8 a.m. 8.30 a.m. 9.15 a.m. In this manner the Boers were successfully kept a distance of 500 yards, and repulsed in all their efforts to reach the rear and flank of the main body. In passing through the various mines and the village of Randfontein we met with hearty expressions of goodwill from the mining population, who professed a desire to help if only they had arms. Ten miles from the start I received intelligence from Colonel Grey, at the head of the column, that Doornkop, a hill near the Speitfontein mine, was held by 400 Boers, directly barring our line of advance. I repaired immediately to the front, Colonel White remaining with the rear-guard On arriving at the head of the column, I found the guns shelling a ridge which our guide stated was Doornkop. The excellent dispositions for the attack made by Colonel Grey were then carried out. The B.B.P., under Major Coventry, who I regret to say was severely wounded and lost several of his men, attacked and cleared the ridge in most gallant style and pushed on beyond it. About this time Inspector Barry received the wound which we have learnt with grief has subsequently proved fatal. Chief-Inspector Bodle at the same time, with two troops M.M.P., charged, and drove off the field a large force of Boers threatening our left flank. The guide had informed us that the road to the right of the hill was impassable, and that there was open and easy country to the left. This information was misleading. I afterwards ascertained that without storming the Boer position there was no road open to Johannesburg except by a wide detour of many miles to the right. At this moment Dr. Jameson received a letter from the High Commissioner again ordering us to desist in our advance. Dr. Jameson informed me at the same time of the most disheartening news, viz., that he had received a message stating that Johannesburg would not or could not come to our assistance, and that we must fight our way through unaided. Thinking that the first ridge now in our hands was Doornkop, we again pushed rapidly on, only to find that in rear of the ridge another steep and stony kopje, some 400 feet in height, was held by hundreds of Boers completely covered from our fire. This kopje effectually flanked the road over which the column must advance at a distance of 400 yards. Scouting showed that there was no way of getting round this hill. Surrounded on all sides by the Boers, men and horses wearied out, outnumbered by at least six to one, our friends having failed to keep their promises to meet us, and my force reduced numerically by onefourth, I no longer considered that I was justified in sacrificing any more of the lives of the men under me. Wonderfully considerate! seeing how they deliberately risked the lives of thousands in Johannesburg when they started. As previously explained, our object in coming had been to render assistance, without bloodshed if possible, to the inhabitants of Johannesburg. This object would in no way be furthered by a hopeless attempt to cut our way through overwhelming numbers, an attempt, moreover which must without any doubt have entailed heavy and useless slaughter. With Dr. Jameson's permission, I therefore sent word to the Commandant that we would surrender provided that he would give a guarantee of safe conduct out of the country to every member of the force. To this Commandant Cronjé replied by a guarantee of the lives of all, provided that we would lay down our arms and pay all expenses. In spite of this guarantee of the lives of all, Commandant Malan subsequently repudiated the guarantee in so far as to say that he would not answer for the lives of the leaders, but this was not until our arms had been given up and the force at the mercy of the Boers. I attribute our failure to reach Johannesburg in a great measure to loss of time from the following causes : (1) The delay occasioned by the demonstration in front of Krugersdorp, which had been assigned as the place of junction with the Johannesburg force. (2) The non-arrival of that force at Krugersdorp or of the guides to the Krugersdorp-Johannesburg section of the road, as previously promised by Johannesburg. (3) The delay consequent on moving to the firing of the supposed Johannesburg column just before dark on Wednesday evening. How is it that nothing was said of this to Celliers and Rowland; nothing in the letter of Colonel White and Dr. Jameson which they wrote at 11 a.m. Wednesday; nothing in the message sent by Bugler Vallé, who was despatched on Thursday before daybreak after the Krugersdorp fight? How is it that if the forces were to meet at Krugersdorp Dr. Jameson telegraphed to Dr. Wolff to meet him en route, so as to decide whether to turn off 20 miles before reaching Krugersdorp and march direct on Pretoria or go into Johannesburg first? This distance (154 I append (1) a sketch-map of the route from Pitsani to Krugersdorp, marked A. miles) was covered in just under 70 hours, the horses having been off-saddled ten times. The 169 miles between Pitsani and Doornkop occupied 86 hours, during 17 of which the men were engaged with the Boers, and were practically without food or water, having had their last meal at 8 a.m. on the morning of the 1st January at Van Oudtshoorn's, 17 miles from Krugersdorp. The average weight carried by each horse was 16 stone. (2) List of officers engaged in the expedition and composition of the force marked B. From this it will be seen that there was a total of 494 men and officers (exclusive of staff). (3) Plans of engagements at Krugersdorp and Doornkop, and of the bivouac on the night of January 1st. I cannot close this narrative without testifying to the very great gallantry and endurance of all officers, non-commissioned officers, and troopers under my command in the field and on the march under most trying circumstances. COMPOSITION OF FORCE. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir John Willoughby, Royal ... ... ... Major Hon. Robert White, Royal Welsh ... Major C. Hyde Villiers, Royal Horse Guards... Surgeon Captain Farmer, B.S.A. Co. ... ... Commanding. Senior Staff Officer. Artillery Staff Officer. master. Surgeon Captain Seaton Hamilton, late 1st Life Medical Officers. Guards ... Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. H. F. White, Grenadier ... Inspector Bodle (late 6th Dragoons) Commanding. Sub-Inspectors Tomlinson and Chawner, B Troop. Sub-Inspectors Murray and Constable, D Troop. Artillery Troop-Inspector Bowden and Sub-Inspector Spain. BECHUANALAND BORDER POLICE. Lieutenant-Colonel Raleigh Grey, 6th Dragoons Commanding. Captain Gosling, commanding G Troop. 2nd in command. Sub-Lieutenants Hoare and Wood, commanding G Troop. Captain Munroe, commanding K Troop. Sub-Lieutenant McQueen, commanding K Troop. Veterinary Surgeon Lakie. M.M. Police officers and men Pitsani camp. ... One 124-pounder, 6 Maxims, 6 Scotch carts, 1 Cape cart, 2 grain 372 13 65 480 128 Mafeking column. Two 7-pounders 2 Maxims, 2 Scotch carts, 2 Cape carts. M.H. Maxims 8 1283 The rifle ammunition used was that supplied by the Maxim firm for their guns and also pellet powder. The powder used with the 124-pounder was that known as 'ballistite.' Rocket signals and limelights were carried, but not used. Off-side wallet, 20 rounds, tin dubbin, hold-all, and towel. Average weight carried by horse = 16 stone. APPENDIX I. MANIFESTO. IF I am deeply sensible of the honour conferred upon me by being elected chairman of the National Union, I am profoundly impressed with the responsibilities attached to the position. The issues to be faced in this country are so momentous in character that it has been decided that prior to the holding of a public meeting a review of the condition of affairs should be placed in your hands, in order that you may consider matters quietly in your homes. It has also been decided that it will be wise to postpone the meeting which was to have taken place on the 27th December until the 6th day of January next. On that day you will have made up your minds on the various points submitted to you, and we will ask you for direction as to our future course of action. It is almost unnecessary to recount all the steps which have been taken by the National Union, and I shall therefore confine myself to a very short review of what has been done. THE THREE PLANKS. The constitution of the National Union is very simple. The three objects which we set before ourselves are: (1) The maintenance of the independence of the Republic, (2) the securing of equal rights, and (3) the redress of grievances. This brief but comprehensive programme has never been lost sight of, and I think we may challenge contradiction fearlessly when we assert that we have constitutionally, respectfully, and steadily prosecuted our purpose. Last year you will remember a respectful petition, praying for the franchise, signed by 13,000 men, was received with contemptuous laughter and jeers in the Volksraad. This year the Union, apart from smaller matters, endeavoured to do three things. THE RAAD ELECTIONS. First we were told that a Progressive spirit was abroad, that twelve out of twenty-four members of the First Volksraad had to be elected, and we might reasonably hope for reform by the type of broad-minded men who would be elected. It was therefore resolved that we should do everything in our power to assist in the election of the best men who were put up by the constituencies, and everything that the law permitted us to do in this direction was done. |