would be nothing but a perception of sense. Then more qualities would be abstracted from the fubftance, more circumstances from the action; and the idea would then confift of the substance, and its principal qualities, thofe, at least, which attracted the attention of the obferver moft; and of the action and its principal circumftances. The idea of a bear, for example, would be taken off only with the qualities of fize, ftrength, or fiercenefs; and the idea of the action of beating, with the circumftances of violent, or gentle, with or without effufion of blood. The next step, in this progrefs of the mind, is to diveft the fubftance altogether of its qualities, the action of its circumftances; and fo form a separate idea of each. And thus far the Hurons have gone. For they have generalized many fubftances by themfelves; and they have begun to generalize actions in the fame manner. The next idea would be farther removed from the individual, and more the operation of the intellect: For it would reprefent fomething that does not exift in nature, but is intirely the creature of the mind; I mean the idea of a genus, fuch as that of animal or vegetable. And here too the Huron has begun to

make fome progrefs: For tho' he have not come so far as the ideas I have mentioned, yet he has formed the notion of a quadruped of the foreft and of a tame quadruped. And here ends the progress of the Huron; fo that the further progrefs of the mind we must trace in other languages more perfect. And from these we discover, that the next step of abstraction and generalization is the idea of qualities ftill inherent in some substance, but not in any particular or definite fpecies of fubftance, but in fubftance in general. And this idea is expreffed by a part of speech well known by the name of adjective, but which is not to be found in the Huron, nor in any other barbarous language, that I know. The next step we can also trace by the means of language, and it was to form an idea of the quality abstracted from every fubftance, definite or indefinite. This idea is expreffed by what the grammarians call an abstract noun, denoting the quality in abstracto, not in concreto, as it is denoted by the adjective. Of this kind are the nouns goodness, juftice, bravery and the like. And that fuch was the next flep, in order of time, is evident from this, that, in our language, in Greek, and

Latin, and, I believe, every language, the nouns of this kind are all derived from the correfponding adjectives; whereas, if the order of things had been followed, and not the progrefs of our minds, the etymology would have been juft the reverfe: For the abftracted quality is undoubtedly prior, in the order of nature, to the quality joined with any subftance. And, accordingly, by philofophical etymology, as I fhall fhew in another part of my work, juft is to be confidered as derived from justice, not justice from just.

The next step, I imagine, would naturally be, to form separate ideas of the several circumftances of the time, place, and manner of action of the perfons acting-whether the first, second, or third perfon-the difpofitions of the mind of the fpeaker with respect to the action-and, laftly, whether the action was suffered, or done. By fuch abstractions and generalizations, were produced adverbs, conjugations of verbs, tenfes, moods, and voices.

The laft part of this progrefs, that appears from the ftructure of language, is the formation of ideas of the connections and dependencies of things upon one ano

ther, and their relation to one another in refpect of time, place, fituation, cause and effect, and the like. From these ideas arife the declenfion and cafes of nouns, and thofe parts of speech we call prepofitions and conjunctions. It is by fuch words that the fyntax of language is chiefly formed; and as fyntax is the last thing perfected in language, it from thence appears, that those abstract ideas of relations are among the last formed by the human mind.

The progrefs, by these fteps, I am perfuaded, has been very flow; for which it is not difficult to account, from the explanation I have given, in the beginning of this work, of the nature of abstraction. For, being immerfed, as we have fhewn, in matter and sense, at our firft entrance into this life, and perceiving only by the intervention of bodily organs; when we come to think in this new way, and which may be called unnatural, as it feparates what is in nature united, it is no wonder that we go on flowly, and with difficulty, abstracting very little at firft, then more; and still going on from abftraction to abstraction, till at last we arrive at the ideas of highest abftraction, which are of all others

the fimpleft, and in the order of nature first, but laft in the order of our conceptions. Nor is it to be wondered that a very small part of mankind are able to afcend fo high, when we confider how far those univerfals are removed from our original perceptions.

Thus it appears, that, from the study of language, if it be properly conducted, the history of the human mind is best learned, especially in the first steps of its progress, of which it is impoffible there can be any other record than what is preferved in language.

CHA P. XI.

Several Questions concerning the first Languages. What Words of them were first invented, or what Names of Things.Whether they have any Radical Words.Whether there be only one primitive Language.

I

T may be afked concerning those primitive languages, What words in them were first invented? My answer is, That