I was yesterday;" "The material world has an existence independent of that of percipient beings;" "There are other intelligent beings in the universe beside myself;" "The future course of nature will resemble the past." Such truths no man but a philosopher ever thinks of stating to himself in words; but all our conduct and all our reasonings proceed on the supposition that they are admitted. The belief of them is essential for the preservation of our animal existence and it is accordingly coeval with the first operations of the intellect. One of the first writers who introduced the phrase common sense into the technical or appropriate language of logic, was Father Buffier, in a book entitled, "Traité des Premières Verités." It has since been adopted by several authors of note in this country; particularly by Dr. Reid, Dr. Oswald, and Dr. Beattie; by all of whom, however, I am afraid, it must be confessed, it has been occasionally employed without a due attention to precision. The last of these writers uses it* to denote that power by which the mind perceives the truth of any intuitive proposition; whether it be an axiom of abstract science; or a statement of some fact resting on the immediate information of consciousness of perception, or of memory; or one of those fundamental laws of belief which are implied in the application of our faculties to the ordinary business of life. The same extensive use of the word may, I believe, be found in the other authors just mentioned. But no authority can justify such a laxity in the employment of language in philosophical discussions; for, if mathematical axioms be (as they are manifestly and indisputably) a class of propositions essentially distinct from the other kinds of intuitive truths now described, why refer them all indiscriminately to the same principle in our constitution? If this phrase, therefore, be at all retained, precision requires, that it should be employed in a more limited acceptation; and accordingly, in the works under our consideration, it is appropriated most frequently, though by no means uniformly, to that class of intuitive truths which I have already called "fundamental laws of belief."+ When thus restricted, it con * Essay on Truth, second edition, p. 40, et seq.; also p. 166, et seq. †This seems to be nearly the meaning annexed to the phrase, by the learned and acute author of "The Philosophy of Rhetoric," vol. i. p. 109, et seq. veys a notion, unambiguous at least, and definite; and, consequently, the question about its propriety or impropriety turns entirely on the coincidence of this definition with the meaning of the word as employed in ordinary discourse. Whatever objections, therefore, may be stated to the expression as now defined, will apply to it with additional force, when used with the latitude which has been already censured. I have said, that the question about the propriety of the phrase common sense as employed by philosophers, must be decided by an appeal to general practice: for, although it be allowable and even necessary for a philosopher to limit the acceptation of words which are employed vaguely in common discourse, it is always dangerous to give to a word a scientific meaning essentially distinct from that in which it is usually understood. It has, at least, the effect of misleading those who do not enter deeply into the subject; and of giving a paradoxical appearance to doctrines, which, if expressed in more unexceptionable terms, would be readily admitted. It appears to me, that this has actually happened in the present instance. The phrase common sense, as it is generally understood, is nearly synonymous with mother-wit; denoting that degree of sagacity (depending partly on original capacity, and partly on personal experience and observation,) which qualifies an individual for those simple and essential occupations which all men are called on to exercise habitually by their common nature. In this acceptation, it is opposed to those mental acquirements which are derived from a regular education, and from the study of books; and refers, not to the speculative convictions of the understanding, but to that prudence and discretion which are the foundation of successful conduct. Such is the idea which Pope annexes to the word, when, speaking of good sense, (which means only a more than ordinary share of common sense,) he calls it "the gift of Heaven, And though no science, fairly worth the seven." To speak, accordingly, of appealing from the conclusions of philosophy to common sense, had the appearance, to title-page readers, of appealing from the verdict of the learned to the voice of the multitude; or of attempting to silence free discussion, by a reference to some arbitrary and undefinable standard, distinct from any of the intellectual powers hitherto enumerated by logicians. Whatever countenance may be supposed to have been given by some writers to such an interpretation of this doctrine, I may venture to assert that none is afforded by the works of Dr. Reid. The standard to which he appeals, is neither the creed of a particular sect, nor the inward light of enthusiastic presumption; but that constitution of human nature without which all the business of the world would immediately cease ;and the substance of his argument amounts merely to this, that those essential laws of belief to which sceptics have objected, when considered in connexion with our scientific reasonings, are implied in every step we take as active beings; and if called in question by any man in his practical concerns, would expose him universally to the charge of insanity. In stating this important doctrine, it were perhaps to be wished, that the subject had been treated with somewhat more of analytical accuracy; and it is certainly to be regretted, that a phrase should have been employed, so well calculated by its ambiguity to furnish a convenient handle to misrepresentations: but in the judgment of those who have perused Dr. Reid's writings with an intelligent and candid attention, these misrepresentations must recoil on their authors; while they who are really interested in the progress of useful science, will be disposed rather to lend their aid in supplying what is defective in his views, than to reject hastily a doctrine which aims, by the development of some logical principles, overlooked in the absurd systems which have been borrowed from the schools, to vindicate the authority of truths intimately and extensively connected with human happi ness. In the prosecution of my own speculations on the human mind, I shall have occasion to explain myself fully concerning this as well as various other questions connected with the foundations of philosophical evidence. The new doctrines, and new phraseology on that subject, which have lately become fashionable among some metaphysicians in Germany, and which, in my opinion, have contributed not a little to involve it in additional obscurity, are a sufficient proof that this essential and fundamental article of logic is not as yet completely exhausted. In order to bring the foregoing remarks within some compass, I have found it necessary to confine myself to such objections as strike at the root of Dr. Reid's philosophy, without touching on any of his opinions on particular topics, however important. I have been obliged also to compress what I have stated within narrower limits than were, perhaps, consistent with complete perspicuity; and to reject many illustrations which crowded upon me at almost every step of my progress. It may not, perhaps, be superfluous to add, that, supposing some of these objections to possess more force than I have ascribed to them in my reply, it will not therefore follow, that little advantage is to be derived from a careful perusal of the speculations against which they are directed. Even they who dissent the most widely from Dr. Reid's conclusions, can scarcely fail to admit that, as a writer, he exhibits a striking contrast to the most successful of his predecessors, in a logical precision and simplicity of language; his statement of facts being neither vitiated by physiological hypothesis, nor obscured by scholastic mystery. Whoever has reflected on the infinite importance, in such inquiries, of a skilful use of words as the essential instrument of thought, must be aware of the influence which his works are likely to have on the future progress of science, were they to produce no other effect than a general imitation of his mode of reasoning, and of his guarded phraseology. It is not indeed every reader to whom these inquiries are accessible; for habits of attention in general, and still more habits of attention to the phenomena of thought, require early and careful cultivation but those who are capable of the exertion, will soon recognise, in Dr. Reid's statements, the faithful history of their own minds, and will find their labours amply rewarded by that satisfaction which always accompanies the discovery of useful truth. They may expect, also, to be rewarded by some intellectual acquisitions not altogether useless in their other studies. An author well qualified to judge, from his own experience, of whatever conduces to invigorate or to embellish the understanding, has beautifully remarked, that, "by turning the soul inward on itself, its forces are concentred, and are fitted for stronger and bolder flights of science; and that, in such pursuits, whether we take, or whether we lose the game, the chase is certainly of service."* In this respect, the philosophy of the mind (abstracting entirely from that pre-eminence which belongs to it in consequence of its practical applications) may claim a distinguished rank among those preparatory disciplines which another writer of no less eminence has happily compared to "the crops which are raised, not for the sake of the harvest, but to be ploughed in as a dressing to the land."† SECTION III. CONCLUSION OF THE NARRATIVE. 66 THE three works to which the foregoing remarks refer, together with the "Essay on Quantity," published in the " Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London," and a short but masterly" Analysis of Aristotle's Logic," which forms an appendix to the third volume of Lord Kames's "Sketches," comprehend the whole of Dr. Reid's publications. The interval between the dates of the first and last of these amounts to no less than forty years, although he had attained to the age of thirty-eight before he ventured to appear as an author. With the "Essays on the Active Powers of Man" he closed his literary career; but he continued, notwithstanding, to prosecute his studies with unabated ardour and activity. The more modern improvements in chemistry attracted his particular notice; and he applied himself, with his wonted diligence and success, to the study of its new doctrines and new nomenclature. He amused himself, also, at times, in preparing for a philosophical society, of which he was a member, short essays on particular topics, which happened to interest his curiosity, and on which he thought he might derive useful hints from friendly discussion. The most important of these were, "An Examination of Priestley's Opinions concerning Matter and Mind;" "Observations on the Utopia of Sir Thomas More ;" and "Physiological Reflections on Muscular Motion." This last essay appears to have been written in the eighty-sixth year of his age, and was * Preface to Mr. Burke's "Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful.” |