousness:

1. A certain class of mental processes may carry the selfmeaning, "apart from any determination of present consciousness." For Lipps, for instance, conscious experiences are either conscious contents or self-experiences. The latter, feelings in the wider sense of the term, always appear together with the objective experiences. As Lipps states it tersely, "I always feel myself somehow."

2. The experiences of self may be due to either an explicit or implicit determination. In the former case a characteristic group of conscious processes may carry the function of self-meaning. In the latter instance the reference to self is due to a particular arrangement and temporal course of the mental processes. Where this course or arrangement is disturbed, there can be no such special self-reference.

As example of the explicit determination of the consciousness of self, Titchener quotes Wundt's statement that the self-experience consists "in essentials of a total feeling, whose predominating elements are the apperceptive feelings and whose secondary and more variable constituents are other feelings and sensations," kynesthetic, organic, etc. James's well-known reduction of the central, spiritual, active self to kynesthetic sensations in head, throat, and respiratory mechanism is mentioned as a probable instance (Titchener is not altogether certain) of the implicit determination of self-experience.

3. The third view is that the experience of self may inhere in the whole of one's experience, in the "warmth and intimacy" which, according to James, distinguish one's own ideas from the ideas ascribed to any "you."

The question covering this point called for a description of the self-consciousness "as definite as possible. Is the consciousness of self explicit (e. g., visual image, organic sensations) or implicit (intrinsic to the nature of consciousness, inherent in the nature of consciousness)? Can you bring out the character of the selfconsciousness by comparing or contrasting it with other phases of a total consciousness?"

The replies show that the reports fall naturally into three categories:

1. Those who affirm the continuous persistence of the selfconsciousness as shown in their affirmative answers to question la.

2. Those who answer la in the negative but 1b in the affirmative, thus asserting that self-consciousness is always implied in the introspective attitude; and

3. Those who reply to both parts of the first question in the negative.

The replies here show no evidence of a special class of subjective processes (Lipps). All the reports, with one possible exception, support the view that the experience of self is a determination, either implicit (as "unified experience," as "my ways of thinking and acting," and in statements referring to the selfconscious experience as of fluctuating content) or explicit (for instance, one subject's "large, dark vagueness which represents my own mind"; another's "translucent rays projected from the chest," etc.). Probably in all cases of visual imagery and in many organic complexes the determination of the experiences of self is explicit, although in most cases no sharp distinction can be drawn. between it and the implicit consciousnesses.

The constituents of the self-consciousness in their order of frequency, as mentioned in the reports, are as follows: organic complexes, 12; visual imagery, 10; affective processes, 8 (implied in four other cases); kynesthetic complexes, 8 (probably in other cases merged in organic); conscious attitudes, 4 (as follows: (a) responsibility; (b) recognition of ownership of introspections; (c) ownership of experience; (d) activity in background of consciousness); verbal auditory images, 4; cutaneous sensations, 2.

The third question was addressed only to those who (in response to question la) denied the persistence of the consciousness of self in everyday life and required a statement of the circumstances under which self-consciousness is likely to appear. All but one of the eleven observers show in their replies that the experience of self is brought out under conscious social determination. It follows that the "spiritual" or "material" self would seem to be subordinate to the "social self," at least for this class of observers.

The unusual or novel situation comes next in the order of frequency as factor to which the realization of the self is ascribed. From this Titchener concludes that "it is not permissible" to define psychology "the science of the self as conscious" as is done by M. W. Calkins. Every one of the thirteen observers rejected this definition.

J. S. VAN TESLAAR.

REVIEW

INCREASING HUMAN EFFICIENCY IN BUSINESS. By W. D. Scott. The Macmillan Co., New York. 1911.

Professor Scott's book is a pioneer attempt to analyze the psychological elements in industrial occupations. It makes a clear and readable presentation of the chief mental factors upon which human efficiency depends. These factors are imitation, loyalty, concentration, wages, pleasure, love of the game, relaxation, practice and improvement, habit formation and judgment. Numerous examples drawn from different occupations show how the appeal to and the study of these processes tend toward greater economy and efficiency.

The book is intended primarily for business men and, consequently, is written in popular, non-technical style.

It might be suggested that most of the ideas set forth are matters of common sense. This is largely true because practically no experimental investigations or critical analyses of the processes involved, in even the simpler occupational activities, have thus far been made. It is none the less profitable to look at matters of common sense from a scientific angle, and thus to promote a more thorough investigation in these fields in order to determine whether common sense and general impression are correct, and finally, to go beyond haphazard observation.

The book ought to be practically useful to business men by way of suggesting serious analyses and examples of the application of the psychological factors in securing maximum efficiency. It ought to prove valuable also to the psychologist by way of furnishing varied and practical illustrations of mental laws and processes. DANIEL STARCH.

University of Wisconsin.

312

THE JOURNAL OF

ABNORMAL

PSYCHOLOGY

DECEMBER, 1912-JANUARY, 1913

CONDITIONS FOR A HOME OF PSYCHOLOGY IN THE MEDICAL CURRICULUM1

M

BY ADOLF MEYER, M.D.

ORE than any year since the early nineties the past twelve months have brought events in the field of psychology and medicine which deserve a brief appreciation and also a brief discussion of the demands they suggest.

The last December meeting of the American Psychological Association made the serious recommendation of including psychology in the medical curriculum. This implies a grave responsibility, considering the inevitably strong individuality which is bound to hold in our field, and which makes it a matter of wide differences of opinion as to what kind of psychology the medical student would get. This very last year has seen striking assertions of contrasts among psychologists themselves concerning the relation of psychology to the sciences (I merely refer to the book of Yerkes), and the psychopathologists are still busy emphasizing contrasts, such as psychopathology and psychiatry, and even psychopathology and pathopsychology, as if they were not merely inevitable differences of emphasis of subordinated issues, and chiefly apt to furnish food to those who are eager to exploit the discords of the great science of conduct and behavior.

Fortunately we can point to concrete achievements in several directions:

'Presidential Address delivered before the American Psychopathological Association in Boston, May 30, 1912.