to emerge from the darkness of the human understanding, or to rise above the prejudices of a corrupt heart.

Under these circumstances, a few pages of a religious miscellany may not be misemployed in an endeavour to exhibit the real office of reason in matters of religion "I gratefully receive and rejoice," said Locke," in the light of revelation which sets me at rest in many things, the manner whereof my poor reason can by no means make out to me. I readily believe what God has declared, though my reason find difficulties in it which it cannot master." This simple declaration of this eminent man, conveys the sentiment of every Christian heart; it is not only scriptural, but, whatever may be objected to it by the pride of human intellect, it is, when duly examined, consistent with right reason, and the boasted moral fitness of things.

With a view to embrace the principal topics of our inquiry, it is proposed first to shew, in opposition to one class of errors, that reason has a lawful jurisdiction in matters of revelation; and secondly, in reply to the opposite, to point out the just limits of that jurisdiction.

To prove so obvious a truth as that our rational faculties have a lawful jurisdiction in matters of revelation, would be a superfluous task, had not the proposition been frequently denied. Its impugners may be class ed under the following divisions :— 1. Certain Sceptics have sneeringly urged this objection, with a view to disparage revelation, by representing its disclosures, not only as above, which is a fact, but, which is not a fact, as contrary to the light of a rational philosophy. Thus Bayle blasphemously observes; "It seems to be a mark of God's sovereign pleasure, that we should not arrive at certainty in any thing, seeing he has given exceptions in his holy word to al most all the common notices of reason." The Deistical author of

"Christianity not founded on Argument," in like manner, says; "That person best enjoys faith who never asked himself one single question about it, and never dealt at all in the evidence of reason." Voltaire writes; "We believe by our faith, and not by our reason, which we take special care not to listen to; for when faith speaks, reason must be dumb." The same ironical argument is frequently heard in the present day. Certain modern physiologists, for example, in alluding to the doctrine of the existence of the human soul, and various fundamental topics of Divine revelation, represent all such subjects as mysteries to be implicitly credited, though unhappily opposed to every rational deduction of science and experiment. They are doctrines, forsooth, "too sublime for human reason!" They are to be treated as speculations, which we should necessarily have pronounced absurd and irrational, had not deference to Divine authority taught us to withhold the conclusion, though we had regularly arranged the premises. It is not necessary to remark on the obvious disingenuousness of this sort of argument. Let the sceptic contend that Christianity is irrational, and therefore untrue; we shall then know how to meet him with the weapons of reason; while we admit, with him, that whatever is really irrational is untrue, we shall have it in our power to disprove that Christianity is irrational : but let him not lay down, as the basis of his argument, an ironical hypothesis, on which no truth can by any possibility be grounded.

2. The Enthusiast is more sincere in his objection; and it is chiefly by means of his mistaken representations, that the sceptic is enabled to give plausibility to the objection which has just been mentioned. It is urged by various classes of mystics, and even in some other departments of the Christian church, that religion has no alliance with human reason; that every evange

lical doctrine and precept is contaminated, if made the subject of intellectual argumentation.

Faith

is stated to be a simple persuasion, wrought in the mind by the Holy Spirit, holding an empire, not only above, but wholly unconnected with, the exercise of the rational faculties. The subject of it believes, because it is impossible for him to disbelieve: he neither asks for, nor admits, any proof of the truth of his opinions: he feels them to be true; not however in that measured sense in which the intimate adaptation of the disclosures of revelation, to the actual condition of human nature, carries an evidence of its truth to every sincere believer, but in a mystical and unaccountable manner, in consequence of some undefined and undefinable impulse, which is to stand proxy for that diligent exercise of the understanding, which, with humble prayer for the guidance and instruction of the Holy Spirit, is, doubtless, one of the principal “means of grace” appointed for our advancement in religious truth.

3. The Papist, in excluding the exercise of reason in matters of religion, acts upon a principle different from that of either the Sceptic or the Mystic. He assumes that the church, though he cannot define what he means by that laxly employed term, is infallible; that her doctrines, be they as irra tional as they may, are indisputably true; and that, if reason is to be employed at all in judging of matters of religion, it is not for the purpose of inquiring what are the declarations of the revealed will of God, but what the church says they are; thus silencing every seeming difficulty by implicit faith in a supposed infallible interpreter. And what renders this incongruity the more glaring is, that even the interpreter does not profess to guide the mind by argument, but requires obedience as much to what cannot be proved, as to what can; to transubstantiation, for example, as much

as to the doctrine of a future state, or the existence of a God.

Now in all these cases, there is an assumption, grounded neither on reason nor on Scripture, that the rationative faculties of the human mind have no jurisdiction in matters of religion.

1. The supposition is not grounded on reason; for reason justly vindicates to itself the majesty of being an express gift of God, bestowed upon man for purposes of the highest moment; to be diligently used in the direction of his affairs, temporal and spiritual; and not to be despised or disparaged for any end, however specious, or apparently sacred. If we discard reason, revelation must fall with it; for not only the powers of the understanding employed in the investigation of Divine truth are an exertion of reason, but even the cultivation of the affections of the soul must proceed through the same channel, else our devotion to God, instead of being what the Scriptures denominate it, "a reasonable service," would be but a vain reverie of the imagination, unstamped by the impress of duty or of truth. Indeed, so plain is it that reason must have some jurisdiction in matters of revelation, that the very consideration of the question is itself an exercise of that jurisdiction. The enthusiast and the papist think they have reason in decrying reason their very arguments, however feeble or illogical, are an involuntary proof that they recognise the exercise of the understanding; so that they unconsciously pay homage, even where they deny that it is due: they reason, while they profess only to believe.

Through no medium but that of our reason can any proposition, whether theological or otherwise, find its way to the mind or heart of man. Even the rapt prophet, receiving his communications of heavenly wisdom unerringly from the Fountain of omniscient intelligence itself, makes use of the powers of his understanding. He ceases not

to be rational, because he is inspired; nay, he proves that his reason has acquired its most sublime elevation, when, whatever may be the dictates of his inclination, or the opinions of his fellow-morials, he silences all with that most reasonable of arguments, that highest of demonstrations," Thus saith the Lord." And doubtless, those celestial intelligences themselves, who drink immediately from the infinite Source of knowledge, are endowed with an attribute somewhat analogous to, though in excellence and operation far above, the human faculty of reason; a faculty which not only dis tinguishes us from the "brutes that perish," but is one of the features of our resemblance to the inhabitants of heaven itself. Revelation introduces Reason into a new world, and exhibits to her treasures of wisdom which she could never by herself have discovered; but she does not bind her in chains, or eject her from her dominions, so long as she is content to confine herself within her proper sphere of operation.

2. Nor is the hypothesis, that reason has no jurisdiction in matters of revelation, more tenable on the principles of Scripture,than of common sense. The whole Bible is an appeal to our rational faculties, as truly as to the affections of our hearts. How are we instructed, for example, to judge of human character in matters of religion? By mere impression? by dreams, or reveries, or unaccountable prepossessions? No;" By their fruits ye shall know them." Our Lord himself appeals to the test of impartial reason: "What! do ye not judge what is right?" His Apostles frequently make similar references. Thus St. Paul says," Prove all things ;" "I speak as unto wise men; judge ye what I say." And St. Peter expressly enjoins us to "be ready to give to every man a reason of the hope that is in us." Revelation shrinks not from the severest scrutiny: "The word of the

Lord is right;" it is reasonable, it will bear deliberate examination; it was no less established by argument than confirmed by miracles. St. Paul "reasoned in the synagogue, and persuaded the Jews and the Greeks." Jehovah, in his controversies, if we may reverently use such an expression, with his chosen people, referred the decision to their own judgment and conscience: "Come now," said he, " and let us reason together." And, so far from the exercise of the understanding being hostile to the simplicity of Scriptural belief, the Apostle expressly classes "unreasonable men" with "those that have not faith."

The Scriptures then plainly admit of, and even enjoin, the exercise of our reason in matters of religion. Yet it is equally certain, that they continually urge the necessity of implicit faith; that they represent the human mind as naturally incompetent to the knowledge of sacred subjects, and point out the absolute necessity of Divine instruction to make us "wise unto salvation." So emphatically indeed is this the case, that St. Paul did not scruple to declare, that the weapons of the Christian and ministerial warfare are "not carnal, but mighty through God, to the pulling down of strong holds; casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ." "The na tural man understandeth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are spiritually discerned." It is not merely with the understanding, but "with the heart," that "man believeth unto righteousness." St. Paul, speaking of "the deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish," states, as the cause of this delusive influence, not that they did not use their reason, though that was true, at least as to its highest exercise, but, that "they received not the love of the truth that they might be saved." The

Scriptures abound with similar sentiments. "Evil men," however acute their reason, "understand not judgment; but they that seek the Lord understand all things." Nor is this the consequence of mere inattention only; for the mind may be applied to the subject, and applied powerfully, and yet the result be unfavourable. "A scorner seeketh wisdom, and findeth it not." Here then is an apparent paradox, which it is of great practical importance to reconcile; in order, on the one side, that the self-sufficient philosophist may cease to arraign the mysterious disclosures of the Divine record, before the fallible bar of his own weak and incompetent reason; and, on the other, that the enthusiast may be warned against the opposite error of denying the legitimate jurisdiction of a faculty which was bestowed upon us for purposes of the highest moment. Let us endeavour to explicate this apparent difficulty.

We have arrived at the seemingly paradoxical conclusion, that both common sense and Scripture acknowledge the use of reason in matters of revelation; and yet that the right knowledge of revelation is not a mere result of the exercise of intellect, but is the offspring of faith and love, and is conveyed to the mind, and fixed upon the heart, by the operation of the Holy Spirit. In order to solve this paradox, it will be necessary to point out the just limits of that jurisdiction of reason which has been vindicated; in order to ascertain which, we may inquire, 1st. What particulars are clearly within these limits; 2d. What are clearly beyond them; 3d. What may be considered disputable or dangerous in approaching these limits.

1st. Our first head of inquiry is respecting those particulars which are clearly within the limits of reason, in judging of matters of revelation.

Reason is an invaluable directrix, so far as her jurisdiction

extends it is only by mistaking her province, or abusing her powers, that her authority can ever become mischievous. Indeed, so imperative is her claim to be heard, that we may lay it down as an axiom in theology, quite as much as in subjects of human science, that whatever is really contrary to right reason cannot possibly be true; it cannot have been derived from God, nor ought it to be imposed or admitted as an article of faith. The repeated cautions of Scripture on the subject, relate invariably to what is there called "carnal" reasoning; which is not the exercise of right reason, but of reason perverted by the original corruption of our nature, blinded by unholy appetites and evil conduct, and exerting itself, not in its legitimate sphere, but in a region where its proudest soarings are but presumptious impotence and vanity.

Some important theological points, however, are strictly within the proper limits of a justly disciplined reason; the chief of which is to examine whether a record professing to be a revelation from God, is in reality entitled to that distinction; and if so, what are its contents. Nay, it is not only within the lawful jurisdiction of reason, but it is a bounden and most sacred duty, to ask ourselves, Has the Creator revealed his will; and if he has, do I understand his revelation? Reason, as we shall further see in a future stage of the argument, has no prerogative to inquire what God can or cannot do; but she may legitimately ask, "What can it be proved that God actually has done?"

Now, in applying such an inquiry to the subject of the sacred Scriptures, Reason has a large field for her allowable operations. She may weigh various antecedent questions; such as whether a Divine revelation. is possible, and whether certain evidences are adequate proofs of its authenticity she may also pursue her way into an investigation of the history of the alleged reve

lation, its proofs, internal; external, and collateral: she may lay down, as Leslie does in his four memorable tests for detecting imposture,suitable criteria for assisting her inquiries,and may employ all the aids of learning and argument, and the deepest skill of natural and acquired dialectics, to prevent the admission of false conclusions. Having ascertained the validity of the record, she may proceed to analyze its declarations; to discriminate, combine, and arrange its scattered truths; to illustrate its statements; to unravel its difficulties, and, in short, to study and apply its sacred contents to the full measure of her humble powers. Every sermon or other religious composition, every meditation or conversation on sacred subjects, every comparison of spiritual things with spiritual, every argument, inference, or analogy, is an exemplification of the use of reason in matters of revelation. Reason cedes none of her rights by being applied to sacred subjects: she may ask for proofs of whatever she is urged to believe; and she has full authority to demand that the proofs be sufficient in their kind. But the nature of those proofs must depend upon the subject of investigation; and it is of the greatest importance to take care that, while reason is exerting her just right of inquiry, she does not forfeit her name and character, by asking for what it is unreasonable to demand. It is one of the most important offices within the limits of her jurisdiction, to determine when she ought to be satisfied; and if she exert this power duly, she will not apply the principles which relate to one subject to every other: if, for example, she can prove the truth of Christianity by testimony, as she undoubtedly can, she will not think herself slighted, because it cannot be proved by the science of mathematics. An argument may be perfectly conclusive in its kind, and adapted for its peculiar purpose, and yet be incapable of universal application. For instance, we know that

we exist, by mere intuition: we learn the obvious qualities of matter around us, from simple sensation; we ascertain a variety of physical and moral truths by argument and induction; we prove the properties of a triangle by mathematical demonstration; but there is not any one of these ways of arriving at truth, more strictly rational than that by which we believe that there existed such a place as Carthage, or as Bethlehem, or such a person as Scipio Africanus, or the Apostle Paul. While, therefore, right reason claims to herself a wide jurisdiction, she will be content to effect her purposes in every department of her empire, by proper means and instruments: she will not require the same species of proof, that the shadow went back on the dial-plate of Ahaz, as she demands to convince her that the descent of heavy bodies is in the duplicate ratio of the time, or that the motion of projectiles is in the curve of a parabola. She will not argue on a matter of pure revelation, precisely in the same way as on a subject of natural philosophy or mechanics. Nay, we may go further, and assert, that she will not even think it necessary to eradicate the kindlier affections of the heart, in order to hold her balance the more evenly. So far from it, she will consider it as perfectly reasonable, that, in the investigation of subjects of a moral and spiritual kind, such affections should be admitted into active exercise, in order to ar rive at a knowledge of the truth. She will not think herself outraged by such a declaration, as that "he who will do the will of God shall know of the doctrine;" she will admit, under all the peculiar circumstances of the case, that prayer and humility, and a desire to know and practise the commands of the Almighty, may very reasonably be a part of the process designed by Him for facilitating the acquisition of practical knowledge on sacred subjects. She will feel, that while she is bound to exercise her office of