is its only guide and assistant in matters of revelation; and it is often found to throw light upon subjects which, to mere reason, appeared wholly inexplicable, but which being once elucidated by revelation, reason herself cannot but admit the explanation to be perfectly satisfactory. For example; it has in every age been a point inexplicable to unassisted reason, why sorrow and happiness, adversity and prosperity, are not always duly apportioned to mankind, in proportion to their moral qualifications. Human philosophy never has, and never could, reconcile this difficulty with the acknowledged attributes of the Creator. Several of the sacred writers themselves felt this; and, arguing upon the mere principles of natural reason, the Psalmist Asaph came to the conclusion, that, if the wicked were so prosperous and happy, moral virtues were an unnecessary burden and restriction: "Verily," said he, "I have cleansed my heart in vain, and washed my hands in innocency.' But revelation explained the enigma. "I went," he adds, "into the sanctuary of God; then understood I their end;"-the doctrine of a future retribution restored the equipoise of the Divine government. Reason admits this doctrine, when once disclosed, to be highly probable, and is perfectly satisfied with the solution; but it is faith to which we are indebted for the discovery. The learned heathen might indeed think it probable, and spoke of it as being so; but they had no evidence for its truth but its probability, added, perhaps, to the remains of early tradition. But when revelation has disclosed the certainty of the fact, reason gladly lays hold of it, to solve her difficul ties, and to guide her otherwise un certain conclusions.

We have seen, then, that it is not within the just province of reason to reject a doctrine of Scripture, either because it appears to our finite understandings improbable, or because it is not fortified by adventitious

arguments. Nor is it within the province of reason to decide peremptorily against a declaration, from whatever quarter it may come, whether Divine or human, merely because it seems to militate against some supposed truth; for that supposed truth may itself be an error. Thus, in introducing Christianity among the heathen, objections are often heard against it, arising from the false notions of an uncivilized people; objections which, to more enlightened nations, would perhaps appear so many arguments in its favour. Nor, again, is it within the province of reason to discard a doctrine established on sufficient evidence, because it seems capable of being followed out into dangerous conclusions. Nor, again, is it within the province of reason to discard either or both of two doctrines, not in diametrical contradiction, merely because they cannot be reconciled by the human understanding. God's foreknowledge and man's free-will, the unity of the Divine nature and the Trinity of persons, are instances of this description. Nor is it within the province of reason, when a point is clearly revealed, to reject it because we cannot account for it. That God gave his own eternal and co-equal Son, to take upon him our nature, and to die on our behalf, is a truth so plainly revealed in Scripture, that we ought either altogether to reject the record or to admit the doctrine. That we cannot fully account for all the circumstances of this mysterious transaction; that we cannot understand, except so far as is revealed, why such a sacrifice was necessary, or why it was permitted; is no more to be admitted as an argument against the doctrine itself, than that it should be admitted as proving the spuriousness of the first verse in the Bible, that we cannot understand all that is in volved in that stupendous act of creation by which God made the heavens and the earth. If our incapacity to solve the difficulties attending a doctrine is to be admitted

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as an argument against the doctrine itself, we have as much reason to disbelieve the existence of a God as of a Trinity in unity. If we will not believe any thing but what we fully understand, we may believe nothing; for every subject traced to its source involves mysteries. With regard to the alleged difficulties attending any Scripture doctrine, it may be that, for the full explication of those difficulties, there are preliminary points necessary to be known, which not only are not, but perhaps could not, be revealed to us, so as to become intelligible to our present understandings. Deity, for example, may have many attributes wholly unknown to us. It is absurd to suppose, that the information derived through our few and feeble senses, can be sufficient to comprehend an infinite and allperfect Being. Were a human being created with a sixth sense, his fellowcreatures would be utterly unable to understand the nature of this new inlet of knowledge. From analogy with our own senses we may conceive of similar senses in a state of a far greater development: we may understand, for example, the nature of hearing or smelling possessed in great perfection by some of the inferior animals; but a new sense cannot be described or realised. Thus, the blind philosopher could conceive of scarlet only as resembling the sound of a trumpet. The torpedo and electrical eel may possibly each have a sense wholly incapable of being known to us: certain at least it is, that no analogy with ordinary see. ing, hearing, smelling, tasting, or feeling, can account for the peculiar phenomena which the habits of these animals present to our observation. Migratory birds may possibly have a sense unknown to us: some of what are called the instincts of animals, may in reality be distinct senses. It is not necessary to the argument that such is the fact: it is enough for the purpose of the present argument, that it is possible.

And shall we then, on higher subjects, reject whatever we cannot explain? Forbid it, reason; forbid it, modesty; forbid it, common sense Intelligibility to our understanding is no more the test of truth than visibility to our eyes is the test of existence; and as the microscope has shewn us many objects of which we should never otherwise have formed any conception, why may not a Divine revelation exhibit new truths to our minds, and present to us mysteries which it would be as irrational to deny, because unintelligible to natural reason, as to doubt the existence of animalculæ, because invisible to our unassisted vision.

These observations may assist in determining what is clearly within, and what is as clearly without, the limits of human reason; but it must be allowed that there is in many cases much difficulty in settling the exact line of boundary. In one view of the subject, points are open to the jurisdiction of human reason, which, in another, appear within those sacred precincts where reason can only implicitly listen and adore.

Let us select, as an illustration, the fundamental doctrine of the atonement. It is made a frequent point of debate, whether this doctrine be consistent with the justice and supremacy of the Almighty. The Socinian maintains the negative; the orthodox believer, the affirmative. Now, strictly speaking, such a discussion ought to come under the head of unlawful limits; since it presupposes a degree of knowledge which we do not possess respecting the character of the Divine Being. It is not for a creature like man to decide peremptorily on what befits the infinite Governor of the universe. Our simple answer on such points must be, "It is written." Yet within certain limits such a discussion may be both allowable and useful; for we are not left wholly in the dark respecting the Divine nature; and we may therefore, perhaps, without presumption

proceed to investigate, with a view to edification, what information our general views respecting God afford in relation to some particular doctrine which is the subject of discussion. Yet it is evident, that we cannot proceed many steps, even in this laudable track, without approaching disputable or dangerous limits. According as we begin with one or another attribute of the Godhead, we may seem to arrive at opposite conclusions; and, as was before remarked, after all our reasoning, it is wholly out of our power to determine what befits the character of the Almighty, in such a manner as to be always a satisfactory test of the truth or falsity of doctrines.

And thus again with regard to drawing inferences from Scriptural positions: reason may doubtless claim to herself, generally, the privilege of so doing; yet, in practice, how soon do we get beyond the just limits of this faculty! Two persons, setting out with the same fundamental truth, may, after a few steps, arrive at the most opposite conclusions. We find different sects objecting to each other's doctrines certain inferences which the opposer maintains necessarily result from them, but which their advocates think clearly separable. Both parties perhaps may be honest; both may admit certain scriptural positions; yet still differ respecting the apparently necessary inferences which flow from their tenets.

And does not this prove, that, even where in theory reason is allowed to claim authority, she may in practice often find herself reduced to extremities, and discover it to be the only rational plan to believe implicitly what is infallibly revealed; and to be content to postpone some part of her privilege of deriving inferences till her powers shall be enlarged to the height of the great argument on which they are employed.

"Is such a doctrine reasonable?" is certainly a reasonable question;

but in answering it, it becomes us to beware that we are not betrayed into disputable and dangerous regions of speculation. We should often rather ask, "Is our reason perfect as respects the point under consideration? Can no error mix with our calculations or conclusions?" It is certainly reasonable to assert that two truths cannot really oppose each other; but are we sufficiently acquainted with all possibilities, to be able to decide universally, and in every case, what positions are or are not in a state of opposition? That God is infinitely merciful; that he has power to forgive every transgression; and yet that he will eternally punish the wicked, are represented by some persons as wholly incongruous positions: and hence, the last of them is peremptorily rejected; yet the objector cannot prove that a deeper insight into truth would not reconcile them. We should ever remember that our reason, like all our powers both of body and mind, is limited and fallible: nay more, that since the fall of man it is corrupted by the dominion of sin, and is, besides, under the influence of innumerable prejudices. Many of the objections which the impugners of Revelation, or of any of its mysteries, most strongly urge as unanswerable, are unanswerable only on their own principles, those principles themselves being false. It is therefore always dangerous to measure spiritual truths by preconceived opinions, even where those opinions are deliberately supposed to be correct; how much more so then, by those vague and unfounded maxims which often pass current in society without any shadow of rational foundation?

Having thus gone through the proposed discussion, it may be useful, in conclusion, to illustrate the legitimate jurisdiction of reason in matters of religion, by an allusion to some of the leading principles of revelation.

ought some difficulties which he might apprehend or imagine in such a doctrine to have induced him to reject, either the doctrine itself, or the system of which this article forms a part. The difficulties might be solvable; and certainly could not abate the force of direct testimony of other evidence which had been shewn to be conclusive.

Let us imagine the allegorical goddess of reason, seated beside king Agrippa, when St. Paul explained before that monarch the nature of his Divine commission; which he stated to be "to open the eyes of the people and of the Gentiles; and to turn them from darkness unto light, and from the power of Satan unto God, that they might receive forgiveness of sins, and an inheritance among them that are sanctified by faith in Christ." Reason would be justified in inquiring into the general evidences in favour of this system; and, in addition to this, in weighing each article of the alleged Divine commission in the balance of calm investigation. The following are the kind of questions which reason would naturally ask:-Were the nations of the world morally blinded? On what points did they require their eyes to be opened? From what, and to what, were they to be turned? What was the nature of this conversion? What are its objects and its end? What is meant by the forgiveness of sins? Were men sinners? Did they need for giveness? What is the nature of sanctification? Is there any necessity for it? What is the promised inheritance? What are the qualifications for it? What is faith in Christ? How does it promote sanctification? and a variety of similar questions, on all which reason would be entitled to make strict inquisition.

There is, however, one most reasonable restriction in such inquiries; namely, as has been already remarked, not to allow a supposed difficulty to shake our faith, so long as the general evidence is found conclusive; not to reject any individual part, while we see cause to believe the whole. Suppose that Agrippa had fully examined the claims of Christianity, and discovered the Apostle's commission to be well founded; it would not then have been reasonable to detach, for example, the doctrine of satanic agency, so strongly adverted to in this passage, from the rest of the revelation: nor

The first object, then, of Christianity, as stated in the commission given by its Divine Author to its chief Apostle, is "to open the eyes of the people and of the Gentiles." Christianity then supposes men by nature to be in a state of moral darkness. Reason asks, Is this true? Yes, it is true. The great body of mankind, and even the wisest philosophers, confessedly knew little or nothing respecting the nature of God or the end of man; their brightest light was but darkness visible; for though, by the use of reason, enlightened by primeval tradition, they might, from the works of creation, have derived some notions of a Supreme Being, sufficient to leave them without excuse in their atheism or polytheism, yet, in point of fact, they were in a state of gross ignorance, idolatry, and superstition. Now, the Gospel undertakes to open men's eyes: it unfolds many points of the greatest moment if found to be true: it speaks, for example, of mankind as fallen from their original purity; as guilty before God, on account of their transgressions; and as needing pardon and reconciliation, which it describes as secured by the obedience unto death of the incarnate Son of God.

But to understand these interesting points fully, it was requisite that the eyes of men should be opened on a variety of other subjects. It was important for them to be apprised of the being and attributes of God; his unity, and yet of the Trinity of persons in the Godhead, with each of whom it was necessary we should be made acquainted as agents in the work of our redemp

tion and salvation. The intention of human life; the actual condition of mankind; the introduction of sin; our duties; our chief good; the doctrine of our immortality; the future judgment and every other disclosure of revelation will appear upon examination to be of a useful, and indeed most momentous, nature. It is certainly within the limits of human reason humbly to make this examination: and the more full the investigation, if honestly conducted, the more convincingly will it appear that natural reason required this Divine illumination; and that the subjects disclosed, though often in finitely above the sphere of our unassisted researches, are in the strictest accordance with every truly rational principle in the human mind.

But Christianity is intended not only to enlighten the mind, but to convert the heart; to turn men "from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God." And what does right reason,-not reason controlled by human passions and the love of sin-but reason really in earnest in the search of sacred truth, conclude respecting this disclosure? Is there anything absurd or improbable in what the Gospel teaches on the subject of man's original defection from his Maker; his continued sinfulness; his guilt; his need of a spiritual change of heart; an education, so to speak, for that celestial world, respecting which the Gospel had opened his eyes?" Or, is the doctrine of "forgiveness of sins;" or of a future "inheritance;" or of that inheritance being reserved not for the careless or deliberate transgressor, but for "them that are sanctified;" or of "faith" being the instrument of putting us in possession of these blessings, attended with any circumstance that can shock right reason? Surely not; for, though connected with all these points are mysteries which no human intellect can develop, the doctrines themselves are not only revealed, but, when calmly ex

amined by the light of revelation, of which reason is bound to make full use in conducting her researches, they will be seen to be perfectly consistent with our most rational ideas of God, and correspondent to the actual condition and necessities of mankind. Even the interior secrets of religion,-such as the doctrine of the Holy Spirit's influences, the Christian's growth in grace, the communion of the human soul with God in prayer, the hopes, the trials, the supports of the believer; all can be proved to be rational and consistent, however far removed they may be from the ordinary subjects which employ the human intellect, and however inexplicable, except upon the principles of the sacred records, and under the Divine illumination of Him by whom those records were indited.

W.

Tothe Editorofthe Christian Observer,

IN connexion with the importance of speaking truth ourselves, and inculcating it on our children and others under our influence, must be viewed the difficulty of so doing, in a state of civilization, in which the language of false courtesy is too generally substituted for that of sincerity, and high colouring and glossing are deemed no deviation from the sacredness of truth. But the difficulties in the way of discharging this duty, do not diminish the importance of so doing; and it is not too much to say, that almost every other moral obligation finds its best support from this, and many are wholly dependent on it. How unceasing then, should be our efforts to maintain truth ourselves, and to impress its practical importance from the very earliest period on the minds of the young!

The Bible is the volume of truth; and God, the Author of the Bible, is Truth itself. All His attributes unite in forming the character of truth; and truth is embodied in the